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Abstract 
In the 1970s Australia, like a number of comparable countries, reorganised the 
provision of legal aid. Within a few years, however, new 'problems' had emerged in 
'access to justice'. In 1993, the Federal Government responded by charging a 
committee to identify 'solutions', some of whi£h were adopted in mid-199 5. Yet, the 
'problems' of 'access to justice', and access to law, remain. 
This thesis considers whether these problems are capable of resolution. It begins by 
posing a general question: is fair and effective access to law a feasible expectation of 
citizens or governments in the Australian welfare state? In addressing this question, 
the thesis takes a 1990 official report into the problems facing legal aid in Australia 
as its starting point. This report left a legacy of unanswered questions. In retrospect, 
moreover, its questions highlighted the ongoing social significance of the problems 
in access to law for governments, business and citizens in post-war Australian 
society. 
The opening contention is that revisiting the origins and significance of the post-war 
experience of legal aid holds the key to determining the feasibility of achieving fair 
and effective access to law. The thesis nominates two major justifications in support 
of this contention. First, it asserts that revisiting the post-war experience will 
improve our understanding of 'why' Australia acted to enhance access to legal aid in 
the 1970s. Secondly, the thesis asserts that improving our understanding of the legal 
aid response will improve our capacity to understand the 'access to justice' response, 
and thereby the feasibility of any future reforms towards fair and effective access to 
law. 
Part I begins by explaining the history behind the national legal aid scheme, the 
reasons why it emerged in 1973-76 and its ideological context in modem Australian 
society. In doing so, it answers some of the unanswered questions of the 1990 
report. However, Part II also demonstrates the limitations of institutional and 
ideological history in explaining the post-war experience, concluding that 'missing' 
parts of the story remain to be told. Thus, Part II begins by revisiting - in a cross-
national context - the existing ideas which explain the post-war experience. It 
develops an alternative theory of the origins and significance of modem legal aid, 
which it proceeds to apply in revisiting - in the context of the Western world - the 
origins and significance of its post-war development. 
Part III proceeds to demonstrate 'why' and 'how' the lessons of revisiting the post-
war experience enable us to better assess the feasibility of achieving fair and 
effective access to law. It begins by applying the insights, 'benchmarks' and 
analytical methodology of Part II to reconsider the origins of the new 'problems' in 
'access to justice', the jettisoning of the legal aid response and the significance of the 
1993 'access to justice' response. Part III concludes by briefly considering the 
implications of the thesis for the feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to 
law in the contemporary Australian welfare state. 
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Chapte~lOne 
Introduction 
1 
In 1976, Australian governments agreed in principle to combine to establish a joint 
Commonwealth-State national legal aid scheme. This agreement had been prece.ded 
by the changes to legal aid policy announced by the Whitlam Federal Government in 
mid-1973, which reversed the 'hands-off approach of the Commonwealth towards 
participation in national and comprehensive provision of legal aid for its citizens. 1 
This approach had been followed by successive national governments since 1950. 
The Whitlam Government acted quickly to translate its new legal aid policies into 
administrative reality. In 1974-75, it rejuvenated the scheme administered by the 
Legal Service Bureaux, thereby transforming it into a comprehensive national legal 
aid scheme providing legal representation and advice in matters of Federal law~ and 
in Commonwealth proceedings. The Whitlam Government also acted to give 
Federal grants to supplement the funding available to the State and Territory public 
and law society schemes. Its interventions were intended as interim measures whilst 
it overcame the political, constitutional and financial obstacles which blocked the 
establishment of a national Commonwealth statutory legal aid scheme. 
This scheme was not to be. On 13 December 1975, a national Liberal/National 
Country Party coalition government led by the Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser was elected. 
The new, conservative Federal government had different ideas about Commonwealth 
participation in national legal aid and very quickly translated those ideas into the 
revised policies which stimulated an 'in-principle' Commonwealth-State agreement 
in 1976 to establish a joint national scheme. By 1979, the essential premises of this 
agreement had been converted into the machinery of a national scheme of legal aid. 
Australia had finally joined Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United States and other welfare capitalist 
countries which had restructured arrangements for legal aid in the post-war period.2 
The Whitlarn Government· the first Australian Labor Party national government since 1949 ·had been 
elected in late 1972. 
The first of the post-war schemes was established in,the United Kingdom in 1949. The Netherlands were 
next in 1957. followed by the United States in the mid-1960s. By the early 1970s. Austria. Canada. 
Denmark. Finland, France. Norway, Sweden and other welfare capitalist countries had restructured 
national arrangements for legal aid. Generally see F H Zemans (ed), Perspecti~·es on Legal Aid: An 
/11rernatio11al Survey, (1979); E Blankenburg & J Cooper, "A Survey of Literature on Legal Aid in 
Europe" (1982) 2 Windsor Yearbook on Access to Justice 263 at 276-277; R L Abel, "Law Without 
Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism" (1985) 32 UCLA Law Review 414 at 475; M Cappelletti 
& B Garth (eds.), Access to Justice, Vol I Bk I (1978) at x-xi. Reforms to the provision of legal aid also 
occurred in other Western and Westernised countries in the post-war period. For instance, Gc:rmany, 
India. Israel and South Africa: HR Lieberman, "Israel's Legal Aid Law: Remedy for Injustice?" (1974) 3 
Israel Law Review 413 at 417-423; N Abramowitz. "Legal Aid in South Africa" (1960) 77 Tire South 
African Law Journal 351; D L Carey Miller, "Some Aspects of Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings" 
(1972) 89 South Africa/I law Journal 11 at 77-80; G 0 Koppell. ''Legal Aid in India", (1966) 8 Journal 
of tlte Indian law fllstit11re 224; Blankenburg & Cooper. above at 276. The Western experience also 
inspired developments in some Developing World Countries: Comminec: on Legal Services to the Poor in 
2 
The national scheme was the first organised response of post-war Australian 
governments to improve popular access to the legal system. High hopes were held 
for its success, none the more so than by Senator L K Murphy, QC, Attomey-
General in the first Whitlam Government and the person responsible for the initial 
changes in Commonwealth legal aid policy. In mid-1973, Senator Murphy told the 
Commonwealth Senate that he foresaw that the changes would make legal aid 
"readily and equally available to citizens everywhere in Australia".3 Many of his 
ministerial contemporaries, others interested in sodo-legal reform an~ lawyers 
shared his vision. Later, they were joined by the administrators and lawyers newly 
employed in the State legal aid commissions, and a significant few in the community 
legal centres. 
However, notwithstanding the hopes of it5 major supporters, the national scheme was 
'to quickly demonstrate its shortcomings. Neither its funding nor design allowed it to 
fulfil the aspiration of providing every Australian citizen with equal access to a 
comprehensive range of lawyer services.4 From its inception, the scheme operated to 
provide a narrow range of lawyer services to poorer people, subject to restrictive 
eligibility criteria. Therefore, it was institutionally disqualified from satisfying the 
expectations of those who hoped that it would - through universal and equal access to 
legal aid - introduce a new era of popular access to law in Australian society. The 
national scheme was also destined to fail on a second front. As it became fully 
operational in the early 1980s, the operations of the scheme were unable to stem a 
rising tide of new 'problems' in popular access to law. Within a few years, there was 
a new consciousness in Australian society of the cost of legal transactions, and the 
socio-economic significance of adequate access to legal services.5 Moreover, there 
was a growing public perception that it was no longer just the 'poor' who were 
disadvantaged by inadequate access to the legal system.6 In 1989, the Australian 
6 
the Developing Countries. legal Aid and World Poverty: A Srm•ey of Asia. Africa and Latin America. 
( 197-l). The tenn "welfare capitalism" is discussed and defined at n 35 below. 
Ministerial Statement.. Senator the Hon L K Murphy, 13 December 1973, Sen Deb 1973 Vol 58 at 2800. 
'"Lawyer services·· are "a subset of 'legal services'" comprising that ''part of the market for legal services 
... provided solely by" practising barristers and solici,ors: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, (February 1992) at 11. The meaning of "legal services" applied in the thesis is 
defined at n 5 below. 
"Legal services" connotes the full range of functions generated by the legal system. Its meaning includes 
"lawyer services" (n 4 above) and "lawyer functions" (n 28 below), together with the services and 
functions the state and its agencies provide through the legal system; for instance, the administrative 
machinery. legislation, the courts - and ultimately the system of centralised legal regulation itself. This 
conception is wider and more inclusive than the conventional definition of "legal services" as 
synonymous with lawyer services: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Legal Services Industry, 1987-88, 
Catalogue No. 8667.0 at 9; Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to Justice: an Action Plan, 
(1994 ), Part III at 65-221. 
The poor citizens of the welfare states are generally closely associated with legal aid - both as targets or 
objects of policy, and as beneficiaries of legal aid schemes. However, the concept of the ·poor' as a legal, 
social or economic point of reference in modem Australian society - and comparable countries • has 
manifest limitations. For instance, Anglo-Australian law has never developed a uniform or 
comprehensive definition of the 'poor', or poverty. Moreover, the idea that the 'poor' exist as a 
potentially identifiable group only serves to obscure the real social, economic and political dimensions of 
modem poverty in the welfare state: R Cranston, Legal Foundations of the We(fare State, (1985) at 5-7. 
3 
Council of Social Services Inc (A COSS) expressed its concern that "greater numbers 
of average income Australians are also becoming disadvantaged in terms of their 
ability to pay their own way to obtain access".7 ACOSS's voice was amongst many 
protestants, and they were not limited to the social welfare sector. For instance, in 
1990, in reviewing legal developments in the 1980s, the editor of the Australian Law 
Journal - an influential and well-respected conservative legal ·academic - lamented 
that "the fruits of justice continue to be denied to the majority of the Australian 
people".8 
These new 'problems' in popular access to law also found a national political voice.9 
In May 1989, the Commonwealth Senate voted to refer the question of the cost of 
legal services and litigation and the availability of legal aid to its Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. 10 In 1990 and 1991, this committee 
conducted its inquiry, seeking submissions and holding public hearings. 11 In 1992, 
the Standing Committee completed its deliberations, and, in 1993, published two 
reports identifying what its members believed were practicable reforms to reduce the 
cost of legal transactions, and to improve citizens' access to legal services. 12 
However, the political significance of these new 'problems' in popular access to the 
legal system had already attracted the interest of mainstream politicians. The 
Keating Federal Labor government decided to initiate its own official inquiry. In 
May 1993, its Attorney-General, The Hon Michael Lavarch MP, established an 
extra-parliamentary body known as the Access to Justice Advisory Committee 
(AJAC) to-recommend reforms to legal services to "enhance access to justice and to 
render the system fairer, more efficient and more effective. " 13 The AJAC was 
directed to consider evidence already collected by various inquiries - convened since 
the early 1980s - into the operation of the national legal system, and to adapt their 
1 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
Furthermore. poverty alone docs not indicate that a person is deprived of adequate access to lawyer 
services: M Cass & JS Western, Legal Aid and Legal Xeed. (1980) at 13-14; P Hanks, Social Indicators 
and the De/i\'ery• of legal Services, (1987) at 53. The idea of an existent 'poor' is also allied with liberal 
legalist explanations of modem legal aid (pp 142-154 below). Consequently, it is both a value laden 
tenn. and has limited value in portraying the reality of the needs of poorer people in the modem market 
for legal services. Accordingly, the tenninology of the 'poor' is used sparingly. Where possible, 
alternative words or phrases · like "poorer people", "poorer and disadvantaged people" lllld "poorer and 
disadvantaged citizens" - is used to describe people living in conditions of relative poveny: R Cranston, 
above at 5. If the ter.n is used specifically in a liberal legalism context - which 'naturally' associates 
poorer people with !~gal aid - it is referred to thus as 'the poor.' 
National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, Legal Aid/or tlie Australian Community, (1990) at 182. 
JG Starke, •'Current Topics" ( 1990) 64 Australian Law Journal 153. 
Access to Justice Advisory Committee, above n S at paras 1.2-1.4; Senate Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, The Cost of Justice: Foundations for Reform, (1993) at paras 16 & 43. 
Ibid at para I. The reference was known as the 'Cost of Justice' inquiry. 
It also published discussion and background papers on the role of market forces in access to lawyer 
services, legal aid, recent reforms to the legal profession in England, contingency fees, lawyers' fees. 
lawyers' ethics. methods of dispute resolution and the courts and the conduct of litigation. 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 9; Senate Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, The Cost of Justice: Second Report: Checks and lmbala11ces, ( 1993 ). 
Access to Justice Ad\'isory Committee, above n 5 at v. 
4 
recommendations to conform to the dictates of the new Federal economic reform 
agenda!4 Its report was presented to the Prime Minister on 2 May 1994, and he 
responded twelve months later by publishing an 'Action Statement'." This statement 
officially endorsed a "comprehensive national strategy for addressing problems with 
access to justice across the entire legal system".'6 This new Federal strategy was 
comprised of various socio-legal reformist policies "geared towards resolving · 
conflkts before they become legal problems, reforming key legal institutions and 
strengthening access and equity across the legal system".17 However, less than a year 
later, in Mai:ch 1996, the Keating Government was defeated at the polls, ending 
thirteen years of Labor Party national administration. It had not been able to fully 
implement its new strategy, the 'access to justice' policies of the incoming 
conservative administration were unclear, and the problems in popular access to the 
legal system in the post-war Australian welfare state remained unsolved. 
The Provenance of the Thesis 
Tne actual provenance of this thesis lies in the work of the Commonwealth National 
Legal Aid Advisory Committee (NLAAC) between 1988 and 1990. In late 1986, the 
Hawke Federal Government changed the administrative arrangeme.nts for 
Commonwealth participation in the national scheme. 18 It established an Office of 
Legal Aid Administration (OLAA) within the Attorney-General's DeparL"llent, and 
constituted the NLAAC and the National Legal Aid Representative Council to carry 
out the function - previously performed by the Commonwealth Legal Aid Council -
of advising the Attorney-General on matters affecting Commonwealth involvement 
in legal aid. 19 The 1986 changes also vested political and administrative 
responsibility for Commonwealth participation in the Minister for Justice. 
In September 1988, the NLAAC advised the Minister that it had resolved to 
"undertake [a national] inquiry into legal aid policy and ... the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the arrangements for funding and administering legal aid".20 The 
inquiry began with the publication of a discussion paper in late 1988, and until mid-
1989 the NLAAC accepted written submissions and heard evidence at public 
meetings throughout Au:;tralia. It presented the report of its inquiry to the .Minister 
for Justice in mid-1990. 21 The NLAAC report contained a detailed analysis of the 
I~ 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Ibid at x.wi-xxvii. 
Ibid at v; Attorney-General's Department. The Justice Statement, ( 1995). 
Attorney-General's Department, above n 15 at 2. 
Ibid at iii. The 'Justice Statement' included new national policies on dispute resolution, including family-
based disputes, lawyer services and the legal profession. courts and tribunals, women's' justice issues. 
legal aid, law reform, consumer protection, criminal law, human rights. and cross-cultural access to law. 
National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, above n 7 at 1-2 & 25-32. 
Ibid at 2-3. 
Ibid at 4; D Fleming, "Rethinking Legal Aid Policy" ( 1989) 14 Alternative Law Journal 6. 
National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, Legal Aid for the Australian Community, (Canberra. Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1990). 
5 
problems facing the Federal Government in financing and administering its 
responsibilities in the national scheme, together with several hundred instances of 
advice and recommendations in thirty different classifications.22 
The NLAAC's advice and recommendations were constrained by its statutory 
functions and responsibilities, the politics of the legal aid sector and the private l.egal 
profession, and the dynamics of the national legal services system. Consequently, its 
report emphasised reforms to the management of the national scheme to enhance its 
effectiveness and efficiency. Nevertheless, the NLAAC endeavoured to portray 
these proposed reforms in the context of the national legal system. In particular, its 
report acknowledged the relationship between optimum levels of effectiveness and 
efficiency in the operations of the national scheme, and the continuing, nationwide 
'problems' in access to· the legal system described above. Sometimes it did so only 
implicitly, but in a number of instances it did so expressly.23 For instance, the 
NLAAC recommended that systemic legal and administrative reforms were 
necessary to improve specific aspects of the national scheme.24 Moreover, in the 
penultimate chapter of the report, it highlighted the centrality of this relationship.25 
The NLAAC advised the Minister that it was impracticable for governments to 
consider legal aid administration without simultaneously confronting the 'problems' 
in 'access to justice', saying that the problems facing the legal aid scheme could not 
"be severed from the wider problems associated with legal transaction costs facing 
the community with respect to protecting or asserting their legal rights and 
interests".26 
Neither did these external constraints stifle the NLAAC in developing new 
perspectives on the national scheme. For instance, its report was the first inquiry to 
acknowledge the impact cf public policy on funding, providing and supplying legal 
aid.27 It also alerted the Minister to the impact of the organisation of the lawyer 
services industry upon th~ costs of administering the national scheme, and the 
capacity of governments to redress problems in access to lawyer services and 
functions. 28 The NLAAC also began to explore and publicise the relationship 
!2 
,. 
_, 
25 
27 
Ibid at 282-252. 
Ibid at 285-289, 312·315 & 322-343. 
Ibid at 179-252. 
Ibid at 182-186. 
Ibid at 184. 
Cf. Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poveny, Law and Poveny Series, Legal Aid i11 
A11srralia. (1975); Australian Legal Aid Review Committee, Report, (1974); Australian Legal Aid 
Review Committee, 2nd Report, (March 1975); Attorney-General's Department, Legal Aid Task Force, 
Final Report, A11g11st 1985: Discussion Paper November 198./, (1985). 
National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, above n 7 at 103-104. "Lawyer functions" refers to the 
perfonnance by ·non-lawyers' of functions similar to those performed by licensed legal practitioners. 
One instance is paralegals or other 'non-lawyers' providing legal representation. assistance or advice in 
connection with contemplated or actual proceedings before couns or tribunals. Another instance is where 
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etc . .,: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. above n 4 nt para 3.2. 
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betv.reen Federal Government outlays on the national scheme and the trend in Federal 
socfo-economic policy favouring "constraint in relation to public expenditure".29 It 
pointed out that this trend - which had been apparent since the early 1980s -
t!videnced a major shift away from principles of political economy, which 
historically had sustained the core of the 'socially defensive' Federal welfare state.30 
The NLAAC suggested that application of these new economic policies would 
adversely effect the administration of the national legal aid scheme. It also cautioned 
that this policy shift meant that it was now unlikely that a universal national scheme 
providing a comprehensive range of legal services would ever be incorporated into 
the Australian welfare state.31 
The Genesis of the Thesis 
Whilst the above describes the provenance of the thesis, its genesis lay elsewhere: in 
the author's experiences of the NLAAC inquiry, its report and its aftermath. In 
1988-90, the author was employed as NLAAC's principal legal officer, and, in this 
capacity, was both actively involved in the conduct of its inquiry and the author of its 
report.32 The author's experiences - and subsequent post-report writing reflections -
left him with a legacy of unanswered questions. These questions covered four 
categories which all related to aspects of methodology, context, history and 
implications of the NLAAC inquiry and its report. 
The first category emerged from the NLAAC's attempt to contextualise the functions 
of the national legal aid scheme in the 1970s and 1980s. We have already seen that 
this was constrained by the four external factors mentioned above.33 In addition, 
there was an equally important internal constraint, namely the fact that almost 
everyone involved the NLAAC inquiry was a lawyer. A chartered public accountant, 
Jong associated with the Legal Services Commission of South Australia, was the 
only exception. However, he held liberal professional values similar to those of the 
lawyers. Consequently, all involved in the inquiry were well-schooled in liberal 
legalism and its modern trinity of social, political and legal ideals. 3~ In the Australian 
context, this meant that all were at least as equally unschooled in political science, 
the sociology of law, social theory, Public Policy, public administration and theories 
of welfare capitalism.35 Therefore, the collective theoretical perspective was narrow. 
30 
31 
. , ,_ 
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National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, above n 7 at 72; National Legal Aid Advisory Committee. 
Fu11di11g. Prol'iding and S11pplyi11g Legal Aid Services, (1989) at paras 3.22-3.25. 
National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, above n 7 at 72-74. 
Ibid at 73-74 & 77-79 . 
Ibid at 4-7 & xi. 
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JN Shklar. Legalism, (1964) at 1-2. 
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From a liberal legalist perspective, the NLAAC's contextualisation of post-war legal 
aid may well have been novel and illuminating.36 However, from other perspectives 
it was naive and superficial - and only marginally improved our understanding of the 
national scheme in the context of the modern law, politics and government. 
Therefore, the NLAAC report left open the question of how we could - and how we 
should - approach the task of understanding the origins of the national legal aid 
scheme and its significance in the society of the Australian welfare state in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
The second category of unanswered questions originate in the NLAAC's own 
engagement with this issue. In retrospect, its report failed to portray its many and 
wide-ranging instances of advice and recommendations in an adequate historical or 
social context. For instance, the NLAAC advised the Minister that 
... many submissions reiterated that inadequate opportunities for affordable, fair and 
effective access to justice remains a major problem for the poor, and are becoming a 
significant problem for the non-poor, in the Australian community in 1990 ... 
governments and their legal and administrative systems are failing to provide access to 
justice to significant numbers of people in the community including many who are 
disadvantaged. 37 
However, in 1990 it was hardly a revelation that ordinary citizens faced problems in 
access to the Australian legal system. After all, it was 15 years since the 
Commonwealth Commissioner for Law and Poverty had placed governments on 
notice of the "high level of unmet need for legal aid services within the 
community".38 Furthermore, the NLAAC's inquiry had originated in part from its 
concerns about the apparent increase in the numbers of ordinary people unable to 
afford the cost of lawyer services.39 Moreover, the presence of problems in popular 
access to legal ~;ervices was not only a post-war phenomenon. Since the 1900s, 
Australian State Parliaments had periodically legislated to extend the availability of 
civil and criminal legal aid. In doing so, they had been motivated by concerns about 
the social injustice of inequality in access to legal services - similar to those 
expressed in the 1970s and l 980s.40 Therefore, neither legal aid nor its associations 
with social justice were new to modern Australian society. Yet the NLAAC did not 
36 
37 
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investigate these historical contexts. It did not ask what the origins of modern legal 
aid were, and whether its experience in modern Australian society had any 
significance for understanding contemporary developments affecting the national 
scheme. 
The third category of unanswered questions is different. This category does not refer 
to the fact that the NLAAC failed to ask the 'right' questions - as in the first and 
second categories above. It is concerned with the fact that, even if the NLAAC had 
sought to place the national scheme in an historical context, it would have faced 
practical difficulties. In 1989, there were - quite apart from the unanswered or 
unasked questions of methodology and history above - major gaps in the historical 
record of the Australian experience of legal aid. Whilst this was especially so in a 
welfare state context, it was also true in the context of the history of legal aid 
administration. The principal, accessible historical source was contained in the 1975 
report of the Commissioner for Law and Poverty - itself heavily permeated by liberal 
legalism and limited in its portrayal of developments before the I 960s 41 The 
NLAAC did little to redress the gaps in the historical record. Therefore, questions 
remained about what had actually happened in the modem Australian experience of 
legal aid - not only in relation to the developments in the 1970s, but also to its 
previous history in Australian law and government. 
The fourth category of unanswered questions stemmed from the aftermath of the 
NLAAC report. Some were prompted by the lukewarm political reaction when the 
report was released: neither the Minister nor the OLAA displayed great enthusiasm 
as advocates for the thrust of the report. Moreover, the legal aid sector, including the 
State and Territory legal aid commissions, community legal centres, the organised 
legal profession and lawyers, showed only a passing interest. Initially, this was 
mildly surprising. Whilst the NLAAC report was not - as we have seen - without its 
flaws, it had achieved its major objectives by providing the Federal Government with 
a fresh analysis of the national problems facing legal aid. Furthermore, it had 
expounded a new and alternative "solution oriented" approach to managing the 
Commonwealth role in the national scheme.~2 Nevertheless, neither the core 
recommendations of the NLAAC report, nor its new approach to legal aid 
management were ever recognised by the Federal Government. Indeed, within 12 
months of its release it had slipped into history - adding to the growing archive of 
reports into legal aid. This left several other unanswered questions. Why were the 
major actors in the national scheme - especially the Federal Government - so 
obviously disinterested in the NLAAC's findings and recommendations? More 
importantly, why had the star of legal aid, so bright in the social firmament of the 
1970s, faded so quickly in the 1980s? 
Other unanswered questions in the aftermath of the NLAAC report came with 
hindsight. By 1992 and 1993, it was obvious that the NLAAC's decision to conduct 
an inquiry into the operations of the national scheme had been taken on the cusp of 
~I Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, above n 27. 
National Legal Aid Advisory Committee, above n 7 at 268. 
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the 'access to justice' response of the Federal Government. By the time the report 
was published in 1990, the ideals of 'legal aid' had ceased to be the central point of 
reference for national public policy towards popular access to legal services. This 
was reflected in the appointment of the AJAC, its report and the Prime Minister's 
'Action Statement'.43 Why did this policy shift occur? Why had the Keating 
Government replaced legal aid and its ideals ·with an 'access. to justice' response -
and what did this signify for popular access to law in the Australian welfare state? 
The Relevance of the NLAAC Legacy 
Initially, it was envisaged that this thesis would focus on these unanswered and 
unasked questions. However, whilst finding answers to the questions is - as we see 
below - an important part of the thesis, its primary objective is different. The change 
to the initial focus occurred for two reasons. The first was that the centrality of the 
NLAAC legacy gradually declined. In retrospect, it was only one of a myriad of 
public interventions since the mid-l 970s affecting Australian legal aid. Secondly, 
once we begin to contextualise the NLAAC questions - in the post-war welfare state 
and its legal system - it quickly becomes evident that they have a wider significance. 
Their real significance is their role as social indicators. They show that the presence 
of inadequate levels of fair and effective citizens' access to the legal system has been 
a characteristic of post-war Australian society. They also indicate that this legal 
problem was socially significant, at least in the 20 ye~r,s from 1973-95. Twice 
Federal Governments took action to improve citizens' access to the legal system -
once in the mid-1970s, via the national scheme, and again in 1993-95, via the 'access 
to justice' response. Finally, the NLAAC questions indicate that, in 1995, we did not 
fully understand the origins of these legal phenomena, namely why post-war 
Australian society displayed inadequate levels of fair and effective citizens' access to 
its legal system, or the two responses of the Federal welfare state. Nor did we have 
an appropriate explanatory framework to understand their significance in post-war 
Australian society, its legal system or welfare state. 
In this role, the NLAAC questions are not merely historically significant indicators. 
The wider issues which they raise remain socially significant in the contemporary 
welfare state. In 1999, Australia has ongoing problems with achieving adequate, fair 
and effective levels of citizens' access to its legal system. On assuming office in 
1996, the Howard Federal Coalition Government adopted the 'access to justice' 
policies of its predecessor - albeit in a diluted form.44 However, these policies in 
themselves have not proved sufficient to change the post-war pattern. Moreover, the 
new Attorney-General was quick to announce the first of a series of measures to 
43 Above, p 4. 
The 1996 election platfonn of the Federal Liberal Party promised to maintain "current commitments to 
access to justice measures". However, in the Howard Government's first Budget it announced that 
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IO 
reduce Federal contributions to the national scheme, a measure which prompted the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee to conduct a new inquiry into 
legal aid.45 Furthermore, since 1995, overall relative levels of access to the legal 
system have probably declined, so that the Australian legal system is even more 
inaccessible to its citizens. Certainly, this is a widely held perception. However, 
perception is subjective, and coloured by social and political expectations of law. 
Therefore, we have to be careful not to overstate the level or significance of current 
problems iu citizens' access to the legal system. In particular, we have to apply 
'reality checks' to test the validity of public perceptions. In Australia, this process 
can be somewhat problematic. Unlike some comparable countries, like The 
Netherlands, we do not have reliable, centralised collections of data on the operation 
of the justice system. We cannot as readily - in some cases, not at all - check 
perception against reality. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the problems in 
citizens' access are insignificant. It simply means that the 'evidence' tends to be 
more equivocal and contestable. Much of it derives from the practical experiences of 
courts, judges, lawyers, legal aid agencies and legal interest groups, whose testimony 
is not unlike that of a State Attorney-General in 1927, who, when pressed for 
evidence of the need for legal aid, replied that "[my] evidence is that I have seen the 
need for it every day of my life; and in scores of cases, both in civil and criminal 
jurisdiction, I know that people have been denied access to the courts owing to their 
poverty" . .u; 
Furthermore, achieving adequate, fair and effective levels of citizens' access to the 
legal system remains socially desirable. In a sense, this proposition is axiomatic. 
After all, Australia is still a free, liberal and modern democratic society. Once we 
could confidently and boldly assert - and few would have disagreed - that in such a 
society fair and effective access to the legal system is a right of citizenship, and its 
achievement a public duty of governments. However, in the 'down-sizing' welfare 
state neither liberal legalism, nor its associated modem conceptions of citizenship 
and government are uncontested:11 Therefore, it seems wise to add - if only briefly -
some less prosaic reasons why fair and effective levels of citizens' access to the legal 
system still matters. Even the 'market-oriented' Australian welfare state still uses 
the legal system to "legitimate public policy", regulate non-state activities and 
organisations, and perform its various social welfare and economic policy 
functions.~8 To perform these functions effectively, the state still needs to ensure, at 
least, minimum levels of effective citizens' access to law. Moreover, governments 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee. Inquiry into the Australian Legal Aid System, 
First Report, ( 1997) at 2. 
Mr. Slater. Attorney-General in the Hogan ALP Government, second reading speech introducing the Poor 
Persons Legiil Assistance Bill, 30 November 1927, Victoria. LC & LA, Vol CLXXV at 3001. 
D Fleming. "Change. tensions and trends in administrative law" in G Singleton (ed) The Second Keating 
Goi·emme111: Australian Commonwealth Administration 1993-1996. (1997) at 163 referring to a review 
of some contemporary iiltemative conceptions of modem citizenship in W Kymlicka & \V Norman. 
"Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, (1993-94) 10-1 Ethics 352 & B 
Thomas. The cul111re of ciri:enship: inventing post-modern civic culture, ( 1994). 
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and the legislative and administrative organs of the state still see an accessible, fair 
and effective legal system as a minimum requirement of political legitimacy. As a 
Commonwealth Minister for Justice opined in 1993, the "rule of law can, in the end, 
.-,nly be maintained if it rests on the absolute confidence and support of the people 
[who] must believe ... that the law will be applied without fear or favour to the 
strong and the weak alike".49 
Adequate fair and effective access to the legal system has also remained important 
for citizens, not only because it is part of their modem civil and political rights. 
Even the 'down-sizing' welfare state continues to manufacture law, it remains "a 
giant machine for making and applying law [and for] social control ... which is 
exercised through law".50 Moreover, Australian citizens in 1998 - as 10, 20 and 30 
years before - cannot avoid the impositions of legal regulation, "everyone is involved 
with law".51 In fact, the 'consumer-citizens' of the 'market driven' economy of the 
contemporary welfare state have potentially more deman~ -~ for access to legal 
services than ever before, as 'customerisation' and privatisation of public functions 
encourages a more pro-active, legally assertive type of citizenship. Finaily, effective 
citizens' access to legal services is important for the operation of business and 
commerce, and for invigorating the social assumptions of the free market ideology 
promoted by the Hilmer Report and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission. 52 
The Subject-Matter and Opening Contention 
Against this background, we can now define the subject-matter of the thesis and 
describe its opening contention. Its subject-matter is the reality of the ongoing 
'problems' in access to the legal system - and 'access to justice' - in the late 20th 
century Australian welfare state. The thesis considers whether these problems are 
realistically capable of being resolved. To do so, it begins by posing a general 
question: is fair and effe1;tive access to law a feasible expectation of citizens or 
governments in the Australian welfare state? 
The opening contention of the thesis is that revisiting the origins of the mid- l 970s 
national legal aid scheme - and its social significance - holds the key to determining 
the feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to law in contemporary 
Australian society. The post-war experience of legal aid was the first coordinated 
national response of the Australian welfare state to the legal problems faced by its 
poorer citizens. Ostensibly, its aim was to improve levels of fair and effective access 
to the legal system. Yet it appears that its outcome was problematic, and we have yet 
to explain its origins or significance in the context of the law and society of the post-
so 
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war welfare state. The thesis contends that we can still learn from this legal 
phenomenon of 25 years ago. Revisiting the post-war experience will improve our 
understanding of 'why' Australia acted to enhance access to legal aid in the 1970s. It 
will also improve our capacity to understand the 'access to justice' response, and 
thereby the feasibility of any future reforms towards fair and effective access to law. 
The Organisation of the Thesis 
The material and discussion in the thesis is divided into three parts. Part I begins by 
explaining the history behind the national scheme, the reasons why it emerged in 
1973-76 and its ideological context in modem Australian society. In doing so, it 
answers some of the unanswered questions of the NLAAC report. However, Part II 
also demonstrates the limitations of institutional and ideological history in explaining 
the post-war experience, concluding that 'missing' parts of the story remain to be 
told. Thus, Part II begins by revisiting, in a cross-national context, the existing ideas 
which explain the post-war e;<perience. It develops an alternative theory of the 
origins and significance of modem legal aid, which it proceeds to apply in revisiting 
- in the context of the Western world - the origins and significance of its post-war 
development. 
Part III proceeds to demonstrate 'why' and 'how' the lessons of revisiting the post-
war experience enable us to better assess the feasibility of achieving fair and 
effective access to law. It begins by applying the insights, 'benchmarks' and 
analytical methodology of Part II to reconsider the origips of the new 'problems' in 
•access to justice', the jettisoning of the legal aid response and the significance of the 
1993 •access to justice' response. Part III concludes by briefly considering the 
implications of the thesis for the feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to 
law in the contemporary Australian welfare state. 
The Central Assumptions and Premises 
The thesis is organised around a number of central assumptions and premises. Most 
of these are identified, defined and their significance explained as they arise in the 
text. For instance, we have already advanced the premise that Australia is a welfare 
capitalist state, and later go on to explain relevant implications of this status.53 
Similarly, the assumption that public policy drives legal regulation and its 
implications for understanding legal phenomena in the welfare state are explained in 
Part II. 5.1 
However, there is one central assumption - and one central premise - which have 
influenced the design of the thesis. The assumption is that Australian society is 
regulated by a unique type of modem system of law and government. Its national 
legal system certainly forms part of the modem Western legal world - in particular, 
53 
54 
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its Anglo-American or common law components. Yet, from the outset, the origins, 
social construction and formative experiences of the Australian legal system have 
been distinctive and different.'' Until the early post-war years, the overwhelming 
'Britishness' of Australian society obscured its distinctive national character. 
However, Australian law and legal culture began to bloom in the 1960s, and social 
transformation was officially matched twenty years later by final legal and political 
devolution from Britain.56 
The designing premise is that comparative public policy - and its techniques - are 
both applicable and useful in evaluating and assessing the significance of legal 
developments. Comparative public policy is now widely used in studies of 
Australian Public Policy and, according to Castles, without "some kind of 
comparison it is impossible to characterise the Australian experience at all".57 Its 
practitioners use two types of comparative techniques, cross-temporal and cross-
national, both of which are necessary to "locate adequately the nature of any aspect 
of the Australian experience".58 Cross-temporal comparison is the familiar technique 
of history. It examines intra-national developments to see what has changed - and to 
look for the reasons whv. Consequently, the historical narrative in Part I below also 
helps us to understand post-war legal aid by comparing it with developments in 
earlier periods - for example, the interventions of some States and law societies in 
the 1920s and 1930s. 
Comparative Public Policy uses cross-national techniques to compare national 
developments - like the Australian national legal aid scheme - with those in groups of 
countries with similar policy agendas and systems of political economy. Cross-
national comparison of economic and social policy developments in the welfare 
capitalist countries is an established field of Comparative Public Policy. Moreover, 
in practice it "is usually to the forefront in contemporary debate about the character 
of Australian society".59 
Part II of the thesis uses cross-national comparison to portray the origins and 
significance of the Australian post-war experience of legal aid in an international 
context. Similarly, Part III uses cross-national analysis to explore the origins and 
significance of the developments in 'access to justice' in the 1980s and 1990s, and to 
help to further define the feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to law. In 
doing so, it draws upon the real benefits of Comparative Public Policy in offering 
"guidance in designing better policies": 
55 
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Even if there are no direct lessons, policy comparisons will often throw light on 
hidden assumptions operating within one's own country and thus alert the observer to 
latent opportunities and constraints that would otherwise go unrecognised. 60 
This is particularly important in an increasingly interdependent and internationalised 
world.61 
\ 
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Chapter Two 
The Modem Background 
The MINISTER FOR JUSTICE: Yes, on capital charges it has always been the custom to 
supply legal assistan :e for the accused if the accused is without means. But in ordinary 
cases that is not done. As soon as the Government took office we placed £ 100 on the 
Estimates for the purposes of providing legal assistance when necessary. However, we 
have hot blazoned anything about it. 
Hon. Sir James Mitchell: How much did you say; £100 a year? 
The MINISTER FOR JUSTICE: Yes, we have put £100 a year on the Estimates in order 
that, if there were one or two cases in which it seemed desirable that legal assistance should 
be rendered, we would be able to supply it. 
Hon. Sir James Mitchell: But is not £100 too much? 
Second reading speech of the Hon J C Willcock, Minister for Justice in the Collier Labor 
Government, introducing the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Bill, 1928 (WA), 27 
November 1928, WA PD 1928 Vol 80 at 2025 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three historical narratives in this part. It relates the 
developments in legal aid in Australia from the British conquest in 1788 until the end 
of World War II. It does so in the context of three phases of modem Australian law 
and government - the colonial period, the first 30 years of the Commonwealth, and 
the period from the early 1930s to September 1945. 
The colonial period began in England in the 1780s with the creation of the legal 
foundations of the proposed new colony of New South Wales. In this context, the 
chapter first describes the metropolitan poor persons jurisdiction, its law and 
procedure which formed the original institutional basis of Australian legal aid. It 
proceeds to relate the circumstances of the reception of this jurisdiction into the 
colonial legal systems in the 1820s. The story of legal aid in this period ends with an 
account of the changes to this received metropolitan law and other developments in 
colonial civil and criminal legal aid between 1850 and 1900. 
The next phase of modern Australian law and government began with the 
· establishment of the federal Commonwealth in 1901. In this second context, the 
.chapter outlines the developments in legal aid in the first 30 years of the new 
century, including the arrangements introduced by the embryonic federal state in the 
1900s, and the policy stance towards national legal aid evident on the part of the 
Commonwealth government in the 1920s. This part of the chapter also narrates the 
story in the Australian States, including the enactment of the poor prisoners' defence 
and criminal appeals provisions in the 1900s, 191 Os and 1920s, developments in civil 
legal aid after World War I and reforms to the informa pauperis procedures in civil 
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proceedings. This period also saw the first significant public appearances of the 
Australian legal profession in relation to the organised provision of legal aid. 
The third phase of law and government considered in the chapter is the period from 
the early 1930s until September 1945. In this last context, the chapter first describes 
the developments in legal aid in South Australia and Victoria .in the 1930s, and the 
reorganisation of civil and criminal legal aid in New South Wales in 1941-43. It 
concludes by narrating the developments during World War II - from the response of 
the State law societies in 1939 and 1940 to provide legal aid for newly enlisted 
servicemen, to the fonnation of the Commonwealth Legal Service Bureau in 1941-
43. 
The Metropolitan Background 
. 
The colonial period began in January 1788 when Britain claimed suzerainty over the 
eastern part of the Australian continent. The metropolitan legal system then 
contained no general schematic provision for legal aid for poorer litigants and 
accused. Neither the Common Law nor legislation recognised any right for poorer 
people to be legally-represented in civil or criminal proceedings at public expense.62 
The only public acknowledgment of the needs of poorer litigants and accused was in 
the poor persons jurisdiction of the Common Law courts, the Court of Chancery and 
other superior courts in the early modem metropolitan central legal system.63 
This jurisdiction had ancient origins, deriving from two primary and personal 
governmental obligations of the Crown. The first was the personal responsibility of 
the incumbent monarch to provide his or her subjects with justice. The second 
primary prerogative obligation in which the poor persons jurisdiction originated was 
the paternal duty of the Crown to defend the "poor and helpless".64 Initially, the 
responsibility for the discharge of these two primary obligations rested with the 
monarch, and his or her entourage of councillors and administrators. However, by 
the early Middle Ages the core of a national system of government through public 
administration had developed in England.6s In this emerging medieval 'state', 
responsibility for the performance of many governmental functions - previously at 
least notionally personally superintended by the Crown - was newly invested in 
public officials and institutions.66 It was at this time that the prerogative duties over 
the administration of civil and criminal justice - including those specifically applying 
to the poor - were vested in the Chancellor and the judges of the new Common Law 
courts. The result was that the original inherent jurisdiction of these judicial 
62 
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administrators included the power to make special provision for poor parties and 
accused, as an incident of their general functions in the administration of justice. 
It is clear that the modern poor persons jurisdiction of the metropolitan superior 
courts originated in these medieval developments. However, it is far less clear that -
as some modern judges and commentators have claimed - the modern poor persons 
procedures developed in the early medieval central legal system. 67 This appears very 
much to be a case of ex post facto 'historical' reconstruction.68 In modem society, 
we have beco111e accustomed to legal fonn following function - in the modern state, 
implementation generally follows the investiture of legal powers and functions. 
These modem raconteurs have all too readily assumed that this was also so in 
medieval society when, actually, nothing could be further from the truth. In 
medieval England, the distribution and exercise of 'state' administrative power was 
ill-defined, fluid and something of a jumble. Therefore, whilst the early medieval 
courts did make special provision for the poor - that they "should have their writs for 
nothing, was an accepted maxim" - it does not inevitably follow that the results were 
akh to the modern metropolitan poor persons procedures.69 Neither does it mean 
that a modern type of in forma pauperis procedure - if it did emerge - was regularly 
used or systematically available in the jurisdictions supervised by the Chancellor or 
administered by the Common Law judges. Indeed, the evidence of history is 
equivocal on this question. 
History does reliably record that a type of special procedure for poor litigants 
appeared after the establishment of the first ecclesiastical courts in England in the 
late 13th century. 70 In these courts, prticedures operated whereby legally-trained 
clerics appearing in ecclesiastical proceedings were authorised to represent poor 
petitioners and litigants. These clerical 'lawyers' were also able to represent poor 
parties on a similar charitable basis in the secular courts.71 History also tells us that 
the expansion of the English national legal system in the 13th and 14th centuries was 
paralleled by the emergence of distinctive classes of legal functionaries who 
represented or acted as agents of civil litigants and criminal accused. 72 However, it 
remains unclear if - or when - these early secular lawyers emulated their 
ecclesiastical brethren in providing gratuitous lawyer services for poor people. 
Similarly, the contemporary historical record is inconclusive as to if - or when - the 
Chancellor or the Common Law judges incorporated special procedures to protect 
poor parties engaged in actions or proceedings in their jurisdictions. However, it 
seems likely that they did so. 
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The first definite record of a modem type of poor persons procedures was its 
appearance in a 1494 statute - "A Mean to help and speed poor Persons in their 
Suits'' ("the 1494 Act").73 Procedural law reform often follows actual practices 
already adopted by the courts, or developed by judges and lawyers. In this case, the 
form and technicality of the 1494 Act suggests that its mechanisms for the conduct of 
civil proceedings in /ormii paupe;is may were based on an existing model. 
However, our knowledge of the immediate historical antecedents of its in /ormii 
pauperis procedures is scant. It allows us neither to say conclusively if they 
preceded the Act - nor, if so, when and in whichjurisdictlon they first appeared. 
If the in form ii pauper is procedures were not simply an invention of statute, it is most 
likely they first appeared in the exercise of the paternal jurisdiction of the Chancellor 
as the "refuge of the Poor and afflicted". 74 This ameliorative equitable jurisdiction -
which enabled the Chancellor to protect the legal rights and interests of the poor, and 
resolve their legal problems - was well-established by the end of the 14th century. In 
exercising this jurisdiction the Chancellor had extensive powers, which certainly 
included the power to grant procedural concessions to poorer civil litigants.75 On the 
other hand, the available historical evidence suggests that it was improbable that an 
in /orma pauperis procedure developed in the Common Law courts. In the first 
place, there is little, if any, contemporary evidence before 1494 that the Common 
Law judges exercised their inherent powers to assist poor litigants and accused.76 
Secondly, their ability to exercise these powers in civil proceedings had been 
circumscribed by the introduction of an early type of party and party costs system in 
the late 13th century.77 Thereafter, non-suited or otherwise unsuccessful litigants 
were required to pay the taxed costs of their opponent. This was likely to have 
retarded - if not prevented - the adoption of poor persons procedures similar to those 
contained in the 1494 Act. 78 In criminal proceedings, it is even more unlikely that 
these statutory procedures were preceded by developments in the jurisdiction of the 
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G Spence. above n 64 at 384 & 387. 
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and tenants over occupancy rights. As Maguire notes, the statutory amelioration of Common Law 
procedures in the I 994 Act to facilitate actions of the poor ''finally came less from a love of the poor than 
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established the Court of Requests, also known as the Court of Poor Man's Causes to deal with the "suits 
of poor men and of the King's Servants": Sir William Holdsworth, A History of £11glish law, 1th ed 
(1956) Vol I at 412. This was a remarkably successful popular jurisdiction. especially in the field of 
protecting the rights of poor tenants. Even the end of its life • when, having been ravaged by the jealousy 
of the Common Law courts in the 16th century, it faded with the Restoration - it ·•continued to thrive (its] 
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416. 
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Court of King's Bench. Poor accused in this jurisdiction had few procedural 
interests to protect· they were not liable to pay the costs of the Crown. Neither were 
criminal accused in the 15th century • whether poor or not • ordinarily entitled to be 
legally represented in the conduct of their defence before the judges at the King's 
Bench.79 
Whatever its early medieval lineage, the informapauperis procedure in the 1494 Act 
provided the institutional basis of the modem poor persons procedural law.80 The 
expressed object of the Act was to enable the "Poor" to obtain access to legal 
services in trials of civil proceedings at Common Law.11 The Act operated to relieve 
eligible poor plaintiffs from payment of the costs and fees ordinarily incurred in 
pleading causes of action in the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, the 
Exchequer and other Common Law courts of record. The poor were entitled to 
freely obtain both writs and the clerical assistance required to draw their pleadings.82 
The 1494 Act also directed the Common Law judges to appoint counsel and 
attorneys - whom it obliged to act without payment of professional fees - to represent 
eligible poor plaintiffs. 83 
From 1494 until 1883 the Act was the institutional response of the metropolitan legal 
system to the conduct of civil proceedings at Common Law by poorer plaintiffs.s.1 
However, its role in the late medieval, early modern and modern English 
metropolitan legal system was not limited to Common Law courts. The Act, and its 
associated procedural law which developed in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries - and 
which is outlined below - also served as a tempiate for the development of in forma 
pauperis procedures in other jurisdictions in the national legal system. The modem 
poor persons procedures in the Court of Chancery - and the lesser national civil 
courts - were modelled on the informa pauperis provisions in the 1494 Act and its 
subsequent procedural law.85 In the early 18th century, the judges of the Court of 
King's Bench - who began to allow criminal accused to be legally represented -
adapted the civil procedures in the 1494 Act to enable poor accused to conduct a 
defence in form ii pauperis. 86 Moreover, its procedures also served as a model when -
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It was not until the early 19th century that criminal accused facing trial were entitled to legal 
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in the few instances in which this occurred in early modern England - legislators 
expanded the availability of special procedures for the poor in other parts -0f the 
national legal system. 87 
By the end of the 18th century - when British law arrived in Australia - the judge-
made procedural law associated with the administration ofthe.1494 Act and its no,i-
statutory progeny was fully developed.88 The Act had never specified who the 
"Poor" subjects of the Crown were or defined the requisite material poverty 
qualifying a litigant to proceed as a poor plaintiff. 89 These omissions were not 
subsequently remedied by the Parliament. Therefore, i~ fell to the judges to develop 
a legal definition of poverty to establishing eligibility to conduct civil and criminal 
proceedings in formd pauperis. From the outset, the judges considered the conduct 
of legal proceedings in formti pauperis to be a privilege restricted to litigants or 
accused who were genuinely poor. In 1810, Mr. Justice Hullock recorded that they 
had "been long in the habit of granting this pri~ilege to such persons, having cause of 
action, as will swear that they are not worth 51 . ... in the world, exclusive of their 
wearing apparel, and the right to the matter in controversy".90 For instance, in the 
Prerogative Court in Lovekin v Edwards Sir John Nicholl said that: 
To sue as a pauper is a great privilege of law, it belongs only to the necessity arising 
from absolute poverty, and from the absence of any other mode of obtaining justice ... 
It is a complete but not an uncommon misapprehension of the law, to suppose that 
because a person is in insolvent circumstances, and because he can truly and 
conscientiously swear that he is not worth 51. after all his just debts are paid, that 
therefore he is entitled to be admitted, or rather to proceed, as a pauper it is a prima 
facie ground to admit him as such but no more; if it were otherwise many persons 
living in great splendour and luxury would be so entitled; for many persons in 
business in the enjoyment of an immense income and maintaining a proportionate 
expenditure would not be worth 51. after payment of their just debts.91 
This was not the only restriction placed by the judges on access to the in formti 
pauperis procedures. The Common Law judges always construed the 1494 Act as 
confining their inherent jurisdiction to make special provision for poor civil 
Iitigants.92 On this interpretation, their powers to specially assist poor litigants were 
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restricted to poor plaintiffs - poor defendants and third parties became ineligible to 
proceed in civil proceedings in forma pauperis. A similar interpretation - and 
practice - was generally adopted by the judges in the Court of Chancery and the other 
national civil jurisdictions. However, it appears that in exceptional circumstances 
civil defendants and third parties in these jurisdictions may sometimes have been 
permitted to proceed informa pauperis.93 
In the Court of King's Bench, the judges did not interpret the 1494 Act as confining 
their inherent powers to assist poor criminal accused. However, they imposed 
another restriction upon otherwise eligible accused - it was only possible to defend 
criminal proceedings in /orma pauperis if thereby the interests of justice were best 
served. Nevertheless, by the end of the 18th century it was usual for all poor accused 
facing trial - and other poor people otherwise involved in criminal or quasi-criminal 
proceeding - in the Court of King's Bench to be admitted to proceed in forma 
pauperis.94 However, this was never a right - it remained a discretionary privilege 
within. the gift of the presiding judge, to be conferred when the legal representation 
of a poor accused or party was desirable, or otherwise dictated by the interests of 
justice. As a privilege it could be denied or, if cases countervailing considerations 
affecting the administration of criminal justice arose, withdrawn.95 
The judge-made procedural law descended to the details of the conduct of 
proceedings informa pauperis. Ordinarily, an application for admission to plead or 
defend as a poor party or accused was made when the subject proceedings 
conunenced.96 In civil actions, the judges asserted a power !o entertain applications 
after the hearing began.97 The judge-made law also ddh:ed the scope of the 
procedural privileges conferred - poor parties and accused pr.'lceeding in forma 
pauperis were entitled to free legal representation.98 In civil proceedings, the 
procedural privileges were more extensive. From 1531, poor plaintiffs were relieved 
from any liability to pay party and party costs if their cause of action failed, they 
were nonsuited or withdrew their action before judgment.99 However, admission to 
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at 381). 
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conduct civil proceedings in formd pauperis did not confer a general license to 
litigate - its privileges were restricted to the specific subject proceedings. '00 Neither 
did it render a poor plaintiff totally immune from any liability for payment of a 
defendant's party and party costs. If their pleadings were amended during the 
hearing, he or she could be ordered to pay the additional costs incurred of a 
defendant newly required to answer fresh allegations. Similarly, dilatory or 
vexatious poor plaintiffs were subject to different forms of judicial sanction - the 
hearing of his or her action could be stayed, or they could be dispaupered. The latter 
was also possible in criminal proceedings. It revoked the procedural privileges 
conferred on poor parties and restored them to the same position as ordinary litigants 
or accused - required to pay for legal representation, and, in civil matters, exposed to 
payment of party and party costs. 101 
Reception of the Metropolitan Poor Persons Law 
The reception of the modern poor persons law was not conterminous· with the 
establishment of modern Australian law and government - the late 18th century 
English legal system was never reproduced in the colony of New South Wales . 
. Instead, the colonial legal system was initially established by a modern combination 
of the prerogative and statute. 102 Moreover, the first colonial superior courts neither 
replicated their metropolitan counterparts, nor exercised comparable jurisdictions. 
Whilst the Court of Civil Jurisdiction was authorised to entertain real and personal 
causes of action modelled on the Common Law, its powers were defined by 
prerogative instrument, aIJd not by reference to the existing powers and functions of 
the judges in the metropolitan superior national courts. 103 Therefore, it did not 
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provide a legal platfonn for the reception of the civil poor persons procedural law, 
although its prerogative origins meant that its officials were at least notionally 
invested with inherent powers to assist its poorer supplicants. In 1814, the Court of 
Civil Jurisdiction was replaced by three new superior civil courts: the Governor's 
Court, the Lt. Governor's Court and the Supreme Court.104 As these courts exercised 
a comparable jurisdiction to their predecessor, they similarly did not attract the poor · 
persons jurisdiction. 105 
The first sup~rior criminal court established in New South Wales was the Court of 
Criminal Jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction, like its civil counterpart, was defined by 
reference to the substantive metropolitan criminal law, and not to powers of the 
judges of the Court of King's Bench.'06 Consequently, it did not incorporate the 
metropolitan law applying to the conduct of criminal proceedings in formd pauperis. 
As a statutory criminal court it was notionally invested with an inherent jurisdiction 
to assist poor accused to obtain justice - although it seems unlikely that this was 
officially recognised by this "best known and often the most dreaded tribunal in New 
South Wales". 10' 
In 1823, the administration of colonial civil and criminal justice was reestablished. 
The functions of the Governor's Court, the Lt. Governor's Court, the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Criminal Jurisdiction consolidated into a new Supreme Court of 
New South Wales. 108 The new Supreme Court was invested with a civil and criminal 
jurisdiction equivalent to the jurisdiction of the courts of King's Bench, Common 
Pleas and the Exchequer, and the equitable and ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
Court of Chancery 109 In 1828, its legal basis was reconfirmed by the Australian 
Courts Act, which also invested it with the Common Law jurisdiction of the Court of 
Chancery. 110 
These jurisdictional transformations saw the reception of the metropolitan poor 
persons law into the colonial legal system. In 1837, the process was repeated when a 
Supreme Court was established in the new colony of South Australia; and several 
times again in the next 24 years as Supreme Courts emerged in the new legal systems 
of Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia "modelled closely upon the older 
Supreme Courts ... with a similar core of authority based on the models of English 
courts."111 By 1861, the reception of the metropolitan poor persons law into the 
colonial legal system was complete. 
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Developments in Colonial Law and Government 
The received metropolitan poor persons law remained the basis of civil legal aid in 
colonial law and government until the l 900s. 112 It was gradually modified and 
reformed as the Supreme Courts developed their own rules of civil procedure. For 
instance, in 1854 the Rules of Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria removed- the 
right of pauper plaintiffs to require defendants to pay party and party costs. 113 Other 
reforms liberalised the eligibility criteria governing access to the poor persons 
procedures - the maximum permissible 'worth' of a person applying to conduct 
proceedings informa pauperis, exclusive of the subject-matter, was increased from 
£5 to £25. By 1900, poor defendants and other parties had also become eligible to 
defend or conduct civil proceedings informa pauperis. The introduction of divorce 
legislation modelled on metropolitan reforms in the late 1850s and 1860s was an 
important instance.114 It included provision for the conduct of divorce and 
matrimonial causes proceedings in form a pauperis .115 The received poor persons law 
also formed the basis of other instances of Civil Law reform in the colonies. For 
example, s 12 of the Crown Remedies and Linbility Statute 1865 (Vic) permitted a 
party who was "disabled by poverty" from defending proceedings to petition the 
Supreme Court for legal assistance. 116 
These reforms to the received law had little impact on the vitality of the poor persons 
procedures. When its jurisdiction arrived in New South Wales, it was already 
ineffective as an institution to assist poorer civil litigants in the metropolitan legal 
system. This was a product of the breakdown of the medieval social fabric in early 
modern England, legal modernisation and the emergence of industrial capitalist 
society after the l 750s. 117 All these factors contributed to the decline of the efficacy 
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of the in forma pauperis procedures - as well as inclining to exclude the poor and 
their legal problems from the jurisdiction of the superior courts. 118 They probably 
also meant that it was impecunious and cash-strapped members of the growing 
middle classes who were more liICely to seek access to its procedural privileges. 119 
Therefore, by the 1820s the poor persons procedures were well and truly ineffective 
in England as a means of legal aid for the poor. 
This situation was compounded in the circumstances of the Australian colonies. 
Between 1830 and 1850, the socio-legal preconditions for the operation of the in 
forma pauperis procedures were non-existent. The colonial social fabric was both 
modern and different - its population small and still predominantly convict in New 
South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. The social penetration of the Supreme Courts 
was limited and there were few practising lawyers. After 1850, the obvious 
differences between metropolitan and colonial society were reduced - with the 
imposition of modern self-government, and the diversification and expansion of local 
economies. However, the plight of poorer civil litigants worsened. The extension of 
the in forma pauperis procedures in the new divorce and matrimonial law had little 
impact since everywhere these refonns benefited the middle classes, and not the 
poor. 120 Moreover, legal modernisation had refonned the civil justice system to the 
detriment of poor litigants in the inferior courts, and the gold rushes saw an influx of 
Anglo-Irish lawyers who were skilled in the arcane and costly pleading practices of 
pre-Judicature Acts Common Lawyers. 121 Furthennore, in this period, in the words 
of Dr John Bennett, a well-known legal historian, the judges of the colonial Supreme 
Courts "dumped the poor". 122 It has not been possible to test this picture against the 
actual records of contemporary usage of the in formti pauperis provisions in civil 
proceedings. 123 However, the available secondary evidence suggests that this 
description is accurate. In 1927, the Attorney-General in Victoria spoke about the 
use of the in Jonna pauper is procedures contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court 
- and his observations probably apply with equal force to describe the experience in 
all the colonies in the latter part of the 19th century: 
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... the Prothonotary has told me that in 20 years' experience he knows of no case 
where any poor person has invoked these provisions of the Supreme Court rul'es in 
order to secure some measure of relief in connexion with civil proceedings ... In 
connexion with divorce proceedings, the which the rules equally apply, the 
B Abel-Smith & R Stevens, above n 99 at 2; below at pp 170-171. 
The cases on dispaupering reveal a significant minority of genteel poor - like naval officers of half-pay, 
or needy clergymen - seeking to avail themselves of this privilege of the poor. 
R Phillips, P111ti11g Asunder: A history of divorce in Western society, (1988) at 607-610. 
In 1846, Couns of Requests operating outside the County of Cumberland were disbanded. Their 
functions and jurisdiction were finally abolished by the District Couns Act 1858 (NSW). These changes 
reflected the centralisation and reform of civil justice in England: below p 177. 
Conversation with Dr John Bennett. Law Program, Research School of Social Sciences, October 1992. 
In 1991, correspondence with Supreme Court officials in New South Wales. South Australia, Queensland. 
Tasmania and Western Australia revealed that this information was not readily available. The actual 
usage of the in formd pa11peris procedures in the 19th century could only be obtained by a manual search 
of the files, and staff were unavailable for this purpose. 
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Prothonotary knows of only two cases in which the in forma pauperis provisions have 
been availed of. 124 
The situation in criminal proceedings was the same, although for slightly different 
reasons. The colonial Supreme Courts had not incorporated the received inherent 
poor persons jurisdiction of the Court of King: s Bench into their everyday practice -
in fact, they appear to not have acknowledged it at all. 125 However, its background 
presence may have accounted for their adoption of the 'dock brief or 'dock defence' 
- or else they may simply have replicated modern metropolitan criminal court 
practice. In certain circumstances, the 'dock-brier system - which itself was 
probably a corruption of the in formd pauperis procedure - allowed judges to appoint 
barristers to defend an otherwise unrepresented poor accused for a nominal fee. Its 
emergence was closely associated with the establishment of a statutory right to legal 
representation in serious criminal proceedings. In the late 19th century, it was 
employed in the colonies, although probably not to any gre'lt extent and generally 
limited to trials of capital and other major indictable offences in the Supreme 
Courts. 126 
In the 1870s and 1880s, a more predictable form of criminal legal aid appeared in the 
colonies. Most governments began to provide legal assistance for the defence of 
poor accused facing trial for serious ·'criminal offences in the Supreme Courts. 127 
These schemes were non-statutory, relying upon the traditional prerogative powers to 
provide justice for the 'poor' - as exercisable by modern executive governments.128 
Legal aid took the form of financial assistance provided at the discretion of the 
colonial Attorneys-General or Ministers for Justice. 129 The amount paid for the 
defence of legally-aided accused was modest - in 1880 in Victoria, £I 0.10.0, rising 
l~S 
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Mr. Slater. Attorney-General in the Hogan AlP Government, above n 46 at 3000-3001 & 3004. 
Borrada/e v Dai·enport [1958] VR 470 per .:iholl J at 472. No significant Australillll case law appears in 
his Honour"s review of the relevant juriicial authority at 474-476. Similm·1y, 1he presence of this 
jurisdiction does not appear to have bee:1 canvassed before the High Court of Australia in either Mc /1111es 
v R ( 1975) 27 ALR 449 and Dietricl: v R (1992) 109 ALR 385: D Fieming. "Legal Aid" in The laws of 
Australia, ( 1996) Vol I I Criminal Procedure at 11.9 [12J. 
For instance. Qld PD 1907 Vol Xc.JX at 485 refer to the cr11duct of a 'dock brier defence in a murder 
trial in 1894. Other instances appear a: NSW PD 1907 V(.11 XCIX at 671 & Vic PD 1916 Vol CXLIII at 
1222. 
By 1900, comparable types of schemes operated in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria. and 
probably also Western Australia. Initially, the Queensland scheme appears to have been restricted to 
Aboriginal accused: J H Phillips, The Trial of Ned Kelly, (1987) at 26-33; WA PD 1928 Vol 80 at 2025. 
There is every reason to believe that comparable schemes also operated in South Australia and Tasmania. 
Indeed, the first Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, Alfred Deakin said inter alia in 1903, in 
response to an amendment to the Judiciary Bill 1903 (Cth), that in "moving the amendment the honorable 
member has correctly stated the practice with which I am personally familiar, and which, I believe, is 
followed irt the several States. The practice is to assign counsel to prisoners only in capital cases, and the 
power to do so is not very frequently employed": Cth Par) Deb 1903 Vol 14 at 1529. 
Above at p 23-24. 
In practice. the schemes were administered by public officials. For example. in New South Wales an 
accused person seeking legal aid would first apply to a local Clerk of Petty Sessions - who would forward 
the application to the Attomey-Gi:neral. If necessary, enquiries would then be made through the Police 
Department as to the financial means of the accused. and other relevant matters: NSW PD 1907 Vol 
XCIX at 668-669. 
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to £14.14.0 if counsel was briefed.'3° These amounts fell well short of the 
professional fees commanded by experienced criminal lawyers of the day. 131 
Consequently, in practice it was often only young or inexperienced lawyers who 
would agree to conduct legally-aided defences. 132 However, the conte'tnporary 
politician who claimed that the "experiments of medical students on the human 
anatomy are not to be compared with the experiments that have been made by junior • 
counsel on men whose liberty or life has been at stake in this country" was probably 
overstating the case. 133 Generally, these schemes provided legal aid for the conduct 
of the defenc.e of all poor accused charged with capital offences, and also in some 
colonies for the defence of all Aboriginal people charged with non-capital indictable 
offences. 
From Federation to the 1930s 
When the colonial period ended, the introduction of state pension schemes and wage 
regulation in the 1890s had already signalled the emergence of the embryonic 
Australian welfare state. 134 Comparable social welfare trends continued in the new 
national polity in- the 1900s and 191 Os.135 By the 1920s, the system of political 
economy and regulation, which would shape the public policy of the Australian 
welfare state until the early 1980s, was well entrenched. Yet , in the 1900s, 191 Os 
and 1920s neither the new Commonwealth nor the State governments provided 
general schemes of legal aid for their citizens. And they only minimally expanded 
the availability of legal aid for poorer people. Neither did this period see the 
emergence of significant non-state private charitable and benevolent and trade union 
legal aid schemes - which had already been the experience in Britain, Germany and 
the United States. 136 
130 
131 
I., ,_ 
133 
134 
136 
/ 
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Apparently, the administrative maxima could be exceeded in exceptional cases. For instance, in 1880 the 
celebrated folk hero Ned Kelly received legal aid at his trial for murder in the Supreme Court of Victoria. 
His instructing solicitor applied for payment of the full amount of the fees sought by the barrister 
originally briefed to conduct the defence. This application was refused, and payment made at the 
standard rate: J H Phillips, above n 127 at 32-33. These rates remained unchanged in Victoria in 1915:ocl.-, 
6 of the Regulations Relative to Defence of Destitute Persons Charged with Capital Crimes and of 
Aboriginals charged with Indictable Offences, Victorian Government Gazette, 27 October 1915, No 148 
at 4187. 
For instance, The banister initially retained to defend Ned Kelly· described by J H Phillips (above n 127 
at 26) as "a rising star in his profession" - demanded a '3rief fee of £50.50.0, with daily refreshers of 
£10.10.0 after the second day of the trial. 
J H Phillips, ibid. at 28-29, records how eventually the "most inexperienced barrister in the colony", who 
had never appeared in the Supreme Court and had practised in Victoria for less th•'n a year, was briefed 
to conduct the defence ofNed Kelly. 
NSW PD 1907 Vol XCIX at 672-673. 
MA Jones. The Australian Welfare State: Growth, Crisis and Change. (1983) at 19-30: NG Butlin, A 
Barnard & J J Pincus, Government and Capitalism, ( 1982) at 9-12. 
MA Jones, above n 134 at 19-30. 
"Legal Aid to Poor Persons" (1928) 2 Australian Law Journal at 181; R L Abel. above n 2 at 537.539 
summarises developments in non-state civil legal aid in comparable Western societies in this period. 
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The Stance of the Commonwealth 
The creation of a national government and Commonwealth Parliament in 1901 had 
little impact on the availability of legal aid. Both entities showed few, if any, signs 
of interest in the organised national provision of legal aid for Australian citizens. It 
is true that in 1903 the Parliament legislated for legal aid for the defence of poorer 
accused facing trial for indictable offences against its criminal laws. 137 It is also· true 
that by 1910 legislators - together with the judges of the High Court of Australia -
had made other fresh provision for legal aid. 138 However, the significance of these 
developments is generally misunderstood. They were not, as is often implied, the 
progenitors of Commonwealth participation in the post-war national scheme.139 In 
the 1900s and 191 Os, federal law and government made few intrusions on the daily 
lives of ordinary residents of the States. They were unlikely to invoke the civil 
jurisdiction of the High Court, and even less likely to attract the attentions of 
Commonwealth criminal law, or the courts-martial provisions of the Defence Act. 
MorecYer, the developments in federal legal aid in the 1900s did not reflect 
initiatives in national social welfare or social justice policy. In any event, the social 
pressures for greater popular access to legal aid were probably not great - pre-World 
War I Australian society was unusually inventive and prosperous. 140 
Instead, new national provision of legal aid in the 1900s and 191 Os was the product 
of less dramatic forces. On the one hand, it was simply part - and a very minor part -
of the establishment of the basic machinery of the federal state and its supreme court. 
By this time, minimal public provision of legal aid for poor accused in serious 
criminal matters, and poor civil litigants in the superior courts, was de rigeur in 
comparable Western states. 141 On the other hand, the appearance of federal legal aid 
schemes was also a product of happenstance. The legal aid provisions in the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Defence Act 1903 (Cth) originated in amendments 
moved by non-ministerial members of the House of Representatives personally 
interested in law reform and procedural justice.142 They were not deliberate state 
initiatives - the Federal Government accepted them on 'good housekeeping' grounds, 
and because they confonned with comparable developments in metropolitan law. 
From 1910 until 1941, the national government displayed no further interest in legal 
aid. 143 Throughout this period, the provision of legal aid in Australia was seen as 
primarily a governmental responsibility of the States. The federal position is 
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Section 69(3) Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). 
Sections 96 & I 03 Defence Act 1903 (Cth). The original Rules of Court of the High Court of Australia 
(Commonwealth Statutory Rules 130/19!0) came into force on I January 1911. · 
JP Harkins, ''Federal Legal Aid in Australia" (unpub. paper 1976) at paras l.l-1.4: National Legal Aid 
Advisory Committee, above n 7 at 24-25. 
G Bolton. A View From The Edge: An A11stralian Stocktaking, ( 1992) at 16-19. 
The poor persons provisions in Order III of the High Court Ruies simply replicated existing provisions in 
the Rules of Court of the State Supreme Courts. 
Cth Par! Deb 1903 Vol 14 at 1529-1530, 1555, 1557 & 1562: Cth Pnrl Deb 1903 Vol 15 at 3291 & 4059-
60. 
S 17 Seaman's Compensation Act 191 l (Cth) also made provision for regulations which may affect legal 
assistance. These nre published in Commonwealth Government Gazette 7 October 1926. 
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tellingly illustrated in a 1925 exchange of correspondence between the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations and the Prime Minister. 144 On 24 February 1925, 
the Secretary-General wrote to the Prime Minister seeking details of provision for 
legal aid for resident and other indigent foreign nationals in Australia. 14' His letter 
also asked the Prime Minister to indicate the willingness of Australian governments 
to enter into an international treaty guaranteeing foreigners equivalent access to 
citizens to legal aid in civil matters. The initial response of the Prime Minister was 
to refer the enquiry to the States.146 When he eventually replied to the Secretary-
General, the Prime Minister relayed the answers of the respondent States, neither 
referring to the existing Commonwealth legal aid schemes nor indicating its attitude 
to the proposed treaty. Whilst his response was not intended to define national legal 
aid policy, and was consistent with the intra-governmental conventions applying in 
the 1920s to the Commonwealth role in international law, it demonstrates that the 
real story of legal aid in this period is to be found in developments in the States. 147 
The Developments in the States 
In the first 30 years of Federation, legal aid in the States - with one minor exception -
remained the preserve of governments and the legal profession. 148 The major 
developments were the enactment of the poor prisoners' defence and criminal 
appeals legislation, and the refonn of the arrangements for civil legal aid in the State 
superior and intennediate courts. The story of these and related developments is 
narrated below. 
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Australian Archives (Mitchell, ACT): Department of External Affairs, Series No. A98 I, League of 
Nations - Legal Aid for the Poor. l 925. 
The League of Nations had resolved in 1924 to adopt measures intended to increase the access of foreign 
nationals to legal aid in its member states. Awareness of this problem had been heightened by the 
experience of mass migration, presumably following the political dislocations following World War I. 
The Premiers of Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia replied saying that legal aid in 
those States was equally available to foreign nationals. However, orlly Tasmania was prepared to enter 
an international treaty guaranteeing foreign nationals equal access to civil legal aid. Queensland was 
prepared to participate bu1 • like Western Australia • saw little need for a treaty. Victoria reserved its 
decision, pending sighting a draft international agreement: Australian Archives: Legal Aid for the Poor, 
1925, above at n 144. 
The response of the Prime Minister indicates that an international treaty on legal aid was seen by the 
Commonwealth as falling outside its governmental responsibilities. In 1925, the scope of 
Commonwealth power to enter into international treaties on behalf of Australia was not settled - the 
question was first considered by the High Court in R v Burgess: £.x parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608. In 
B11rgess, Evatt and McTieman JJ 462 at 466 suggested the capacity of the Commonwealth to rely on the 
external affairs power to enter into International Labour Organisation treaties was limited. Also. it 
appears that ii was the practice i11. the 1920s for the States themselves to participate in international 
treaties affecting Australia. 
In the early 1920s, the newly-formed ex-servicemen's organisation Legacy provided limited legal aid 
informally to former World War I servicemen and thejf families: M H Ellis, The Torch: A Picture of 
Legacy, ( l 957) at 60. 
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Tile Poor Prisoners' Defence Legislation 
In 1907, New South Wales and Queensland joined the Commonwealth in enacting 
provision for legal aid for the defence of 'poor' accused committed for trial for 
indictable offences.149 By 1930, all the States - except Tasmania - had followed 
suit. 150 These enactments were known as the poor prisoners' defence legislation, and 
they remained the principal machinery for criminal legal aid in the States until the 
1960s."' 
This legislation replaced the infonnal criminal legal aid schemes operated by the 
colonial governments. "2 Its provisions took various forms in the different States. 
For instance, in Victoria s 2 (1) of the Poor Prisoners Defence Act 1916 provided 
that any "person committed for trial for an indictable offence against the laws of 
Victoria may at any time within fourteen days after committal and before the trial 
jury is sworn apply in writing in the prescribed fonn to a Judge of the Supreme Court 
or to a chainnan of a court of general sessions or to a police magistrate for legal aid 
for his defence". Whilst the provision in the other States had similar objectives, they 
did not, notwithstanding the hopes of the Commonwealth 1903. reflect the presence 
of a coordinated national response. 153 It was simply that State 1c:gislators - like their 
Commonwealth counterparts - had taken the provisions in the metropolitan Poor 
Prisoners' Defence Act 1903 (UK) as a model. 154 
Administratively, responsibility for triggering the poor prisoners' defence legislation 
rested with an accused, although - on the basis of the New South \Vales experience -
judges, magistrates, police and other officials frequently guided poor accused 
towards its provisions. iss An accused was first require:i to apply to a judge or 
magistrate for a certificate of eligibility. 156 Generally, this application was required 
to be made after committal, and prior to the swearing in of a jury for the trial."' An 
applicant was also generally required to satisfy two threshold criteria too qualify for 
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S 2 Poor Prisonei;s Defence Act, 1907 (NSW); s 2 The Poor Prisoners' Defence Act of 1907 (Qld). 
S 2 Poor Prisoners Defence Act 1916 (Vic): s 3 Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1925 (SA): s 5 Poor 
Persons Legal Assistan-:e Act 1928 (WA). 
Below at p 56. 
Above at pp 25-27. Steps had already been taken in Victoria to regularise the administrative 
arrangements. In 1911, 1915 and 1916, provisions of its scheme were incorporated into instruments 
made by the Executive Government (Regulations Relative to Defence of Destitute Persons Charged with 
Capiml Crimes and of Aboriginals charged with Indictable Offences, above n 128). 
Cth Par! Deb 1903 Vol 14 1529. 
Ibid: NSW PD 1907 Vol XXVII at 661: Vic PD 1916 Vol CXLIH at 1222 . 
.-
C E Weigall, "Poor Prisoner' Defence" (1941) 15 Australian Law Journal 72 at 72. In 1916, the 
Attorney-General in Victoria expressed the hope that similar infonnal facultative processes would evolve 
in the administration of its own legislation: Vic PD 1916 Vol CXLllI at 1226. 
In Western Australia. the procedure was different. Section 5 of the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 
1928 (WA) required an accused to apply to the Attorney-General - the application would then be referred 
to the Law Society to assess eligibility for legal aid. 
The Commonwealth, Victorian and Western Australian legislation also required that an application be 
made within 14 days of committal for trial although this requirement may sometimes have been waived if 
the practice in 1970s and 1980s in the administration of s 69(3) o.f the Judiciary Act 1903 is any guide: D 
Fleming, ''Legal Aid" above n 125 at [16). See also R v Pierce [1961] VR 496. 
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the issue of a certificate. First, he or she was required to establish their inability to 
afford the cost of lawyer representation for the conduct of a defence. "8 Secondly, 
applicants were required to establish the desirability - in the interests of justice, - that 
he or she be legally represented at trial. 159 Relevant considerations included the 
applicant's.personal circumstances, and his or her legitimate interest in obtaining 
legal representation. However, the central premise of this conception of the 
'interests of justice' was the wider public interest in procedural fairness in the 
criminal justice process. 160 
An applicant accused also carried the onus of establishing eligibility for legal aid -
proving that their own and the public interest would be best served by a grant of legal 
aid. 161 If they did so, applicants became entitled to a certificate of eligibility which 
empowered State Attorneys-General to exercise a statutory discretion to grant legal 
aid. 162 In capital cases, the evidence suggests that this discretion was generally 
exercised in favour of an accused. 163 In non-capital cases, the State authorities 
assessed applications on their merits, including the basis of the proposed defence. 
For instance, in New South Wales legal aid would generally be granted if the facts 
disclosed a real defence, or if a question of law was likely to arise at the trial. 164 In 
the 1930s, in the few Commonwealth cases in which the judges of the High Court 
granted a certificate of eligibility under s 69(3) of the Judiciary Act I 903, the 
Attorney-General generally granted legal aid.165 
Various arrangements existed for lhe provision of legal aid in the poor prisoners' 
defence schemes. In Western Australia - and Queensland until 1916 when the Public 
Curator was authorised to pr9vide legal representation for the defence of poor 
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Again, the Western Australian procedure was different. An applicant was required to satisfy the Law 
Society that he or she was impoverished - s 2 of the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1928 (WA) 
defined a "poor person" as anyone who proved that he or she was ·•not worth £50 (excluding his wearing 
apparel and tools of trade, and, in a civil proceeding, the subject matter of such proceeding). if such poor 
person is then married then he or she and his or her wife or husband as the case may be are not together 
worth said sum of £50 and that SIJth poor person has not earned th'e basic wage detennined and declared 
under the provisions of the Industrial Arbitration Act. 1912-1925, during the previous twelve months; and 
also any other person who proves that spcci:tl circumstances incidental to his case necessitate legal 
attention which his means do not enable him to obtain". 
In Western Australia, the equivalent statutory test was expressed as the 'overall merits' of an application 
for legal aid. 
Re Matthew Forrest {1912] VLR 466 per Cussen J at 468-469: Re.t v Douglas (1904] 10 "The Argus" 
law Reports 100 per Hodges J at IOI. 
For instance, in the 1930s and 1940s the justices of the High Coun required applicants to file a supporting 
statutory declaration evidencing their inability to pay for - or obtain - sufficient funds for the conduct of a 
defence. The justices also required an applicant to include a brief statement explaining why the interests 
of justice would be served by the provision of legal representation. Applicants who failed to comply with 
this procedure "were invariably refused": Mr. Frank Jones, Registrar of the High Court of Australia. letter 
12 November 1991 at 2-3. 
In South Australia. s 3(2) of the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1925 conferred this power on the 
Supreme Court judges. 
CE Weigall. above n ISS at 72. This was probably also true of the other States. given the experience of 
the infonnal criminal legal aid scheme introduced by the colonial governments. 
Ibid. 
Mr. Frank Jones. above n 161 at 2-3. 
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accused - it was provided by private legal practitioners. 166 Thereafter, in Queensland, 
lawyers in the Public Curator's Office worked as de facto public defenders to 
represent legally-aided accused. 167 Between 1916 and 1927 in Victoria, legal 
assistance was provided by private legal practitioners. In 1927, a statutory Public 
Solicitor assumed responsibility for poor prisoners' defence, although retaining 
private barristers to represent legally-aided accused at trial. 1~ A similar statutory 
office was created in South Australia in 1925 and was invested with responsibility 
for representing legally-aided accused. 169 However, in 1933 this role was devolved 
to the private legal profession when existing arrang~ments for legal ·aid were 
reorganised. 170 In New South Wales, until 1941, when a Public Defender was 
established, legal representation was provided by private legal practitioners. 171 At the 
national level, the defence of legally-aided poor prisoners was conducted by 
practising barristers instructed by the Commonwealth Deputy Crown Solicitor in the 
State in which the trial was pending.172 
Tlze Crimi11al Appeals Legislation 
Between 1912 and 1924, the Parliaments in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria 
and South Australia enacted criminal appeals legislation modelled on similar refonns 
in the metropolitan criminal law.'73 This legislation included provisions for legal 
assistance for poor appellants unable to afford the cost of providing lawyers for the 
appeal. For instance, s I 0 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1914 (Vic) provided that the 
Attorney-General should "assign to an appellant a solicitor and counsel or counsel 
only in any appeal or new trial or proceedings preliminar/ or incidental to an appeal 
or new trial in which ... appears desirable in the interest of justice that the appellant 
should have legal aid and that he has not sufficient means to enable him to obtain 
that aid. " 174 Comparable provisions were enacted in the legislation of the other 
States. 175 The eligibility criteria and administration of legal aid under the criminal 
appeals legislation closely resembled the law and practice in the poor prisoners' 
schemes discussed above. 176 
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Regulations made on 30 March 1916 pursuant to s 114 (I) Public Curator Act 1915 (Qld) authorised .. the 
provision of legal aid in any legal proceedings by or against poor persons, accused persons, and others'': 
H Gregory, Tlie Queensland Law Society Inc. /928-88: A History, (1991) at 170. 
Ibid: Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, above n 27 at para 3.55. 
S 6(b) (ii) & (iii) Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1927 (Vic). 
S 8(c) and (d) Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1925 (SA). L Mumford, .. The South Australian Public 
Solicitors Office 1926-1933: A Public Salaried Legal Aid Scheme Ahead of Its Time?", (unpublished 
1996 Honours Thesis) records the background to the formation of the Office of Public Solicitor in South 
Australia. 
Below at p 37. 
Below at p 38. 
Mr. Frank Jones. above n 161at2-3. 
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW): The Criminal Code Amendment Act 1913 (Qld): Criminal Appeals 
Act 1924 {SA): Criminal Appeal Act 1914 (Vic). 
This provision was reenacted with minor amendments ass 601 Crimes Act 1915 (Vic). 
S 13 Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW); s 671CCriminal Code Act 1899 (Qld): s. 13 Criminal Appeals 
Act 1924 (SA). 
Above at pp 31-33. 
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Reform of tlte Poor Persons Law ill Civil Proceedi11gs 
Until World War I, the in forma pauperis provisions in the Rules of Court of the 
State Supreme Courts remained the principal form of legal aid in civil proceedings. 
At the outbreak of war in 1914, it appears that some State law societies provided free 
legal advice, wills and other minor legal services to enlisting soldiers. in More 
significantly, in the closing months of the War in 1918, New South Wales introduced 
reforms to its existing arrangements for civil legal aid. Legislation was enacted 
which reformed the in forma pauperis procedures in its Supreme Court. 178 Over the 
next 14 years, legislators in South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia and 
Tasmania followed suit. 179 It was only in Queensla.;ti that statutory reform of civil 
legal aid did not cccur. In 1915, the expanded functions of its l>ublic Curator had 
included reform to civil legal aid, which was thenceforth available tu poorer people 
in conveyancing, wills and probate matters. 180 Moreover, in the 1920s and 1930s, the 
Queensland Law Society and the Bar administered an informal scheme whereby 
legal representation was available to civil litigants proceeding in forma pauperis in 
Supreme Court actions.181 
In the other States, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia and Tasmania, 
the purpose of legal aid reform was to "make effective provisions of our civil and 
criminal law, which, at the present time, are ineffective". 182 The reforms were 
primarily schematic and administrative retaining the principles and machinery of the 
poor persons procedures. 183 Consequently, successful applicants retained both the 
procedural privileges, and social stigma of poor parties. The changes in New South 
Wales and Tasmania were modelled on the Poor Persons Rules introduced in the 
civil divisions of the English Supreme Court in early 1914.'84 In 1918, the New 
South Wales variant of the metropolitan scheme authorised the judges of its Supreme 
Court to make comparable procedural rules enabling litigants to take, defend or be a 
party to proceedings in the Court as a "poor person".'85 In 1932 in Tasmania, new 
rules modelled on the Poor Persons Rules were made directly by the judges of the 
Supreme Court. In both States, the new Rules of Court made few changes to the 
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Documents in the Australian Archives (Australian War Memorial) indicate that the Law Institute of New 
South Wales, the Australian Services Movement and the Australian National Services League cooperated 
to provide legal advice to soldiers. 
Poor Persons Legal Remedies Act 1918 (NSW). 
Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1925 (SA): Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1927 (Vic): Poor 
Persons Legal Assistance Act 1928 (WA): Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act I 932 (Tas) and Part I 
Division 3 of the Rules of Court made under its provisions. 
Above at p 32-33. 
H Gregory, above n 166 at 170. 
Mr. Slater, Attorney-General in the Hogan Labor Government. above n 46 at 2999: NSW PD 1918 Vol 
LXXllI at 2269-2270. 
For example s 2 of the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1927 (Vic) was expressed in terms of 
extending the privilege of suing or defending informa pauperis in civil proceedings. 
Lord High Chancellor. Report of the Committee on Legal Aid and Legal Advice in England and Wales, 
Cmd 6641, (1945) at 2: S Pollock, legal Aid. The First 25 Years, (1975) at 12·14. 
S 3 Poor Persons Legal Remedies Act 1918 (NSW). Legislative authority was deemed necessary because 
the Supreme Court judges had doubts about the scope of their inherent jurisdiction to provide relief to 
poor civil litigants: NSW PD 1918 Vol LXXIII at 2274. 
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existing poor persons procedural law . The major innovation was that the organised 
legal profession now agreed to participate on a regular basis in providing legal 
representation to poor parties in Supreme Court proceedines. 186 
In the end, a similar solution was adopted in Western Australia. Apparently, the 
Poor Persons Legal Assistance Bill 1928 (WA) originally only made provisioq for 
the creation of a statutory Public Solicitor. However, the introduction of the Bill 
sparked the interest of the Law Society.187 Consequently, in its passage through the 
parliamentary process the Bill was amended - still providing for the appointment of a 
Public Solicitor, but only if the Law Society was unwilling to carry out those 
statutory functions. 188 The absence of a Public Solicitor in Western Australia in the 
1920s suggests that the Law Society proved willing to administer the new legal aid 
scheme. 
On the other hand, in South Australia and Victoria the establishment of Public 
Solicitors in the mid- l 920s was an integral part of the reforms to civil legal aid. 189 
These new statutory creatures were required to be legal practitioners whose primary 
function in civil matters was to provide legal representation to approved poorer 
litigants. In both States, the choice of a public lawyer for poor civil parties was 
prompted by a belief that reforms modelled on the 1914 Poor Persons Rules were 
impracticable. 190 In South Australia, the Attorney-General considered that "to solve 
the problem of providing legal assistance for the poor, the government needed to take 
responsibility for legal aid". 191 In Victoria, the Attorney-General blamed the legal 
profession for the "utterly ineffective" state of the existing poor persons procedures 
in its Supreme Court Rules. 192 He also claimed that the evidence from England was 
that relatively few solicitors actually participated in the 1914 scheme}93 These 
arguments carried the day. From 1928 until 1961, the Public Solicitor in Victoria 
was to be solely responsible for civil legal aid. 194 In South Australia, a Public 
Solicitor was appointed in 1925, but his role was short-lived. In 1933, the office was 
abolished, and its functions replaced by a new civil legal aid scheme administered by 
the Law Society. 195 
In all States, reforms liberalised the financial eligibility criteria for civil legal aid. 
Previously, these had remained fixed at their 19th century maxima of a personal nett 
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worth not exceeding £25. 196 In New South Wales and Victoria, the legal aid refotms 
increased the maximum qualifying amount to £50, excluding an applicant's clothes 
and tools of trade and the subject-matter of the proceedings. 197 In South Australia, 
the statutory maxima was increased to £100. 198 Comparable reforms to the capital 
criteria were also made in Western Australia and Tasmania.199 However, these States 
also introduced a new requirement that an applicant's weekly income fall within 
prescribed limits. In Western Australia, an applicant for civil legal aid was required 
to establish that he or she had not earned the basic wage fixed by the Industrial 
Arbitration Act 1912 (WA) in the previous 12 months.200 In Tasmania, the 1932 • 
reforms provided that the usual income of an applicant should not exceed £3, or, in 
special circumstances, £4, per week.201 Moreover, in all States the reforms typically 
extended the scope of civil legal to proceedings before District or County Courts, 
workers' compensation courts and tribunals and sometimes other jurisdictions.202 
The 1930s and the Developments During World War II 
From the late 1920s until the late 1930s, Australia shared in the worldwide blight of 
economic recession. These social circumstances ••could have stimulated the growth 
of the [Australian] welfare state".203 Instead, for various reasons it was economic and 
not social policy which dominated the welfare state in the 1930s. 204 The onset of 
recession also retarded developments in the legal profession and lawyers' services 
industry.205 The combination of these and related factors meant that the legal aid 
schemes in the 1930s were generally moribund, with the principal exception of the 
developments in South Australia in 1933. Social salvation of a kind came to 
Australia in the early 1940s in the course of the World War II. It was the coming of 
war - and its unintended and incidental gradual restoration of national economic and 
social well-being - which produced the remaining developments in legal aid 
discussed in this chapter. 
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The Developments in Legal Aid for Poorer People 
In the 1930s, the public face of legal aid in Australia was one of stability. In 1935, 
the Commonwealth introduced a legal aid scheme in the Northern Territory.206 
However, this merely replicated the limited provisions for civil legal aid already 
available to residents of the States, and the pre-war Commonwealth national position 
was undisturbed. With one exception, the State: retained their existing arrangements 
for civil and criminal legal aid. 
The exception - as foreshadowed above - was South Australia. By the early 1930s, 
both the government and the Law Society believed that the legal aid scheme 
administered by the Public Solicitor had failed to meet public expectations. They 
saw the 1925 scheme as limited in scope and as providing legal aid in a narrow range 
of proceedings and legal problems.207 These shortcomings were compounded by 
divorce law reform in 1929, and the economic stringencies wrought by the onset of 
the Great Depression. 208 Some private legal practitioners also complained that the 
Public Solicitor was assisting parties who were financially able to pay for lawyer 
services.209 In 1933, when the government invited the Law Society to cooperate with 
the Public Solicitor in providing legal aid, it rejected the invitation, making a 
counter-proposal to create a legal aid scheme modelled on the English 1914 Poor 
Persons Rules.210 In fact, the scheme proposed by the Law Society was far more 
generous and comprehensive than the metropolitan scheme; its members were 
willing to agree to provide legal aid to poorer people requiring representation in 
various civil, criminal and matrimonial proceedings, together with advice and 
assistance in non-contentious matters.211 Assistance would be freely available for the 
genuinely poor, and for ordinary people - the 'non-poor', on lower incomes • on 
payment of a financial contribution graduated according to income, capital and other 
means.212 The Law Society's counter-proposal was subject to the condition that its 
members would assume all the functions of the Public Solicitor. The South 
Australian government accepted the offer, and its terms, and the new scheme began 
on I September 1933.213 
This second round of change to legal aid in South Australia reflected two 
undercurrents behind the public face of legal aid in the 1930s. One was the position 
of the private legal profession. The developments in South Australia followed the 
reaction of the Law Society of South Australia in 1928. Both demonstrate the 
growing interest of the State legal professions in controlling legal aid. These two 
206 
207 
208 
209 
210 
211 
212 
213 
Poor Persons Legal Assistance Ordinance 1935 (NT). 
D Bruce-Ross. "A Legal Assistance Scheme" (1948) 22 Australian Law Journal 51 at 54. 
Ibid: Australian Government Commission oflnquiry into Poverty, above n 27 at 36. 
D Bruce-Ross, above n 207 at 54. 
Ibid. 
Ibid: Australian Government Commission oflnquiry into Poverty, above n 27 at 35. 
D Bruce-Ross. above n 207 at 54. 
Originally, the scheme was known as the Poor Persons Legal Relief Scheme • its name was later changed 
to the Legal Assistance Scheme. The operation of the scheme was facilitated by the Poor Persons Legal 
Assistance Act 1936 (SA). 
38 
law societies were not alone. In 1937, the Law Institute of Victoria made 
representations to the Victorian government to replace the legal aid functions of the 
Public Solicitor with a scheme akin to the South Australian model. 214 Whilst its 
representations were rejected, the general point is nevertheless made. 215 The other 
undercurrent was the decay of the Poor Persons Rules type-scheme in New South 
Wales. By the end of the 1930s, it was evident that the hopes of reformers in 1918 
for effective civil legal aid through the organised voluntary efforts of private legal 
practitioners had not been realised.216 The operations of the scheme were described 
as "slow and cumbrous, and that only those who are virtually paupers [were] eligible 
for its benefits, if they may be so called".217 
It was this problem in New South Wales which prompted the final significant 
development in legal aid for poorer people in the States in this period. In the early 
1940s, the McKell Labor Government initiated a series of reforms to legal aid, its 
Attorney-General readily conceding that whilst they would not create a popular 
"legal utopia", they would "build a system that will be a tremendous improvement on 
the existing utterly inadequate arrangements".218 
The changes began with reforms to the administration of criminal legal aid. In 1941, 
a non-statutory Office of Public Defender was established within the Attorney-
General' s Department.219 The Office was to be constituted by barristers employed to 
conduct the defence of poorer criminal accused granted legal aid. Two years later, 
the Legal Assistance Act 1943 (NSW) established a new scheme of civil legal aid for 
the benefit of "persons of limited means and with limited income".:?.."O The Act also 
created a Public Solicitor to administer the scheme and make arrangements for legal 
assistance.221 This scheme differed from its predecessor - and existing statutory 
arrangements for legal aid in other States - in one important respect. A person 
granted legal aid was no longer required to be officially stigmatised as poor - anyone 
in New South Wales whether 'rich', poor or of indifferent means or status was 
entitled to apply for legal aid.m However, popular eligibility did not mean universal 
entitlement - this was to be determined by the Public Solicitor in accordance with 
specified jurisdictional, financial and other criteria.223 Nevertheless, entitlement was 
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extensive, with the Commissioner for Law and Poverty suggesting in 1975 that 
contemporary records indicated that as many as 75% of New South Wales residents 
were financially eligible for legal aid when the scheme was introduced in 1943.224 
The Legal Assistance Act made legal aid available in civil proceedings in the District 
Co.µrt, and civil and matrimonial proceedings in the Supreme Gourt.225 Civil legal aid 
was also available in related appeals, and proceedings in the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council.226 In civil matters, legal representatio,n was provided either by the 
Public Solicitor and other employed lawyers - or else by private legal practitioners.227 
In crimi~al proceedings, it was provided by lawyers in the Office of Public Defender 
- whose functions were the Act expanded. 
The Outbreak of War, the Law Societies and Legal Aid for Soldiers 
The anned forces of the Commonwealth were mobilised within a few days of the 
official outbreak of World War II in September 1939. In the next six months, large 
numbers of civilians enlisted for military sel'Vice - these new military personnel 
frequently needed legal advice to assist in making the transition from civilian life. In 
the first few months of the war, the State Jaw societies and legal practitioners 
volunteered to provide infonnal legal advice schemes.228 
However, within a few months these initial arrangements for legal aid were 
formalised. In February 1940, the Law Institute of Victoria established a legal aid 
service for soldiers. Free legal advice and other lawyers' services were provided to 
members of the Australian Imperial Forces who had enlisted for overseas service and 
to their dependants - eligibility was subsequently extended to all members of the 
Commonwealth armed forces, their dependants, nurses training for overseas services 
and intending recruits. In July 1940, the Alf Director of Personnel Services at 
Southern Command in Melbourne wrote to his counterparts in Northern Command, 
Eastern Command, Western Command and the 7th Military District suggesting that 
the Victorian scheme might be a "way in which the services of the members of the 
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legal profession might be utilised".229 His suggestion prompted these officials to 
approach the other State law societies to establish voluntary legal aid schemes for 
soldiers. 
Soldiers' legal aid schemes were subsequently established by the law societies in 
New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia.230 
Services were provided by practising members of the law societies in their own c~ 
offices - or in temporary offices in military camps and recruiting offices. However, 
visiting military camps to provide legal aid was sometimes not without its problems. 
In September.1940, the Queensland Law Society agreed to provide solicitors to make 
weekly visits to camps at Enoggera, Grovely and Redbank, but this arrangement was 
to be short-lived. The solicitors experienced transport difficulties, and the demand 
for their services was less than predicted - in late November, the frequency of their 
visits was reduced to once a fortnight. n• By mid-1941, the Law Society advised the 
military authorities in Queensland that it would only provide legal aid to soldiers at 
its Brisbane office, and only on 24 hours notice. 232 
The services provided in the State soldiers' legal aid schemes were usually restricted 
to free legal advice, and the preparation of wills and powers of attorney. m When 
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necessary, arrangements would sometimes be made for soldiers to obtain assistance 
from solicitors practising in other States. In New South Wales - and almost certainly 
in other States - these arrangements were complemented by officers of the Public 
Trustee who visited military camps to provide legal advice and minor assistance.234 
The Formation of the Commonwealth Legal Servic~ Bureau 
In March 1941, the Federal Cabinet approved the establishment of a national scheme 
to advise members of the anned forces and their dependants on the operation of the 
National Security (War Service Moratorium) Regulations, the National Security 
(Reinstatement in Civil Employment) Regulations and similar provisions."' In its 
original visage, it appears that the Federal Government intended to rely on services 
provided voluntarily by the private legal profession to administer the scheme - the 
relevant minute contemplates the appointment of State panels of solicitors willing to 
give free legal advice.236 The scheme was advertised along these lines in mid-
1941.237 However, it appears· that the voluntary plan did not gain the support of the 
State law societies - which already made their own arrangements to pi:ovide legal aid 
for soldiers and their dependants. 231 In the event, it was decided - it is not clear 
precisely when, although the answer may yet lay in the archival records - to 
implement the scheme with the assistance of lawyers employed in the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department. 
However, by 1943 Legal Service Bureau (LSB) offices were in operation. Their 
function was basically to provide free lawyer services in connection with new legal 
problems arising out of the management of the war-time national economy. 
Accordingly, in 1943-44 its work focused around providing legal advice and 
assjsting with legal problems arising out of moratorium provisions. The work of its 
officers soon expanded to include providing advice to servicemen and their 
dependants in relation to their legal rights under the war time occupancy and rent 
control provisions. By I 945, LSB offices had been established in all State capitals, 
and several smaller cities in New South Wales and Queensland.239 
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The LSB was also involved with the Commonwealth Ministry of Post-War 
Reconstruction, established in late 1942 to plan for the future of the economy and 
society of the Australian welfare state.2'io In September 1945, the Attorney-General's 
Department agreed with a proposal from the Ministry that the LSB should prepare a 
legal aid pamphlet as part of a series of pamphlets to accompany a handbook entitled 
a "Return to Civil Life".241 400,000 copies were published, the majority being 
distributed to members of the armed forces on demobilisation, and the rest 
distributed to LSB offices and voluntary organisations.242 The pamphlet was soon 
revised with the assistance of the LSB. Mainly because difficulties had arisen with 
respect to the advice it cont~ined on tenancy law, notices to quit and taxation law, 
but also because of concerns that it was seen· as a legal manual instead of a 
procedural guide. 243 
Conclusion 
In 1945, the metropolitan poor persons jurisdiction had been part of the Australian 
law and government for over 120 years. Until the 191 Os, in traditional in formti 
pauperis procedure had - with colonial adaptations - provided the basis of civil legal 
aid in the Australian superior courts. rn criminal proceedings, neither the jurisdiction 
nor its procedures were ever specifically employed. However, the ancient 
prerogative functions from which they derived - the provision of justice and 
assistance to the weak and impoverished - were the foundation of the initial state 
responses to criminal legal aid - the 'dock-brief system and the informal scheme 
administered by the colonial and State executive governments. Furthermore, the 
modem application of these two prerogative functions lay behind the developments 
in criminal legal aid in the 1900s and 191 Os: the poor prisoners' defence and State 
criminal appeals legislation. This legislation represented a legalisation of existing 
practice, and this along the lines of metropolitan models. · 
Other developments in Australian legal aid in the 191 Os, 1920s and 1930s continued 
to reflect metropolitan developments.2~ Positively, in the case of the voluntary legal 
aid schemes in New South Wales and Tasmania modelled on the 19 I 4 Poor Persons 
Rules. Negatively, in the case of the decisions by governments in South Australia 
and Victoria and, at least in original conception, Western Australia to create statutory 
SJ Butlin & C 8 Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, (1977) at 625-679; YA Mamchak, "The Origins 
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..... Public Solicitors. However, this latter development, namely the administration or 
' provision of legal aid by state officials under the auspices of a legislative scheme on 
the basis of hybrid conceptions of 'impoverished citizenship', also represented a 
significant departure from the metropolitan experience. This was not the British 
interwar experience - where legal aid remained a niggardly gesture of the legal 
profession and the state towards the poor.245 In reality, the Australian experienc.e in 
the 1920s and 1930s may not have been spectacularly different - in fact, it almost 
certainly wasn't. Nevertheless, in the Public Solicitor schemes we glimpsed the links 
between the state, legal aid and modern citizt>nship - . the essential elements of 
citizens' legal assistance in the welfare state. 
;J,'> ..... 
Precisely why this occurred in some Australian States in the 1920s is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it appears that it was a product of a cocktail of factors. 
Something was happening to the legal profession - although our knowledge of this is 
fragmentary. The traditional nepotistic selection practices in solicitors' employment 
were bowing to meritocracy in a few signs of fracture. 246 For many solicitors, it was 
a difficult period to worsen during the Depression.247 There were also developments 
in the organised legal profession, and indications of a higher public profile. Calls .in 
1924 and 1927 for an Australian Law Association were followed by the 
establishment of the Law Council of Australia at a national conference in 1933, at 
which the Chief Justice of the High Court spoke about the duties anci opportunities of 
the legal profession.248 The State governments themselves - at least in New South 
Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia - began to articulate 
increased expectations of the social functions of the profession.249 Thi~ was 
especially so in the Labor governments in the three States - South Australia, Victoria 
and \Vestem Australia - which legislated for Public Solicitors. The developments in 
Australian legal aid before 1945 culminated in New South Wales in the early 1940s, \ 
in particular in the 1943 general, citizen-based legal aid scheme. In retrospect, this 
was a remarkable development which pre-empted the national schemi established in 
Britain in 1949, which has been acknowledged as the beginning of the Western post-
war experience, by six years and which was at least as broad in scope and 
conception.:?.S0 
Nevertheless, in 1945, at the national level legal aid provision in Australia remained 
un-coordinated and diverse, like the legal profession and legal services system itself. 
The formation and operations of the LSB had not been the forerunner, as legend 
would have it, of a Commonwealth inspired, national citizen's legal aid scheme. In 
1942-1945, the LSB had functioned primarily in facilitating Federal administration 
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of the economy, society and de-mobilisation of the war time welfare state, an 
incident of the unprecedented expansion of its administrative functions.m Neither 
does any long-term peacetime role of the LSB - cir the national provision of legal aid 
to Commonwealth citizens - appear to have been on the agenda of the social planners 
in the Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction. Nor does the Federal Labor 
Government appear to have contemplated the legislative needs of a national scheme 
in its various proposals over 1943-45 to expand Commonwealth powers over 
national economic regulation and social welfare provision. :m 
However, it was not as though there was no interest in legal aid in Australi:.&. The 
law societies, lawyers and reformers were aware of developments in Britain. m More 
significantly, in September 1945 the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Dr H V 
Evatt, clearly had in contemplation a continuing, peacetime function for the LSB, 
maybe even as the nucleus of a new and significant post-war national scheme.254 
Thou3hts of a national continued expanded role for the LSB existed in the immediate 
post-war period.255 Yet, as we describe in the next chapter, it was to be almost 30 
years before the estaplishment of a national legal aid scheme. 
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Chapter Three 
The Post-War Background 
Mr. HA YLEN. I direct a question to the Attorney-General regarding the announcement 
that 600,000 pensioners and persons entitled to claim social services benefits are to be 
provided with free legal advice by the Legal Service Bureau e;tablished by the Attorney-
General's Department for the benefit of ex-servicemen •.. Since it is proposed to extend its 
operations to involve the giving of advice to civilians, wiU the bureau be decentralized by 
the setting up of country branches, so that this very important org~nization, which works 
for the under-privileged, may be more readily accessible to the people? 
Dr. EV A TI. - ... The Legal Service Bureau, which was set up to help ex-servicemen and 
their dependants, has a statutory basis, and its work is not only being continued, but is also 
being extended ... Under the new arrangements, officers in the bureau are authorized to 
deal with legal questions arising ou! of certain social services claims. The Minister for 
Social Services and I have arranged that officers of the bureau shall be available to give 
advisings if called upon by claimants for age, invalid or widows' pensions, in connexion 
with which legal questions sometimes arise regarding their property and means ... 
Question Time in the House of Representatives, 30 September 1949, Cth Parl Deb 1949 
Vol 204 at 775-776 
Introduction 
Australia w'ls a laggard in joining in the post-war 'wave' of legal aid in welfare 
capitalism. This chapter tells the story of developments in the politics and 
administration of legal aid in the Comm9nwealth and the States from 1945 until 
1972, i.e. the post-war period preceding the national scheme which emerged in 1973-
76. 
The chapter begins by describing the peacetime functions of the Legal Service 
Bureau, namely its role in social reconstruction in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
and its gradual decline as prosperity and social change overtook its functions. The 
chapter proceeds to outline the wider national picture in the 1950s, including the 
re~:toration of pre-war Commonwealth legal aid policy, the spread of the charitable 
and semi-charitable State law society schemes and the work of the few, informal 
charitable schemes. 
Much of the remainder of the chapter is taken up with the developments of the 
1960s. Thanks to the research of the Commissioner for Law and Poveny in 1974-75, 
we know more about the 1960s than any previous decade. However, this research 
focused on the shortcomjngs of the legal aid system in the 1960s - as was its task -
and bypassed some of its subtleties and contiguities in Australian society. Whilst the 
chapter d.!scribes the crumbling of the State charitable and semi-charitable law 
society schemes, it reveals that this development was more complicated than we 
have come to believe. In many States there were attempts to save the lav.1 society 
schemes by trtinsfonning them into more viable 'public' schemes - with funds from 
State governments, or interest from trust account and fidelity fund deposits. 
46 
Furthermore, the chapter points out that the decline of the law society response was 
linked to post-war changes in the legal services industry. It also records the hitherto 
neglected role of the La\'1 Council of Australia in calling for a new Federal legal aid 
scheme in 1964-65. The chapter also alerts us to the background presence of public 
concerns about the impact of poverty in Australian society, and its impact on 
developments in legal aid in the 1960s. 
Finally, the chapter describes other developments in the 1960s, including the refonns 
to State criminal legal aid and the trade union and other minor 'non-state' schemes. 
It concludes by briefly relating the formative developments in Aboriginal legal aid 
services and community legal centres in 1971-72. 
The Peacetime Role of the Commonwealth Legal Service 
Bureau 
In June 1945, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Re-Establishment and 
Employment Act 1945 (Cth). This was part of the planning for the task of civil 
reconstruction which had become the dominant concern of the Federal Government 
as the war dragged to an end.2'6 The Re-Establishment and Employment Act 
provided inter alia that the LSB were to continue providing legal aid to wartime and 
demobilised armed services personnel and their dependants, and authorised the 
Atto1ney-General to establish new LSB offices for this purpose. 257 
Two months later, Dr Evatt directed the Attorney-General's Department - in 
response to "the pressing requirements of servicemen and their dependants" - to 
expand the operations of the LSB.m The direction placed the LSB under the 
administrative umbrella of the Department. m However, operational responsibility 
was to remain with its Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Frank Wilkins, who was to continue to 
take policy direction from the Attorney-General personally.260 These organisational 
arrangements remained in force until 1951.261 In 1947, s 8 of the Interim Forces 
Benefit Act (Cth) again expanded the functions of the LSB to include serving 
members of the armed forces. 
2~6 
260 
261 
Y A Mamchak. above n 240 at 143: G Sawer, above n 240 at 166. 
s 105. 
Memorandum 25 August 1945, H. V. Evatt to Secretary, Attorney-General's Depanment, Canberra 
(Australian Archives file series A472/l Item Wl9084). 
Ibid. The revised administrative arrangements included the renaming of the LSB as the 'Legal Aid 
Bureau'. This nomenclature was never adopted. 
Ibid. On 6 November 1992, Mr. J.P. Harkins was interviewed at his home in Canberra. In 1945, Mr. 
Harkins was a Legal Officer in the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor's Office in Sydney. From 1951. he 
worked as Senior Legal Officer in the Sydney office of the LSB • becoming officer-in charge in I 959. 
After 10 years, Harkins left the LSB and subsequently held senior appointments in the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General's Depanment before his appointment as the first Director of the Australian Legal Aid 
Office in 1973 (below at pp 83-95). Frank Wilkins was, according to Harkins. a personal friend of Dr 
Evatt· lllld was fonnerly a solicitor in private practice at Wellington, in New South Wales. 
Below alp 47-48. 
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In the immediate post-war years, the provision of legal aid to demobilised armed 
services personnel and their dependants was the major function of the LSB. In 
September 1949, the Chifley Federal ALP Government proposed to extend its role to 
include the provision of legal aid to Commonwealth aged and invalid pensioners. It 
appears that an agreement for this purpose was reached between the Attorney-
General and the Minister for Social Services.262 If so, .and if it was ever 
implemented, it would have only operated for a few months. The Chffley 
Government lost office at the Federal elections held in December 1949.263 A 
Liberal/Country Party coalition under the leadership of Mr. R. G. Menzies, which 
would remain in power until 1972 was elected as the new Federal Government. 
Senator Spicer, the new Commonwealth Attorney-General, had no intention of 
expanding any of the functions of the LSB. Indeed, when he assumed office in 
December 1949 he was concerned at what he saw of the work of the LSB - "its 
functions had been extended beyond statutory limits and . . . it was rendering service 
to certain people without legal authority".2&1 His initial concerns were not ~Hayed as 
he gained familiarity in 1950 with its operations: 
Five years having elapsed since the end of hostilities, the main emphasis of the work 
of the bureaux had shifted. It was obviously never intended that the bureaux should 
provide for all servicemen and their dependants, at the taxpayer's expense, the 
services of a solicitor over the whole range of legal problems of civil life, both in their 
business and their private affairs. But I found that, unless the bureaux were simply to 
drift into something very like this position, a clear line would have to be drawn.265 
In March 1951, Senator Spicer - in response to an enquiry by Dr Evatt, then Leader 
of the Federal Opposition, about the future role of the LSB - restated and clarified its 
peacetime functions. 266 These were to remain confined to the provision of legal aid 
to serving members of the armed forces, its former wartime members and their 
dependants. LSB staff were authorised to provide legal representation in 
rehabilitation and reestablishment matters, including tenancy and moratorium 
263 
265 
266 
Cth Parl Deb 1949, Vol 204 at 16 & 775-776: Cth Part Deb 1949, Vol 205 at 1210. The parliamentary 
record corresponds with the recollection of Mr. I P Harkins above n 260 at 2. According to Harkins, 
shortly before the 1949 federal election. Dr Evatt issued an administrativi: order that the LSB would 
thenceforth provide legal aid to Commonwealth social security beneficiaries. No record of the order has 
been located. However, the likelihood that such a direction was given is supponed by the later 
parliamentary record. In 1952, Senator Spicer, Attorney-General in the Menzies Liberal/Country Party 
coalition Federal Government, said that when he first assumed office in I 949 the LSB "had a son of 
vague, general charter to give advice to people who received social services benefits" • going on to say 
that this "type of activity" had since .;been discontinued": Cth Parl Deb 1952. Vol 219 at 2397-2398. 
In Question Time in the Senate in 1951 the Minister for National Development, Senator Spooner, said his 
''departmental advice [was] that there is a doubt whether [it was] ever actually put into operation": Cth 
Par! Deb 1951 Vol 213 at 617. 
Cth PD 1952 Vol 219 at 2397-2398. 
Ministerial Statement, Senator The Hon J A Spicer, Attorney-General. 8 March 195 I, Cth Parl Deb 195 I. 
Vol 212 at 103-104. 
H Reps Deb 1951 Vol 212 at 52-53. There are suggestions elsewhere in the parliamentary debates that 
the Menzies Government may have been considering changes to the role of the LSB: Cth Par! Deb 1951 
Vol 213 at 149-150 & 617. 
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proceedings.267 In other matters, legal aid was to be restricted to legal advice.268 
Clients who were advised by the LSB and who still required legal representation 
afterwards were to be advised to obtain the assistance of private solicitors.269 Those 
who did not already have access to a private solicitor - or who did not themselves 
wish to retain one - were able to request LSB staff to place them "in contact with an 
ex-service solicitor who is willing to act ... if possible at some concession in respect 
of fees".270 Senator Spicer said that he also intended that the LSB was to become 
more closely integrated with the operations of the Attorney-General's Department.211 
This marked the official start of the second phase of the post-war role of the LSB. Its 
peak operational capacity had already been reached in the years 1945-49.272 
However, public demand for its services did not correspondingly decline - in fact, it 
peaked in the early 1950s reflecting the continuing social aftermath of World War II. 
The high cost and limited availability of residential accommodation and rents control 
created demand for legal aid in tenancy problems. It also extended the period of 
post-war social disruption - and exacerbated to marital and other family problems 
which many people were encountering as ex-service personnel resumed civilian 
life.273 These problems often manifested themselves in divorce and other 
matrimonial disputes. Post-war reconstruction also produced its own, new types of 
legal problems. People needed legal advice and assistance to transact legislation 
governing the rehabilitation of demobilised service personnel and regulating 
economic activities. 
Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, the LSB operated successfully within the 
limits of its scarce resources, notwithstanding the occasional parliamentary grumble 
about its peacetime raison d'etre.m Its own lawyers provided free legal advice in a 
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t111inisterial Statement. above n 265. The question of continuing legal representation before Fair Rents 
Boards in Sydney was placed under consideration. 
Ibid. In matters involving complaints about Commonwealth administration, LSB staff were directed to 
t;ilce particulars and request that the relevant department or authority take remedial action. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. Referrals were to be made in consultation with professional associations and to be spread fairly and 
regularly amongst ex-service solicitors. Similar principles were to be followed in briefing counsel, who, 
in any even!, were not to be briefed at Commonwealth expense "except in cases of substantial financial 
need, and with the approval of the secretary of the department". 
Ibid. Real integration finally occurred in 1959 when Frank Wilkins retired as Director of the LSB - his 
position was not filled. and the LSB was placed under the control of the Deputy Commonwealth Crown 
Solicitors in the States: H Reps Deb 1959, Vol 24 at 873-874. 
In 1946 for instance 44 lawyers and 63 suppon staff were employed in LSB offices throughout Australia: 
JP Harkins. above n 139 at 4. 
Mr. J P Harkins interview, above n 260, 
The few expressions of parliamentary Jiscontent about the LSB revolved around the justification for its 
continued presence in peacetime. ~ume thought that its functions should - and could - be assumed by the 
State law societies. The first .!Xpression of these views was in 1948. A senator suggested that the 
functions of the LSB in Queensland should be assumed by the Law Society. He voiced similar views in 
1949: Cth Par! Deb 1948, Debates, Vol 199 at 2299-2300; Cth Parl Deb 1949-50, Vol 203 at 1427. In 
1952. another call was made for a transfer of LSB functions to the State law societies: Cth Par! Deb 1952, 
Vol 219 at 2401-2402. See also H Reps Deb 1954, Vol 4 at I 107. On the other hand. in 1957 one 
parliarnen1arian called for the LSB functions to be expanded: H Reps Deb 1957, Vol 16 at 1270-1271. It 
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wide range of legal matters and legal representation in civil and criminal 
proceedings.275 Legally-assisted proceedings were often referred to private legal 
practitioners. Many practising barristers and solicitors were willing to represent LSB 
clients without charge, or else at concessional rates. Sometimes, these lawyers were 
former members of its own staff who were now establishing legal practices. Other 
times, they were demobilised lawyers ree~tablishing practices left behind on 
enlistment.276 However, often they were merely legal practitioners who were' ex-
service personnel - or otherwise were favourably disposed towards ex-servicemen 
and women and their families. m The benevolence of these solicitors and barristers 
greatly contributed to the success of the LSB in this period. 
By the early 1960s, the heyday of the LSB was well and truly over. This was 
manifested in two different ways. First, the functions of the LSB were increasingly 
less relevant to the majority of wartime service personnel and their families. For 
most of its clients, the personal hardships which they experienced in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s had been temporary. National post-war reconstruction had been 
accelerated by the economic boom of the mid-1950s. By 1960, the restoration of 
peacetime socio-economic conditions was almost complete.278 Ex-service personnel 
were now able to take advantage of the social and employment opportunities offered 
in the prosperity of the revived post-war economy. Economic prosperity was the 
vehicle which saw many ordinary people and their families move into the relative 
affluence of mainstream Australian society in the 1960s. It was not that their 
changed fortunes inevitably freed them of legal problems - but the legal problems 
they now confronted were outside the scope of the services which the LSB was 
authorised to provide. The result was "a decline in the work of the Bureaux".279 
However, the workload of the remaining LSB staff did not ease significantly in the 
early I 960s. Indeed, it was claimed at the time that LSB staff were suffering from 
overwork and poor resources.210 The reason was that a minority of ex-service 
personnel and their families still needed - and were eligible for - legal aid from the 
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appears that he may not have been alone. Gregory claims that in l 959, Sir Garfield Barwick - then 
Commonwealth Attorney-General - wrote to the Law Society of Queensland to "suggest that the 
Commonwealth should establish Legal Service Bureaux to assist people receiving Commonwealth 
pensions". The Society replied that its informal law society scheme was adequate: H Gregory, above n 
166 at 172. 
The LSB provided, for instance, legal representation before war pensions and fair rents tribunals and in 
courts in tenancy proceedings and moratorium proceedings. Legal aid in tribunal proceedings was 
usually provided by its own paralegal advocates, especially in the case of proceedings before Fair Rents 
Tribunals in New South Wales: JP Harkins, above n 139 at 4-5; Cth Pnrl Deb 1946 Vol 186 at 983-984. 
This was also the practice in proceedings before the Commonwealth War Pensions Entitlement Appeal 
and War Pensions Assessment Appeal Tribunals. where paralegal advocacy was an alternative to self· 
representation. S 72 (2) Repatriation Act 1920 (Cth) excluded lawyers - but pennined parties to be 
represented by non-lawyers. 
J P Harkins, above n 139 at 4·5. 
Mr. J P Harkins interview, above n 260 at 2. 
MA Jones. above n 134 at SS. 
J P Harkins, above n 7 at 5. 
H Reps Deb 1961, Vol 33 at 1380. 
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LSB.281 The difficulty for the LSB was that the exigencies of war and post-war 
economic recovery had ceased to be the focal point of Australian society. The 
original social basis of its peacetime functions had almost disappeared - its clients 
had become less distinguishable from other poorer people. Moreover, the numbers 
of private lawyers willing to assist the remaining clients of the LSB probably also 
declined. In the early 1960s, it was over 15 years since the war had ended and many 
ex-service lawyers now had growing family and professional responsibilities. It was 
also the time when new cost pressures on operating solicitors' practices began to 
appear - with a downward implications for profitability.282 
In 1966, official interest in the LSB momentarily revived when the Federal 
Government prepared to send troops to fight in Indochina.283 Military conscripts -
and potential conscripts - became eligible for legal advice on civil employment rights 
and entitlements.284 Regular serving soldiers called for active duty and their 
dependants coul~ now also obtain legal aid from the LSB - an entitlement which 
continued throughout the period of active service. m Legal aid was also available to 
enable departing members of the armed forces to order their personal affairs.286 
However, these new functions were not matched by additional resources - which 
remained deficient. 287 In 1973 - when the LSB was subsumed into the Australian 
Legal Aid Office - its staff had dwindled to 31.zss It has been estimated that since 
1943 the LSB, its staff, volunteer lawyers and those acting on referral had provided 
legal aid to over 1.5 million people. 289 
The Wider National Picture until the 1960s 
In the immediate post-war years and the 1950s, the presence of the LSB in its new 
peacetime role was the only significant innovation in legal aid. Australia did not 
follow the British welfare state which established a comprehensive national public 
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The scope of the functions of the LSB had been varied twice since the 1951 ministerial direction. Shortly 
afterwards, the Attorney-General had advised that LSB services were to be extended to World War I 
veterans and !heir widows: Cth Parl Deb 1951-52, Vol 215 at 2488. Members of the armed forces who 
served in the Korean War and the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s and their families also became 
eligible for legal aid from the LSB: J P Harkins, above n 7 at 5. Yet neither of these changes significantly 
increased demand for legal aid from the LSB. 
Below at pp 73-75. 
H Reps Deb 1966, Vol 50 at 116: H Reps Deb 1966, Vol 52 at 757. 
H Reps Deb 1966, Vol 52 at 847-848. 
Ibid. Those who returned alive from the war and their dependants were to remain eligible for the services 
of the LSB for 2 years from the date of their discharge from the anned services. The dependants of those 
who were killed would relain eligibility for assistance from the LSB. 
Ibid. These additional services included the preparation of wills. powers of attorney, maintenance or 
separation agreements. other necessary documents and assistance in negotia-.i.ig settlements of potential 
civil li1igation. 
J P Harkins. above n 7 at 5: H Reps Deb 1966, Vol 52 at 847-848. 
13 lawyers and 18 administrative staff: J P Harkins, above n 7 at 4. 
Ibid. 
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law society scheme in 1949.290 As in 1945, it was not that Australian governments 
and the law societies were unaware of - or disinterested in - these developments.291 It 
was simply that they chose a different path, one which, until the 1960s, substantially 
mirrored the shape of Australian legal aid as it had emerged in the late 1920s and the 
1930s.292 
The Continuation of Pre-War Commonwealth Policy 
The modest presence of the LSB was the only significant face of the Commonwealth 
in national legal aid in this period. Its pre-war arrangements for civil and criminal 
legal aid remained in force. 293 Moreover, both the Chifley Government in 1945-49 
and the Menzies Governments in 1950-60 retained the policy stance followed by the 
Commonwealth since Federation, namely that of a minimal provision of legal aid in 
a limited range of activities associated with federal or national functions. 
The few new developments in Commonwealth legal aid confonned to this pattern. 
In 1945, the new legislation which facilitated the prosecution and trial of suspected 
war criminals included legal aid provisions.m Four years later, amendments to the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1903 (Cth) creating mechanisms to redress 
malpractice in elections for office in industrial organisations also included provision 
for legal aid. 295 In 1955, the existing arrangements for legal aid in courts-martial 
were revised - as part of reforms to the law governing members of the 
Commonwealth anned forces facing trial for military offences. 296 The minimalist 
response of the Commonwealth to legal aid was also evident in 1959 when it enacted 
national divorce and matrimonial causes law. Its Matrimonial Causes Act made only 
token provision for legal aid.297 The primary task of assisting poorer people seeking 
matrimonial relief under Commonwealth law was left to the civil legal aid schemes 
in the States. 
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Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1949; S Pollock, above n 184 at 37-48. 
H Gregory, above n 166 at 171; "Legal Aid in the United Kingdom" ( 1949) 22 Australian law Journal 
405 ... Public law society scheme" is defined below at n 299. 
Above at pp 28-39. 
Commonwealth SR No 23/1952 amended the in forma pauperis provisions in the original High Court 
Rules (above n 138) ·the maximum net capital assets allowed to a poor party were increased from £25 to 
£I 00, or, in special circumstances, £200. The amount of the allowable weekly income was increased to 
£9. In 1968, these provisions were amended again when SR No 411968 substituted decimal currency 
equivalents. 
War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth). 
S 96K Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1949 (Cth). 
S 60 (d) Courts-Martial Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) and cl 11, Commonwealth SR No 20/1957: H Reps Deb 
1955, Vol 6 at 567-568. 
S 127 (6) Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth). Section 127( I )(k) authorised regulations pennitting the 
conduct of matrimonial proceedings in formd pa11peris and relieving 'poor' litigants from payment of 
court fees - regulations were never made. Poorer petitioners and parties could only invoke the poor 
persons rules in the State Supreme Courts and the various law society legal aid schemes: P Toose. R 
Watson & D Benjafield. Australian Divorce law and Practice, (1968) at 689-690. 
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The Spread of Law Society Schemes in the States 
In the States, the pre-war statutory arrangements for criminal and civil legal aid 
remained intact throughout the 1950s, with only a few modifications or reforms. 298 
These changes were neither important nor did they represent any significant 
innovation. Where innovation occurred in the late 1940s and 1950s, it reflected the 
desire of the State law societies to participate in the organised provision of legal aid 
for poorer people. Once again, this reflected a continuation of pre-war trends, i.e. 
developments in the pattern which had emerged by the end of the 193 Os, and which 
had been frozen in consequence of war. By 1961, new charitable or semi-charitable 
law society legal aid schemes had been established in Queensland, Tasmania, 
Western Australia and Victoria.299 
This process began in late 1945, when the Queensland Law Society considered the 
adoption of a public law society scheme similar to that proposed by the Rushcliffe 
Committee. 300 A year later, the Queensland Government had similar thoughts. It 
established an advisory committee, including representatives of legal practitioners, to 
consider the introduction of a new statutory scheme.301 The initiative fizzled out. 
However, the actions of the State Government did lead the Law Society to 
acknowledge that the "implementation of some form of legal aid in Queensland was 
inevitable".302 It also prompted the Queensland Law Society to define its political 
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In some States. the poor prison.e~,f defence legislation (above pp 31-33) was repealed. For instance. in 
Victoria the original provisions had already been consolidated in the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 
1928 (Vic). which itself had repealed and reenacted in the Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1958 (Vic). 
Comparable changes in other States in the 1950s also retained the machinery and eligibility criteria of the 
original scheme. In 19~7. in Queensland new regulations made under the Public Curator Acts 1915 (Qld) 
reorganised the public defender functions within the Public Curator's Office: Australian Government 
Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, abo\'e n 27 paras 3.55-3.59. There was one significant related 
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public duty of the legal profession. The 'semi-charitable' law society schemes were motivated by similar 
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administrative costs of these legal aid schemes was offset by public funds. However, the major part of 
those costs were still 'paid' - directly or indirectly - by the law societies or practising lawyers. Secondly, 
it was the intention of the 'semi-charitable' schemes that participating lawyers should be paid for their 
services, if only at a standard, average rate or concessional rates of professional fees. The ·public' law 
society schemes were also professionally administered. However, they had two distinctive state 
components: public (or in the case of the Australian 1960s schemes semi-public) funding and 
administration under the auspices of a public legislative scheme. They were, in the legal aid jargon of the 
1970s. •Judicare' type legal aid schemes: E C Bamberger ... The American Approach: Public Funding, 
'....aw Reform, and Staff Attorneys" [ 1977} IO Cornell /mernational law Joumal 207 at 211: A Paterson . 
.. Legal Aid at the Crossroads" (I 991) 10 Civil Justice Quarterly 121 at 126. 
H Gregory, above n 166 at 171. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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stance, asserting that "the lead should come from the private profession which should 
control legal aid when it was introduced".303 In the meantime, Queenslanders would 
have to be content with the Law Society's somewhat belated efforts to promote an 
infonnal charitable scheme amongst its members.304 This scheme began with the 
provision of assistance to fonner wartime members of the armed services and their 
families. 30' In 1950, its scope was extended to include old age and invalid 
pensioners.306 Throughout the 1950s - and into the early 1960s - the Queensiand 
charitable scheme operated to provide legal aid on a minimal basis "for needy cases 
by the Council's infonnal approach to solicitors".307 
The informal charitable option was also the choice of the Law Society in Western 
Australia, probably as a continuation of the 1928 arrangements with the State 
Government.308 In 1960, it established a charitable law society scheme wherein 
eligible applicants for legal aid were referred to its members, who participated on a 
voluntary basis.30') 
The major influence on the development of the law society schemes in the 1950s was 
the experience of the South Australian semi-charitable scheme.310 By 1945, this 
scheme had been operating successfully for twelve years, although public demand 
for its services initially dipped after the war. 311 Nevertheless, it remained an attractive 
model for other parts of the Australian legal profession. In the early 1950s, the Law 
Council recommended that other State law societies interested in establishing legal 
aid schemes should adopt the South Australian semi-charitable model.312 
The Law Institute of Victoria had first been attracted by the South Australian 
experience in I 937.313 In 1949, it again approached the Victorian government with a 
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Ibid at 172. Gregory opines th.:~ the "assistance provided by solicitors under the voluntary scheme was 
considerable'' - a somewhat surprising statement as she also says that during .. the early 1960s the 
numbers of people helped in this way grew steadily from 55 in 1961 to 151 in 1965" (ibid). 
Above at p 35. 
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Above at pp 3 7-3 S. 
·-Jn the early post-war period. the number of applications to the Law Society for legal aid was initially less 
than in the mid-1930s. In 1936-37, there had been 1,383 applications, with 734 referrals to legal 
practitioners. In 194.'i-46, the number of applications had fallen to 944, with 409 referrals. In 1946-·t7, 
the number of applications fell still further to 873, with 375 referrals: G E Parker, W R Comish & A C 
Castles. "The Crisis in Legal Aid in South Australia", (1960-1962) I Adelaide Law Review 59 at 64 & 
Table Cm 67. 1'he decline in demand was attributed to greater economic prosperity and the impact of the 
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H Gregory, above n 166 at 171. 
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proposal to substitute a semi-charitable law society scheme for the functions of the 
Public Solicitor.314 Once again, the Victorian government rejected the idea. 
In fact, the first of the new post-war semi-charitable schemes were established in 
1954 by the Tasmanian Northern and Southern Law Societies.315 The scope and 
administrative arrangements of these two schemes closely resembled the South 
Australian model. The result was that poorer people in Tasmania became eligible for 
legal aid from private lawyers on a comprehensive basis.316 
ln 1961, the Victorian Government finally succumbed to the entreaties of the legal 
profession for the introduction of a semi-charitable law society scheme. Its 
agreement was influenced by the prospects which it saw the scheme offering to 
increase the availability of legal aid throughout Victoria - especially in Courts of 
Petty Sessions and rural areas - at minimal public expense.317 The Victorian 
Government approved a scheme whereby the Law Institute and the Victorian Bar 
Council would "provide legal assistance for poor persons and to appoint a committee 
to establish and administer a scheme for that purpose".318 The scheme was intended 
to provide civil legal aid for poorer ordinary people unable to afford the cost of 
lawyers' services.319 It retained the legal aid functions of the Public Solicitor - and it 
was intended that he would continue to assist poorer civil litigants and criminal 
accused. 320 
The Few Informal Charitable Schemes 
A.fter the war, the ex-servicemen's organisation Legacy made informal arrangements 
for legal aid to assist widows and dependants of deceased servicemen.321 This 
scheme relied upon the voluntary charitable participation of private legal 
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practitioners.322 It reached the peak of its operations between 1945 and the mid-
l 950s.323 
Another informal legal aid scheme operated in Melbourne by the late 1950s. The 
Brotherhood of St Laurence established a legal advice service with the assistance of 
law students enrolled at the University of fyfelboume.324 By attending court to 
provide favourable character and background evidence, its youth workers also 
assisted young people involved in criminal proceedings.m This practice continued 
into the 1960s. 326 
In the early post-war period and the 1950s, comparable developments in the informal 
provision of legal aid occurred elsewhere. For instance, in 1949 the Good Neighbour 
Council of Victoria had sought assistance from the Law Institute "to assist in the 
formation of a panel of solicitors . . . prepared to assist migrants who had legal 
problems".327 It would be surprising if comparable small-scale developments did not 
emerge in other religious and charitable organisations in Australia in this period. 
The informal charitable schemes included legal aid provided by private lawyers 
outside the various State law society schemes. Some voluntarily participated in 
informal court-based schemes.328 More generally, individual private lawyers 
provided free services to poorer people and their families. The public antipathy 
which has developed towards the legal profession since the 1970s would tend to 
decry this suggestion. However, there is no doubt that this type of informal 
professional provision of legal aid was significant for poorer and disadvantaged 
people. Neither can it be doubted that this informal charitable response sprang from 
the social ideals of the modern professionalism which was deeply-rooted in the lives 
of many Australian barristers and solicitors in the 1950s As late as 1977, researchers 
into law and poverty could say - without equivocation - that many "lawyers in 
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private practice regard it as part of their professional responsibilities to provide legal 
assistance for people they think of as poor ... [They have] made, and will continue to 
make, a significant contribution towards satisfying the legal needs of many poor 
people".329 
The Developments of the 1960s 
However, the problem was that even a "significant" voluntary contribution by 
individual members of the legal profession had never been enough. Moreover, 
towards the end of the 1950s, it also began to become clear that the organised 
provision of legal aid through the charitable and semi-charitable schemes was 
inadequate to meet the needs of poorer people. By the early 1960s, the law society 
schemes had begun to crumble - and new solutions needed to be found to the 
problems of post-war legal aid. This led to calls for greater involvement of the 
Commonwealth and State governments through public funding of the law society 
schemes. This response, through the transformation of many of these schemes into 
public law society schemes, was the next phase and major new development in 
~ustralian legal aid in the 1960s. Criminal legal aid was also refonned, and the 
small-scale informal charitable provision of legal aid continued. 
The Crumbling of the Charitable and Semi-Charitable Schemes 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the charitable and semi-charitable law society schemes had 
suited the interests of both the State governments and the organised legal profession. 
Governments and their poorer citizens were the beneficiaries of increased availability 
of legal aid at minimal public expense.330 In some States - like Queensland and 
Western Australia - it was effectively for no financial cost to the state at all.331 On 
the other hand, the organised profession obtained the not inconsiderable political 
.benefits of being seen to make a public display of the social justice dimensions of its 
professional ideals, and this, once again, at minimal institutional cost. 332 The real 
cost of the ch~ritable and semi-charitable schemes was borne by poorer people, and 
practising la\\'yers. 
The former paid the social cost because the law society schemes were only well-
equipped to provide poorer people with access to the types of services available to 
the paying clients of private lawyers. Yet the legal needs of the poor had never been 
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the same as those of the 'rich', the middle-class or waged ordinary people. However, 
in the 1960s, neither poorer people - nor their special legal problems - had vanished 
in the affluence of post-war Australian society.333 
Moreover, it was practising barristers and solicitors - and not their professional 
organisations - who bore the real financial cost of the charitabl.e and semi-charitable 
legal aid schemes. They paid this cost by way of fees foregone or discounted, and it 
was this 'contribution' which accounted for the success of the charitable and semi-
charitable response. For example, in.the late 1950s it was estimated that the annual 
value of free services provided by private lawyers practitioners in the South 
Australia..,_ semi-charitable scheme was £50,000.334 Comparable sums, adjusted up or 
down according to specific local factors, would have been evident in the law society 
schemes in Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania and Victoria.335 
Until the mid-l 950s, many practising lawyers - primarily solicitors - had obviously 
been both willing and able to subsidise the law society schemes to this extent. 
However, by the early 1960s they became increasingly less willing, and financially 
less able, to continue to do so. Moreover, the financial burden of legal aid was not 
distributed evenly amongst practising lawyers. The Law Society of Western 
Australia reported in 1966 that its charitable scheme cast "a very heavy burden on a 
limited section of the profession, namely those practitioners who practise in the 
inferior matrimonial and criminal jurisdictions".33~ 
In South Australia, disenchantment amongst practising lawyers with the terms of 
their involvement in legal aid had become public in 1959. The Council of the Law 
Society reported that the cost of the semi-charitable scheme had "become 
increasingly burdensome on members of the profession". 337 Furthermore, there was 
growing criticism amongst its members of the negligible state contribution to the 
financial cost of providing legal aid. 338 They also questioned whether a semi-
charitable legal aid scheme, which had been conceived during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, was still appropriate in the prosperity of the post-war boom.339 
.Moreover,..many South Australian lawyers had come to believe they were making a 
disproportionate contribution - in time and income foregone - to community needs 
for legal aid. In the I 950s, the number of applications for legal aid had increased 
significantly, including growing numbers of applications for legal representation in 
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lengthy and complex criminal trials.340 The increased application rate was claimed to 
be disproportionately high compared to the actual post-war increases in population. 
The effect of all these factors was magnified by the wide compass of the South 
Australian scheme.341 
In 1960, the South Australian Government responded to these concerns by agreeing 
to make annual grants to cover part of the actual costs of operating the legal aid 
scheme.342 Thenceforth, the Law Society was able to pay legal practitioners 
providing legal aid a small proportion of their ordinary professional fees.343 
However, this limited state intervention, which did not increase significantly in 
financial scale throughout the 1960s, was insufficient to prevent the demise of the 
scheme in 1969.3""' 
Comparable problems arso appeared in the law society schemes in Tasmania, 
Victoria and Western Australia in the early 1960s. In Tasmania, its two semi-
charitable schemes were consolidated in 1962, but the State Government did not 
increase the amount of its annual financial grant.m It was reported as being reluctant 
to do so, notwithstanding the fact that the number of annual applications for legal aid 
was already "rising steeply",34E< It retained this stance towards the new consolidated 
semi-charitable ~cheme until 1969. The result was that "the funds were far too low 
to effectively run" the scheme and that lawyer participation steadily declined until it 
"virtually collapsed".347 In 1969, the operations of the law society scheme were 
rejuvenated when the Tasmanian Government provided new and additional 
funding. 348 
Against this background, it is obvious in retrospect that the semi-charitable scheme 
in Victoria was destined to have a short and troubled life. 349 The days of the post-war 
law society schemes were clearly coming to an end by the time it commenced 
operations in 1964. Money was the bane of the existence of the Victorian law 
society scheme, for reasons comparable to those discussed above in relation to South 
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Australia and Tasmania.350 The amount of state funding was inadequate to enable the 
scheme to operate effectively. This generated its major and recurring operational 
problem, namely the lack of adequate funds to pay participating lawyers. In the five 
years 1964-69, payments to legal practitioners in the scheme averaged approximately 
50 per cent of ordinary professional rates.351 The lawyer recipients believed these 
payments were demonstrably and seriously inadequate and lamented the fact that 
they did "not even approach the bare overhead of the average solicitor's office".352 
The Legal Aid Committee, which administered the Victori!Ul scheme, agreed in its 
1967 report that "some guaranteed minimum dividend at something more than 
'overhead' level, [was] urgently required" to retain the professional support 
necessary to ensure the future viability of the scheme.353 In the mid-1960s, the Legal 
Aid Committee also encountered difficulties in providing eligible accused with legal 
representation in long and complex criminal trials.3"' 
In Western Australia, the charitable scheme was in an even worse predicament. At 
least the law society schemes in the other States had some public fur.ding, even if in 
dangerously inadequate amounts. In Western Australia, it was not only that legal aid 
scheme had no state funding. As elsewhere, changes in the post-war lawyer services 
industry were adversely affecting its operations.355 In mid-1966, the Secretary of the 
Law Society explained to the Law Council of Australia that the scheme could only 
assist those applicants "who are virtually destitute".3~ 
These problems prompted the Law Society of Western Australia to seek state 
funding. Approaches to the Federal Government in 1967 were apparently 
unsuccessful.357 However, the State Government responded with a degree of interest. 
In 1966, the Law Society began negotiations with the government to obtain its 
financial support for the establishment of a public law society scheme, similar to the 
scheme which had been introduced in Queensland in 1965.358 However, after these 
negotiations the Law Society was not convinced that the State Government would 
provide sufficient money to enable it "to conduct anything more than a very limited 
Scheme for Legal Aid".m Furthermore, it believed that the changes which the 
government contemplated were inadequate. For instance, they did not extend to 
legal aid in divorce and ancillary matrimonial proceedings.360 Accordingly, the Law 
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Society advised the State Government that it would first be necessary to make 
realistic provision for payment of participating lawyers, if comprehensive and 
adequate new arrangements for legal aid in Western Australia were to be 
introduced. 361 
The cri de C(J!Ur of the Law Council 
By 1964, the crumbling of the law society schemes, and the otherwise inadequate 
arrangements for legal aid throughout Australia, had attracted the attention of the 
Law Council.362 The Council sent a proposal to the Commonwealth Attorney-
General advocating the introduction of a federally-funded national legal aid 
scheme.363 The proposal envisaged "a modern legal service established, not on 
bureaucratic lines, but run by the profession and subsidised by the State, as in the 
United Kingdom."364 A meeting of its national executive, in Melbourne in November 
I 964, reported "strong support" for this proposal amongst legal practitioners, 
especially those practising in States where no law society schemes had been 
established.365 The national executive also "resolved to establish a committee ... to 
give consideration to more proposals and to seek a deputation to the Attorney-
General". 366 
In early 1965, a deputation from the Law Council met the Attorney-General, who 
was not convinced of their argument for a national legal aid scheme. Whilst he 
conceded - somewhat condescendingly - that the United Kingdom public law society 
scheme was "credited \vith success in its field", it was nevertheless "designed to suit 
a unitary system, whereas we in Australia have six State jurisdictions and a Federal 
jurisdiction".367 Moreover, it was clear that the Attorney-General linked the 
possibility of Commonwealth participation in a national scheme with the proposals 
of the Federal Government to establish a new federal superior court.368 The only 
outcome of the meeting was that both parties agreed the Law Council should 
reconsider its proposal. and that the Attorney would then listen to its further 
submissions. 369 
361 
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The task of reconsideration fell to the newly-established legal aid sub-committee, 
which in late 1965 presented a report to the Law Council Executive.370 The sub-
committee recommended reaffirmation of Law Council support for the United 
Kingdom model as an appropriate basis for a national legal aid scheme.371 Moreover, 
it cautioned that its support for a public law society scheme carried the proviso that 
"the necessary funds to administer the scheme and to remunerate the profession were 
made available from Government sources".m The legal aid sub-committee believed 
that the optimal solution was "a uniform legal aid and advice scheme throughout the 
whole of the Commonwealth covering all matters, whether Federal or State, with 
grants from State Governments and appropriate subsidies from the Federal 
Govemment".373 However, as pragmatic lawyers its members considered that - as 
law society schemes were already operating in many States - State Governments 
would be unwilling to contribute to the operating costs of a national legal aid 
scheme. They concluded that a comprehensive national public law society scheme 
did "not appear at present practicable".374 
Instead, the legal aid sub-committee report opted for a national public-law society 
scheme "limited to Federal Courts, with possibly a similar scheme to include legal 
advice ... for the Australian Capital Territory and later for the Northern Territory".375 
Its plan was that the new scheme would be a cooperative venture between the Law 
Council and the federal government. The former would administer the scheme "with 
grants ... by the Federal Government towards the cost of administration and to 
reimburse the profession to the extent of 90% of their proper costs".376 The sub-
committee envisaged that legal rl!presentation would be available in Federal civil 
proceedings in Commonwealth courts and tribunals and State Courts exercising 
Federal jurisdiction.377 Eligibility would be restricted to poorer people whose net 
annual income did not exceed the Commonwealth basic wage by £ 100, and whose 
capital assets did not exceed £1,000.371 
The Law Council submitted the report of its sub-committee to its constituent State 
and Territory professional associations379 In mid-1966, its Executive resolved to 
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accept the proposal for a Federal public law society legal aid scheme.380 Copies of 
the resolution were sent to the Standing Committee of Attomeys'-General, and the 
Commonwealth Attomey-General.381 The Executive also resolved to convene a 
conference of its members and senior Commonwealth law officials to consider the 
proposed scheme in detail. In particular, there were questions affecting funding it 
wished to discuss.382 On 1 October 1966, a meeting - which does not appear to have 
been very fruitful - of representatives of the Law Council and Commonwealth 
officials was held in Melboume.383 Subsequently, "representations were made to the 
Federal Attorney-General who has indicated that he will in due course discuss the 
matter further with the Law Council".384 No significant further discussions appear to 
have taken place. Late 1966 or early 1967 saw the question of Commonwealth 
involvement in national legal aid laid to rest for the rest of the decade. 
The Evolution of the Public Law Society Schemes 
One of the questions the Law Council sought to discuss at the Melbourne meeting 
was the issue of interest from the Solicitors' Guarantee Funds, and its impact on 
legal aid funding. The States had first enacted legislation to guarantee the integrity 
of money deposited with practising solicitors' in the 1940s.38s The legislation 
established statutory reserves, which were administered by the law societies, to 
compensate members of the public who lost money if solicitors stole or otherwise 
misappropriated trust account funds. The income of these statutory fonds - the 
Solicitors' Guarantee Funds - was generated from annual payments by practising 
solicitors, penalties imposed on defaulting solicitors and interest.386 
For the first ten or fifteen years, the statutory guarantee scheme generally operated 
satisfactorily. However, the efficacy of the Victorian scheme was threatened in the 
late 1950s when the monetary value of the claims against the Solicitors Guarantee 
Fund increased appreciably. Between 1959 and 1964, six claims for amounts of 
compensation exceeding £5,000 - the maximum amount payable under the Legal 
Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) - were submitted to the Law Institute. The 
problem was that the total amount of the money in the Solicitors Guarantee Fund was 
insufficient to fully satisfy outstanding claims.m The claims, and the shortfall in the 
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Fund, were probably yet another instance of the changing reality and assumptions of 
post-war legal practice· and the political economy of the private legal profession.388 
In 1963, the Law Institute suggested to the Victorian Government that the income of 
the Guarantee Fund could be increased by requiring banks to annually pay interest on 
solicitors' trust account deposits.389 The Institute proposed a variation to the original 
scheme, whereby solicitors would be required to annually deposit an amount of 
money - equivalent to the lowest balance in their bank trust accounts in the preceding 
year • into a new statutory investment. The Institute, as trustee of the Guarantee 
Fund, would manage these new bank trust accounts.390 The annual income generated 
from investing these deposits would be added to the statutory pool available to pay 
compensation claims arising from the actions of defaulting solicitors.391 The banks 
and some members of the Law Institute opposed the idea. How~ver, it was 
supported and accepted by the Victorian Government, and the necessary legislation 
was passed in 1964. 392 
These new arrangements for the administration of solicitors' trust accounts had 
implications for the funding of the Victorian semi-charitable law society scheme.393 
The expanded income base of the Guarantee Fund meant that its annual income was 
now likely to exceed annual demands for payments of compensation claims. 
Accordingly, the Legal Profession Practice (Amendment) Act 1964 (Vic) permitted 
part of any surplus unallocated annual income to be made available for expenditure 
on legal aid. 
Between 1965 and 1970, most other States made comparable changes to their 
statutory guarantee scheme legislation.394 Only Tasmania rejected the idea, its Law 
Society believing that funding legal aid "should be a direct responsibility of Federal 
and State governments".395 In the other States, the emergence of this new 'source' of 
public income provided both State governments and the law societies with a partial 
solution to the funding and related problems of the charitable and semi-charitable 
schemes. In the late 1960s, this was to supply temporary salvation of a kind. 
Queensland was the first jurisdiction to take advantage of the availability of the 
income from solicitors' bank trust accounts. In 1963, its Law Society began to 
develop proposals for a public law society scheme.396 The following year, it 
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presented the State government with a proposal for a comprehensive scheme. Its 
actions were partly in response to the renewed interest of the Queensland 
Government in legal aid. However, the Law Society was not the only influence upon 
the design of the scheme, or the shaping of policy. In early 1965, informal 
discussions took place between the Minister for Justice, the Law Society, the 
Queensland Bar Association and leading English lawyers, including the Attorney-
General, Sir Elwyn Jones, at the Commonwealth and empire Law Conference held in 
Sydney.397 Shortly afterwards, these influences bore fruit when the Queensland 
Parliament enacted the Legal Assistance Act 1965, introqucing a public law society 
scheme. The administrative framework, eligibility criteria and scope of the scheme 
reflected the influence of the Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1949 (UK).398 
However, there were also important differences, including the fact that it was not to 
be funded from consolidated revenue. 399 
The hybrid origins of the Queensland scheme were also reflected in its structure and 
scope. All Queensland residents were eligible to apply for legal aid, but means tests 
and other internal limitations· restricted eligibility for grants of legal aid."°° 
Restrictions were also placed upon the availability of legally-aided lawyer 
representation in the scheme, the types of legal proceedings and problems in which 
legal representation was available. The scheme was initially restricted to civil and 
criminal proceedings in Queensland courts and tribunals in which no other legal aid 
was available.401 Conversely, it was innovative in making provision for free legal 
advice, and other assistance falling short ·Of taking actual legal proceedings, to enable 
people to protect their legal.rights.402 Its most significant innovation, which was 
made practicable by access to income from the Solicitors Guarantee Fund, was thal. 
participating solicitors could now be paid a more realistic proportion of their 
professional fees in providing legal aid. 
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The Queensland model offered a solution to the impasse which existed in Western 
Australia.403 In 1967, the Parliament of Western Australia enacted a new legal aid 
scheme which was in all respects comparable to the Queensland public law society 
scheme.404 The scheme contained in the Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) 
replaced the existing semi-charitable law society scheme which had operated since 
1960. In 1969, South Australia and Victoria followed in reforming the 
administration of legal aid - although neither adopted the Queensland model.40s New 
public law society legal aid schemes replaced the existing semi-charitable 
arrangements. However, the administrative framework, eligibility criteria and scope 
of the schemes in South Australia and Victoria adapted existing arrangements for 
legal aid, varied only in the sense that there was now a new source of 'public' 
funding via the Guarantee Funds.406 Moreover, in Victoria the new law society 
scheme was part of a general reform of statutory arrangements for legal aid.407 
The Reforms to Criminal Legal Aid 
Throughout the 1960s, the poor prisoners' defen~e provisions remained the principal 
machinery of criminal legal aid in the States. However, some States reformed or 
() expanded their arrangements for legal aid in criminal proceedings. In some cases, 
this reflected the appearance of the public law society schemes. In others, it was part 
of changes in public administration. For instance, in 1960 the New South Wales Bar 
Council and the Attorney-General agreed that barristers - if requested to do so by the 
Public Solicitor - would defend accused facing trial for indictable offences.408 This 
was not a major development, with only about ten requests for legal aid annually 
over the years 1960-66. 409 On the other hand, in Queensland in 1961 there was a 
more significant change in the administration of criminal legal aid. The power of the 
Minister for Justice to grant legal aid to poorer people in criminal and quasi-criminal 
proceedings was increased. For the first time, legal aid was also made available in 
Children's Court and ~Iagistrates Court proceedings and coronial inquiries.410 The 
functions of the Office of Public Defender were expanded accordingly. 411 Similar 
eligibility criteria to those which had governed the operation of the Queensland poor 
prisoners' scheme applied, although interpreted liberally in practice. 412 In 1967, the 
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administration of criminal legal aid in Queensland was changed yet again when a 
Public Defender's Office was established within the Department of Justice.413 
In Victoria, Part I of the Legal Aid Act 1969 made administrative reforms and 
increased the availability of criminal legal aid.414 Existing provisions for legal aid, 
based on the poor prisoners' and criminal appeals legislation, w.ere repealed although 
equivalent provisions were reformulated in the new Act.m However, new statutory 
provisions now enabled those charged with murder, treason or manslaughter to apply 
for legal aid. 416 The administration of criminal legal aid remained vested in the 
Attorney-General, who was able to grant legal aid to accused and appellants without 
adequate means if it was desirable in the interests of justice.417 In 1969, comparable 
reforms, including statutory reestablishment of the Office of Public Defender, were 
also made in New South Wales.418 
The Experience in the Mainland Federal Territories 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the operation of the Poor Persons Rules in the Supreme 
Courts of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory were 
supplemented by non-statutory civil and criminal legal aid schemes.419 The major 
change occurred in the ACT, where a public law society scheme was introduced in 
1966. This scheme had its origins in 1961 and 1962, in discussions about legal aid 
between the Law Society and the Commonwealth Attomey-General.m Whilst no 
agreement was reached, the Society began to investigate the practicability of 
introducing a legal aid scheme.421 No further action was taken until early 1966, when 
the Attorney-General proposed that the Society should establish a panel of solicitors 
to administer a semi-charitable legal aid scheme. The Law Society rejected his 
proposal, replying that it would not provide a panel until it was itself "incorporated 
and a proper legal aid scheme established".422 Later that year - apparently prompted 
by the Law Council having placed legal aid on the national agenda - the Federal 
Government agreed to establish an interim public law society scheme in the ACT. 
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For an initial period of two years it agreed to pay the costs of legal aid provided by 
Law Society members.423 Payment in criminal proceedings was to be at an agreed 
rate of professional fees, in legally-aided civil matters it was to be a rate not less than 
75% of the professional fees fixed by the costs scales.424 The operation of the 
agreement was extended in October 1968, and it was still operating in 1973 when the 
interim national legal aid scheme was established.425 
The Scene Outside the Official Framework 
Informal arrangements remained part of legal aid provision in the 1960s. Practising 
barristers and solicitors continued to provide free or discounted services to poorer 
people, which continued to be important for individual recipients. However, the 
systemic significance of personal charitable acts by individual lawyers continued to 
decline. 
The trade unions, related bodies and a few State administrative agencies provided the 
major alternative sources of legal aid. Legal aid provided by the trade unions and 
trades and labour councils in the States and Territories was generally restricted to 
advice and assistance relating to industrial accidents and workers' compensation 
claims.426 Administrative agencies - State Public Trustees and equivalent officials -
continued to provide legal advice, assistance and referral to poorer people with legal 
problems. This type of legal aid was also available locally from chamber 
magistrates, clerks of petty sessions and magistrates' court staff in association with 
actual or pending civil, family law and criminal proceedings. These public officials 
were an important source of legal advice for poorer people, especially in New South 
Wales.427 In South Australia, the Department of Community Welfare provided 
paralegal representation in magistrates' courts for women seeking maintenance 
awards, affiliation orders and for related problems.4: 8 
Several social organisations also provided limited access to legal aid. For example, 
the Divorce Law Reform Association provided legal advice in undefended divorce 
proceedings and related matters. Motorists' associations in several States also 
provided legal assistance and advice to their members. Legal aid in connection with 
repatriation and pension claims were available to members of the Returned 
Servicemen's League. In some States, Citizens Advice Bureaus provided advice and 
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referral about legal problems - and Councils of Civil Liberties provided legal advice 
on an informal basis to members of the public. 429 
The Developments of the Early 1970s 
In 1970, it was only three years before the first steps would be taken to establish the 
post-war national scheme. Yet there were few - if any - signs of an impending major 
change to the organisation of Australian legal aid. In 1972, the arrangements in the 
States for both civil and criminal legal aid remained substantially the same as in 
1969. In 1970, a public law society legal aid scheme - comparable to those operating 
in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria - was established in 
New South Wales.430 However, its scope differed significantly, being intended to 
assist "middle income earners" ineligible for legal aid from the Public Solicitor, who 
was to retain "sole responsibility for providing aid to poorer people".431 In Tasmania 
in 1971, the Law Society had established the first of the State duty solicitor legal aid 
schemes.432 Its members provided duty solicitor services on a charitable basis, 
apparently in both civil and criminal proceedings, at Courts of Petty Sessions in 
Hobart, Burnie and Launceston.433 
Similarly, there had also been a few minor changes in the Federal system. 434 In 1972, 
the public law society scheme in the ACT was reestablished by statute, and the 
Federal Government reached an agreement with the Law Society of the Northern 
Territory to establish a joint legal aid scheme.435 
However, in the early 1970s the really significant developments occurred outside the 
mainstream legal aid system. One was the emergence of legal aid specifically for 
Australian indigenous peoples. The other was the establishment of the first 
community legal centres. The origins of both these developments, which were the 
become key parts of the national legal aid system in the later 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s, are discussed briefly below. 
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The Foundation of the Aboriginal Legal Services 
In the post-war period, the balance of the indigenous experier..ce of law and'-its 
processes continued to be unfavourable. Like the poor, Aboriginal <ind Torres Strait 
Islander litigants and accused were generally disadvantaged by lack of access to 
lawyers' services in civil matters and civil and criminal proceedings.436 This 
situation was frequently compounded by discrimination against indigenous accused 
in many parts of State criminal justice processes. 4)7 
In 1970, no specific legal aid provision existed for indigenous peoples. Aboriginal 
welfare legislation in some States empowered public officials to make arrangements 
for the representation of Aboriginal accused.438 Legal practitioners also sometimes 
provided legal aid on a charitable basis, often at the request of Aboriginal community 
welfare associations. 439 In the later 1960s, some attempts had been made by these 
community associations and others to negotiate special access for Aboriginal people 
to the State statutory and law society legal aid schemes:"'0 These attempts had mixed 
results. The mainstream legal aid system in the 1960s lacked the resources, focus 
and capacity to provide the range of legal services required by indigenous people and 
their communities.441 
It was in this context that a legal aid scheme to serve the needs of Aboriginal people 
was established in New South Wales. In 1970, a group of Aboriginal and other 
residents of the Redfern, an inner-city suburb of Sydney, legal practitioners, 
academic lawyers and students concerned with improving indigenous access to law 
established the Aboriginal Legal Service (NSW) Ltd. ""2 The following year, the 
Federal Government provided a grant of $24,250 to help support the new legal aid 
scheme.443 In 1972, a second Aboriginal legal aid service was established at Fitzroy 
in inner-city Melbourne, opening its doors in February 1973 with the aid of 
Commonwealth and State financial grants.444 
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The Appearance of the Community Legal Centres 
The Australian community legal centres originated in the legal referral services for 
poorer people established in 1971 and 1972 by law students, legal practitioners and 
social agencies in Melbourne and Sydney.44' These services - like Aboriginal legal 
aid - reflected a new and growing interest of s_ome lawyers, law students, reformers 
and social welfare groups in improving access to the legal system through legal 
aid.446 The first 'true' community legal centre was the Fitzroy Legal Service, which 
began in Melbourne in December 1972.447 Within six months, approximately six 
other community legal centres had opened in and around Melbourne.448 
Conclusion 
In I 945, we have seen that the provision of legal aid in post-war Australian society 
was an issue - but a minor and insignificant one. The structures and politics of legal 
aid in the States continued to describe pre-war pattc:rns, and this situation did not 
substantially change in the remaining years of the 1940s. In defining the peacetime 
functions of the LSB, the Commonwealth Parliament had merely extended its 
original role as an adjunct of the war time state, with its functions instead now geared 
towards civil rehabilitation and resettlement. Over the next 10 or I 5 years, as these 
social demands subsided, so did the role of the LSB. Moreover, it is something of a 
romantic illusion - however tempting - to interpret the defeat of the Chifley Labor 
Government as an opportunity lost for the earlier establishment of a national legal 
aid scheme. Dr Evatt's attempt to expand the role of the LSB in late 1949 "to deal 
with legal questions arising out of certain social services claims" did not reflect a 
national policy position towards legal aid.4-19 Realistically, this was simply an 
incident of his superintendence of the work of the LSB, and of the pursuit of wider 
Federal social welfare objectives. The interest of the Federal Labor Government in 
introducing major social reforms, like a national legal aid scheme, had come and 
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gone. As Gillespie comments in the context of its proposals to reform medical 
practice in connection with a national'health scheme: 
Delay killed the already slim chances of a radical change in medical practice. By the 
end of the war the popular enthusiasm for sweeping social refonn had considerably 
diminished. The failure of the fourteen pow.ers referendum in 1944 was an important 
sign that a large part of the Australian electorate - otherwise prepared to vote Labor -
was becoming impatient with government controls. The central welfare refonns of the 
Curtin and Chifley governments were on the statute books and despite the electoral 
and referendum victories of 1946, little was achieved that did not build on the 
foundations laid in 1944 and 1945.450 
If this was true of the prospects of change in medical practice, it was even more so in 
the case of Commonwealth involvement in national legal aid, which had been neither 
on the agenda of the Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction nor Labor's proposals for 
expansion of Commonwealth social welfare powers. Moreover, in the political 
atmosphere of 1946-49 - when Australia was divided over nationalisation, civil 
conscription and other 'socialist' issues - any attempt by the Chifley Government to 
. exercise the amorphous Commonwealth powers over legal aid would inevitably have 
been bitterly contes~ed. In any event, its attention was focused on its social welfare 
reforms and marketing control and increasingly preoccupied in resolving the civil 
and political unrest of the late 1940s.4~ 1 
In 1951, in defining the guidelines of the LSB, the Menzies Government was not 
merely bringing its operations back into the offi,~ial fold. It was also removing the 
potential for departure from the standing Commonwealth policy on legal aid, limiting 
it to servicing Commonwealth law and federal functions. This minimalist approach, 
which it had pursued since Federation, was reaffirmed in the mid-1960s in its 
negotiations with the Law Council, and was to remain the basis of Commonwealth 
legal aid policy until 1973.452 However, whilst its policy conformed to the pre-war 
pattern, the capacity of the Commonwealth in the 1950s to introduce and administer 
a national legal aid scheme did not. The financial, governmental and political 
powers of the federal welfare state had been greatly enhanced by the administrative 
demands of \Vorld War II, and the events of 1946-49."53 It now enjoyed new and 
unprecedented powers to engage in making and projecting national social welfare 
policies - through the distribution of grants and encouraging the development of 
particular policies. m However, unlike many comparable welfare state governments 
in this period, the Menzies Govem.ment was "unwilling to expand its social welfare 
role and social service expenditure was tightly controlled [relying] increasingly on 
the voluntary sector".455 This attitude did not merely retard federal involvement in 
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legal aid for its poorer citizens. It was typical of the attitude of the Menzies 
Government towards social policy in the Australian welfare state. Therefore, we 
have to be careful not to overstate - or misinterpret - the absence of Commonwealth 
activity in citizens' legal aid in the 1950s and early 1960s. Tiiroughout the 17 years 
of the Menzies administration of the federal welfare state, social welfare policy - of 
the kind which had the potential .to produce a national legal aid scheme - was: 
... an area of modest action or incremental change when compared with activity in 
other countries or with activity in Australia the periods before and after the long 
interval of Liberal-Country Party govemments. First, whereas soci.:I expenditures 
grew rap'idly in OECD countries, Australian expenditures grew slowly in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Second, compared with the 1940s and 1970s, there were relatively few 
new policies introduced. However, those innovations that were made had a distinctive 
feature:ithey were of most benefit to the middle classes or even to the middle and 
upper classes. With the exception of child endowment, this was not a period of 
universal pl ograms as was the case in some countries. Nor was it a period of 
focussing on the most disadvantaged ... Rather, the policies of the Menzies era were 
intended, :.n the rhetoric of the day, 'to encourage thrift and self-reliance'. The groups 
which ga'.ned most were those with the capacity to help themselves, especially middle 
class farr ilies.4s6 
In the States in the 1950s and early 1960s, this "dullest period in Australian social 
history" was similarly reflected in developments in legal aid. m The most notable 
change was the expansion of the law society schemes in Queensland, Tasmania, 
Victoria and Western Australia. These 'professionally' administered, charitable and 
semi-charitable schemes were the prevailing national social policies backdrop, with 
its emphasis on voluntarism and associated notions of the 'deserving poor'. In 
retrospect, the developments in legal aid in the States in this period - both 'positive' 
and 'negative' - could equally well have occurred 20 years before. They show that 
until 1960 - and even beyond - the conception of a distinctive 'post-war period' in 
Australian legal aid is a somewhat artificial - and not terribly useful - perspective. 
The 1960s were a turning point for Australian legal aid. By the end of the decade, it 
was clear that the law society schemes in most States - even the new public versions 
- were faltering, and the statutory schemes were threadbare.4s8 The "pattern of legal 
aid provision" was inadequate, for reasons later described in detail by the 
Commissioner for Law and Poverty~s9 The organised provision of legal aid displayed 
"an uninspired mixture of interstate differences, gaps in services, harsh eligibility 
requirements, overlapping jurisdictions and a multitude of anomalies", a description 
which is by now entrenched in our rtecollections of the post-war experience.460 
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However, we have paid less attention to the reasons for the breakdown of the legal 
aid system in the 1960s. The legends of the post-war experience have been all too 
ready to blame the legal profession. This overlooks the role of Australian 
governments, who neither provided adequate funding for citizens' legal aid, nor 
placed it on the social policy agenda. The running - in financial, policy, 
organisational and delivery terms - was left to the organised legal profession and the 
lawyers. The continued existence of the law society schemes - operated at real 
institutional and personal cost - demonstrated their genuine commitment to the ideals 
of legal aid for the 'poor'. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s practising lawyers 
generally, and solicitors in particular, were becoming increasingly unwilling to 
continue to express these ideals through their unpaid or subsidised participation in 
the law society schemes. Prima facie, this was a paradoxical position, sometimes 
mistakenly interpreted as revealing the hypocrisy of the legal profession. Instead, it 
was a product of the rising cost of providing lawyer functions in the legal services 
industry in the 1960s, especially in 'ordinary' solicitors' firms - the backbone of the 
law society schemes. 
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The rising cost of lawyer functions reflected changes in the political economy of the 
legal profession, especially from the mid-l 950s. In these years, according to the 
professional orthodoxy, the Australian profession remained in its "long and 
languorous" phase, a state it is supposed to have enjoyed until the mid- I 960s.461 
However, this is somewhat of a liberal gloss, we have indicated above that 
significant changes in the organisation of solicitors' practices first occurred in the 
1920s and 1930s. 462 These transfonnative trends were renewed in the context of the 
post-war economy. 
The first change which increased the cost of lawyer functions was the 
protessionalisation of the solicitors' services sector, the solicitors' firms which 
dominated the legal services industry. Until the mid-l 950s, law clerks - who were 
neither qualified lawyers, nor generally could realistically aspire to become so - had 
provided a major part of the workforce in solicitors' finns. 463 They were relatively 
low paid wo;~ers, with narrow career prospects and income expectations, who 
nevertheless performed many lawyer functions. The post-war boom changed the 
employm,.:nt profiles in solicitors' offices. The expansion - and diversification - of 
the Australian economy provided Jaw clerks with alternative opportunities for 
employment in other occupations, as sales representatives, insurance agents, finance 
company workers and similar types of white-collar jobs. These occupations offered 
greater prospects for social and financial advancement.o1&i Younger people, who may 
otherwise have been destined for legal clerical work, now had similar 
opportunities.~65 
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Solicitor employers responded by replacing the 'lost' law clerks with lawyers. Firms 
"increased their intake of articled clerks working toward professional qualification 
through university law schools or admission board courses".466 Furthermore, the 
breakdown of the law clerk system had coincided with the availability of increasing 
numbers of law graduates - "young men (infrequently women) anxious to become 
lawyers" - as the university sector began its post-war expansion. By the early l 9.60s, . 
the number of law graduates began its so-far unending upward spiral.467 Thereafter, 
the pace at which qualified solicitors replaced law clerks in solicitors' practices built 
up momentuvi, with the former increasingly performing the functions perfonned in 
earlier decades by non-professionals. This process of 'replacement' continued, and 
by the end of the 1960s the historical profile of employment in Australian solicitors' 
practices had been substantially transfonned. 
Professionalisation increased the cost of providing solicitors' services. This process 
continued throughout the 1960s. It had a direct impact at the enterprise level, the 
provision of lawyer functions in solicitors' firms. One reason is obvious - "solicitors 
had to be paid more than clerks".468 The second is less so. Professional training 
encouraged a tendency towards manufacturing transactional complexity amongst 
service providers. In the leading commercial firms, the replacement of law clerks 
with solicitors had "reinforced the otherwise reflexive movement ... towards 
providing more complex, hence more expensive, legal services, which legitimately 
demanded the attention of skilled lawyers".'169 It also reduced the opportunities for 
enterprise owners to simplify or standardise legal work, which they had been able to 
do with a more compliant legal workforce. Another impact of professionalisation at 
the enterprise level was that the changed profile also meant that the effect of the 
changed structures were exacerbated. 
Indirectly, professionalisation led to increased cost of service provision in the context 
of changes in the labor market, including in a few of the leading 'commercial type' 
solicitors' practices. Sustained national economic growth from the early 1960s 
onwards and lo\v unemployment increased the cost of labor, including the wages of 
secretarial and clerical workers, which were a significant cost factor in operating 
solicitors' firms. The diversification of the post-war economy enhanced and 
rewarded other, 'non-lawyer' segments of the skilled labour market. Comparisons 
with the status, career prospects and incomes of its employees - and white-collar 
employment generally - increased the profit and salary expectations of solicitor 
principals and employees. The early 1960s also saw a major shift in the activities of 
capitalism - the "whole style of Australian business activity changed with the huge 
inflow of capital from multi-national corporations, the aggressive expansion of many 
l6i 
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... companies and a new government interest in the way business was done"470 This 
generated new demands for new types of lawyer services and presented special 
opportunities for a few of the leading 'commercial type' solicitors' firms:"' They 
transformed themselves into corporate-type law practices, specialist providers of 
commercial legal services to business and government, and "a more sophisticated 
(and profitable) style of legal service". 472 Gradually, throughout the 1960s, the 
corporate firms, their principals and employed solicitors emerged as a high-income 
elite - further raising income benchmarks throughout the solicitors' segment of the 
legal services industry. 
By the early 1970s, for these and other reasons - it was generally a period "of 
remarkable growth and change" for Australian legal practice - the cost of providing 
lawyer functions in solicitors' firms increased significantly. Consequently, 
'ordinary' solicitors' practices became less able to comply, by adjunct participation 
in the law society schemes, to fulfil the professional objective of controlling legal 
aid. It was these practices, who bore the cost of professional control of legal aid -
and not the leading 'commercial type' or new corporate practices, who were 
becoming progressively less and less interested in servicing individual clients, 
whether 'rich' or 'poor'. It overstates the argument to claim that 'ordinary' solicitors 
and their firms were becoming financially unable to participate in the law society 
schemes, or the charitable provision of legal aid. However, it was for many 
solicitors becoming increasingly costly to do so. And there were positive 
disincentives against participation in the schemes. Achieving 'acceptable' levels of 
profitability and income was one, the other was the presence of a healthy market of 
non-poor clients able and prepared to pay for legal work in connection with real 
property, general legal services, probate and administration of estates and personal 
injury transactions.473 
Finally, we need to note another development affecting legal aid in post-war society, 
namely the growing awareness of the presence of systemic poverty. It was not only 
that it was realised that poverty had not been vanquished by post-war prosperity. The 
1960s also saw "a dramatic expansion in the knowledge about poverty" amongs~ 
Australian researchers and policy-makers.m Beginning modestly in 1959, the first 
major development was in 1964, when the Institute of Applied Economic Research 
at the University of Melbourne began its project on poverty.47s In 1969, when the 
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research was published it showed "about 7 per cent of the population of Melbourne 
to be poor after payment for housing and another 4 per cent to be marginally poor". 
This research project represented the first attempt at systematically measuring 
poverty in Australia.476 Moreover, by the early 1970s, social reformers were 
beginning to draw attention to the links between poverty and legal aid. In 1972, the 
Right Rev Peter Hollingworth, the Director .of the Brotherhood of St Laurence, 
concluded a review of the legal aid system and the poor with the following 
observation: 
The present legal aid system is as unsatisfactory in its bperation as are all our other 
welfare systems. The basic problem lies in the fact that we have a tripartite system 
where the rich buy services from private solicitors and where the poor are either 
dependent upon the discretion of [the] Public Solicitor or upon the private charity of 
the Legal Aid Service. We need a scheme which is far better integrated, which seeks 
to reach out to areas where there is greatest need and which finally seeks to ensure that 
every citizen is innocent until finally proven guilty in the court. This can only occur 
with adequate representation, and that representation should be of the same quality 
regardless of whether it is being privately paid for or publicly prescribed.)" 
The same year - four months before the election of the Whitlam Labor Government 
in December - the McMahon Liberal/Country Party Federal Government established 
an independent, non-parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Poverty.478 It was to 
examine the extent of poverty and groups at risk, the income needs of 'poor' people, 
housing and welfare services.479 The question was how the new Federal Government 
would deal with the decay of the system of legal aid, and how it would respond to the 
legal needs of poorer Australians, during its period of office. 
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Chapter Four 
The National Scheme Emerges 
I declare open this special meeting of Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General to 
discuss legal aid services in Australia ... One of the commitments of the new 
c_pmmonwealth Government was to review legal aid to see whether a rationalised system 
of legal aid could be worked out in the Commonwealth. Having in mind the diversity, not 
that that is bad in itself, the fact that the Australian Legal Aid Office had grown over the 
last 3 years, having in mind that there were numbers of State legal aid systems both at a 
governmental level and also at a voluntary professional level, it seemed to my Government 
to be desirable that we have a look at the overall question of legal aid and see whether we 
can work out something that we think will not only be adequate to the country as a whole 
but also adequate to the States and Territories. 
0 
Extract from opening remarks, The Hon R J Ellicott QC, Commonwealth Attorney-
General, special meeting of State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General, Hobart, 
4 March 1976 
Introduction 
From every partisan perspective, the three years of the Whitlam Government from 
late 1972 until late 1975 were a "turbulent time" in Australian society and politics."0 
It \V.lS the first Federal Labor Government in 23 years. From the outset its legitimacy 
was disputed, its administration was "beset by unprecedented economic problems". 
and it lacked a majority in the Senate and consequently effective governmental 
capacity. It was also increasingly internally divided.481 Moreover, in 1972 Australia 
had already emerged from its post-war stupor and was experiencing a time of great 
and impending social and cultural changes and shifting hierarchies.482 
It was in this politically uncertain and socially vibrant context that the national legal 
aid scheme emerged. Like other social reforms initiated by the Whitlam 
Government, its emergence was not unaffected by the wider national political 
context. Indeed, it was part of the context, playing various roles as actor, victim and 
victor. The stories of its emergence, as they are typically retold, are deeply infected 
by this partisan context. In fact, as this chapter reveals, the reality of the 
, developments in legal aid in this period are far less dramatic and heroic than these 
memories and legends suggest. 
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The chapter begins in early 1973, when the Whitlarn Government first acted to 
revers.e the existing Federal policy towards Commonwealth involvement in the 
national provision of citizens' legal aid. It goes on to describe the content of its new 
policy, which was an interim policy pending the report of an expert committee 
established to review needs for legal aid throughout Australia. The chapter then 
proceeds to explain the developments in the interim new arrangements for legal aid 
over 1973-75. In particular, the establishment of the Australi'an Legal Aid Office, 
the recommendations of the Australian Legal Aid Review Committee and the role of 
the Commissioner for Law and Poverty are discussed. 
By late 1975, the emerging national scheme - like the rest of Australian society -
could not escape the aftermath of the dismissal of the Whitlam Government. The 
chapter describes how its plans for a national, federally-administered national 
scheme collapsed • and was replaced by the 'co-operative federalist' plans of the 
incoming Liberal/National Party Government. It explains how the Fraser 
Government pursued this approach in early 1976 to reach an 'in principle' agreement 
with the States for a joint national approach to legal aid. This agreement finally 
supplied the financial and administrative basis for the national legal aid scheme in 
the post-war Australian welfare state. 
The chapter then relates the story of implementation of the Australian national 
scheme, namely the signing of the first Commonwealth-State le13al aid agreements, 
the establishment of the legal aid commissions and the dismantling of the Australian 
Legal Aid Office. It concludes with a brief review of developments outside the 
national scheme from the ascension of the Whitlam Government until 1980 by 
describing the expansion of the Aboriginal legal services and the growing number of 
communitv legal centres. In combination with the final version of the national 
. -
scheme, these agencies were to constitute the Australian legal aid svstem throughout 
.... - "' -
the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Reversal of Federal Legal Aid Policy. 
On 19 December 1972, Senator L K Murphy, QC, was appointed as the first 
Atto .. mey-General in the Whitlam Government. Twelve months later, he would make 
an alli'louncement in the Senate explaining the policy of the new Federal government 
towards kgal aid.m This announcement officially marked the end of the policy of 
non-intervention in citizen's legal aid on a national basis, which had been the 
consistent policy of the Commonwealth since Federation.4s.i 
However, it is not clear when the decision to reverse Federal legal aid policy actually 
occurred. The Australian orthodoxy ofthe 1980s and 1990s has entrenched the idea 
that the Whitlam Government assumed office with a definite intention of establishing 
a national scheme.485 In fact, the historical reality is more complicated. The Federal 
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Labor Party election policy platform in .1972 certainly included plans for the 
establishment of a national "system of legal aid to ensure ready and equal access to 
the courts".486 However, it was not "a particularly prominent part of the platform" -
only one of 31 proposals for national law reform.487 Furthermore, these plans were 
"not in fact mentioned at all in the 1972 ALP policy speech, though other [law 
reform] matters ... were stressed".488 Indeed, neither legal aid nor law reform were at 
the forefront of the Labor Party's policies for social reform. For instance, earlier in 
1972, in a collection of Fabian Society essays on social reform, Senator Murphy 
wrote on the subject of the social ecology of science and technology .489 Neither law 
reform nor legal aid appeared in this collection as a discrete essay topic. 
Nevertheless, in late 1972 there can be no doubt that there were good prospects for 
Federal involvement in legal aid. The background atmosphere of social change had 
"injected ... a 'middle class radicalism'" into Australian politics - which augured 
well for the prospects of the prominence of legal aid in the agendas of the new 
Federal Government:490 
'Quality of life' issues began to gain significance: a concern about the social and 
environmental costs of economic growth began to stir people's consciences; urban 
planning and development were debated, poverty deplored; health and education took 
on a new urgency.491 
In January 1973, the Whitlam Government quickly set about an ambitious program 
of law reform.492 Indeed, so ambitious that some critics have described it as 
"resembling nothing so much as the man who flung himself upon his horse and rode 
madly off in all directions".J93 Its endeavours were spearheaded by Senator Murphy, 
\vho was to demonstrate in 1973, 1974 and 1975 a consistent, informed and 
passionate interest in law reform, legal aid and other issues of s0cial justice.494 The 
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decision to reverse Federal legal aid policy was certainly allied with the pursuit of 
the program of law reform in early 1973. In mid-1973, Senator Murphy announced 
the adoption of the Government's int~rim new legal aid policy.49' Yet, precisely 
when this decision was taken and its actual circumstances are unclear. 
According to Hawker, it impossible to "document or date, or even identify, the ~itial 
decision to take action".496 Hawker is partly right· and partly wrong. He is right in 
claiming that there appears to be no documentary record of the decision to establish a 
national legal aid scheme.497 However, Hawker is wrong in so far as he - like most 
interested parties • neglects to distinguish between the presence of two separate 
decisions. The first - and seminal • decision was the decision of the Whitlam 
Government to reverse existing Federal legal aid policy. The second - and 
instrumental - decision was to establish the Australian Legal Aid Office. The latter 
was really a manifestation of the new Federal policy, and technically one can argue 
that it occurred on 6 September 1973, being documented by a ministerial directive.498 
The timing, documentation and circumstances of the former decision, namely the 
seminal decision to change Federal legal aid policy, is more problematic. As 
Hawker suggests, it is probably impossible to ascertain precisely when it was taken. 
However, the contextual evidence of the timing and circumstances of the making of 
the decision is more substantial than Hawker indicates. 
By implication, the decision to change Federal legar aid policy had clearly been 
taken by 25 July 1973, when Senator Murphy announced the adoption of the interim 
legal aid scheme. Indeed, the parliamentary record indicates: that the decision had 
been made at least three months before. On 30 April 1973 Senator Murphy 
':announced Government approval of a grant of $2m to the States on a per capita 
basis ... [as] an interim grant ... designed to effect a quick improvement in the 
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availability of legal aid".499 This, as is explained below, was part of the interim legal 
aid policy of the Whitlam Government. '00 
Therefore, the decision must have been taken in January or February, or possibly 
March. This timetable is consistent with a hitherto unrecorded version of its 
surrounding circumstances. In early 1973, according to Mr. J B Harkins, a 
delegation comprising some State Attorneys' -General and leading members of the 
legal profession arrived in Canberra for an unscheduled meeting with the Attorney-
General, who had just returned from overseas.501 Senator Murphy agreed to meet 
with them to discuss their proposals for legal. aid. The meeting was attended by 
se·nator Murphy, the delegation, Mr. Clarrie Harders, then Secretary of the Attorney-
General' s Department, Mr. Harkins and another senior departmental officer.'02 At 
the meeting - of which no fonnal record was kept - Harkin's says that two members 
of the delegation spoke, presenting Senator Murphy with a 13 point proposal for a 
national scheme.503 The proposal contemplated a Commonwealth funded, State 
based scheme which was to be administered by the legal profession. As the 
Attorney-General had effectively been 'door stopped' by the delegation, there was no 
opportunity for the Commonwealth officials to adequately brief him on a response to 
their proposal. Harkins recalls that Senator Murphy read the delegation's proposals, 
noted their State orientation, and then - in a forceful 'off the cuff speech - addressed 
the meeting, arguing for a national federally-oriented approach to legal aid. Such 
was the flair and brilliance of his argument - according to Harkins' clear recollection 
- that he convinced the assembled ministers and lawyers of the desirability of a 
Commonwealth response to the problems facing Australian legal aid.'o.i 
After the delegation had left the meeting, Senator Murphy canvassed with Harders, 
Harkins and the other official the possible courses of action open for a Federal 
national legal aid scheme. According to Harkins, Senator Murphy turned to him and 
said words to the effect, "\Vell, what are we going to do, Joe?" Harkins replied that 
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he had worked in che LSB earlier in his career and that he believed that its great 
strengths had been its success in providing people with legal advice, and the way in 
which it cooperated with the practising legal profession. Senator Murphy then asked 
Harkins to go away and write a submission for a Federal response based on these 
experiences, which Harkins did, and Senator Murphy subsequently accepted.sos 
It is not necessary for the present purpose to engage with the credibility of Harkins'· 
version of the circumstances pf the original decision to reverse Federal legal aid 
policy. Other than to say, that there is no reason to doubt - and every reason to 
accept - his account. ' 06 Furthermore, his dating of the decision in very early 1973 is 
corroborated by the parliamentary record. By the time of the first parliamentary 
session in February 1973, it appears that the Attorney-General's Department had 
already been briefed to consider national arrangements for legal aid. On 28 
Februaty, the Attorney-General replied to a question in the Senate about the 
availability of legal aid in the proposed reforms to the Commonwealth matrimonial 
causes legislation, saying inter alia that: 
I think there is a very strong and special case for the provision of legal aid. That can 
be done in many forms. Many forms of doing so have been tried in the community. 
The Attorney-General's Department is now engaged in formulating proposals for the 
provision of legal aid. They will be taken up at the next meeting of the Standing 
Committee of Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General and concurrence with 
them will be sought.'07 
The fact that a decision with respect to Federal legal aid policy had already been 
made is also evident from a reply of Senator Murphy on 7 March 1973 to another 
question in the Senate. On this occasion he was asked about the availability of legal 
aid in divorce proceedings. Senator Murphy replied inter alia that the "Government 
has proposed a Commonwealth legal aid scheme".m Later that same day, in reply to 
a question concerning cases of hardship in litigation, he said that he believed that it 
was "important that there be a proper scheme of legal aid for those affected ... such a 
scheme is being formulated, and as soon as I can do so I will inform the Senate of it 
in some detail".~09 Three weeks later, he again referred in the Senate to increasing 
legal aid in matrimonial causes proceedings, a "matter in respect of which proposals 
are already in hand"."0 
By the end of April 1973, the direction of the proposed Federal involvement in legal 
aid was beginning to take shape. On 5 June, when Senator Murphy was asked about 
sos 
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why the arrangements in the Northern Territory - adopted ·~the previous 
government in 1972 - had not been implemented, he was able to reply that the 
Whitlam Government now 
... has a different approach to legal aid ... [in] accordance with a scheme now being 
worked out to implement Government policies to supplement, by grants for federal 
matters, legal aid programs already existing in the States, I am re-examining the whole 
basis of the Northern Territory scheme".m 
The Interim Ne'v Federal Response 
Whatever the historical reality of the background events in the first six months of 
1973, the result was that the Whitlam Government reversed existing Commonwealth 
policy towards the provision of legal aid for its citizens. On 25 July 1973, the 
Attorney-General announced the adoption of an interim Federal legal aid policy - a 
new policy with three key components, each of which are discussed briefly below.512 
The first component was the establishment of an effective national organisation, a 
step which was central to implementing the new legal aid policy. This process began 
modestly on 6 September 1973, when the Attorney-General directed that the Legal 
Service Bureaux thenceforth be known as the Australian Legal Aid Office 
(ALAO).m Initially, the new organisation was in effect only a revitalised version of 
the LSB. However, its functions differed significantly from those of its predecessor. 
The ALAO was to administer a new and comprehensive national Federal legal aid 
scheme, establish a national network of lawyers' offices and assist in providing and 
coordinating legal aid in the federal legal system. 
This new Federal scheme incorporated the legal aid scheme previously administered 
by the LSB.~ 1 ~ Legal aid was to continue to be available to eligible serving and 
former members of the armed forces and their dependants. However, the new 
scheme expanded the scope of Federal legal aid to include social security pensioners, 
migrants, assisted overseas students, and others for whom the Federal government 
claimed 'special responsibilities' under Commonwealth law. People falling within 
these categories became eligible for legal aid in respect of any legal problem.m The 
scheme also provided that everyone who was unable to afford the cost of legal 
representation or assistance in respect of problems generated by Commonwealth law 
was eligible for legal aid. Legal aid was made available to all 'Commonwealth 
people' in respect of any legal problem, and to all other citizens - provided they were 
financially eligible - in respect of 'Commonwealth matters'. 
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These twin concepts of 'Commonwealth people' and 'Commonwealth matters' 
defined the general limits of the new legal aid scheme. The ALAO was not intended 
to provide legal aid to every citizen of the Commonwealth.516 Officers of the ALAO 
were directed to refer applications for civil and criminal legal aid in proceedings by 
non-'Commonwealth people' to the State and Territory public and law society 
schemes. Similar directions applied in respect of applications for legal aid in 
proceedings in 'Commonwealth matters' by those who were financially ineligible 
under the Federal scheme. Moreover, in general ALAO staff were directed to refer 
those ineligible for legal aid to the existing schemes in the States, or - if this was 
impracticable or inappropriate - to private lawyers.517 
However, the general scope of the scheme was subject to several exceptions. The 
first was that all poorer people, irrespective of whether they were 'Commonwealth 
people' or parties in 'Commonwealth matters', were eligible for legal advice and 
referral from the ALA0.518 They were also all eligible for legally-aided non-
representative lawyer services. For instance, ALAO staff lawyers were authorised to 
prepare legal correspondence, wills, powers of attorney and other simple legal 
documents, negotiate settlements and perform limited advocacy functions for poorer 
people.519 Moreover, if legal aid was otherwise unavailable, they were also permitted 
to represent poorer people in civil proceedings in State and Territory magistrates' 
court s. 520 
The interim Federal legal aid policy conferred a second function on the ALAO, 
which further distinguished it from the LSB. The ALAO was directed to establish a 
national network of 'store front' solicitors' offices. In part, this was merely a co-
requisite of the administration of the expanded availability of Federal legal aid. 
However, it was also part of a wider - if inchoate - policy to "present a new image of 
accessibility to the law".521 It was intended that the 'store front' solicitors' offices 
would not only assist the ALAO in the performance of its primary function but 
~16 
517 
SIS 
519 
520 
521 
From 1974, the ALAO published eligibility criteria and guidelines for the provision of legal aid under the 
Federal scheme: Attomey-Generars Department, "OMS sent to all ALAO Offices"', JO October 1974 to 
31 August 1987. (unpub memoranda). 
The ALAO was required to maintain a panel of private practitioners willing to accept referrals of legally-
assisted clients: Cl 3 (d) Directive by the Attorney-General Senator Lionel Murphy, Q C: Establishment 
of Australian Legal Aid Office dated 6 September 1973 in J P Harkins. above n 139 at Attachment "D" at 
47-48. 
~linisterial Statement, above n 3 at 2802. 
Clause 3 (a), (t) & (g) Directive by the Attorney-General, JP Harkins. above n 139 at 47-48. 
Ibid. cl 3 (c). 
JP Harkins, above n 139 at 6-7. The experience over 1974-75 contains several instances of the pursuit of 
this objective. In mid-1974, Senator Murphy announced proposals to obtain premises in capital cities and 
regional centres to provide "one-spot shopping" for legal aid. The goal was to improve the effectiveness 
of legal aid to the public by locating the operations of the ALAO, law society schemes and the legal 
referral services at the same location. Accommodation was leased in Adelaide for a pilot "store-front'' 
scheme • but agreement could not be reached with the Law Society on establishment. removal and other 
costs. The proposal lapsed with the demise of the Whitlam Government (below at p 95). A pilot scheme 
involving law students assisting the ALAO, which was under consideration. also lapsed: J P Harkins. 
above n 139 at 23. 
85 
"provide administrative support bases for community advice centres and legal or 
welfare advice groups generally". 522 
The new policy also contemplated that the ALAO would assist in providing and 
coordinating legal aid in the federal legal system, including cooperation with the 
Aboriginal legal services, which the new Federal legal aid policies also proposed to 
expand.523 Furthermore, the plan proposed that ALAO staff lawyers would provide 
legal representation for poorer people in undefended divorce and ancillary family 
law proceedi11gs arising under Commonwealth law and duty lawyer services in other 
federal courts and jurisdictions. 524 
The second component of the new policy was the provision of Commonwealth 
funding for legal aid on a national basis. m In the financiai year 1973/7 4, the 
Whitlam Government made $2m available to assist public and law society schemes 
and community legal centres in the States and Territories. In a few cases, 
Commonwealth funds were also made available to improve access to legal aid 
services by 'Commonwealth people'. For instance, in Western Australia a special 
grant was made to the Law Society to establish a 'flying lawyer' legal aid scheme to 
service the needs of residents in the isolated north-western region. 516 
The third component of the interim response was the establishment of Australian 
Legal Aid Review Committee. Its terms of reference were to investigate areas of 
'need' for legal aid and the optimal form of provision of a national legal aid scheme, 
including the practicability of deploying public salaried lawyers. m 
The Interim Response at Work 
By the end of 1973, the machinery required to implement the interim Federal 
response was in place.528 The ALAO had begun to establish itself, and during 1974-
75 continued to expand its operations and to consolidate its functions. The 
Australian Legal Aid Review Committee had begun its inqJiry, and the Commission 
of Inquiry into Poverty had commenced its inquirie,s into the impact of the law on 
poorer Australians, including the provision of legal aid. 
517 
518 
Cl 2 Directive by the Attorney-General. ibid at 47. 
rvlinisterial Statement. above n 3 at 2802: below at pp 107-108. 
Cl 3 (b) & (e) Directive by the Attorney-General, J P Harkins, above n 139 at 47. These jurisdictions 
were the 'Special Federal Court' at Sydney and magistrates' courts in the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northern Territory. 
Ministerial Statement. above n 3 at 2802: J P Harkins, above n 139 at 6-7. 
JP Harkins. above n 139 at 23. 
Attorney-General's Department. A11s1ralia11 Legal Aid Re~·iew Commiuee. Report. February 1974. ( 197.!) 
at 8. 
In July 1973, the Federal Government had also established a new scheme in the Northern Territory. 
pending the establishment ofa regional ALAO office: Sen Deb 1973 Vol 56 at 2368. 
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The Australian Legal Aid Office 
The LSB had bequeathed few staff and little infrastructure to the ALAO. The LSB 
offices had been located in the State and Territory capital cities, typically in premises 
occupied by the Commonwealth Deputy Crown Solicitors. This type of 
accommodation was inadequate and unsuitable for the role of the ALAO in the new 
Federal legal aid scheme. 
In early 1974, the ALAO began a concerted effort to establish a national network of 
branch and regional offices, and to recruit additional staff.'29 By 1975, branch offices 
of the ALAO had been reestablished in new premises in the States and Territories. 
Fifteen regional offices were opened and over 200 staff, including almost 100 
solicitors, were employed.530 The national reach of the ALAO and its services 
continued to expand throughout the year, with ten more regional offices established 
by September. 
In 1974 and 1975, ALAO staff provided legal aid in accordance with the principles 
of the new scheme, with individual entitlement for legal aid being determined in 
accordance with newly prescribed financial criteria. 531 These criteria were adjusted 
to reflect changes in national wages and living standards, and variations in legal aid 
policy.532 The scope and emphasis of the new scheme were also reflected in the 
operations of the ALAO. It deliberately made special provision for 'Commonwealth 
people', especially migrants. ALAO offices were established in suburbs with high 
immigrant populations, including Fairfield and Leichhardt in Sydney, and Brunswick 
in Victoria. Moreover, it was ALAO policy to recruit lawyers and administrative 
staff conversant with the language of the major local immigrant groups in these 
districts for employment in its local office.333 The operations of the ALAO in 1974 
and 1975 also reflected the focus of the new scheme on 'Commonwealth matters'. 
Its major activity was providing legal aid in family law matters, which comprised 
"some 40% of pt:rsonal interviews conducted and some 80% in number and value of 
legal aid matters referred to the private profession".m 
However, the ALAO also provided legal aid in criminal law proceedings. Duty 
la\vyer services were provided in Magistrates' courts, Courts of Petty Sessions and 
other courts of summary jurisdiction located near regional offices. ALAO lawyers 
attended these courts to advise unrepresented accused apply for bail or adjournments 
532 
m 
53.& 
JP Harkins. above n 139 at 9-10. 
Between June 1974 and September 197S. ALAO regional offices were established at Blacktown. 
Leichhardl, Fairfield, Ryde, Bankstown, Newcastle. Wollongong and Tamwonh in New South Wales; 
Sunshine. Brunswick, Broadmeadows and Geelong in Victoria; lnala, Ipswich, Townsville, 
Rockhampton. Southport. Cairns and Mackay in Queensland: Elizabeth in South Australia; Fremanlle and 
Midland in Western Australia; Burnie and Launceston in Tasmania; and Alice Springs in the Northern 
Territory: JP Harkins. above n 139 at 13-14 and Attachment 'F' at SS. 
Above at pp 83-8.$. 
JP Harkins, above n 139 at 7 &. Attachment ·•E ... 
Ibid at 21. 
Ibid at 14-lS. 
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and present simple pleas of guilty.535 ALAO regional offices proximate to isolated 
areas operated mobile or visiting lawyer services to provide residents with access to 
legal aid. In Tasmania, lawyers from its office at Burnie visited west coast mining 
towns with no resident solicitor. In Queensland, a lawyer from the ALAO's 
Rockhampton office made monthly visit~ to outback towns - including Blackall, 
Longreach, Winton Maryborough, Bundaberg and Gladstone - to increase local 
access to legal aid. ' 36 
The functions of the ALAO in coordinating legal aid in the federal legal system also 
expanded. In changing Commonwealth policy, the Whitlam Government had not 
abandoned the coMection between legal aid and the perfonnance of Commonwealth 
and national governmental functions. In 1974 and 1975, it established five new 
statutory or administrative legal aid schemes. In 1974, the Commonweaith 
Parliament enacted new trade practices legislation which included provision for legal 
aid. ' 37 In addition, a "special scheme for the provision of legal aid in cases raising 
environmental or conservation issues [was] developed in conjunction with the 
Minister for Environment and Conservation".'31 This scheme applied to matters 
having a "national aspect", although legal aid was sometimes available in matters 
having "vital local significance".539 In 1975, reform of the Commonwealth 
matrimonial causes jurisdiction made further statutory provision. S 117(3) of the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) enabled a party to a matrimonial cause or proceeding to 
apply to the ALAO for legal aid, which was also available for the separate 
representation of children.~ In connection with these developments, the ALAO 
established :i duty lawyer service in the new federal Family Court to assist deserted 
wives, ard other unrepresented parties, to obtain adjournments, handle urgent 
matters and, if legal representation was required, to facilitate the making of a 
statutory application for legal aid."' The Commonwealth made statutory provision 
for legal aid in its new racial discrimination legislation, and in connection with its 
new Administrative Appeals Tribunal.542 
The Reports of the Australian Legal Aid Review Committee 
Immediately after it was established, in July 1973, the Australian Legal Aid Review 
Committee (ALARC) began to investigate community needs for legal aid, and ideas 
about the possible organisation of a national scheme. It convened meetings with the 
535 
'38 
Ibid al 21 ·22. 
Comparable arrangements operated in the Nonhem Territory. ALAO lawyers in Danvin used airline 
services to provide legal aid in Gove, Katherine and other remote towns and couns. The ALAO in Alice 
Springs provided similar services in TeMant Creek, and elsewhere: ibid at 22-23. 
Ibid at I S-19: s 170 Trade Practices Act 1974 {Cth). 
Sen Deb 1973 Vol SS at 2800; Dcpanmcnt of the Environment and Conservation, Report for period 
December 1972toJune197.1, (1975) at 58-59; JP Harkins, above n 139 at IS. 
JP Harkins. above n 139 at IS. 
S 6S Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) & Family Law Regulations. cl I 14, Siatutory Rules 210/1975. 
JP Harkins. above n 139 at 22. 
S 25ZB (I) Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Clh); s 69 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 197S (Cth1. 
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administrators of the State public and law society legal aid schemes, and invited 
public submissions on its terms of reference. A few ALARC members also carried 
out some examination of post-war developments in legal aid in other Western 
countries. By April 1974, the Committee was ready to present its first report to the 
Attomey-General."0 
The first ALARC report was inevitably tentative.™ It highlighted the major public 
policy questions which the ALARC believed impinged upon the national public 
provision of legal aid. The report also recommended ~itiatives to improve public 
access to lawyer services, and defined what it saw as the necessary constituents of a 
national scheme which would satisfy its terms of reference. 545 As part of this 
process, the ALARC offered its preliminary conclusion that the scope and 
accessibility of the existing arrangements were demonstrably inadequate to meet the 
'needs' of poorer Australians for legal aid. Its members believed the only 
satisfactory response to this problem was increased public funding to create a legal 
aid scheme with the flexibility to address the special 'needs' of poor people. They 
also cautioned the Attorney-General that the success of any national scheme would 
depend upon the careful costing of its service delivery programs - and the continued 
support of the legal profession, social welfare workers and community groups. The 
first ALARC report also advised the Attorney that the organisation and funding of 
any national scheme should be integrated with related arenas of social policy and 
administration. $.16 
Following the presentation of its report, the ALARC continued to consider its tenns 
of reference, assisted once again by consultation with the public and the legal 
profession. It also began to cooperate closely with the inquiry that was being 
conducted by the Commissioner for Law and Poverty into the provision of legal aid 
for the poor.'~1 In March 1975, the ALARC presented its second report to the 
Attorney-General, which contained three principal recommendations. 
I ts first recommendation was that the States introduce duty lawyer schemes on a pilot 
basis to determine the practicability of establishing a national service in magistrates' 
courts. s~s Its second principal recommendation affirmed a prior recommendation of 
the Commissioner for Law and Poverty. The ALARC agreed that a Legal Services 
Commission should be established to coordinate legal aid on a national basis, and 
Attorney-General's Department, above n 527 at 9·IO. Little evidC'nce was available about the work and 
operations of the ALAO. 
Ibid at 9. 
Ibid at 00-00. For instance, the ALARC recommended that money be provided for legal representation in 
trials. other criminal proceedings and duty lawyer schemes in magistratu' couns. It also addressed 
questions affecting the organisation and administration of a national scheme • canvassing the pros and 
cons of the Judicare and salaried models of legal aid, the problems of servicing remote regions. legal 
insurance, the establishment of a Federal advisory body and the inter-governmental coordination. 
Ibid at 10·1 I. 
Attorney-Generals Department, Australian legal Aid Review Committee. 2nd Report. (1975), para 1.3: 
below at pp 89-90. 
Ibid. paras l.S & 2.1·2.7. 
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advise the Commonwealth on related expenditure."'9 However, its members urged 
that the proposed Commonwealth commission would function best within a general 
Federal framework of "dynamic and co-ordinated law reform"."0 The third principal 
ALARC recommendation in its second report was that Commonwealth funding of 
the State public and law society schemes should be continued a~ current levels. 
ALARC believed this was a necessary inteI'im measure, pending assessment of 
national long-tenn funding requirements for legal aid.'" In presenting this report, the 
ALARC had discharged its functions .. and by mid-1975 its work was discontinued. 
The Inquiry of the Commissioner for Law and Poverty 
In March 1973, the Whitlam Government had appointed four additional members to 
the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty to broaden its scope by including 
educational, economic, socio-medical and legal aspects of poverty.552 Professor 
Ronald Sackville - from the Faculty of Law at the University of New South Wales -
was appointed Commissioner for Law and Poverty. Shortly afterwards, he 
commenced work on several references relating to law and poverty, including the 
availability of legal aid for poorer people. 
In November 1974, Professor Sackville released a discussion paper "for the purpose 
of eliciting comment from interested persons, groups and organizations".m It 
contained the findings of an inquiry conducted by the Commissioner and his staff 
into legal aid for poor people, and reported their conclusions that existing 
arrangements for legal aid in civil and criminal proceedings were inadequate to meet 
the needs and legitimate expectations of poorer Australians.'"' 
The paper also contained two major recommendations. The first was that the 
existing national infrastructure should be retained, pending any future amelioratory 
Commonwealth action. The Commissioner agreed that the Federal Government 
should continue to supplement the funding of the public and law society schemes."' 
His second major recommendation was a new and comprehensive Commonwealth, 
financed national scheme was necessary that in the longer-term. This new national 
scheme should focus on the provision of legal aid for poorer and disadvantaged 
people, providing its services via a network of neighbourhood or local law centres.556 
549 Ibid, paras 3.7-3. IO. ALARC members were however unable to agree (paras 1.7 &. 3.2·3.23) whether the 
proposed Commonwealth commission should administer the ALAO. 
Ibid, paras 3.24-3.25. 
Ibid. paras 1.8 & 4.1-4.2 at 26. 
Australian Government Commission oflnquiry into Poveny, above n 479 111 vii. 
Australian Go\'cmment Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Legal Aid in Australia. Discussion Paper. 
(1974), frontispiece. In March 1974. the Commission of Inquiry into Poveny had released an interim 
repon of its in\'estigations - Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poveny. Poverty in 
Australia. Interim Report. (1974 ). 
Australian Government Commission oflnquiry into Poveny, Discussion Paper. above n SS3 at 402. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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These locally-managed law centres should employ lawyers to provide 
comprehensive, localised legal aid."' 
The discussion paper cautioned the Whitlam Government against seeking to use its 
financial power to dominate the presence any national legal aid scheme. The 
Commissioner and his staff believed it was important that the scheme should 
emphasise and encourage participation at the regional and local level, by the 
community and private lawyers.'" They also recommended that an 'independent' 
Commonwealth Legal Services Commission should be created to administer the 
scheme, coordinate local law centres and allocate funds to the State and Territory 
legal aid schemes.559 
In April 1975, a revised version of the discussion paper, which incorporated 
corrections and comments made following public consultation in late 1974 and early 
1975, was published in the form of a final report to the Poverty Commission.'60 
However, its basic recommendations remained "substantially the same" as those 
contained in the discussion paper and outlined above. 561 
The inquiry into legal aid was not the only investigation which the Commissioner for 
Law and Poverty conducted into the plight of poor people in the legal system. In 
1975, he published national reports on legal 'needs', migrants and the law and 
tenancy - portraying a general picture of "widespread ignorance of the scope and 
function of legal aid services" .562 Over the next two years, Professor Sackville and 
his staff published related reports on homelessness, bail and social security, debt 
recovery and poverty and the legal profession. 563 
The Climax of the Interim Federal Response 
By the end of 1974, the Whitlam Government was ready to convert its interim 
response into a permanent national scheme of legal aid. Its interim national policies, 
which are described above, had been in place for about 15 months. The 
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infrastructure of the ALAO was now established - and it had quickly achieved 
widespread popular support. $64 A public survey commissioned by the ALAO in May 
1975 indicated that its national public profilem, which had been reinforced and 
promoted in 1974 by television advertising and other media coverage, was high and 
favourable. 565 The ALAO also enjoyed a significant degree of cross-partisan political 
support.366 However, the reaction of the organised legal profession to the ALAO was 
not as positive. 
The organised profession - together with many practising lawyers - had reacted with 
hostility to the presence of the ALAO and its work."7 On 20 February 1975, 
members of the Law Institute in Victoria resolved, at an extraordinary general 
meeting, to initiate High Court proceedings challenging the ALAO's legality and 
funding. 568 Other law societies expressed their opposition less dramatically - but no 
~68 
In 1974175, the ALAO had provided legal advice to over 99,000 people - and referred over 20,000 
legally-assisted matters to private lawyers. In June 1975, a month which probably represented the peak 
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awareness about the need for the ALAO. People saw it as serving the legal needs of poorer and 
disadvantaged people, primarily with respect to marital problems. property, rent and eviction matters. 
However, the survey also indicated that the ALAO should clarify what services it actually provided. 
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profession. It had been the dominant actor in legal aid throughout the post-war period (see Chapter 
Three). The Commonwealth had finally entered the field of national legal aid. but it was not on terms 
which were to the liking of the State and Territory law societies and bar associations. They were 
concerned about the independence of the private profession. and the constitutionality of the operations of 
the ALAO: Lener 19 February 1975, VF Wilcox, Attorney-General of Victoria. to Mr. Gordon Lewis. 
Executive Director, The Law Institute of Victoria; Letter 4 March 1975, Kep Enderby, Attorney-General 
of Australia. to Mr. Dawson. President. The Law Institute of Victoria. 
The resolution was subsequently ratified in a special referendum by a majority of members of the Law 
Institute. A writ was issued on 12 July 1975. on behalf of the Victorian Attorney-General at the relation 
of the Law Institute - challenging the constitutional validity of the ALAO. The defendants were the 
Commonwealth of Australia and its Attorney-General. The writ claimed that the establishment of the 
ALAO lacked statutory authority. the appropriation of Commonwealth funds for its purposes was 
unlawful and invalid and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. No further action appears to have been 
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less forcefully. In the Australian Capital Territory, the Law Society challenged the 
right of legal practitioners employed by the ALAO to hold practising certificates. 569 
In South Australia, the Law Society protested to the ALAO about its advertising of 
legal aid services. 570 
Nevertheless, professional hostility had peaked by mid-1975, and the organised l~gal • 
profession and practising lawyers had come to a kind of begrudging acceptance of 
the presence of the ALAO. This was not surprising, given that in the financial year 
1974-75 the ~AO referred 20,346 cases - with an estimated value of $6.071 m - to 
private lawyers.571 In the coming financial year, the number of legally-aided 
'private' referrals was set to double - and the associated expenditure would increase 
by almost 100 per cent.572 
However, by early 1975, notwithstanding the reaction of the legal profession, the 
Whitlam Government was ready to convert the interim scheme into a permanent 
national scheme of legal aid. It had in hand the first ALARC report, and was 
anticipating its final report.573 The discussion paper on legal aid for the poor 
prepared by the Commissioner for Law and Poverty was in public circulation, and 
the thrust of his views were now known.57~ Moreover, the Federal Government had 
established a national profile as a financier of legal aid. Commonwealth expenditure 
had risen from a total of slightly more than $1.1 m in 1972-73 {Table 1 below) to 
$8.29 m in 1974175. Whilst approximately 32 per cent of this expenditure was on 
the Aboriginal legal services, the majority ($5.6 m) was spent on the State and 
Territory public and law society schemes and the ALAO (Table 1 below).m 
In February 1975, the new Commonwealth Attorney-General, the Rt Hon K E 
Enderby, began to discuss the Federal plans for the future of legal aid with the Law 
Council of Australia, the legal profession and other interested parties.576 By the end 
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Table 1: Federal e."penditure on legal aid 1972-80 
Legal aid scheme Financial Year, ASm (figs. are rounded) 
1972- 1973· 1974· 1975- 1976- 1977· 1978- 1979-
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Legal Service Bureau .229 . . . . . . .; 
Special circumstances .029 .028 .020 . . . .084 .073 
(including special 
appropriations) 
ACT/NT legal .108 .180 .282 .320 .225 .075 . . 
aid schemes 
Grants to supplement . 2.0 1.550 1.0 1.0 .080 . . 
State legal 
aid schemes 
State and Territory . 
-
. . . 
.158 4.511 9.007 
legal aid commissions 
Australian Legal .340 3.175 11.208 16.9 19.186 17.022 13.888 
Aid Office 
Commonwealth Legal - . - . . .078 .35 .557 
Aid Commission 
Aboriginal national .741 1.235 2.671 3.656 3.711 3.89 4.208 4.983 
legal aid scheme• 
Grants to . 
-
. . . . 
.021 .175 
voluntary schemes 
1.107 3.783 8.298 16.184 21.836 24.067 26.197 28.684 
Notes: 1. Includes a total of $52146 over 1972-78 for special projects, social welfare and 
legal expenses involved in national issues. 
Sources: H Rep Deb 1981 Vol 123 at 2632-2634; Appendix 8, H Reps St Comm on 
Aboriginal Affairs, ( 1980) 
of April, progress had been made towards settling draft legislation to establish a 
framework for a permanent national scheme managed by the Commonwealth. In 
June, Mr. Enderby introduced the Legql Aid Bill 1975 (Cth) into the Parliament. The 
Bill envisaged incorporation of the ALAO as a statutory authority with comparable 
functions to its non-statutory predecessor.'" The reconstituted ALAO would 
continue to provide legal aid to 'Commonwealth people', in 'Commonwealth 
matters' - and within Federal law and government. 
,77 Cls 4. 5. 7, 37-.JO & Pan III Legal Aid Bill 1975 (Cth); H Reps Deb 1975, Vol 95 at 3472. Cls 3 (2). 6 
(1)-(2) 8:. 31-3.J of the Bill intended that the statutory ALAO would provide legal aid in accordance with 
the policy and administrative guidelines specified in cl 8 (I), a statutory transformation of the 
administrative warrant and legal functions of the existing ALAO. 
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Clause 6 (2) of the Legal Aid Bill proposed that the statutory Australian Legal Aid 
Office was to be empowered to provide legal aid via its own employed lawyers - or 
by referral to those in private practice.571 It was also to be empowered to make law 
reform recommendations to the Attorney-General in relation to legal aid, and to 
conduct educational programs designed to promote greater public understanding of 
Federal laws.579 The Legal Aid Bill also contemplated the formation of another new 
statutory authority, which was to be known as the Australian Legal Aid Commission. 
Its proposed functions were to advise and make recommendations to the Attorney-
General on the provision of legal aid, and to conduct related educational programs 
and research. 580 The administrative arrangements incorporated in the Legal Aid Bill 
included special provisions intended to keep the operations of its proposed national 
scheme within the limits of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth 
Parliament. 511 They also defined an eligibility regime for the provision of legal 
assistance, legal advice and other legal aid services.m 
However, neither the Legal Aid Bill nor its proposed national scheme were ever to 
become part of the legal machinery of the Australian welfare state. On 9 October 
1975, when the second reading debate was resumed in the House of Representatives, 
the further passage of the Bill was opposed by the Federal Opposition. Mr. R J 
Ellicott, QC and Mr. J Howard, who were the principal Opposition spokesmen in the 
debate, did not object to the basic policy underpinning the new Commonwealth 
profile in legal aid. Indeed, as Mr. Howard made very clear, the Federal Opposition 
supported the principle of Commonwealth participation in a national legal aid 
scheme: 
We support legal aid and we have made that clear before. We make it clear again and 
nothing that we will do during the course of the debate can be honestly represented as 
being other than total support for t!le provision of adequate legal services. But the 
Government apparently intends to argue that, just because doubts may be expressed 
about the method that it has chosen to implement legal aid, those who have expressed 
the doubts are therefore against legal aid.513 
However, the Opposition rejected - for various reasons - the proposals for a national 
scheme as expressed by the Whitlam Government in the Legal Aid Bill. In some 
instances, Federal Opposition took objection to particular clauses of the Bill, for 
instance, its plan to create a statutory Australian Legal Aid Office. Its spokesmen 
also questioned the desirability of a permanent separation between Commonwealth 
and State provision of legal aid. 
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Ultimately, the Opposition's objections went beyond concerns about the machinery 
provisions of the proposed national scheme. Mr. Howard and Mr. Ellicott also voiced 
concerns about the likely total financial cost of the proposed permanent scheme. 
Both men believed there had been inadequate consultation with the private legal 
profession. Furthermore, they were concerned about the possible impact of the 
proposed scheme upon the 'independence' of both the private legal profession and 
the perf onnance of the statutory functions of the new Australian Legal Aid Office.'" 
The consequence was that Mr. Howard moved that furt_her parliamentary 
consideration of the Legal Aid BiJJ be deferred and a joint committee established to 
"consider the important legal, social and constitutional issues involved".585 His 
motion was seconded by Mr. Ellicott, but defeated in a division on 16 October. 516 
Yet, unbeknownst to the Whitlam Government, the destiny of the Legal Aid Bill 
1975, and its own fate as a national government, was being settled elsewhere. On the 
11 November I 975, the Governor-General dismissed its ministers from office, 
prorogued the Commonwealth Parliament, and appointed an interim Federal 
Government to be administered by the Leader of the Federal Opposition, the Rt Hon 
Malcolm Fraser. Accordingly, the Legal Aid Bill lapsed, and its provisions were 
never to be revived. 
The Establishment of the National Scheme 
National elections for a popularly constituted new Federal government were held on 
13 December 1975, and a Liberal/National Country Party coalition led by Mr. J M 
Fraser was elected to office. A few days before Christmas. Mr. R J Ellicott, QC was 
appointed as its first Attorney-General. 
The policy of the new government towards Commonwealth participation in a 
national legal aid scheme was already public knowledge. It was less than two 
months ago that its ministers - including Mr. Ellicott - had opposed the passage of 
the Legal Aid Bill 1975.587 Moreover, since 1974 it had been the official Liberal 
Party policy to abolish the ALAO, nutwithstanding contemporary evidence of 
considerable support amongst the ranks of some Liberal Members of Parliament in 
early 1975.588 Therefore, whilst the Fraser Government supported continuing 
Commonwealth involvement in national legal aid, it believed there were alternatives 
to the 'Commonwealth-centric' plans of the Whitlam Government for a permanent 
national scheme. 
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The Ellicott Review of National Arrangements for Legal Aid 
To explore these alternatives, in mid-January 1976 Mr. Ellicott announced the 
Federal Government would conduct a national review of legal aid, excluding the 
Aboriginal legal services.519 The review, which began almost immediately, was 
intended to determine "exactly how the provision of legal aid could best be managed, 
in the public interest, bearing in mind the need of citizens for legal aid and the 
efficiency and economy of its administration".'90 The Attorney-General discussed 
his proposals for revised Commonwealth participation in legal aid with the Law 
Council of Australia and other interest groups.591 Meetings were also held at the 
administrative level with State officials to discuss the future of Commonwealth 
involvement. By the end of February, the preliminary consultative phase of the 
review was completed. 
The review culminated in a special meeting of the Standing Committee of 
Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General in Hobart on 4 March.592 Mr. Ellicott 
had previously circulated a position paper to the States outlining five options to 
reorganise the national provision of legal aid. Each of these options had one 
common element - they all proposed the disbandment of the ALAO and the 
absorption of its functions and staff into a new national scheme.593 The Fraser 
Government preferred two of these options, and this was disclosed to the State 
Attorneys-General at the OP'ening of the meeting. 
The preferred Commonwealth options favoured the creation of a permanent national 
scheme administered by new statutory authorities, to be established in the States and 
Territories. These agencies would be administered by boards of management, who 
were 'independent' of governments in their deliberations and functions. Whilst the 
Commonwealth would have representation, Mr. Ellicott proposed that 
representatives of the legal profession should constitute the majority of the 
membership of the boards of management of the new legal aid agencies. 594 These 
managing boards should administer the operations of the new national scheme, 
which would be financed by the Commonwealth and State governments in 
accordance with funding agreements. The funds to be committed through these 
inter-governmental agreements would be negotiable, although the Commonwealth 
anticipated making ''a very substantial commitment in terms of funds". m 
$90 
$91 
Commonwealth Attorney-General. Press rclel!Se 3176. "Review of Legal Aid .. , IS January t 976: J P 
Harkins. above n 139 at 33-JS. 
J P Harkins. above n 139 at 34. 
Ibid at 35. 
The meeting was attended by the Commonwealth Attorney-General. the New South Wales Attorney-
General and Minister for Justice. the Anorneys·Gcneral of Victoria. Queensland. South Australia and 
Western Australia. and the Chief Secretary ofTasmania. 
Transcript of the special meeting of State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General, Hoban. Thursday. J 
March 1976 at 6-7. 
Ibid. 
Ibid at S. 
97 
The preferred options also proposed the establishment of a Commonwealth statutory 
representative body which was to be empowered to monitor the operations of the 
national scheme, and investigate, report and make recommendations to the Federal 
Government on national 'needs' for legal aid. Mr. Ellicott saw the Commonwealth 
options as addressing two important policy criteria. First, they recognised the 
significance of the legal profession and private lawyers in the·national organisation 
and provision of legal aid. Secondly, they acknowledged the governmental and 
legislative responsibilities of the States.s96 
. 
The special meeting of the Standing Committee of Commonwealth and State 
Attorneys-General discussed at length questions relating to the Commonwealth 
proposals, but ended without any final agreement having been reached. However, 
the law ministers did leave Hobart having agreed - in principle - that it was desirable 
for all Australian governments to cooperate in establishing a comprehensive national 
legal aid scheme, which minimised overlap in service provision.597 They had also 
agreed to further meetings between Commonwealth and State public officials to 
discuss in detail the optimal form of the proposed national scheme. 598 
By mid-1976, the original 'in principle' agreements had been converted into a joint 
Commonwealth-State policy on legal aid which closely followed the preferred 
Commonwealth options outlined in Hobart. The Fraser Governm~nt and the States 
agreed to enter into formal agreements for the provision of legal aid. the 
Commonwealth was to constitute a national legal aid commission and, within each 
State and Territory, statutory agencies were to be established to administer the 
national scheme. The implementation of this policy over 1976-80 is considered 
below. 
The CommonweaJth-State Legal Aid Agreements 
The linchpin of the permanent national scheme agreed to between the Fraser 
Government and the States was the execution of inter-governmental agreements for 
the funding and provision of legal aid. These were central to it organisation, 
definition and funding. By mid-1979, agreements had been signed between the 
Commomvealth and State governments in Western Australia, South Australia a,d 
Queensland.599 Negotiations were in train with Victoria, which at the end of 1979 
executed a legal aid agreement with the Commonwealth .600 
These inter-governmental agreements were to fix the shape of the national legal aid 
scheme until the mid-l 990s. However, outside the inner circles of Commonwealth-
State legal aid administration they are its least-known feature. Accordingly, it is 
useful to outline the major principles and conditions which they contained. Whilst 
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the original inter-governmental agreements were not identical, they were highly 
comparable. 601 Consequently, it is possible to consider one agreement - the 1978 
agreement between the Commonwealth and Western Australia reproduced and 
appended at Appendix "A" - to exemplify the organisational basis of the joint 
Commonwealth-State national scheme.602 
The primary function of the legal aid agreements was to divide governmental 
responsibilities within the national scheme, and to define its scope. The Federal 
Govemment,.on its part, agreed to establish a Commonwealth commission to oversee 
the national provision of legal aid. 603 It also agreed that the Commonwealth would 
not establish new legal aid agencies in the contracting States for the duration of the 
agreements. 604 
The responsibility for providing legal services was assigned to the State statutory 
commissions.60' These legal aid commissions were to absorb the functions of the 
ALAO as well as the public and law society schemes in the respective States.606 The 
agreements contemplated that the legal aid commissions should be constituted by 
members representing the contracting parties, together with representatives of local 
social welfare bodies and the organised legal profession. 
The agreements provided that the State commissions would assist people requiring 
legal aid in problems and proceedings arising under either Commonwealth or State 
law. Legal problems and proceedings arising under Commonwealth law were 
defined as "the Federal area", and legally-aided 'Federal matters' were to be paid for 
by the Commonwealth.607 The value of these matters was to be calculated by 
reference to ALAO expenditure on 'Commonwealth matters' in a State in the year 
preceding the effective date of the respective legal aid agreement.608 State 
commissions providing legal aid in the Federal area were required to observe 
relevant recommendations of the Commonwealth commission.609 However, the 
obligation of States to provide 'Federal' legal aid was conditional. A State could 
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avoid the obligation if the cost exceeded its actual or anticipated income from 
Commonwealth funding, contributions paid by 'Federal' applicants and costs 
recovered in 'federal matters'.610 
In legal problems and proceedings falling outside the Federal area, the States were 
required to fund all legal aid provided by the statutory commissions, and contribute 
towards their operating costs. The amount of operational funding was to be 
determined by reference to the net operating costs of the legal aid commission, an 
amount which represented total operating costs less "contributions by and costs 
recovered or to be recovered from applicants and statutory interest available in 
solicitors trust accounts and other trust accounts".611 
In performing their statutory functions, the State legal aid commissions were to be 
'independent' of both Commonwealth and State governments. Moreover, they were 
- with the agreement of the contracting governments - permitted to finance local 
voluntary legal aid bodies.612 The inter-governmental agreements also regulated the 
delivery of lawyer services. A State legal aid commission was authorised to provide 
services via its own employed lawyers, or by referral to private lawyers. It was 
required to determine policies to allocate the distribution of legally-aided lawyer 
work while keeping in mind the desirability of maintaining internal professional 
lawyer skills. The States also agreed to ensure that local legislation enacting the 
national scheme would acknowiedge the presence of a solicitor-client relationship 
between staff lawyers and their legally-assisted clients.613 Finally, the inter-
governmental legal aid agreements were intended to operate indefinitely, but there 
was reciprocal provision for terminntion on notice.614 
By 1980, inter-governmental agreements had been executed, and were in force, 
between the Commonwealth and South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia 
and Victoria. The Federal Government and its negotiating Ministers and officials 
had been unable to settle the terms of an agreement with New South Wales and 
Tasmania.6 " 
The Ellicott plan had always contemplated that the mainland federal territories 
should join the national scheme on terms comparable to those negotiated between the 
Commonwealth and the States. Following the meeting in early 1976, Mr. Ellicott 
had issued revised administrative instructions to the ALAO in both the Australian 
Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. Pending the establishment of statutory 
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commissions, its staff were directed to modify local operational practice to conform 
with the 'in principle' Commonwealth-State agreement.616 In mid-1979, the 
Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission recommended that provision of legal aid in 
the Territories should be on similar terms to those in the inter-governmental 
agreements. 611 However, it was not until the late 1980s, when the mainland federal 
territories achieved self-government, that agreements were executed. In 1989, the 
Commonwealth entered into a legal aid agreement with the new government in the 
Australian Capital Territory, and similarly in the Northern Territory in 1990. 
The Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission 
In mid-1977, the Commonwealth established its national legal aid commission.'11 
The statutory functions of the Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission reflected its 
role as an agent of the Federal Government in the administration of the national 
scheme.619 Its primary function was to monitor the opera"Lion of the national scheme 
and advise the Attorney-General on Federal and national interests in the provision of 
legal aid. In effect, it assumed the national coordination functions performed by the 
ALAO. The Commission was also required to provide and manage the infrastructure 
for effective Commonwealth participation in the national scheme. For instance, it 
was to conduct research, and represent the Federal Government in the State and 
Territory legal aid commissions.620 It was also to assist in the administration of the 
national statutory and non-statutory schemes. 621 
The State and Territory Legal Aid Commissions 
It was the State and Territory legal aid commissions which were very much the 
public face of the new national scheme. The first legal aid commission was 
established by \Vestern Australia in 1976, followed by South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory in I 977.6n In 1978, coqimissions were established in 
Victoria and Queensland.623 By 1980, these five commissions were fully 
operational. 62~ 
The statutory schemes enacted in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, South 
Australia. Western Australia and Victoria were highly comparable, as were the later 
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schemes in New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Tasmania.'" They charged 
the legal aid commissions with two primary statutory functions. 
The first was to administer the statutory accounts into which the funds paid to the 
commissions to administer the schemes were to be deposited. 626 The principal source 
of these operational funds was the annual financial grants paid by the 
Commonwealth under the inter-governmental agreements. The remainder was to be 
derived from State and Territory financial grants, interest from solicitors' trust 
accounts, client contributions and recovered costs and intc:rest on investments. 
The second primary statutory function of the commissions was to provide legal aid in 
the most effective, efficient and economical manner in accordance with the 
provisions of the respective schemes.627 The scheme required the commissions to 
provide legal aid consonant with the organisation of the legal services industry, and 
nominated social justice objectives. In the case of the former, they were directed to 
ensure that an appropriate balance was achieved between the organised public 
provision of legal aid, and maintaining an independent private legal profession.621 
They were also required to be cognisant of the different and sometimes competing 
interests of staff lawyers and private lawyers - including different sub-groups of 
private lawyers - in allocating and distributing legally-aided matters.6:?9 In the case of 
the social justice objectives. the commissions were required to take steps to establish 
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local legal aid offices to promote access to lawyers' services and provide community 
and public legal education.630 
The statutory scheme neither gave poorer people a right to legal aid nor conferred 
upon ordinary citizens a universal juridical right to have legal representation 
provided at public expense. Instead, it adopted a mechanism which was applied in 
many comparable Western post-war legal aid' schemes.631 It created a general right to 
apply for lawyers' services to be provided at public expense and to have that 
application made the object of the statutory discretions lawfully exercisable by the 
commissions. In the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Victoria and Western 
Australia, the ambit of those discretions varied according to whether an applicant 
sought legal advice, duty lawyer services or legal assistance.632 In these four 
jurisdictions, commissions were empowered to grant applications for legal advice 
and duty lawyer services without charge or the imposition of a' means test.633 
However, their powers to approve or refuse applications for legal assistance was 
subject to two statutory constraints. The first constraint were limitations arising out 
of the status and residence of applicants and the forum of the subject proceedings.6J.I 
Secondly, the discretion to determine applications for legal assistance was required 
to be exercised in accordance with prescribed financial and 'merits' eligibility 
criteria. 
The prescribed financial criteria required that the legal aid commissions in the 
Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia be satisfied 
that an applicant would be unable to afford the cost of lawyers' services if he or she 
were to seek to 'buy' them from a private lawyer. In making this determination, the 
commissions were required to give attention to all relevant matters, including an 
applicant's income, the cash readily available or accessible to him or her, their debts, 
liabilities and other financial obligations, the local cost of living, the cost of private 
lawyers' services and any other matters affecting their ability to meet the cost of 
obtaining legal services. The prescribed 'merits' or equity criteria took the form of a 
requirement that legal assistance could only be provided where it was reasonable in 
all the circumstances to do so. For instance, s 28 (3) (a) and (b) of the Legal Aid 
Ordinance 1977 (ACT) provided that635 
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may b~ suffered by the person, by the public or by any section of the public if the 
assistance is not provided; and 
(b) in the case of assistance in relation to a proceeding in a court or before a tribunal 
- whether the proceeding is likely to terminate in a manner favourable to the 
person. 
South Australia was the exception, in its scheme the power to detennine applications 
for legal aid was undifferentiated.636 The Legal Services Commission - or its 
principal offi~er - was empowered to establish different procedural and eligibility 
criteria to· determine applications for legal aid.637 However, the exercise of this 
power was subject to the governing principles prescribed by s 10 (2) of the Legal 
Services Commission Act 1976 (SA). Its overriding principle was that "legal 
assistance should be granted ... where the public interest or the interests of justice so 
require." Its subsidiary principle was that "legal assistance should not be granted 
where the applicant could afford to pay in full for that legal assistance without undue 
financial hardship." All the legal aid commissions were empowered to make 
administrative guidelines distinguishing between specific classes of applicants, types 
of proceedings and the cost of legal services to assist in deciding which appEcations 
for legal assistance in civil, criminal and family law matters should be approved. 
The statutory scheme also conferred a range of incidental powers on the legal aid 
commissions with respect to applications for legal assistance. For instance, they 
could impose conditions requiring successful applicants to pay out-of-pocket 
expenses or execute a mortgage or charge to secure payment of the cost of providing 
legal assistance.631 The commissions were also required to determine the type and 
extent of the services to be provided to a legally-aided person.639 Furthermore, they 
were empowered to determine guidelines for the allocation of legally-assisted 
matters between staff and private lawyers.6111 
To varying degrees, the statutory scheme pennitted a legally-assisted person to 
express a preference for a specific private lawyer.6'1 In Victoria and Western 
Australia, the legislation entitled a legally-aided person to select a private lawyer 
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from a list established and maintained by the commission.642 If this right was 
waived, it could make its own selection from the list - if it did so, the commission 
was required to give paramount consideration to the interests of the legally-aid 
person, but also to consider the equitable allocation of referrals amongst listed 
lawyers.643 In the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, legally-aided people 
were not entitled to select their own lawyer.644 However, their personal prefer~nce 
was a paramount consideration for the legal aid commission when making a selection 
from the names of enlisted private lawyers, also having regard to the equitable 
allocation of. work amongst panel members, and the nature of their practices and 
expertise. 64' 
The statutory scheme also included review and appeal procedures. Applicants who 
were aggrieved by a decision with respect to an application for legal assistance could 
obtain redress. In the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Victoria and 
Western Australia, an aggrieved applicant could invoke the review and appeal 
procedures by initially asking to have a decision reconsidered by the primary 
decision-maker.616 If he or she was dissatisfied with the outcome of this preliminary 
review, they could appeal to a statutory committee empowered to confirm or vary the 
original decision - or substitute its own. Once again, South Australia was the 
exceptional case. Its legislation did not provide for an initial process of preliminary 
review. The Commission itself was nominated as the review body.M' In all 
jurisdictions, legal aid was not generally available for an appeal and decisions of 
reviewing authorities were final and conclusive.641 
The Dismantling of the Australian Legal Aid Office 
Over 1973-75, the ALAO had embodied the hopes of many for law reform and 
improved access to law.M9 However, in the end it "lived a less heroic existence" than 
many of its supporters - both then and now - would have us believe.650 As the 
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650 
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machinery of the permanent national scheme was constructed, the scope of the 
operations of the ALAO was dismantled and its brief national presence gradually 
faded. In the late 1970s, ALAO staff and functions in the Australian Capital 
Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria were 
absorbed into the legal aid commissions. The ALAO offices continued to operate in 
New South Wales until 1987 and in the Northern Territory and Tasmania until 1990 
when legal aid commissions were established in accordance with the 
Commonwealth-State agreements. 
In 1976, the ALAO's central office became a division of the Attorney-General's 
Department, where it continued to assist in providing and coordinating legal aid in 
the Federal legal system.m These functions - which in policy areas overlapped with 
the role of the Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission - included the administration 
of its ten national administrative and statutory legal aid schemes. The number of 
secondary national legal aid schemes increased over 1976-80. In 1976, 
Commonwealth provision of legal aid was extended with the enactment of a scheme 
to protect the land rights of Aboriginal peoples in the Northern Territory.652 
Administrative schemes were also introduced - or newly operating."3 In 1979, the 
number of secondary national schemes increased again when legal aid was made 
available for the purposes of application to the Commonwealth Security Appeals 
Tribunal for review of security assessments. 654 
The Developments outside the National Scheme 
The emergence of the national scheme was the major development in Australian 
legal aid in the 1970s. However, it was not the only change in the national system. 
The changes to legal aid outside the story of the national scheme fall into two 
categories. First, there were those which had some direct relationship to the changes 
in Federal legal aid policy. Secondly, there were changes which occurred separately 
651 
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to the national scheme although indirectly influenced by mainstream national public 
policy developments in the period - including legal aid. 
In the first category were the developments in the public, law society and other 
schemes in the States and Territories. In the interim phase of the new national 
approach - 1973 to late 1975 - this arena saw few changes. In 1973, the Law Society 
of the Australian Capital Territory established a Legal Aid Bureau to provide free 
legal advice. There were also minor changes to the public scheme in New South 
Wales.655 In 1974, Queensland repealed its poor pris9ners' defence legislation, 
statutorily established its Public Defender and enacted reforms to criminal legal aid 
which were comparable to those introduced in New South Wales and Victoria in 
1969.656 
The major change in the States in this period was the growth in Jaw society and other 
legal referral schemes, a development which was most marked in the two most 
populous States.657 By 1974, there were 23 Citizens Advice Bureaux, social welfare 
offices and other advice and referral services centres at which people could obtain 
legal advice operating in Melbourne and provincial cities elsewhere in Victoria. 651 In 
New South Wales in 1975, the Law Society members voluntarily staffed 21 similar 
referral services in metropolitan and provincial centres.659 Another significant 
development was the increased availability of duty lawyer services. In 1974, the law 
society schemes in Queensland, South Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia 
provided duty solicitors in a restricted number of metropolitan magistrates' courts.660 
However, after 1976 the focus in legal aid in States was inevitably upon 
implementing their 'in-principle' agreement with the Commonwealth. Until 1978, 
the Federal Government continued to provide the law society schemes with 
supplementary funding (above Table 1). This gave a final boost to these otherwise 
flagging schemes, particularly those in South Australia and Tasmania.661 However, 
over 1977-80 the State legal aid schemes - both the public and law society versions -
in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and 
\Vestern Australia were absorbed into the legal aid commissions. 
656 
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Direct supplementary Federal funding of State legal aid - outside the national scheme 
- continued in New South Wales, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, but was now 
channelled through the ALAO which acted as a de facto legal aid commission in 
these jurisdictions. In 1979, in a development quite independent of the national 
scheme, New South Wales established a new statutory legal aid agency.662 Its new 
Legal Services Commission - in conjunctioh with the Public Defender, the law 
society scheme and the ALAO - provided the basis of legal aid in New South Wales 
until its agreement with the Commonwealth in 1987. Comparable coalitions 
operated in Tasmania and the Northern Territory until .1990, although the ALAO 
remained the major legal aid provider. 
In the second category defined above - changes which occurred separately to the 
national scheme - there were two significant developments. First, there was the 
establishment of a national Aboriginal legal aid scheme and, secondly, there was an 
increase in the number of community legal centres. These two developments are 
discussed below. 
The Establishment of a National Aboriginal Legal Aid Scheme 
In 1972, the Whitlam Government had come to office with a definite program to 
improve the social welfare of indigenous Australians. 663 This program included 
policies to tackle the injustice which historically had stigmatised their relationship 
with the legal system. These social justice policies included the expansion of the 
existing program of federal expenditure on legal aid.664 As in other arenas of 
Aboriginal affairs, the Whitlam Government acted promptly.665 
Within a few weeks of assuming office, it had issued a policy statement which said 
that it would provide legal aid for Aboriginal peoples in all courts.666 Furthermore, in 
March I 973 the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department prepared a draft 
program for the establishment of federally-funded autonomous, self-managed legal 
aid services for indigenous people.667 In April, a meeting was convened in Canberra 
between Commonwealth officials and interested parties to discuss the draft program. 
The meeting agreed upon the final content of a program to administer an expanded 
legal aid scheme, and its proposals were subsequently adopted by the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs.661 
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665 
666 
661 
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In 1973 and 1974, new Aboriginal legal aid services were established in Western 
Australia, Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory. By 1975, 
legally-aided lawyer representation and legal advice in criminal and civil 
proceedings were provided at 23 locations throughout Australia. 669 In practice, the 
majority of legal aid provided to Aboriginal people through the scheme related to 
criminal proceedings.670 However, legal aid was also available to local indigenous 
communities for the protection of community legal, soc;ial and cultural interests.671 
The demise of the Whitlam Government also impacted upon Aboriginal legal aid. 
Initially, the Fraser Government sought to reduce the autonomy and self-
management inherent in the program by restricting the eligibility criteria applied by 
the Aboriginal legal services. Accordingly, in October 1976 the Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs introduced draft revised guidelines for the provision of legal aid, 
proposing that the Aboriginal legal services should not provide legal aid in 
proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), or in Supreme Court and 
intern1ediate court proceedings where duty solicitor schemes operated.6T.? The draft 
guidelines also proposed that the Aboriginal legal services should cease providing 
ancillary welfare services.673 The guidelines - and their promulgation - were part of 
an attempt by the Fraser Government to shift the focus of the services towards 
replicating the range and type of services available within the national scheme.674 
However, the draft guidelines were subsequently rejected by the Aboriginal legal 
services at a meeting with the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.675 In early 1977, their 
representatives proposed alternative guidelines which emphasised "the community 
base of the Services and the basic objective of Aboriginal self-determination".676 
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This proposal was accepted by the Minister, who withdrew the original draft 
guidelines and announced that the Federal Government now agreed that each 
Aboriginal legal service should continue to determine its own guidelines for legal 
aid, consonant with its own budgetary constraints.m 
Thenceforth, the Fraser Government continued to support the thrust of the Aboriginal 
legal aid policies introduced by the Whitlam Government. 671 In the four financial 
years 1976-77 to 1979-80, it expended $11.8 m on the Aboriginal legal aid scheme 
(above Table. I) which permitted a small but significant increase in the number of 
services. 679 By 1980, 13 Aboriginal legal services were operating, providing legal aid 
- according to Department of Aboriginal Affairs estimates in 1978-79 - to indigenous 
peoples in over 70,000 matters every year. 680 
The Growth of the Community Legal Centres 
The other development in the secon~ category of changes in legal aid outside the 
national scheme was the increased number of community legal centres. The new 
centres were established over 1973-80 and had similar origins to the community-
oriented legal aid agencies of the early 1970s - emerging from local coalitions of 
social welfare interest groups, legal practitioners, other lawyers and law students.681 
Moreover, the continuation of this trend was consistent with the appearance of 
similar 'community'-based or non-state provision of legal aid in comparable Western 
countries since the mid-l 960s.682 
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By 1980, there were approximately eleven community legal centres operating in the 
capital cities. In Melbourne, the Fitzroy Legal Service had been joined by the 
Nunawading Legal Service, the Springvale Legal Service Co-operative Limited and 
the Tenants Advice Service. Student legal referral services continued to operated at 
the University of Melbourne and La Trobe University.613 In Sydney, the Redfern 
Legal Centre had been established in 1977 and the Macquarie Legal Centre,. the • 
Marrickville Legal Centre and an advice and referral service at the University of 
Sydney had also commenced operations.684 In Adelaide, The Parks and Bowden-
Brompton community legal centre - and a student advice service at the South 
Australian Institute of Technology - were in operation.685 In Brisbane, the Caxton 
Street Legal Service - and a student scheme at the University of Queensland -
completed the national picture.686 
Conclusion 
Th'! social impact of the three years of the Whitlam Government was unprecedented 
- and quite disproportionate to its short tenure. On the one hand, it was a bitter and 
divisive period, particularly in 1974 and 1975. There was an unrelenting atmosphere 
of open political conflict, a situation foreign to many Australians after 23 years of 
conservative government. Moreover, there was a growing realisation that the 
highpoint in post-war economic prosperity had been reached, and people - the middle 
class in particular - feared that "inflation had taken an unbreakable hold and was 
beyond control".68; Its political legitimacy contested from the outset, the legality of 
its vice-regal dismissal was dubious and left deep political and social scars. On the 
other hand, the \Vhitlam Government had introduced important reforms in 
immigration and ethnic affairs, law, the welfare of indigenous peoples, education. 
health, social welfare, urban services and foreign policy - and expanded the focus of 
the Australian welfare state.681 
This confronting mixture of hope and fear polarised significant parts of Australian 
society. It also left a mythology describing the aims and objectives of the Whitlam 
Government, including its role in the formation of the national scheme. From the 
mid- l 970s onwards, one consequence of this mythology was the development of a 
legal aid orthodoxy, with polarised versions of the origins of the national scheme. 
This orthodoxy is still virulent today. One version - that favoured by the legal aid 
sector, social democratic politicians and 'radical' and Left-leaning lawyers - is that 
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the scheme originated in the golden age heralded by the election of the Whitlam 
Government. These 'true believers' see the national scheme as an instrument of 
social justice forged by a visionary Commonwealth Attorney-General - Senator 
Murphy. In this version, his vision of social reform through legal aid was cruelly 
dashed in 1975 by the legal profession and by the re-ascendancy of reactionary 
politics following the election of the Fraser Government. The other version of the 
orthodoxy - harboured by the organised legal profession, conservative politicians and 
many private lawyers - interprets these events differently. Its countervailing 
mythology interprets the emergence of the national scheme in 1976 as reaffirming 
the social significance of the legal profession in achieving popular access to law. 
The political resistance of the Federal Opposition, the legal profession and lawyers to 
the interim national scheme of the Whitlam Government in 1974 and 1975 is 
portrayed as resistance to state control of lawyer services, ennobled by the social 
responsibility of the legal profession to protect the quality of popular access to law. 
Moreover, state control posed a threat to its 'independence', without which the legal 
profession believed it could no longer safeguard the 'rule of law' and protect 
individual rights in Australian society. 
This chapter has illustrated the shortcomings of the Australian legal aid orthodoxy. 
It has also demonstrated - in three different ways - the complexity of the real story of 
the emergence of the national scheme. First, it has shown that whilst there are 
fragments of fact in the orthodoxy, it generally belies the historical reality. 
Secondly, the chapter shows that the election of the Whitlam Government was the 
catalytic event in the emergence of the scheme - as it was for other developments in 
the post-war welfare state.689 Furthermore, the 'decision' - instigated by Senator 
Murphy in early 1973 - to reverse Commonwealth policy and adopt a new, interim 
national response to legal aid was indisputably its own. However, the chapter has 
demonstrated that this 'decision' was neither an inevitable result of the election of 
the Whitlam Government, nor of any clear, preconceived agenda of Senator 
Murphy.690 This is not say that its election was unimportant, or that it had not 
targeted the legal aid system for reform. It was important, and the Federal Labor 
Party law reform program clearly included legal aid.691 Neither does this conclusion 
imply that Senator Murphy was not passionately concerned with legal aid - and other 
aspects of law reform. His record as Commonwealth Attorney-General and judge 
demonstrates that he was, and this is a fact even his detractors would probably 
concede.692 In the former role, Senator Murphy had clearly been remarkable, but it 
was not so remarkable for Australian government to produce reforming Attomeys-
General. Victoria had done so in the 1920s, New South Wales in the 1940s and early 
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1950s and the Commonwealth in the late 1950s and early l 960s.693 Moreover, these 
reformers had - to varying degrees - also sought to improve access to legal aid.694 
Therefore, the chapter demonstrates that these two factors - the election of the 
Whitlam government and the zeal of Senator Murphy - alone are not sufficient to 
explain the emergence of the national legal aid scheme in the post-war welfare state. 
There were other important, background factors - revealed in this and earlier chapters 
- influencing the 1973 'decision'. If we accept Harkins' account, the seminal event 
behind the national scheme was the meeting in Canberr~ between Senator Murphy 
and ministers and lawyers from the States shortly after the Whitlam Government 
took office - an exchange meeting which prompted him, his ministerial colleagues 
and Commonwealth officials to take action. 695 Even if we reject this account - or 
discount Harkins' recollections - legal aid in Australia in early 1973 was in a parlous 
condition, and had been so throughout the 1960s. Moreover, since the Law Council 
first approached the Menzies Government in 1965, the nationwide problems of legal 
aid had been a looming Federal presence. Inevitably its problems would have 
emerged onto the agendas of Federal governments in the 1970s.696 The likelihood of 
this occurring earlier - rather than later - was increased by the prevailing national 
climate of social change and reform in the early 1970s and the simmering presence 
of the national inquiry into poverty.697 Furthermore, the Whitlam Goveuunent itself 
had law reform agendas which were far more pressing, and at least as socially 
significant as citizens' legal aid. In early 1973, Senator Murphy was considering 
other developments in social and legal reform. All of them had incidental 
consequences for the future direction of Federal legal aid. This reveals that his 
deliberations were influenced by other developments in Federal law and government, 
in particular, matrimonial causes reform, and the environment and Aboriginal legal 
aid. These developments were also part of a wider law reform agenda and work of 
the Attorney-General. 698 
Furthermore, the account of the 'decisional' history of the national scheme also 
demonstrates that it is a complex story. Existing accounts of its formation -
including the orthodoxy - tend to portray the story as a seamless, singular event, 
beginning with the ALAO in late 1973 and ending with its 'destruction' by the Fraser 
Government two and a half years later. Conversely, this chapter has portrayed the 
scheme emerging in three distinct phases: first, the reversal of existing policy and the 
interim new Federal response in 1973 and 1974; secondly, the climax of new 
response in 1975 and the plan to establish a permanent statutory scheme; and, finally, 
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the establishment of the national scheme in 1976.m The presence of three phases -
rather than a single, undifferentiated process - has important implications for 
explaining the emergence of the national scheme. It means that the first six months 
of 1973 - when the Whitlam Government changed Federal legal aid policy- are not 
the only point at which we should marshal relevant fonnative factors. We must also 
include in the changed or new factors influencing the other phases of the emergence 
of the national scheme. 
By the start of the second phase - the climax of the F.ederal response in 1975 -
Senator Murphy's ministerial role had ended, and a new Attorney-General carried 
the plans of the Whitlam Government for a pennanent national scheme of legal 
aid. 700 In many respects, it is in describing this phase that the orthodoxy comes 
closest to describing the historical reality. By 1975, the Whitlam Government's 
plans had been injected with the vision of the Commissioner for Law and Poverty, 
who believed that in modem, post-war Australian society the provision of legal aid 
for poorer people was axiomatic.701 Moreover, the objectives of the interim Federal 
response had become more publicly focused on the needs of poorer people. There 
were a number of reasons why this had occurred. In 1973 and 1974, Senator Murphy 
had been actively involved in promoting the ALAO. And he had similar views to 
Professor Sackville on the social significance of legal aid.702 By 1975, the ALAO 
had established itself, and the public perception was that it served the legal needs of 
poorer people.703 Moreover, it had attracted a small cadre of bright - generally young 
- lawyers to its ranks who were committed to social justice ideals. A few - but 
influential - similarly endowed and committed young and younger lawyers, who 
worked for the Fitzroy Legal Service and in some university law faculties, had 
adopted legal aid as the forum and vehicle to legally enfranchise the 'poor'. 704 
Furthennore, the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty had given law and poveny a 
national profile, especially since Professor Sackville's appointment and the 
publication of his discussion paper on legal aid. 705 Lastly, since 1973 the Whitlam 
Government had vigorously pursued its objective of improving "the Australian social 
welfare svstem", including throueh well-advertised local ventures like the Australian 
. - -
Assistance Plan. 706 Behind these several developments in the latter part of I 973, 
1974 and early 1975 \Vas the conception of a national citizens' legal aid scheme for 
the poor, which is a key component of the 'lost' scheme mourned by the 'true 
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believers'. 707 However, those developments - and their ideological context - also 
played a real part in the emergence of the national scheme. 
In 1915, another key part of the orthodoxy - the resistance of the Federal Opposition, 
the legal profession and many lawyers - was also at its most forceful.7DI However, 
this chapter has demonstrated that their opposition was neither as straightforward -
nor as significant - as either version of the orthodoxy suggests. The federal 
conservative parties were not inherently opposed to Commonwealth participation in 
legal aid. Like the legal profession and the lawyers, their objection was that the 
Whitlam Government's plan overlooked "the important legal, social and 
constitutional issues involved", and in particular those involving the role and 
'independence' of the legal profession.709 Neither the legal profession itself nor its 
mainstream members were inherently opposed to legal aid, including 
Commonwealth participation. Until the arrival of the Whitlam Government, the 
legal profession had acted as the principal delegate of Australian governments in 
running legal aid. In 1975, it was yet to relinquish this role. The profession and 
lawyers were still actively administering the State and Territory law society schemes. 
Furthennore, the Law Council had requested Commonwealth intervention in legal 
aid in 1965, as had the law society in Western Australia in 1967.710 
Moreover, in the second phase the legal profession and mainstream lawyers did - as 
the orthodoxy records - vocally oppose the Whitlam Government's plans, both 
informally and in the press, in politics and in the courts.711 Their motivations closely 
correspond to the orthodox explanation, at least overtly. They were often motivated 
by genuinely held fears about the desirability - and dangers - of a centrally-controlled 
national legal aid scheme. This was a response quite consistent with the professional 
ideals which had played an important part in the involvement of lawyers in legal aid 
since the 1920s and 1930s.712 However, in opposing the Whitlam Government's 
plans, the Australian legal profession and mainstream lawyers were also motivated 
by self-interest, as they had been in the law society schemes since the 1920s, and as 
their overseas counterparts were in comparable post-war developments. 713 Whilst the 
professional, economic and political interests of lawyers in this phase were 
legitimate, their significance in this second phase is overlooked by the orthodoxy, 
ignored by the profession's version and over-simplified or parodied by the 'true 
believers'. Finally, another relevant factor in the second phase of the national 
scheme was the changed focus of the welfare state - a product of the Whitlam 
Government's policies in 1973 and 1974 which had shifted the balance of the 
welfare state. Previously, the main attention and the biggest budgetary share had 
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gone to cash benefits, but Labor's attention to health, education, and many generous 
specific-purpose programs shifted the emphasis to the government as a supplier of 
services. This was a crucial step, which made the welfare state m.uch more visible 
than cash benefits and forced the government to be evaluated as a retailer of 
programs rather than as a wholesaler that allowed people to spend cash supplements 
as they saw fit. 714 
By the third phase - the 'decision' of the Fraser Government in 1976 - the national 
scheme was ~lready carrying considerable baggage. This 'decision' added to the 
complexity of the story of its emergence. The Fraser Government acted almost 
immediately to commit the Commonwealth to finance and administer a new national 
legal aid scheme, which would, in conjunction with the Aboriginal legal services and 
the community legal centres, form the basis of the Australian system for the next 
twenty years. 1" Yet, it had come to power - only a few weeks beforehand -
professing its intention to cap the new focus of the welfare state by reducing 
Commonwealth outlays on social welfare. 716 Moreover, its Attorney-General - who 
emerged as the real architect of the Australian post-war scheme - had led the 
opposition of the Federal Liberal Party to the Whidam Government's plans for a 
permanent scheme only two months before. 717 Furthermore, the Fraser Government 
was a Liberal/Country Party coalition, the same breed of national government which 
had avoided involvement in citizens' legal aid throughout much of the post-war 
period. 
The third phase has yet other complicating features. For those who most actively 
supported legal aid in 1973, 1974 and 1975 - the Labor Party, the ALAO, reforming 
and 'radical' lawyers, social democrats and reformers - the national scheme was 
second-best. Instead of welcoming the eventual Commonwealth commitment to 
legal aid in 1976 - in a national scheme building upon the law society experience 
_ since the 1930s - they condemned its domination by the organised legal profession 
and private lawyers. Prima facie, the scheme and the Commonwealth-State 
agreements represented an unqualified victory for the latter. However, the legal 
profession and private lawyers, in accepting regularised state funding and 
administration of legal aid, had mounteci a Trojan horse. The inter-governmental 
agreements, and the legislation they spawned, enabled governments and their 
statutory agents to regulate and intervene in the organisation, distribution and unit 
cost of lawyers' work. In the short term, this was not a problem. Private lawyers' 
interests controlled the 'dangerous' parts of the new legal machinery. In the longer 
term, this machinery gave Australian governments the legal capacity to intervene in 
the legal profession and its work on a new scale - with its acquiescence, if not at its 
invitation. 
1).t 
11.S 
716 
MA Jones, above n 134 at 64. 
The Commonwealth statutory and non-statt:!·..!?)' schemes. the Aboriginal legal services and community 
legal centres: D Fleming, "Legal Aid" above n 125 & D Fleming, "The Mixed Model of legal Aid in 
Australia" in Legal Aid in tire Post-Welfare State Society. ( 1995) al 165-244. 
MA Jones. above n 134 at 65. 
Above at p ~3-94. 
718 
116 
This chapter has concluded the three historical narratives in this part. Its description 
of the reality of the emergence of the national scheme - and the accounts of its 
modem and post-war background in Chapters Two and Three above - have addressed 
the substance of the second and third categories of the NLAAC report. 711 We now 
know more about and are in a better position to understand the social and historical 
context of Australian legal aid, and the origins of the national scheme. However, to • 
complete our investigations - and this part of the thesis - it remains to consider the 
ideological context of the national scheme. 
.Above at pp 7-8. 
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Chapter Five 
The Ideological Context 
I come now to what might be tenned my general remarks on legal aid. Legal aid is 
granted and given because of the wish to establish the principle of equality before 
the law. That is a nice, resounding phrase. If it means anything it should mean 
that the courts decide issues between citizen and citizen and between citizen and 
State on their merits, regardless of the importance or unimportance of the citizen. 
It may be true that the courts are fair, but the assurance does not help a person who 
cannot afford to go to court ... Legal aid is provided as an equalizer. Its aim is and 
should be to ensure, as far as humanly possible, that no man is thwarted or limited 
in the exercise of his rights merely because he cannot afford to go to law ... 
The Hon R R Downing, Leader of the Opposition, in the resumed second reading 
speech on the Legal Practitioners (Legal Aid) Bill 1970, 5 August 1970, NSW, PD 
1970 Vol 136 at 4918-4919 
Introduction 
This concluding chapter of Part I examines the ideological context of the national 
scheme. It aims to complete the inquiry into the unanswered questions of the 
NLAAC report. Instead of an institutional historical focus, which has been the 
subject of the three preceding chapters, this chapter reviews the ideas behind the 
national scheme. 
It undertakes this task in a deliberately unambitious and uncritical manner. The 
chapter portrays the ideas about legal aid - and legal aid schemes - as they were 
evident in the national scheme, and in the context of the background of modem 
Australian experience. In other words, this chapter's objective is to complete the 
story of the emergence of the national scheme while leaving the task of critical 
analysis of its origins and significance in post-war society to Part II below. 
To achieve its objective, the chapter begins by describing the ideas evident in the 
joint Commonwealth-State legal aid scheme adopted in 1976. It continues to 
describe the background dimensions which defined the scheme's ideological context, 
beginning with the ideas of the Fraser Federal Government, and the plans and 
policies of its predecessor. The chapter continues to describe the historical 
substratum, namely the ideals behind the State schemes, and the legal aid ideology of 
the legal profession. Its review ends with noting - in passing - another ideological 
dimension implicit in the national scheme, namely the modem social and political 
ideals of the Australian legal system. 
The chapter also reviews the significance of the ideals behind the national scheme in 
order to conclude its own portrayal of the ideological context and this part of the 
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thesis. It sketches the three ways in which these ideals are significant: in defining the 
ideological context of the national scheme, in completing the historical picture and in 
highlighting the limitations of conventional analysis in explaining the legal aid's 
origins and significance in the post-war welfare state. 
The Ideas Evident in the National Scheme 
Prima facie, the inter-governmental 'in-principle' agreement which constructed the 
national legal aid scheme was bereft of an ideological perspective. 719 In early 1976, 
the question of 'why' it was desirable for Australian governments to establish a 
national scheme does not appear to have crossed the minds of the Standing 
Committee of Attomeys-General.720 If it did so, the meeting transcript suggests they 
thought it was a superfluous question, unnecessary to consider or discuss. It appears 
that all governments had already agreed that a national scheme was desirable - the 
only remaining question was how it should be administered. Mr. Ellicott - the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General - made this clear when he opened the meeting: 
One of the commitments of the new Commonwealth Government was to review legal 
aid to see whether a rationalised system of legal aid could be worked out in the 
Commonwealth ... it seemed to my Government to be desirable that we do have a 
look at the overall question of legal aid and see whether we can work out something 
that we think will not only be adequate to the country as a whole but also adequate to 
the States and Territories. 721 
The State ministers had a similar approach. For instance, Mr. Wilcox - the Attorney-
General for Victoria - said that the meeting was "looking for a panacea to the 
problem of legal aid".72~ Consequently, the discussion at the Hobart meeting 
concentrated upon administrative and operational matters - issues like the division of 
administrative and financial responsibility, legislative requirements, delivery of legal 
services and the optimum balance between service delivery by employed and by 
private sector lawyers. Indeed, most of these issues - save for those specifically 
concerning lawyer services policy - were typical of those arising in any new public 
venture which was to be jointly financed and managed by Australian governments in 
the 1970s. 
The absence of an overt ideological perspective permeated the instruments whereby 
the 'in-principle' agreement was translated into administrative reality. The legal aid 
agreements executed in 1978 and 1979 between the Commonwealth and Queensland, 
South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia simply formalised and implemented 
its objectives.723 Neither they nor the subsequent agreements with the Australian 
Capital Territory, New South Wales or the Northern Territory contained any express 
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statements as to the ideas behind the national scheme, or legal aid itself. Nor were 
overt statements of ideological perspective or intent evident in the processes to 
implement the Commonwealth-State legal aid agreements. The relevant 
parliamentary debates did not reveal the goals or objectives of the national scheme, 
nor did the legislation which constituted the Commonwealth and State legal aid 
commissions. 724 The latter simply constitutetl the legal machinery of the national 
scheme, containing, as Hanks has commented, "very little (if any) reference ... to the 
goals and objectives towards which those processes are a means" and was by and 
large "cryptic on [the J vital questions" of the "goals and objectives of legal aid in 
Australia".'" 
Technically, Hanks is correct. The legal aid legislation was very sparring in its 
treatmen~ of the ideology of the national scheme.726 However, the legislation -
together with the 'in-principle' agreement and the Commonwealth-State legal aid 
agreements - was only the public face of the national scheme. Behind its 
organisational facade lay two other dimensions which defined its ideological context. 
The first other defining dimension were the ideas associated with the national 
scheme, namely the views of the Fraser Government and those associated with the 
plans and policies of its predecessor. The second defining dimension was the 
historical substratum of the existing ideas about legal aid in modern Australian 
society. The impact of both these 'covert' sources of legal aid ideology is discussed 
below. 
The Ideas Associated lvith the National Scheme 
The ideas associated - by implication - with the ideology of the national scheme fall 
into two categories. First, there are the ideas which the Fraser Government brought 
to the making of the 'in-principle' agreement in 1976, the last emergent phase of the 
national scheme.m Within the second category are those ideas evident in the 
interventions associated with the Whitlam Government: the reversal of Federal 
policy, the interim scheme and the climax of its response.721 Whilst these ideas had 
no direct impact on the ideological content of the national scheme, they did influence 
it indirectly through defining the ideological framework in 1973-75, through 
influencing policy-makers, 'designers' and legal drafters and via the structural legacy 
of the Legal Aid Bill 1975 {Cth). 
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The Ideas of the Fraser Government 
The 'in-principle' agreement - and the legal machinery which it spawned - reflected 
the ideas of the Fraser Government towards a national scheme, and legal aid. These 
ideas originated in 1974, when plans for a national scheme were first included in the 
federal Liberal Party election platform, providing that its government would: 
Ensure an adequate and accessible system of legal aid, suitably publicised and 
operating through government and professional bodies, to assist those persons who are 
financially unable to incur the cost of litigation and whose just claims may otherwise 
be neglected. 729 
This promise was reaffirmed in the Liberal Party's policies for the 1975 federal 
election, although it was given negligible prominence by the temporary Prime 
Minister in his campaign policy speech.130 
The foundation of the Fraser Government's ideas about legal aid are also evident in 
the second reading debates on the Legal Aid Bill in October 1975. Mr. Ellicott - as 
shadow Attorney-General - had expressed clear and defined views about the 
functions of a national scheme. Importantly, the ideas he canvassed were not 
restricted to organisational issues and opposition to the proposed statutory ALAO. 
They included the role of legal aid in Australian society: 
I wish to set out what I believe to be some basic principles to be applied in devising an 
efficient legal aid service in this country. Firstly, [it] should represent co-operative 
involvement between governments at State and Federal levels, the legal profession, 
other professionals who are involved, such as social workers, and the assisted public. 
Secondly, the Federal Government has a definite role in ensuring the provision of 
legal aid ... Obviously a Federal Parliament which passes laws creates rights, duties 
and obligations has a real consideration in relation to those citizens who are enforcing 
those rights. The Houses of Parliament are entitled to pass laws which effectively 
provide legal aid for people enforcing federal rights. So a Federal government has a 
clear involvement in legal aid.731 
The other major Liberal Party spokesman in the debate - Mr. Howard - also took the 
opportunity ~o state "a few principles of the Opposition's attitude towards legal 
aid". 732 The central principle of legal aid - as the Liberal Party then saw it - was that 
.. no person should be denied the benefit of legal advice or assistance through Jack of 
financial resources".733 However, the Liberal Party believed that the practical 
application of this principle should primarily benefit those citizens for whom the 
Commonwealth "has a direct constitutional legal responsibility" .734 This 
responsibility - according to Mr. Howard - extended to people who needed legal 
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assistance in respect of the operation of federal laws. 735 Furthermore, Mr. Howard 
noted that the economic hegemony of the Federal Government enabled it to "support 
financially the provision of legal aid services".736 In combination, these two factors -
restricted constitutional responsibility and financial capacity - meant that the 
Commonwealth had "a very direct interest and responsibility in the provision of legal 
aid services throughout Australia". 731 
The Plans and Policies of the Whitlam Government 
The opening gambit in the emergence of the national scheme was the reversal , in 
early 1973, of existing Federal policy towards legal aid. 731 In late I 973, the Whitlam 
Government publicly stated its intentions in reforming legal aid via a Ministerial 
Statement made by Senator Murphy.739 In some respects, the objectives recorded in 
this statement are an ex post facto reinvention or gloss, given the circumstances of 
the •decision' to reform legal aid. Nevertheless, it defined how the Whitlam 
Government conceived of its initiatives in legal aid. Senator Murphy explained to 
the Senate: 
The Government has taken action because it believes that one of the basic causes of 
inequality before the law is the absence of adequate and comprehensive legal aid 
arrangements throughout Australia. This is a problem that will be within the 
knowledge of every honourable senator who will on many occasions have had to 
inform citizens seeking assistance with their problems that there is nothing that he can 
do for them; that they will need to go and see a private solicitor. With some 
exception, we in Australia have been slow to respond to the need of the ordinary 
citizen for ready and equal assistance when confronted with a legal problem or court 
proceedings. The ultimate object of the Government is that legal aid be readily and 
equally a\'ailable to citizens everywhere in Australia and that aid be extended for 
advice and assistance of litigation as weJJ as litigation in aJI legal categories and in aJI 
courts.740 
In 1974 and early 1975, the ideas associated with these plans are to be found in the 
work of the ALAO, the Australian Legal Aid Review Committee and the 
Commissioner for Law and Poverty. 741 Their ideas generally conformed to the 
essential principle of the Murphy statement that Commonwealth involvement in legal 
aid was ultimately in pursuit of the objective of citizens' equality before the law. 
However, the ideological framework generated by these agencies tended to 
emphasise the interests of a particular group of citizens, namely the poor and poorer 
Australians. In the case of the ALAO, this was not evident from its statements. It 
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made few, if any. It was evident from its guidelines governing eligibility for legal 
aid as these focused on poorer and disadvantaged 'Commonwealth' people.742 
For the Australian Legal Aid Review Committee in 1974, legal aid was primarily 
about promoting greater social justice and equality. Its members believed that "in 
any just society each person should have access to the legal process and that to deny 
a person that access is to perpetuate a life condition of social deprivation". 743 • The ' 
Commissioner for Law and Poverty had a similar conception He was adamant that 
in a modern society the provision of legal aid for poorer people was axiomatic: 
Where one party to a dispute does not have access to the legal system in order to 
enforce his rights, or where enforcement is expensive or otherwise difficult to obtain, 
his ability to gain proper redress is impaired or frustrated altogether ... If a number of 
people experiencing similar problems suffer from an inability to gain effective access 
to the legal system, they have little chance of overcoming those problems and there is 
a danger that they will be subjected to systematic exploitation based on their inability 
to resist the practices perpetrated on them ... Unless all interest groups have access to 
legal re.>ources to press their claims, the less powerful will fin<1 their interests ignored 
or suppressed. It is no accident that groups which have not had legal assistance 
readily available to them such as poorer welfare beneficiaries, consumers and tenants 
have not been able to secure changes that markedly improve their collective 
position. 744 
The work of the ALAO - and the ideas and proposed policies of the ALARC and the 
Commissioner - influenced the content of the Legal Aid Bill 1975 (Cth}.745 In 
introducing the Bill in the House of Representatives on 5 June 1975, Mr. Enderby -
by then Commonwealth Attorney-General - said: 
Ready and equal access to the Jaw and the legal process is the birthright of every 
Australian. The Government believes that if this is to become a reality under our 
federal system, State systems of legal aid will have to be complemented by an 
Australia-wide system of legal aid. 746 
There were marked differences between the scheme in the Bill, and the national 
scheme as it was enacted by Commonwealth and State legal aid commission 
legislation. However, there were also similarities, especially in defining the 
functions of the statutory agencies, which added to the continuum between the plans 
and policies of the Whitlam Government and the final version of the national 
scheme.747 
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The Historical Substratum 
The second other defining dimension of the national scheme was the historical 
substratum in the form of the existing ideas about legal aid in modem Australian 
society. The nexus between these ideas and the national scheme is not as obvious as 
with the ideologies directly associated with its emergence. Moreover, subsequent 
appreciations of the scheme • including the Australian orthodoxy • have tended to 
focus on its novel aspects. It certainly had important new aspects, including Federal 
Government involvement, its ministers talking about legal aid, significant 
Commonwealth expenditure and its cooperation with States in national legal aid 
provision. Furthermore, the emergence of the national scheme saw, for the first time, 
open conflict between the national government and the organised legal profession 
and lawyers over the direction and control of legal aid. 
However, we have often overlooked the fact that the national scheme was also 
significant for what it did not change. While existing Federal policy towards legal 
aid, which had been applied since the 1900s, was reversed, the interim plans and 
policies of the Whitlam Government - and its successor as reflected in the national 
scheme -nevertheless remained closely linked to the performance of federal 
governmental functions. In 1973-76, the significant difference was that those 
functions increased to include legal aid in the national arena, which was a 
consequence of the legislative ambitions of the Commonwealth Parliament and the 
growing functions of the federal welfare state. m Furthermore, the Commonwealth-
State legal aid agreements • whilst an innovation - reinforced the historical focus on 
the States as the forum for legal aid administration. In effect, the legislative 
obligations they imposed required State governments to consolidate their existing 
legal aid schemes - the statutory civil and criminal schemes, and the semi-charitable 
and public law society schemes. 749 These prior schemes carried with them their 
ideological baggage from colonial times, which is one of the reasons why Hanks was 
unable to identify the goals and objectives of the new legal aid legislation.750 
~1oreover, this legislation itself actively involved the organised legal profession and 
private lawyers in the States, and was premised upon their continuing primacy in the 
market for lawyers· services.751 
Therefore, for these aspects of continuum as reflected in public policy, 
administration and legislative links, the historical substratum played a significant 
part in defining the ideological context of the national scheme. The historical 
context of legal aid ideology in Australia in 1976 derived from two principal sources: 
the ideas behind the State legal aid schemes, and the legal aid ideology of the State 
legal professions. 
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The Ideals behind the State Schemes 
In criminal matters, the organised provision of legal aid for its - often desperately .. 
poorer citizens had been part of State law and government since the 1880s.752 Its first 
intervention, in the form of the informal scheme administered by colonial 
governments, reflected the fonnative presence of the metropolitan poor persons 
procedures - with modem modifications.753 • Its provision of legal aid for poor 
accused was portrayed as an expression of the ancient duties of the Crown towards 
the fair and effective administration of justice.7,. This was now accepted as a 
responsibility of the modem state which was the 'embodiment' of the governmental 
functions of the Crown. But criminal legal aid remained a privilege restricted to 
impoverished accused facing trial for capital and other odious offences. 1" 
These modified metropolitan conceptions were the predominant ideological force 
behind the poor prisoners' defence scheme which served as the legislative model for 
Australian criminal legal aid until the mid-1960s.756 For example, in 1907 the 
Attorney-General in the Queensland Kidston Government - in moving the second 
reading of the Poor Prisoners' Defence Bill 1907 - said: 
Hon. members, I am sure, will agree that it is the duty of the State to see that innocent 
people are acquitted, and to prevent the terrible injustice - and injustices have 
occurred - which follows on the conviction of an innocent person, and it is just as 
much the State's duty to do this as to see that a wrongdoer is punished ... 151 
Moreover, he saw this objective as the "splendid, magnificent thing" to be said in 
favour of the legislation."' However, modem translations of the principles behind 
the poor persons procedures were not the only ideals influencing the poor prisoners' 
defence scheme - or criminal legal aid - in the 1900s and 191 Os. The early State 
legislators also saw the scheme as an instrument of social justice, as "another step on 
the road to law refonn ... an endeavour, in a small way ... to deal humanely with 
prisoners".759 By providing poorer people with legal aid, should they "be put in the 
unfortunate position of being a person charged in a criminal cour..", social justice 
would be achieved by promoting equal justice for rich and poor: 760 
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meaning I attach to it. The rich individual or the man comfortably off, if he falls into 
trouble and is accused of any offence or crime, is able to provide assistance to defend 
himself and properly present his case to the court. The poor man is unable to do that, 
and for that reason there exists the necessity for a measure of this kind.761 
Nevertheless, the early legislators stopped well short of recognising legal aid as a 
civil right of poor accused, as Mr. Wade, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice 
in the Holman Government, made clear in 1907 when introducing the Poor Prisoners 
Defence Bill (NSW): 
[It] must not be supposed that because the Crown is beneficent and prepared to extend 
the principle of defence to prisoners who are impecunious, therefore every man can 
with impunity break the law and rely on the Crown to defend him ... 762 
Consequently, legal aid in the poor prisoners' scheme retained its original 'public' 
flavour in that it was available to poor accused when the 'interests of justice' made it 
desirable. 7u3 This conception of justice was defined by reference to systemic 
considerations, and to legal paradigms defining the functions of the judge, the 
prosecutor and the criminal justice process.764 Nevertheless, the personal plight of an 
accused - anJ the legal or forensic problems he or she would confront at trial - were 
relevant considerations in fixing the demands of the 'interests of justice', but always 
in a systemic context: 
I think, too, that in determining the matter one may regard the personal qualifications 
or disqualifications of the prisoner, or the intricacy of the case, either in point of Jaw 
or fact or both, or possibly both these things together. It might be important, for 
example, if the prisoner was not out on bail, or was a foreigner and ignorant of the 
language, or dumb or nearly so, or very deaf, or very ignorant of the facts necessary to 
be proved. All those matters might have to be considered ... 765 
This mixture of ideas - especially the idea of state intervention justified on the basis 
of poverty and procedural justice - also influenced the other early 20th century 
development in criminal legal aid: the criminal appeals legislation.766 Moreover, 
these ideas, including considerations of social justice, generally survived and 
continued to influence developments in criminal legal aid in the States into the post-
war period. For instance in 1969, Mr. McCaw, Attorney-General in the Askin 
Liberal Government - in his second reading speech introducing the Public Defenders 
Bill (NSW) * said inter alia: 
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For a long time the need for the State to provide legal assistance has been recognised 
on two grounds: first that a person held in custody and charged with serious crime 
should have the help of a trained legal adviser, and second that it is in the interests of 
the State, for smooth and efficient administration of justice, that legal assistance 
should be provided in these cases.767 
These ideas about legal aid also influenced reforms in other areas affecting the 
administration of criminal justice. For example, in 1967 when 'the New South Wales 
Parliament made limited provision for costs in criminal cases. Mr. Maddison, then 
Minister for Justice - in his second reading speech - said inter alia that the provisions 
of the Costs in Criminal Cases Bill 1967 were "an honest and serious attempt by the 
Government to fulfil the moral responsibility it owes to the community". 761 
Other developments in legal aid in the States - which we will loosely label 'civil 
legal aid' - did not have the same institutional focus as the poor prisoners' 
schemes.769 Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify influential ideological themes. 
As in criminal matters, the organised provision of 'civil legal aid' was influenced by 
the metropolitan poor persons procedures, with local modem modifications.770 Until 
the 191 Os, the in forma pauperis procedures of the State Supreme Courts were the 
principal source of legal aid in civil proceedings. Whilst these procedures were 
already ineffective, their charitable ideals continued to influence developments in 
'civil legal aid' until the 1960s - if not beyond. 771 
It was the ineffectiveness of the informa pauperis procedures which first prompted 
State intervention in 'civil legal aid'. The idea of State Parliaments was to reform 
the law. For example, the enactment of the Poor Persons Legal Remedies Act 1918 
(NSW) was seen as a reform to make the law and courts more accessible to the poor. 
Mr. D R Hall, Attorney-General in the Holman Nationalist Government said in his 
second reading speech introducing the constituent Bill on 23 October 1918: 
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I ask the House to consider the need for an alteration in our legal system as affecting 
the poor. Looking back over the development of that system one cannot help being 
struck with the fact that throughout the centuries men who have not had eminent 
lawyers to assist them in their legal struggles have always been placed at a tremendous 
disadvantage. The whole of our legal system proceeds upon the error that every man 
is presumed to know the law. Though every man may be presumed to know the law, 
we all know very well that nobody does really know it ... The whole effect in the 
development of our law has been that those who have not had the means available to 
employ eminent counsel have seen the law developed against their interests ... Other 
countries have developed more rapidly. I suppose there are very few countries where 
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the interest of poor persons are less considered than in Great Britain and Australia, in 
England particularly ... m 
Whilst this legislation refonned the law by introducing a semi-charitable law society 
scheme, the underlying conception of legal aid as a charitable privilege of the 
deserving poor remained. However, in other States in the 1920s - South Australia, 
Victoria and Western Australia - a new conception began to emerge in the statutory • 
reforms to 'civil legal aid' .773 Whilst these reforms contained administrative 
provisions akin to the in forma pauperis procedures, eligibility for legal aid was also 
now being e_xpressed in terms approaching a right of modem citizenship. For 
instance, in Victoria, Mr. Slater, Attorney-General in the Hogan Government, 
explained in his second reading speech that he believed the Poor Persons Legal 
Assistance Bill 1927 was: 
... of tremendous importance to a section of the community to whom the elementary 
rights of justice are quite as important as to the most affluent in the land ... there is a 
fundamental conception of a right to equality before the law on the part of all 
individuals in the community."174 
Therefore, access to legal aid - as an incident of equality before the law - began to be 
linked with political citizenship in early 20th century Australia, albeit in a hybrid 
fashion. This alternative ideological basis of State 'civil legal aid' received a boost 
with the wartime reforms in New South Wales. In 1943, Captain C E Martin, 
Attorney-General in the McKell Labor Government, said in his second reading 
speech introducing the Legal Assistance Bill: 
Of all social reforms, none, I suggest is more important than that the administration of 
justice should be improved. In a democracy a poor man should have as equal an 
opportunity in litigation as a rich man, but under present conditions, ashamed of it 
though we may well be, this is not the fact. As in other fields, so in the field of law, 
from time immemorial the social structure has always been so weighted that the poor 
are at a disadvantage when opposed by the wealthy and powerful. Bad though the 
position has always been, the ever-increasing complexity of life makes it daily worse. 
Criticism upon criticism has been levelled at the system of "justice," yet the great 
mass of people who think have been too busy about their individual affairs to 
appreciate the stark, and perhaps unpleasant, fact that justice has become almost 
completely beyond the reach of a large proportion of the populace. "Equality of all 
men before the law" is the proud boast of British jurisprudence, but it is no more than 
a boast when justice is withheld from thousands because of their inability to pay for it 
... We are not, then, I suggest to this House, before our time in seeking to render 
litigation a practical remedy for the defence and enforcement of undoubted rights, no 
matter by whom possessed. 775 
This ideological duality - legal aid as a privilege of the modem poor as compared to 
as a political right of modem citizenship - was carried into the post-war period. In 
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1950 for instance, Captain Martin - then Attorney-General in the McGirr Labor 
Government - introduced the Suitors Fund Bill, referring again to ideals of modem 
citizenship. He also noted that it was "the responsibility of the State to provide laws 
to regulate the affairs of its citizens". 776 Yet, in Victoria in 1961, when. a semi-
charitable law society scheme was introduced, the traditional ideals of legal aid as a 
privilege of the deserving poor were at the forefront: 
And whereas on behalf of members of [the legal] profession the Victorian Bar Council 
and the Council of the Law Institute of Victoria have voluntarily offered to provide 
legal a~sistance for poor persons and to appoint a committee to establish and 
administer a scheme for that purpose ... m 
This ideological duality, together with ideas of law reform and the mixture of ideals 
influencing criminal legal aid, continued into the 1960s. In 1965, the Queensland 
Parliament - almost certainly unwittingly - progressed the political citizenship 
,, dimension of Australian legal aid by enacting a scheme modelled on the Legal 
Advice and Assistance Act 1949 (UK).771 This new schemP -reated a universal 
statutory right to apply for legal aid - whilst real eligibility was significantly 
restricted by administrative criteria. However, this limitation, which was to be 
replicated in the national scheme, did not constrain the Hon P R Delamothe, Minister 
for Justice in the Nicklin Country Party/Liberal government, from proclaiming: 
For too long it has been said - perhaps not altogether without some reason - that 
jc'itice - the remedy. of wrongs and the assertion of rights - has been rather the 
privilege of the wealthy and not the absolute right of all, both rich and needy ... With 
the passage of this Bill, such a statement can never again be made in Queensland ... 779 
Nevertheless, elsewhere in the States in the 1960s there was a significant shift 
towards acknowledging legal aid as a right of citizenship. In 1967, Mr. Durack - in 
the second reading debate introducing the Legal Contribution Trust Bill 1967 (WA) -
said inter alia that: 
... the provision of adequate legal aid for all sections of the community, regardless of 
one's financial position, is an important social service. It is a social service perhaps 
not so urgent as medical assistance and like matters, but it is one which is of 
importance and which should be provided for members of the community.7IO 
The final change to 'civil legal aid' in the States prior to the national scheme was in 
New South \Vales in 1970, when a law society scheme intended to remedy the gaps 
in access of middle-income earners to the legal system was enacted. This scheme 
was portrayed both as law refonn and as providing effective access to justice. Mr. 
V./ addy, Assistant Minister in the Askin Government, said - in moving the second 
reading of the Legal Practitioners (Legal Aid) Bill - inter alia: 
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The Attorney-General sees in the contributory legal aid scheme proposed in this bill 
the most effective means of providing some assistance for the huge number of people 
in this State ... who, broadly speaking, come within the medium income range. We 
have in New South Wales judges and court officials of the highest standard, ready and 
able to adjudicate in the increasingly complex fields of human behaviour. It is of little 
use maintaining, in our democratic society, a sophisticated juridical system, if the 
average person is, through lack of means, denied proper access to justice. The courts 
must be available to every member of the community, and this bill will fill some of the 
gaps which have prevented this State from claiming that there is, indeed, equality 
before the law in New South Wales.711 
Moreover, spokesmen for both major parliamentary actors - the New South Wales 
Liberal and Labor parties - strongly defended the changes to 'civil legal aid' in the 
context of civil and political rights of citizenship. The Minister for Decentralisation 
and Development said in his second reading speech in the Legislative Council on 25 
March 1970 that in: 
... a democratic society it is essential that every citizen shall have easy and equal 
access to the juridical system. If any sector of society is for any reason discriminated 
against in this regard, democracy becomes for it merely a theory rather than a practical 
reality ... "782 
His ideas were echoed by the Hon R R Downing - Leader of the Labor Opposition -
who said that the new legal aid scheme: 
. . . represents nothing like the advance made by a Labor government in the Legal 
Assistance Act of 1943 and its subsequent amendments. This is a new age in which 
people realize more readily than they did in the past the necessity to have the full 
protection of the law. Unless legal assistance is given on a much wider basis, we 
cannot pride ourselves on being a democracy and cannot with justification claim that 
everyone is equal before the law ... m 
The Ideology of the Legal Profession 
By 1920, the organised legal profession had begun to participate in legal aid 
administration in the States.™ Hitherto, its involvement had been negligible, being 
restricted to lawyers acting on a charitable basis who represented the few litigants 
conducting proceedings in forma pauperis and defended poor accused granted 
criminal legal aid. The entry of the legal profession into legal aid administration was 
a significant step, both for the organised profession and for governments. Thereafter, 
organised professional involvement in the charitable, semi-charitable and public law 
society schemes • sanctioned by State governments - slowly became a feature of the 
Australian experience, especially in the post-war period.715 
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The public record of this alliance between governments and legal profession in the 
Australian States is shadowy, and scholarly investigations have so far been 
negligible. 716 In Part II, the thesis will defend the proposition that this alliance, and 
its constituent ideology, was a product of legal modernisation.717 However, the 
purpose of this chapter is simply to portray its accessible public record in the 
historical evidence. There are similar problems in seeking to reveal the ideas about 
· legal aid harboured by the legal profession. Australian lawyers and their 
organisations have, until very recently, been remarkably reticent in publicly 
formulating their professional ideology. In the era before the national scheme, this 
reticence extended to statements about professional conceptions of legal aid. Once 
again, the explanations for this situation are pursued in Part II. The remaining part of 
this chapter simply describes some of the few instances when the profession did 
enunciate its ideology of legal aid. 
What is clear is that in the 1900s and 191 Os, State governments appear to have been 
ambivalent about organised professional participation in legal aid. However, in 
1918, when the first state-sanctioned law svciety scheme was established, law-
makers began to express their expectations of the legal profession. In introducing the 
Poor Persons Legal Remedies Bill 1918 (NSW), the Attorney-General, Mr. Hall, 
deliberately downplayed the significance of voluntary professional involvement in 
the new scheme, exclaiming that the lawyers were doing: 
... only what the doctors are already doing in the hospitals. A poor person who has a 
disease or desires an operation is not denied the services of the most eminent medical 
men in Sydney.788 
In the 1920s, while other State law-makers were similarly ambivalent about lawyers' 
participation in legal aid, they still believed that organised professional involvement 
was desirable. Yet their expectations were often negative, as the story of the 
establishment of statutory Public Solicitors in South Australia and Victoria 
indicated. 789 However, State law-makers continued to proclaim their right to expect 
professional participation. In 1943, the Attorney-General in New South Wales 
proclaimed in the context of its reforms to 'civil legal aid' that .. the legal profession 
is a profession, and there is every good reason to expect that it should give the same 
social service as do other professions."790 
These expectations were matched by the legal profession itself. By the early 1930s, 
the organised profession was creeping towards establishing a national profile. This 
process involved a degree of modest, public self-definition. In his address to the 
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Second Convention of the Law Council in 1935, the Chief Justice of the High Court -
The Rt Hon Sir John Latham - said inter alia: 
It should be actively recognised that, in this sphere and others, it is the function and 
duty of the profession to serve the public .. . It should never be forgotten by the 
members of the legal profession that the justification of the existence of the profession 
as a profession is to be found in the value 0£ the service they render to the people. The 
effective protection of the rights of the citizens depends very largely upon the 
existence of a body of lawyers who are independent, honourable, capable and 
fearless. 791 
In 1948, the President of the Law Society of South Australia relied on this 
professional ideal to justify its semi-charitable scheme.792 Its values continued to 
define the social foundation of the legal profession throughout the post-war years, 
with Sir Owen Dixon reaffirming in 1960 the obligation to make its "skill or 
knowledge ... available to the service of the State or the community".m Moreover, 
the professional ideal continued to be the overt basis of the involvement of the legal 
profession in legal aid. In 1961 in Victoria, Mr. Meagher, Minister without Portfolio 
in the Bolte Liberal Government, said in his second reading speech introducing the 
Legal aid Bill inter alia that enactment of a semi-charitable law society scheme 
would reflect the belief of: 
... the members of the legal profession ... that no one should be without legal 
assistance because he is unable to pay for it, and accordingly have offered, through the 
Victorian Bar Council and the Council of the Law Institute of Victoria, to provide 
legal assistance for poor persons, and to establish a scheme for the purpose.794 
In 1970, these traditions of professional participation in legal aid as a public service 
were still evident in New South Wales: 
One of the aims of law is the maintenance of social justice. Civilization rests upon 
social order and this rests on the maintenance of the law. The law, therefore, through 
the centuries, has ranked as a high calling, serving the most fundamental needs of the 
community, order and justice. Members of the profession have an ideal of public 
service which imposes on them a special code of conduct. It is in the best traditions of 
the profession that its members have done so much in the past to bring legal aid, and 
consequentially, access to justice, to the people of New South Wales under this 
scheme ... 795 
However, the involvement of the legal profession in legal aid had a reverse side, 
namely the protection and expansion of its socio-economic interests. Modern 
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professionalism had involved the construction - and maintenance - of state-backed 
monopolies. 796 In the Australian legal profession, until 10 or 15 years after the 
national scheme emerged this was manifested in its "monopoly - conferred by statute 
law and judicial practice - over certain areas of lucrative work, especially property 
conveyancing". 797 
The profession was not unaware of the links between its participation in legal aid and 
its wider interests. However, it rarely articulated this nexus in the public domain. In 
part, this was a product of professional camouflage which protected the secrets of 
professional control. In part - and probably more importantly - it was because for the 
Australian profession for much of the century the public interest has been 
inextricably interwoven with its own. One exception to professional reticence was 
when the Law Institute in Victoria wrote to the government in 193 7 in support of the 
introduction of a semi-charitable law society scheme.791 The President, after 
enumerating the anticipated public benefits, continued to explain: 
From the profession's point of view, the most important benefit might well be to assist 
in absorbing the very large number of young practitioners who may be expected to be 
admitted in the near future. In this respect it will, in the first place, give to these 
young practitioners good clinical experience similar to that gained by doctors at the 
Public Hospitals. Moreover, as a satisfied client is the best advertisement, it will assist 
young barristers and solicitors to establish themselves in practice and may even prove 
financially advantageous to them .... It will also relieve the individual solicitor of the 
present necessity of deciding whether, by reason of the client's financial position, he 
ought to reduce his costs. It should go a long way to removing the abuses of 
"undercutting" and "ambulance chasing." Finally it should build up the same public 
good will as the medical profession, by reason of its hospital service, has always 
enjoyed. 799 
Similar sentiments were expressed in I 948, again by the Law Society of South 
Australia in the context of its legal aid scheme.800 Consequently, the organised 
profession - or at least parts of it - was conscious of the benefits it derived from 
participation in legal aid. In particular, these benefits were seen in expanding the 
work prospects of young lawyers, developing legal competency, increasing demand 
for services and assisting internal self-regulation, as well as enhancing the public 
standing of the legal profession. 
Active professional involvement in legal aid was also perceived as a means of 
discouraging state intervention in the profession and its market-place. This appears 
from the historical record in Queensland in 1945, and South Australia in 1948, where 
the President of the Law Society said that it was:'°' 
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. . . greatly in the interests of the profession to make the scheme work and avoid any 
grounds for re-establishing a government department to provide legal aid. The general 
public are well served by the Scheme which gives much wider assistance than a public 
solicitor could. Moreover, the delays which would be unavoidable if all legal aid was 
placed in the hands of a State department are non-existent under our scheme for the 
reason that the whole of the profession are available to act when called upon ... 802 
The Significance of the Ideals behind the National Scheme 
Finally, we need to note in passing - before considering the significance of this 
review - a third and deeply implicit ideological dimension of the national scheme. In 
1976, and throughout its 20th century experience of the ideals of legal aid, Australian 
society was governed by a modem central legal system. Moreover, this legal system 
had progressively established closer links with the political ideals of liberal 
democracy. The socio-legal ideal of equality before the law was deeply embedded in 
this matrix, as the above review has demonstrated. The managers of modem 
Australian law and government - the state, its executive governments, law-makers, 
the organised legal profession and lawyers - saw legal aid as a central tool in 
matching this political aspiration with social reality and as a means of ensuring that 
the courts decided "issues between citizen and citizen and between citizen and State 
on their merits, regardless of the importance or unimportance of the citizen. "803 
The significance of this review of the ideas behind the national scheme is threefold. 
First, it has demonstrated that it had an ideological context - beyond the bare bones 
of the Commonwealth-State agreements. Moreover, this context, whilst having 
many features in common with the ideology of legal aid in other modem Anglo-
American societies, nevertheless had its own national features. It was a product of 
the Australian experience of modem law and government, reaching back into the 
early 20th century welfare state. And like its institutional mirrors it exhibits a strong 
sense of social continuum. 
The review has also shown that the content of the Australian ideology of legal aid 
was disparate, save for a recurring theme of equality before the law. Otherwise, 
legal aid was explained - and defended - in terms of an obligation of the Crown to 
the poor, a socio-legal responsibility of the modern state, an adjunct of the 
administrative of justice, a privilege of poorer litigants and accused, a social justice 
objective of governments, a civil or political 'right' of modem social citizenship, a 
measure to achieve legal equality between 'rich' and 'poor', a social obligation of the 
legal profession and a means of promoting lawyers' market competence and 
dominance. Despite this apparent disparity, Australian governments, politicians, 
law-makers and the legal profession generally approved of the desirability of state or 
professional intervention to provide legal aid, especially for poorer people. Yet they 
often disagreed about how and why this might be achieved. This picture accords 
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with Abel's conclusion that legal aid at "various times and in different environments 
... has been justified as advancing values that are not only divergent but often 
fundamentally inconsistent. "804 
Secondly, the review is significant because by portraying the history of ideas of 
Australian legal aid it has completed the inquiry driven by the unanswered questions 
of the NLAAC report. In portraying these ideas - in their context and describing • 
their content - the review has advanced our understanding of the historical origins of 
the national scheme. In particular, it has explored many of the issues in the NLAAC 
report's first, second and third categories of unanswered questions.w It reveals the 
national scheme originated in the response of governments to underlying, ongoing 
dynamics of legal aid in modem Australian society. This response will be de-
constructed and explained in Part II. 806 
Yet, the review still leaves the Australian story incomplete, for it does not answer all 
the questions appertaining to the origins of the national scheme. Furthermore, it 
produces other, new questions. For instance, why did governments wait until the 
early 1970s to make a coordinated national response to legal aid, when its ideology -
and the social objectives it projected - had been present throughout the experience of 
modern law and government in the Australian welfare state? Moreover, merely 
acknowledging the ideological context of the national scheme does not answer the 
two questions in the fourth category of the NLAAC's legacy.'°' In other words, why 
did its star, which had been so bright in the early 1970s, fade so quickly in the 
1980s? And why did the Keating Government replace legal aid and its ideals in 
1993 with the 'access to justice' response. And finally, what did this action signify 
for popular access to law? 
Third I y, the review of the ideas behind the national scheme is significant because it 
highlights their essentially 'legal' character. The players in the history of ideas of 
Australian legal aid were also the principal actors in its system of law and 
government: the state, governments, political parties, administrators, officials, 
judges, the legal profession and lawyers. In other words, the review has shown that 
the ideological context of the national scheme was really part of a much wider 
scenario, namely that of the legal ideals and praxis of government of modem 
Australian society. This is something of a mixed blessing. It is valuable as it 
provides the ideological counterpart to the institutional history of the Australian 
experience narrated above.aoa It means that we have enhanced our understanding of 
this modem legal development in the post-war welfare state. 
On the other hand, in highlighting the legal character of the ideological context and 
the institutional history we have revealed the limitations of these frameworks in 
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explaining the origins of the national scheme. For it is not possible to explain the 
origins of these legal developments within their own terms, namely the self-
referential ideals of the modem Australian legal system. And these limitations 
cannot simply be overcome by adding the other development factors discussed 
above, namely the post-war changes and trends in public policy, politics, the legal 
profession and the lawyers' services industry. The reason is that neither the legal nor 
the wider social and political contextual frameworks examine the role and functions 
of modem Australian law and its ideals as such. Nor do they address the institutional 
and ideological paradoxes of modem legal aid: 
First, there is the analytic mystery of why the state creates and supports an institution 
that frequently challenges its discretion, reveals its ineptitude, and makes vocal and 
sometimes irresistible demands on its resources ... Secondly, there is the normative 
puzzle: is legal aid promise or peril? Is it a nonRreformist reform that not only offers 
material gains to its beneficiaries but also permits them to gain control over their lives 
and to organize for further action? Or is it a mere sop, a diversion from the important 
tasks of social, political and economic mobilisation?809 
Consequently, the history of the legal development of Australian legal aid - even 
informed by a background 'political' context - is incapable of adequately explaining 
the origins of the national scheme. Similarly, its explanation is incapable of 
explaining the significance of the national scheme as a legal development ~ a 
requirement which is essential if we are to be able to consider whether fair and 
effective access to law is feasible in the Australian welfare state. To adequately 
answer these questions, we must discover an alternative approach to explaining the 
origins and significance of the post-war Australian legal aid experience. This is the 
task which we undertake in Part II. 
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Chapter Six 
Reconsidering the Theory· 
[O]ne of the important functions of myth is that it anchors the present in the past. This is 
done by establishing a dramatically significant series of events: and the drama is conveyed 
by the style, which may well consist of using oppositions and their resolution; and it is also 
conveyed by dredging deep into unconscious symbolism, so that the message 
communicated by the myth does have an impact at a number of levels. The advantage that 
myth has over cosmology is that the latter may merely provide a set of ideas which set 
limits to conceptual exploration; while myth does provide a time reference, it does 
presuppose that circumstances can be traced to particular, if only imaginary, events. To 
locate things in time, even if the exact time is unspecified, creates a far more effective 
device for legitimation, for example, than simply creating a set of abstract ideas which are 
timeless. 
P S Cohen "Theories of Myth" (1969) 4 (New Series) Man (The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute) 331 at 349-350 
Introduction 
The two chapters in this part of the thesis revisit the post-war JegaJ aid experience. 
In doing so, they pursue three objectives. First, they seek to remedy the explanatory 
'gap' in the Australian experience, the neglect of its orthodoxy and liberal legalist 
ideals to engage with the reality of law, which has limited our capacity to explain the 
origins of the national scheme, and its significance in post-war Australian society. 
The second objective of Part II is to defend and explain the opening contention of the 
thesis, which claims that revisiting the origins and significance of the national 
scheme holds the key to determining whether fair and effective access to the law is a 
feasible expectation of citizens and governments in the Australian welfare state. 110 
Thirdly, these two chapters and the conclusions they defend provide an analytical 
platform for identifying the lessons of the post-war legal aid experience and for 
considering their implications, which is the task of Part III below. 
As foreshadowed in Chapter One, Part II proceeds, in both scope and subject-matter, 
from a cross-national perspective.811 Chapter One also canvassed the general 
justifications for the injection of this perspective. Australia was one of a number of 
\Vestern or \Vesternised societies which reorganised or reformed legal aid after 
\Vorld War Il.m Many of these societies - like Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States - also had welfare capitalist systems of political 
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economy.813 Moreover, these welfare states, together with those in which legal aid 
was not prominent in the post-war years - like Belgium, Gennany, Italy, Japan and 
Switzerland - also displayed modem, national centralist-type systems of legal 
regulation. 114 These links in comparable experiences, political economy and law 
mean that cross-national inquiry • the stuff of comparative public policy and its 
techniques - is seen to potentially offer us fresh insights into the origins and 
significance of the Australian scheme.115 
For the purposes of Part II and III, however, there are more particular and specific 
reasons for pursuing cross-national inquiry. The literature of post-war legal aid, 
which is outlined and reviewed below, treats the different, post-war national 
experiences as part of a general social phenomenon - at least in the Western world.'16 
Both its explanatory frameworks and significant subsequent professional and 
scholarly investigations have established cross-national comparison as the forum for 
explaining developments in legal aid.'17 
The second and third objectives of this Part also encourage comparative perspectives. 
The links between Australia and comparable countries evident in post-war legal aid -
social experience, political economy and law - have continued. The actions of 
successive Australian governments in downgrading the administrative significance of 
legal aid - and in gradually constricting public expenditure - were replicated in other 
welfare capitalist states in the 1980s and l 990s.'11 Furthermore, Australia has not 
been the only Western society where significant parts of the central justice system 
have remained inaccessible to poorer citizens, notwithstanding post-war reforms to 
legal aid. Moreover, in many Western countries the legal problems of poverty have 
been exacerbated by unemployment on a new post-war scale, by the emergence of 
alienated and marginalised underclasses, and by conflicts over race and migration. 
Australia was neither alone in the 1980s in experiencing unprecedented levels of 
public concern about access to civil and criminal justice, nor were its governments 
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alone in adopting new, 'access to justice' responses. Britain and Canada had both 
done so since 1988.819 
Moreover, the transformation of Australian public administration and infrastructure 
is typical of the welfare capitalist world, where five new public policy 'megatrends' 
have emerged since the early 1980s, comprising "attempts to peg back the growth of 
government; the internationalization of public administration; the privatization of • 
public administration; and the rise of the 'New Public Management"'.120 In adopting 
the principles and strategies of 'New Public Management' - including its 
deregulation of the private sector, shrinking of public services and limiting access to 
public functions through 'cost-recovery' and efficiency - Australia followed 
developments in Britain and New Zealand in the late 1970s and early l 980s.12' The 
principles and practices of 'New Public Management' have since spread to non-
English speaking welfare capitalist countrics.122 Its 'contract' paradigms have 
created new mass markets for legal infonnation, advice and representation, whilst 
denying its 'consumer-citizens' adequate access to a corresponding range of 
publicly-funded legal ser\'ices. The political premises of 'New Public Management' 
have also prompted many Western countries to retreat from the liberal ideals which 
gave legal aid its special social post-war significance. In turn, this has often seen 
some of the more comfortable assumptions of modem citizenship recontested in 
increasingly corporatised and polarised societies. 823 
These and other economic and political transformations have generated new 
pressures on the modem Western matrix of the state, its central legal system and its 
social functions. Since the early 1960s, legal integrity of the nations of Western 
Europe has been challenged by growing administrative and economic union. This 
trend was accelerated at Maastricht in 1992 by the adoption of the goal of European 
political union. The projection of free market dogma through 'globalisation' is also 
challenging the integrity of the social functions of the modem Western national legal 
systems. Since 1995, Australia, for instance, has conducted negotiations with the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development over entry into the 
f\1ultilateral Agreement on Investment, an international treaty which seeks to protect 
foreign investors from unfavourable treatment by host governments. 824 These and 
other new external pressures all have the potential to modify the social allegiances of 
the nation state, especially in responding to the needs of its poorer citizens. 
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Since the late 1980s, there have been two major changes in world politics which 
have seen a significant extension of the compass of the law and legal ideology of 
advanced capitalism. The first was the collapse of the communist systems in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union (with the attendant breakdown of the economic support 
these countries had provided for their political allies). In some cases, the gradual 
democratisation of government and society saw a revitalisation of the values of 
modern centralist law. Not all of the former communist countries had similar 
experiences of democratisation and legal reform. However, in all the former 
communist states, economic reform and restructuring opened up new markets for the 
investment ·capital, technology and know-how of advanced capitalism. The 
establishment of these new, 'market' economies increased the global social 
significance of modern Western centralist law and its institutions, especially the 
Anglo-American type, which provides the legal lubricants of international capital, its 
supply, management and regulation. 
The other major change in world politics was the thrust of Western capitalism, 
investment and legal ideology into the southern Asian countries. Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam are now vigorously pursuing 
strategies to modernise their legal systems, particularly in relation to corporations 
law and business regulation.125 These developments have created a huge market for 
Western legal products and technology, which governments and the private legal 
profession in Australia, Britain, the United States and elsewhere are competing to 
service. 826 Once again, the result has been to increase the prominence and 
penetration of modern Western centralist law and its institutions, especially in the 
legal regulation of the global economy. Both these changes are other instances of the 
'links' between international legal developments since the late 1970s - the pinnacle 
of post-war legal aid - and the role of the legal system in the contemporary 
Australian welfare state. 
The Role and Scope of This Chapter 
The role of this chapter is to address the first of the objectives of this Part. It seeks to 
remedy the explanatory 'gap' in the Australian experience which limits our ability to 
explain the origins of the national scheme, and its significance in post-war society. 
The chapter begins by identifying and outlining the literature of post-war legal aid. 
In doing so, it concentrates upon those contributors who have sought to explain the 
post-war experience in a cross-national, welfare state context. This literature is 
briefly reviewed, and its significance explained, shortcomings are highlighted and 
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the inherent limitations of its ideological framework discussed. The review iqentifles 
these limitations as the failure of the literature to factor in the political dimensions of 
modem law in Western society in explaining the origins and significance of post-war 
legal aid. The 'missing' political dimensions are highlighted, before the proceeds to 
consider the fruits or benefits of having reviewed the explanatory literature. 
The next section of the chapter presents a redesigned framework from which to 
analyse the post-war experience. This framework seeks to build upon the postulates 
stated earlier in the thesis. It also incorporates the 'strengths' of the explanatory 
literature, particularly its historical record of post-war developments in national 
arrangements for legal aid. However, at the same time the redesigned framework 
also aims to remedy the defects identified in the litera~e. Consequently, it 'adds' to 
the existing framework by including a legal pluralist perspective, a dynamic model 
of legal development using Renner's notion of functional transformation and 
incorporating the methodology and techniques of Public Policy. The new framework 
also acknowledges some important limitations of the epistemology of legal 
development in the modem state. 
The first application of the re-designed analytical framework is to explain the 
modem transfonnation of the poor persons legal assistance institutions. The chapter 
proceeds to link this modem transfonnation with legal aid, by invoking the analytical 
techniques and insights of Renner's idea of functional transfonnation. These 
techniques are then employed to trace the transition of the modem poor persons 
institutions into the bifidial modem Western 'institution' of legal aid. In the case of 
the- 'concrete' or machinery dimensions of the poor persons institutions, this task 
proves to be relatively straightforward. There is more comparability than difference 
in the subsequent developments of the law and institutions of the modem state in 
Civil Law and Common Law world. On the other hand, in explaining the transition 
of their 'ideal' or nonnative dimensions into the ideals of legal aid, the discussion in 
the chapter is inevitably drawn to the differences in the social construction of 
'modem Western !aw' in the Civil Law and Common Law societies. 
The chapter concludes by comparing the origins and social functions of modem legal 
aid in the mid-century Western world on the cusp of the post-war experience. It 
reveals that whilst its origins and social functions were in many respects highly 
comparable, there was one significant difference between the Civil Law and 
Common Law societies. This difference lay in the character and social function of 
the 'ideal' or nonnative dimensions of modem legal aid. The chapter explains the 
reasons for this essential difference, highlighting in particular the distinctive and 
different character and social functions of the socio-legal 'institution' of legal aid in 
the Common Law world, and 'within' its 'modem Anglo-American law'. 
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The Explanations of the Post-War Experience 
The post-war legal aid experience produced a voluminous scholarly literature, 
especially in the world of liberal legalism in the United States in the 1960s and early 
1970s. 121 The public policy of legal aid administration in Australia, Britain, Canada, 
The Netherlands, Sweden and the United States generated an equally extensive 
public literature.121 • 
Typically, the legal aid literature was nationally or regionally oriented, describing the 
history of particular schemes or political struggles with. the legal profession over 
administrative arrangements, funding and service delivery. It also generally insisted 
on "divorcing law from politics".129 In particular, most scholarly analyses adopted 
and portrayed "the same ideological approach towards the legal system ... 
[assuming] law is independent of any conflicts within society and that there is 
consensual agreement upon the use of the legal system to provide solutions to social 
problems".130 
Therefore, generally the literature does not offer us adequate explanatory 
frameworks to better understand the origins of legal aid in the post-war legal 
systems. Neither does it typically engage with the social and political dimensions of 
legal aid. However, within the scholarly literature there are a few exceptions, 
accounts of "arying significance and depth, which have sought to contextualise the 
post-war experience and other developments in legal aid within the modern society 
of the welfare state.131 
In 1950, Marshall explained the origins of the British post-war scheme as indicating 
the renewed efforts of the modern state to redress the problem of social equality by 
removing "the l:arriers between civil rights and their remedies".832 Two decades 
later, the renewed interest in Marxist legal scholarship in Britain produced other and 
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richer accounts of its post-war developments, or their origins and significance.133 In 
1976, Bankowski and Mungham published an Anarcho-Marxist critique of the duty 
solicitor legal aid schemes and the inner-city neighbourhood law centres which had 
been established since the late 1960s.134 They damned legal aid because, like all 
ref onn of capitalist law, pre vi ding lawyers for the poor was ultimately a "waste of 
time" serving only to help "law much more, by increasing its domination-legitimacy, 
though making it ... 'accessible"', and strengthening "the hand (and pocket) of 
lawyers" .13.s 
Also in 1976, Alcock published his study of the politics of the law society scheme 
which had operated in England in the 1920s and 1930s.136 He saw developments in 
this scheme as: 
... the product of the interrelation of the economic, political and ideological practices 
of various groups within the ruling class, reacting to what they perceive to be the 
demands of the lower classes and producing and changing legal aid as a legitimation 
for the operation of a class based legal system.137 
Alcock concluded that, if we are to understand the social basis of post-war legal aid, 
we needed to recognise its legitimating role, especially in any attempt to contest the 
functionalism and contradictions of the explanatory orthodoxy.131 
In the mid- l 980s, Paterson and Nelken responded to Bankowski and Mungham and 
to work by Bankowski in 1981, and Abel in 1982 and 1984, which explained 
developments in legal aid around 'demand creation' hypotheses.139 Paterson and 
Nelken argued the contention that legal aid was a product of oversupply of lawyers, 
the expansion of legal education and an economic subsidy to solicitors did not 
withstand critical exposure to the reality of the British experience in the 1960s.l40 
J\1oreover, they claimed the 'demand creation' hypotheses of Abel, Bankowski and 
i\.1ungham oversimplified the complexity of the legal services industry, the 
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importance of interest group politics and competing definitions of the problem of 
legal 'need' .141 
In 1994, Cousins, in an article influenced by Alcock's theoretical premises and by 
Abel below, examined common fai:-tors affecting the development of legal aid in 
Belgium, France, Ireland, The Netherb .ids and the United Kingdom.142 He argued 
that the emergence of legal aid schemes in these and other advanced Western 
societies was influenced by the presence of three key social dimensions: (a) 
distinctive factors of the national historical and cultural environment, (b) functional 
factors of industrialisation, modernisation and development, marital breakdown and 
divorce, religion, political conflict and political violence and developments in 
national legal systems, and (c) political factors, primarily the influence of the 'access 
to justice' interest groups, public administration and the private legal profession.143 
Cousins concluded that these explanatory perspectives enable us to comprehend the 
origins of post-war developments in legal aid ...... 
However, among those who have sought to contextualise the post-war experience, 
two writers remain at centrefield: Cappelletti and Abel. In 1972, Cappelletti 
published an article in which he portrayed modern legal aid as originating in the 
ancient quest to solve the problem of providing lawyers for the 'poor' .1"' He saw the 
post-war experience as the culminant legal aid response of the modem Western 
society, representing a "first wave" towards achieving equal and universal access to 
justice.146 In 1985, Abel published an epic article in which he sought to explain the 
origins of modern legal aid and its political significance in Western capitalist 
society.847 Abel contended that legal aid was a product of a diversity of factors, 
including industrialisation, urbanisation, regional and international economic 
migration, philanthropic capital and its influence, socio-political reform, and other 
capitalist social transformations in the 19th and 20th centuries. 841 While these were 
the background causes, Abel argued that there were other, contemporary 
transfonnative forces affecting the development of post-war legal aid. These forces 
included changes to family structure, changes to state regulation of the reproduction 
of labour, the expansion of public administration in the welfare state and changes in 
the legal profession and legal system.149 However, ultimately, according to Abel, the 
presence of transformative social forces alone could not account for the post-war 
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phenomenon. It was necessary to look to contextual factors in the form of "concrete 
historical circumstances", including the social aftermath of World War II, the social 
and political changes of the 1960s, and the election of social democratic 
governments in particular countries."° 
The contextual scholarly literature also includes two writers who have tackled the 
question of the origins and significance of post-war legal aid from sociological • 
perspectives: Blankenburg and Regan. In 1982, Blankenburg explained the diversity 
of the responses in the Western European welfare states by reference to differences 
in national welfare expenditure, the attitudes of the legal profession and the legal 
education curriculum.151 In 1997, Blankenburg again demonstrated the diversity of 
the Western response, describing the reactions of the legal profession and the welfare 
state in the English-speaking countries and Western Europe.m He attributed this 
diversity to differences in the relative prosperity of the welfare states and to the 
success of lawyers in defending their professional privileges.153 
Regan, on the other hand, has sought to develop an explanatory model of the post-
war experience in the context of welfare capitalism. In 1994, dissatisfied with the 
existing options - particularly the analytical limitations of the "funding/personnel" 
approach in the models of legal aid - he began to explore whether it was possible to 
construct an alternative approach to analysing the social policy of legal aid.',.. For 
this purpose, Regan adopted the three categories of welfare capitalist states ('liberal', 
'social democratic' and 'corporatist') first described by Esping-Andersen . .,5 He 
compared the development and significance of legal aid in Sweden - like the other 
Scandinavian countries, a 'social democratic' welfare state - and Australia - like the 
United States, United Kingdom and Canada, a 'liberal' welfare state.156 Whilst the 
results of his comparative study were mixed, Regan concluded that: 
. . . viewing legal aid through the Jens of the welfare state is a major 1.•dvance in the 
level of detail that it provides, and the way that strengths and weaknesses of legal aid 
can be identified in different societies.157 
Regan has since pursued this perspective in a paper which seeks to explain variations 
in legal aid services in welfare states by reference to different opportunities for 
citizens• mobilisation of law, as they exist in the Civil Law and Common Law legal 
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systems.158 This conjunction of welfare states and legal 'families', he argues, helps 
to explain "why some societies offer very effective assistance for court while [others] 
offer more effective help for outside court".159 
A Revielv of the Explanations of Legal Aid 
This chapter does not present a detailed critical review of the legal aid literature, its 
descriptive or contextual components. Instead, it briefly reviews the literature from 
three perspectives. First, the chapter considers the significance of the explanatory 
literature in portraying developments in post-war legal aid schemes, and in defining 
and describing "legal aid" and "the post-war experience". Secondly, it considers the 
shortcomings of the literature and highlights the principal flaws in the explanations 
of the legal aid post-war experience presented by the various contributors. Thirdly, 
the chapter identifies the inherent limitation of the ideological frameworks behind 
the explanatory literature. It proceeds to explain the basis of this limitation, and why 
it disqualifies the liberal legalist, liberal centralist and Marxist-oriented explanations 
as explanatory frameworks of the post-war experience. The review concludes by 
identify the missing part of the explanatory frameworks, namely the political 
dimensions of modem Western law. 
The Significance of the Explanatory Literature 
In seeking to explain legal aid, the explanatory literature serves two important 
functions. First, it portrays and describes experiences of legal aid in post-war 
society, providing us with a record of developments in the machinery, funding, 
politics and public policy of legal aid, and associated developments in the areas of 
poverty, government, the legal services industry, lawyers and the legal profession. 
Moreover, the explanatory literature does so in a cross-temporal and cross-national 
context. It shows us important aspects of the development of modem legal aid in the 
welfare capitalist countries, in other advanced capitalist countries, and in other parts 
of the modern world, including Africa and South America. Consequently, the 
explanatory literature is an important and valuable explanatory resource, and is 
extensively referred to below and in Chapter Seven, in reconsidering the origins of 
the post-war experience and its significance. 
I ts second function is definitional. In other words, the explanatory literature serves 
to define "legal aid", and the "post-war experience". It defines legal aid as the socio-
legal organisation through which the modem state and legal profession cooperate for 
the purposes of providing lav.')'ers' services for poorer people, at minimal or no cost. 
The explanatory literature, expressly or by implication, applies this conception to 
explain the 'institutional' basis of the developments in the machinery and 
administration of legal aid which represented the post-war experience. The literature 
also defines and constitutes ''the post-war experience". It asserts, in the case of botJ:i 
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its liberal legalist and Marxist-oriented components, that these developments 
constituted a new and unified phase or 'wave' in the significance of legal aid in the 
post-war world and its modem Western legal systems. The explanatory literature, in 
other words, serves to constitute "the post-war experience" as a series of 
interconnected, unprecedented developments in the significance of legal aid in 
modem Western society. In performing this function, the explanatory literature is 
also valuable and important. In retrospect, as we consider below, it can be seen as 
forming part of"the post-war experience" itself.860 
The Shortcomings of the Explanatory Literature 
However, the explanatory literature does not offer us an adequate and comprehensive 
basis for explaining the origins and significance of the post-war experience and, in 
particular, why welfare capitalist states like Australia 'decided' to reform the 
organisation, administration or scale of legal aid administration in the post-war 
period. One reason for this is that no part of the literature adequately explains the 
origins of the post-war experience861• 
The case against the non-contextual component literature - which constitutes the 
great body of legal aid scholarship, public reports and investigations - is twofold. 
First, this literature rarely purports to consider the origins of national developments 
in post-war legal aid in a cross-national context, and never considers their 
significance in the context of modern Western law and society. Secondly, the 
'contributors' to the non-contextual literature almost invariably proceed from 
analytical premises based on liberal ideological assumptions about the role and 
functions of law.16~ This is a characteristic which, as Abel reminded us, is "hardly 
surprising'', given the role of liberal legalism as the "prevailing ideology of advanced 
capitalism".163 
Liberal legalism served definite, and important, functions in post-war society - and it 
still does. In the Western world, together with the modem mythology of Jaw to 
which it is inextricably linked, liberal legalism and other modern centralist 
conceptions of law enabled "'us' to have a 'unified' law", bringing "together law's 
contradictory existences into a patterned coherence".164 However, its acontextual 
historical, social and political perspectives and centralist perspectives of modem law 
do little to inform our understanding of the legal dynamics of the modem state. And 
the developments in post-war legal aid are no exception.165 
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In the case of the 'contextual' explanations. a comparable case exists against Alcock, 
Bankowski and Mungham, Blankenburg, Cousins, Marshall, Paterson and Nelken 
and Regan. None of these writers presents a general explanation of the post-war 
experience, although, as already noted above, each is important because they 
contribute to explaining particular aspects of its origins and significance. Similarly, 
all these contributors proceed from centralist legal perspectives, albeit - especially in 
the case of the Marxist-oriented writers Alcock, Bankowski and Mungham and 
Cousins - of a different kind to liberal legalism. On the other hand, Blankenburg, 
Marshall, Paterson and Nelken and Regan have a more ambiguous association with 
liberal legalism. Whilst none can fairly be said to be 'lib~ral legalists', liberal social 
theories permeate their social construction of modern Western law and its 
institutions. Consequently, like other reformers and non-Marxist social scientists, 
Blankenburg, Marshall, Paterson and Nelken and Regan neither effectively engage 
with nor deeply contest the omnipresent liberal images of law, its institutions and the 
modern legal system in the post-war welfare state. 
On the other hand, both Cappelletti and Abel have presented detailed and 
comprehensive explanations of post-war legal aid, which are in each case easily 
translatable into a general theory or model. Nevertheless, these two contributors 
have also failed to adequately explain the origins of the post-war experience. 
Detailed arguments against both Cappelletti and Abel, demonstrating the 
shortcomings of their explanations, have been presented elsewhere.166 It is not 
necessary for the purposes of this chapter to reproduce these arguments. The key 
objections to both Cappelletti and Abel - and to the other 'contextual' explanations 
of legal aid - lie in the limitations of their conceptualisation of the legal 
developments in modern Western society which are discussed below. Therefore, 
only the principal objections to the respective explanations of Cappelletti and Abel 
are briefly summarised below. 
Cappelletti' s explanation of the origins of post-war legal aid is ultimately an elegant 
and lucid piece of liberal mythology.867 Its acontextualism, as in the other liberal 
legalist accounts above, disqualifies it from representing a complete record of the 
modern development of legal aid, or the origins and significance of the post-war 
experience. Abel's explanation, on the other hand, is not so easily dismissed. His 
;r-.1arxist-oriented liberal' perspective on modern law and society allowed him to 
defrock the liberal legalist explanatory orthodoxy, yet compelled Abel to reconstruct 
legal aid in a 'political' guise.868 Abel was not, in other words, prepared to extend his 
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defrocking to the 'institution' of legal aid itself. Moreover, Abel adopted a 
superficial interpretation of the public policy processes of the welfare state.169 The 
consequence is that his 'political' explanation - insightful and important as it is - fails 
like all the other explanations to explain the legal dynamics of the modem capitalist 
state. 
The Inherent Limitation of the Ideological Frameworks 
The other reason why the various contributors do not adequately and 
comprehensively explain the post-war experience is a common flaw in their 
ideological premises. Neither the liberal legalist, liberaf centralist nor the Marxist-
oriented interpretations confront the politics of law in post-war society, and its 
impact on developments in legal aid. This neglect, avoidance or denial of the 
political dimensions of modem Western Jaw is the central limitation of the 
explanatory literature. 
This claim is relatively uncontroversial in the case of the explanations which have 
been inspired by liberal legalism, or other liberal centralist conceptions of modem 
law - the great bulk of the scholarly literature, the literature of legal aid 
administration and the explanations presented by Blankenburg, Cappelletti, Marshall, 
Paterson and Nelken and Regan. At their most paradigmatic, liberal constructions of 
modem law sanctify its inherent apoliticism. They also avoid or deny the politics.I 
origins of modem law, and the political character of the processes and institutions of 
the modem Western legal systems. The liberal reformist perspectives - like those of 
Marshall and Paterson and Nelken - and non-Marxist sociology - like those of 
Blankenburg and Regan - are less dogmatic. These perspectives are prepared to 
admit, to varying degrees, the political character of the origins, role and functions of 
the modem legal system. Indeed, much of their work is concerned with interpreting 
the political significance of legal phenomena in the welfare state. However, the 
liberal reformist perspectives and non-Marxist sociology similarly avoid or deny the 
political dimensions of Western law itself. Generally, they are unwilling to trespass 
behind the steely mist of the mythology of modem centralist law. And Blankenburg, 
Cappelletti, Marshall, Paterson and Nelken and Regan are no exceptions. 
The claim that the Marxist-oriented interpretations avoid or deny the politics of 
modem law in post-war society is more controversial. Indeed, at first glance, it may 
even seem perverse. After all, Marxism and its derivatives have been the principal, 
most profound and persistent critics of modem Western society, and the role and 
functions of its institutions.170 The law and legal institutions of Western capitalism, 
however, have been an exception. The nature, construction or politics of modem 
V/ es tern centralist law and its legal systems were "not a central focus of concern for 
l\1arxists":871 Modem state law was only relevant when it affected the "decisive 
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factors" of class and capital in social evolution.172 Consequently, 'capitalist law' 
was: 
... not a prominent analytical concept of comparable importance to social class or 
capitalism for example. Nevertheless legal systems ... [were] of considerable interest 
to Marxists because of the part they played in different social formations such as 
feudalism or capitalism. Marxists ... [could not] deny the importance of some of the 
functions performed by legal institutions, but essentially their interest in law ... [was] 
tangential to a predominant focus on the general mode of social organisation and the 
material circumstances in which men are placed. 173 
Even post-war Marxist and Marxist-oriented legal scholarship still only focused on 
revealing the social reality of the operation of modem Western centralist law, and on 
portraying the economic, social justice and political implications of its legal 
systems. 174 Therefore, in effect, from its inception Marxism generally abandoned 
law, in the sense of recognising the modem, centralist law of the capitalist state as a 
discrete political phenomenon, with its own developmental history, processes and 
experience. In other words, Marxist analyses of law, like their liberal counterparts, 
have generally avoided or denied the politics of law: 
Marxists deny that there is a special and distinctive phenomenon which we can term 
law. Because Marxism has approached law tangentially, treating it as one aspect of a 
variety of political and social arrangements concerned with the manipulation of power 
.and the consolidation of modes of production of wealth, there has been no 
commitment towards an identification of the unique qualities oflegal institutions.175 
The result has been that the "nature of legal institutions themselves remains an 
unexplored terrain" in Marxist legal perspectives.176 Indeed, it "has often been 
remarked that then:: is no Marxist theory of Jaw", and apart "from extremely recent 
literature ... only two major works [have been] devotedly exclusively to the 
formuhtion of a Marxist theory oflaw".'77 
Therefore, the Marxist ideas which inform the ideological frameworks of Abel, 
Alcock, Bankowski and Mungham and Cousins enable them to de-construct the 
politics oflegal change in post-war society. They reveal, in other words, the political 
factors influencing developments in kgal aid, and - in Abel's case - post-war legal 
aid itself. 878 However, their reliance on ~farxist legal ideology means that they do 
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not - and cannot - explain the politics of law itself and, in the instant case, the politics 
of the institutional development of legal aid in post-war society. 
The outline of Marxist legal ideology above shows that there are three justifications 
for this claim. In the first place, in Marxist orthodoxy, modern Western centralist 
law and its institutions are inherently apolitical. Indeed, they are 'non-institutions', 
solely constituted by the sum of their economic parts and functions, and thereby • 
incapable of 'independent' action or development. They are mere receptacles of 
capitalist ambition. Secondly, in adopting Marxist-oriented frameworks, Abel, 
Alcock. Bankowski and Mungham and Cousins have not 'abandoned' modem 
centralist law and its institution, unlike the Marxist orthodoxy. However, in not 
'abandoning' law, they have 'retained' or 'saved' the social construction of modern 
centralist law and its institutions produced by a century or more of legal 
development. In the 20th century, liberal, centralist, apolitical representations of law 
have deeply infected the very character of the modem Western legal systems. By 
failing to directly engage with these omnipresent legal representations, the Marxist-
oriented frameworks have accepted by omission - or default - an apolitical, social 
construction of the law of the modem state in post-war society. Thirdly, neither 
Marxist legal orthodoxy nor the Marxist-oriented explanations of legal aid contest 
the governing ideological premise of liberal centralism that modem Western law is 
mono-typical - that it is a centrally manufactured, exclusive product of the state. 
The 'Missing' Political Dimensions of Modern Western Law 
Rejecting the explanatory literature on the grounds outlined above begs the question: 
"\\That were the political dimensions of modern law in post-war Western society?" 
The answer is that its dimensions were threefold. 
The first political dimension was that in post-war Western society the reality of 
modern law continued to be legal plurality. The centralist law of the national legal 
systems dominated legal regulation in both the Civil Law and Common Law 
countries, everywhere pervading social life to an omnipresent and unprecedented 
degree. Its dominating presences were not, however, to the exclusion of non-state, 
non-central types of Jaw or legal ordering. Notwithstanding the overarching role of 
the regulatory machinery of the modem state, and its legislative, judicial and 
administrative-types of centralist law, these other types of modem legal ordering 
continued to exist, as Galanter reminds us: 
Counterparts or analogs to the institutions, processes and intellectual activities that are 
located in national legal systems are to be found at many other locations in society. 
Some of these lesser legal orders are relatively independent, institutionally and 
intellectually, of the national legal system; others are dependent in various ways. That 
is, societies contain a multitude of partially self-regulating spheres or sectors, 
organised along spatial, transactional or ethnic-!amilial lines ranging from primary 
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groups in which relations are direct, immediate and diffuse to settings (e.g., business 
networks) in which relations are indirect, mediated and specialized.'79 
Thus, in post-war society modem law comprised a multitudinous collection or 
aggregation of coexisting forms of legal ordering. Whilst centralist law was 
predominant, it nevertheless formed part of a fundamentally pluralistic legal domain 
or province, as we explain below. The presence of this plural legal domain • 
represents the first dimension of the politics of modern law in post-war Western 
society. 
. 
The second dimension of the politics of modem law is generated by the legal 
domain. Its modern aggregation or 'collection' of law has a dual political dynamic 
within Western societies. Its legal multitudinality produces an internal dynamic - the 
'internal' politics of the legal domain. These 'internal' politics of law, i.e., the 
relations amongst the various 'members' of the legal domain, are inherently fluid, 
with allegiances regularly shifting, or else fracturing, and new alliances developing. 
However, the legal domain functions within the social context of the modem 
Western world. Thus, there is also an 'external' aspect to its political dynamics. The 
'external' politics of the legal domain are themselves bi-dimensional. On the one 
hand, the 'external' politics of the legal domain are 'corporate', or collective, as far 
as the politics of the relationship between modem law - in all its variety - and other 
organisations, entities and political actors in Western society is concerned. On the 
other hand, the legal domain also provides the forum for interaction between its 
'individual' members and the 'external' social world. This is the forum, for 
example, for the interaction between modem centralist-types of law and their 'host' 
societies which we discuss in the next paragraph. Therefore, the existence of the 
'internal' and 'external' politics of the modem Western legal domain means, as Sack 
points out, that "law, even in a certain place at a certain time, is ... never a single 
phenomenon but a (more or less systematic) conglomerate of (more or less diverse) 
phenomena". &&0 
The third dimension of the politics of law arises from two qualities displayed by 
centralist law and its institutions - the machinery and law of the modern state - in 
post-war society. The first is that the different parts of the modem Western legal 
systems retained the capacity to change or adapt their social functions in the absence 
of corresponding changes to institutional form, 'legal• design or new public policy 
directives. Courts, other state legal agencies and the 'legal' organisations of 
centralist law, like contract, property and legislation, appeared to be capable of 
changing what they actually 'did' without deliberate or conscious 'external' 
intervention. This quality of the 'institutions' Western centralist law was first 
identified by Karl Renner, whose ideas are acknowledged and explained below.881 
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Renner's positivism and 'organic' theory of legal development are outdated and, in 
some respects, anachronistic. Nevertheless, modern state centralist law and its 
institutions have always displayed a remarkable capacity to adapt to social change 
and the requirements of legal regulation in 20th century capitalism and its welfare 
states. To a socially significant degree, they appear to possess a 'life of their own'. 
This apparent capacity of the law and institutions of the legal system to adopt 
'independent' or 'autonomous' responses gives it a political quality, irrespective of 
the fact that it may be an illusion. What is significant, in a political context, is the 
appearance of an effective locus of 'legal' power, somehow detached from the state. 
The other quality of the legal machinery and law of the post-war state was its 
apparent 'separateness'. Modem centralist law and its institutions were popularly 
perceived as existing as something 'separate', 'apart' and remote from the social 
world. This is the characterisation of modern law projected by legal positivism, 
especially in the first half of this century. Marxism and Marxist-oriented critiques of 
modern Western law, and other socio-political perspectives - like the great eruption 
of modern 'political' jurisprudence in the United States - have discredited the 
intellectual foundations of legal positivism. Nevertheless, its ideals of modem law as 
something 'separate and 'apart' from the state and society remain powerful and 
influential. This is particularly so in the Anglo-American world, where legal 
centralism was so successful in projecting its image of modem law "as a thing apart 
from society, politics or economics".181 However, this conception of law is also 
closely allied with the legalism which was "a very common social ethos" in modem 
Western society.813 Furthermore, as we discuss in Chapter Seven, the post-war 
period had seen a significant projection of Anglo-American legal ideals throughout 
the Western world.114 
In this context, it is also important to recognise that the 'separateness' of law was not 
only a widespread perception in modern social life. It was also a real quality of 
modern legal regulation in the post-war welfare state. In its legislative, judicial and 
administrative-types, modem centralist law is manufactured by, or on behalf of, the 
state, and serves as an instrument of public policy. Thus, in a real and identifiable 
sense, state law originates 'outside' the social and economic spheres which are the 
objects or 'targets' of its actions. Furthermore, the institutions of the legal system 
exist 'apart' - in an administrative and organisational sense - from other 'non-legal, 
state institutions and social organisations, including the other 'members' of the 
modem legal domain. 
Moreover, the deployment of centralist law as an instrument of public policy tends to 
reinforce its 'separate' qualities. The 'legal', nonnative or technical structures of 
legislation, judicial law and administrative law are unable to adequately mirror or 
describlreal life' and its impossibly complex soc.ial, political and economic 
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relationships. The very process, therefore, of social ordering through state Jaw, and 
its paradigms of rules, regulation and adjudication, tends to 'separate' and 
'disconnect' modem centralist law from social reality. This is a reality in which, 
moreover, the massive scale and scope of the legal system and its system of legal 
regulation in the post-war welfare state highlight these aspects of social disjunction. 
For these several reasons, the legal system and its law appeared to be something 
'apart'. Once again, it appeared to the state and its citizens as being capable of 
forming and pursuing its own political objectives. 
The Fruits of Reviewing the Explanatory· Framework 
Reviewing the explanations of post-war legal aid above has had three major benefits. 
First, it has shown that the explanatory literature does not allow us to remedy the 
explanatory 'gap' in the Australian experience. This literature has a number of 
shortcomings, foremost amongst which is its failure to present an adequate and 
comprehensive explanation of the post-war experience of legal aid. It cannot, 
therefore, provide us with the additional information required to fully explain the 
origins and significance of the Australian national scheme. Furthermore, the review 
has shown that the ideological frameworks behind the explanatory literature contain 
a common, central flaw. None of its contributors confronted the politics of law in 
modern Western society, and considered its impact on developments in post-war 
legal aid. Consequently, the explanatory literature is unable to supply an adequate 
framework with which to revisit the Australian experience, discover any missing 
segments in its story, and reconsider its social significance in the welfare state. 
The second benefit of the review has been that it has demonstrated the significance 
of the explanatory literature in portraying and describing national developments in 
post-war legal aid. This literature, moreover, helps us to explain what we mean 
when we use the terminology of 'legal aid' and to define the parameters of its "post-
war experience".885 Thus, the review has identified the principal 'database' of the 
post-war developments in legal aid, and the post-war experience itself, which will 
pro,·e to be useful in revisiting the Australian experience in Chapter Seven below. 
Thirdly, the review has also identified and explained the three dimensions of the 
politics of modern Western law 'missing' from the explanatory literature. These 
'missing' political dimensions of modern law inevitably impinged upon the origins 
and significance of the post-war experience. The review, however, has not merely 
highlighted that these political factors are absent in the explanations of Abel, Alcock, 
Bankowski and Mungham, Blankenburg, Cousins, Marshall, Paterson and Nelken 
and Regan. It has also shown why we need a fresh analytical framework if we are to 
complete the process of revisiting the origins and significance of post-war legal aid. 
In so doing, the review has sketched the essential requirements of the new 
framework. It must incorporate analytical perspectives which recognise the plurality 
SSS Above at pp 146-147. 
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of modern Western law, the political dynamics of the modern legal domain, the role 
of the modem legal system and legal regulation in the welfare state. 
Redesigning the Analytical Framework 
In the first place, designing a new alternative framework for post-war legal aid 
requires restatement. The framework which is applied in the following parts of the 
chapter, and, as we .wiJI see, throughout Chapter Seven and Part III, incorporates the 
postulates defined, explained or implicit in earlier parts of the thesis.116 
Secondly, a philosophy of revision, and not of radical reconstruction, has been 
adopted in redesigning the analytical framework of legal aid. In reviewing the 
explanatory literature, we have not rejected its contribution without significant. 
qualifications. Its descriptions of the history of the post-war developments have 
been acknowledged as an important resource of ongoing significance. More 
importantly in the present context, neither did the review entirely jettison the liberal 
legalist, liberal centralist and Marxist-oriented ideological premises which infonned 
the explanatory accounts. Nor are these premises discarded in the redesigned 
analytical framework. For instance, three of the new perspectives below proceed 
from Marxist-oriented premises on law, society and the state. Moreover, the 
ideological premises within the explanatory literature form an indelible part of the 
Western experience of modem law, and the literature itself an irremovable part of the 
post-war experience. Thus, any new analytical framework cannot ignore their 
influence, even if we wished to do so. 
I', 
In any case, modem law, its origins and social functions are impossibly complex 
phenomena. And, as Hart once philosophised, the "diyerse, strange, and even 
paradoxical ways" in which "serious thinkers" have answered the question "What is 
Law?" in modem Western societies "throw a light which makes us see much in law 
that lay hidden".817 Thus, a 'kaleidoscope approach' to modern legal development is 
more likely to be productive, although this is not quite what Hart intended. 
Furthennore, as much as the explanatory literature may avoid or deny the politics of 
modem law, the impact ofits fonnative political ideologies - liberalism and Marxism 
- on the shape, content and development of the modem legal system as we knew it in 
the post-war Western world is both unavoidable and undeniable. Consequently~ the 
new framework must be one which accommodates the Catholicism of modem law 
and its embracing social ideologies. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to redesign the investigative framework to redress the 
defects in the existing - or 'old' - analytical perspectives, and to accommodate the 
political dimensions of modern law. Accordingly, the redesigned analytical 
framework also includes the four other perspectives identified and explained below: 
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first, it adds a legal pluralist perspective; and, secondly, a dynamic model of 
development in the state legal system; thirdly, it applies the methodology and 
techniques of Public Policy; and, fourthly, it acknowledges the ultimate brake on 
explaining legal development in the welfare state. 
A Legal Pluralist Perspective 
I 
The first addition is to adopt a legal pluralist perspective t< analyse the politics of 
modem law. Legal pluralism is not a "technical term with a precise, conventional 
meaning" .... For the present purpose, the legal pluralist persptctive embraces two 
different conceptions. First, it describes a pluralist con~ption of the legal character 
of the modem legal domain. Modern law is envisaged as the multitudinous 
collection of coexisting fonns of legal ordering described above.119 
However, the legal pluralist perspective is "more than the acceptance of a plurality of 
law."190 As Sack reminds us, legal pluralism is also an ideological perspective - a 
different view of modem law - standing in opposition to the centralist conceptions of 
liberal and Marxist theory. Moreover, it is an ideology of law which considers the 
muJtitudinality of the modem Western legal domain: 
... as a positive force to be utilised - and controlled - rather than eliminated. Legal 
pluralism thus involves an ideological commitment. However, this commitment takes 
the form of an opposition to monism, dualism and any other form of dogmatism 
instead of prescribing a cenain, positive choice of action. Moreover, the refusal to 
treat the plurality of law as a positive force also implies an ideological stance. It 
means, at its weakest, that the plurality of law must be temporarily tolerated as a 
necessary evil: it forces us to adopt a series of essentially undesirable compromises, it 
prevents us from fully implementing other, positive goals which demand that this 
plurality be overcome. In shon, the counterpan of legal pluralism is an ideology 
which aims at global unification of law and which deserves the ugly label of 'legal 
unificationism '.191 
Thus, the legal pluralist perspective is not merely an alternative to modem monist, 
centralist legal perspectives. It pro~eeds from - and projects - the belief that legal 
plurality and diversity are the preferable form o'f social ordering - and legal analysis -
in modem \Vestern society. 
A Dynamic Model of Development in the State Legal System 
The second addition to the rede-signed analytical framework seeks to harness the 
transfonnative capacity of the legal institutions and law of the modern Western state. 
This. as we described above, was a key dimension of the politics of modem law in 
post-war society. To do so, the framework incorporates the model of legal 
development of the institutions of Western law propounded by Karl Renner, an early 
20th century legal theorist. In The Institutions of Private Law and their Social 
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Functions, Renner sought "to utilise the Marxist system of sociology for the 
construction of a theory of law" to explain the processes of legal developm_ent in 
modem capitalist society.192 The basis of this theory was the evolution of the legal 
institution of private property in the historical context of the Civil Law legal systems. 
R~nner's theory and his methodology, however, apply equally to the Common Law 
world, where the socio-economic functions of private property are similar, with its 
institutional content varying "in detail, not in fundamentals" .191 
The purpose of 'adding' Renner, however, is not merely to theorise what we have 
already identified as an observable and politically significant phenomenon, i.e., the 
apparently 'separate life' of the law and institutions of the welfare state. Renner' s 
explanation of modern legal development helps us to 'de-construct' this 
phenomenon, so that we can more clearly understand its role in the politics of 
modern law in post-war society. To understand this, it is necessary to sketch 
Renner's theory of legal development, before justifying the claim that it is a worthy 
and useful addition to the redesigned analytical framework. 
As indicated above, it was the apparent historical capacity of private property to 
retain its original legal integrity, in the face of changes to its social function, which 
first attracted Renner's attention. How was it. · ~ asked, that pre-modem types of 
private property survived, even though their social functions were sometimes 
"diametrically opposed" to those which they had originally performed?194 However, 
the 5cope of Renner's inquiry was not restricted to this phenomenon, but embraced 
the wider question of how modern Western society had adapted its: 
... pre-capitalist and early capitalist legal conceptions to the needs of high capitalism 
without changing those conceptions themselves? How does society use the 
institutions of the law, what does it make of them, how does it group and re-group 
them? How does it put them to new services without transforming their normative 
content?195 
In Renner' s theory, this phenomenon of social transformation, without apparent legal 
transformation, was made possible by the process of"functional transformation". To 
understand the idea of functional transformation, it is first necessary to acknowledge 
the jurisprudential premises of Renner's theory. Whilst he was a Marxist, Renner 
clung to positivist conceptions of law, juxtaposing them with the economic 
determinism of Marxist theories of social development.196 He sought, in other words, 
to 'save' the institutions of Western centralist law by reconstructing them in a 
realistic, modem capitalist guise. 
Thus, Renner's idea of functional transformation was premised upon positivist 
conceptions which assumed the existence of a 'legal' realm, exclusively inhabited by 
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law and its institutions, and disassociated from the political and economic 
machinations and influences of social interaction. The 'legal' realm, however, was 
not entirely divorced from social life. It provided capitalist society with the 
normative ordering necessary to regulate its economic transactions, and it was in 
performing these functions that the social functions of Western centralist law and its 
institutions emerged. For Renner, the relationship between modem Western society 
and its law was both interactive and dichotomous. ·· 
The existence of different 'legal' and social realms meant that social change could 
manifest itself either in the institutions of 'law', or in the functions performed by its 
institutions in social regulation.197 On the one hand, 'law' and its institutions could 
change, independently of changes to their social function. On the other hand, the 
regulatory functions of modem 'law' institutions might change, without changes 
occurring within the 'legal' realm. In this case, however, changes in social function 
would eventually necessitate changes to the institutions of 'law' within the 'legal' 
realm.'91 These possibilities of legal development defined the scope of the 
phenomenon of the functional transformation of the institutions of 'Law' modem 
Western society. This is the phenomenon, in other words, whereby the 'Law' may 
not overtly develop or change its institutional format or structure, but nevertheless 
begin to perform new and different regulatory functions in the social world. 
For Renner, functional transformation could occur in three different circumstances. 
First, the social functions of a legal institution could be transformed by changes or 
development within the 'legal' realm. In this case, the internal elements - or 
constituent norms - of the institution would alter, resulting in a corresponding 
transformation of its social functions which reflected the degree of the normative 
shift, change or innovation. 199 Secondly, the social functions of a legal institution 
might have "either increased or diminished, changed or disappeared". 'JOO In these 
circumstances, the role of the institution would be correspondingly transformed, once 
again according to the degree and direction of the initiating variation in social 
function. Thirdly, a legal institution might also undergo functional transformation as 
a consequence of near contemporaneous change within the 'legal' realm, and society 
itself. In this case, its actual institutional functions would be changed, with 
transfonnative pressures emerging from both the 'legal' and social realms. 
It is vital to the idea of functional transformation that the integrity, legal form or 
shape of the legal institution is not overtly changed, or its 'appearance' altered. 
Overtly - or 'externally' - the original or existing form of the institution or law 
appears to be 'legally' and institutionally intact, notwithstanding that the functions it 
actually performed in society have - to varying degrees - been transformed. For 
Renner, recognising functional transformation was important if we were to fully 
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comprehend the process of legal development in the modem capitalist state. Its 
transformative possibilities meant that it was necessary to study political 
developments both within the 'law', and in the politics of modem Western society 
'i tselr. 901 
The redesigned framework incorporates this model of legal development through 
functional transformation, although not in an unalloyed form. Renner's theory of • 
modem law is dated, and its jurisprudential premises have been "shaken by the 
course of history".902 As we indicated earlier, the trend of 20th century Western 
j urisprudenc.e has not favoured the positivist conception of a clear dichotomy 
between 'law' and society. Indeed, even as Renner wrote, the intellectual credibility 
of distinguishing 'legal' and social realms had begun to crumble in the face of 
d~velopments in sociology and sociological jurisprudence. 
Moreover, the functions performed by the legal institutions and law of the modem 
state have also changed. In particular, the expanded functions of state legal 
regulation since the 1900s have meant that the Western 'institution' of private 
prcperty can no longer sensibly be defined solely in economic tenns. It was already 
"part of the order of labour [and] part of the order of power" when Renner wrote the 
first edition of The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions.9'" The 
social functions of private property continued to be transformed by the 
diversification of modem government accompanying the expansion of the welfare 
state. This development has also seen the diversification of the functions of the legal 
institutions and law of the modem Western state.904 
Nevertheless, the legal system of the welfare state in post-war Western society 
retains its essential original modem configuration. It remains fundamentally a 
collection of the legal institutions of the central state, together with its variety of 
centralist-types of modem law. Therefore, as Kahn-Freund concluded in 1949, 
whilst Renner's central thesis may be dated, his model of legal development through 
functional transformation "remains fruitful, and can and should be used for a better 
understanding of legal developments in our own time."905 
The Methodology and Techniques of Public Policy 
Thirdly, the redesigned analytical framework applies the methodology and 
techniques of Public Policy to legal development. From the outset, this thesis has 
proceeded from the assumption that public policy drives legal regulation in the 
welfare state. In Part I, and in this chapter, we have referred to the modem role of 
the institutions and centralist-types of law of the legal system as 'instruments' of 
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public policy. However, we have not yet acknowledged important corollaries of 
linking public policy and state law. 
"Public policy" is not only a description of the processes, content and outcomes of 
state decision-making. It is also a sub-discipline of political science or public 
administration, which emerged in the 1970s for the study of modem govemment.906 
The subject-matter of Public Policy is the politics of state decision-making, which, 
for its purposes, is characterised as either 'positive', in the sense direct or overt 
decision to undertake particular courses of action, or 'negative', in the sense of an 
indirect or complicit 'decision' to endorse, or acquiesce in, an existent or evolving 
social or political trend or development.907 
By studying decision-making, Public Policy scholars have sought to better 
understand the political dimensions of "what actually happens within that space 
called the state".908 Generally, they have not extended their inquiries to decision-
making affecting modem centralist law. However, there appears to be no reason 
why we cannot extend their techniques to investigate the politics of legal decision-
making, given the origins of modem centralist law •within' the state, and its 
'instrumental' functions in modem government. Moreover, its law is amongst the 
'resources' of the modem state. Thus, its law 'outcomes' are as much 'policy 
products' of the state, as those, like decisional 'outcomes' in social welfare, 
education, health, housing, economic, taxation, income maintenance, occupational 
welfare, urban planning and environmental policy, conventionally associated with 
Public Policy. To 'disentangle' the politics of these types of decisional 'outcomes', 
its scholars have developed a methodology to explain "why issues arise on the 
agenda, and how they are resolved."909 As Davis et al explain, Public Policy analysis 
is a method which: 
... requires us to 'puzzle out' ... the processes and limits of the state and to assess the 
relative influence on outcomes of politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups, 
organisational structures and economic forces.910 
This inquisitive or 'puzzling-out' approach provides us with another platform from 
which we can explore legal development in modem society, especially in those 
cases, like legal aid, where governments and the machinery of the state are so closely 
involved. 
The Ultimate Brake on Explaining Legal Development 
The last addition to the analytical framework take the form of a qualification. It 
refers to the fact that there are inherent limitations to understanding the processes of 
legal development in the welfare state. Ultimately, these processes cannot be fully 
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comprehended or explained. This redesigned perspective can assist in making the 
processes of legal development more transparent. However, an aura of mystery will 
always remain about its 'hows', 'whys' and 'whens'. Renner attributed this problem 
to the similarities between legal development and "organic development", or growth 
in the natural world:911 
. . . the process of growth, cannot be understood from genn to fruit and again to the 
new genn; so the change of functions can be recognised only at an advanced stage, 
and then only by way of historical comparison: it can be recognised only when it has 
matured.912 
Public Policy scholars have issued comparable - if more prosaic - warnings, alerting 
us to the fact that the welfare state "is above all a fragmented set of institutions with 
roles that are often contradictory, responding with varying effectiveness to 
competing class and sectional interests".913 
In seeking to analyse the origins and significance of legal development in the welfare 
state, we run the risk of attributing "the appearance of life and certainty, to find 
hidden logic in actions, or motivations separate from the intentions of those who 
make, or are affected by, state policy."91• Consequently, we must take care in not 
mistaking 'appearances' for causality in analysing legal aid and the post-war 
experience. The complexity of the politics and law of the welfare state places an 
ultimate brake on explaining legal development. The best that we can realistically 
and sensibly hope for is to give greater transparency to its major and more overt 
causes. 
Applying the Ne\v Analytical Frame\vork 
\Ve are now in a position to apply the new analytical framework and its option to 
ascertain whether we can locate any 'missing' parts in the story of the origins of the 
post-war experience of legal aid. And, if so, we can explain what those 'missing' 
parts are and also explain their importance in interpreting the significance of the 
post-war experience. 
Modem legal aid, however, as the historical record in the explanatory literature 
reveals, was not an invention of post-war Western society. Legal aid already formed 
part of the modern Western systems of law and government, as the study of the 
Australian experience in Part I has confirmed. Therefore, if we are to place 
ourselves in a position to explain 'what' happened, and why it did in the post-war 
experience we must first understand the origins, role and functions of modern legal 
aid in Western societies. 
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The Modern Origins of Post-War Legal Aid 
For Cappelletti, the origins of modem legal aid were unproblematic: it first emerged 
in a charitable form in medieval Europe.9" His description of the medieval 
charitable origins of legal aid has been a powerful and lasting image. As 'image', 
'myth' or 'history', the medieval charitabl.c origins are deeply implicit in the 
mainstream, liberal legalist orthodoxy of modem legal aid. It is a view, moreover, 
which is accepted - or at least not seriously contested - in both the liberal centralist 
and Marxist-oriented explanations above.916 
: 
In fact, Cappelletti and his liberal fellow travellers have not misled us in locating the 
origins of institutionalised assistance for poor litigants and accused within the 
medieval legal systems of England and Europe. In the case of the former, Chapter 
Two of the thesis has already described the medieval origins of the in forma pauperis 
procedures.917 In Europe, as Cappelletti tells us, medieval governments in French, 
German and Italian cities, kingdoms and principalities made comparable institutional 
provision for poor litigants and accused.911 These poor persons institutions did 
survive into modem England and Europe and were incorporated in the new legal 
systems of the outlying 19th century \Vestem-dominated world, like the Australian 
colonies.919 
Despite these historical realities, locating the origins of modem legal aid in the 
Middle Ages is mistaken. Cappeiletti and the liberal orthodox have misinterpreted 
the history of modem legal aid as we knew it in post-war society. The fact that they 
have done so does not reveal them as 'bad' or sloppy legal historians. It is, however, 
another instance of their progressive historiography. The liberal legal aid orthodoxy 
conducted its 'investigations' from the vantage point of the modem society of the 
post-war Western world. In doing so, these legal aid historians have adopted from 
one of two equally flawed methodological premises. Either liberal legal historians 
have engaged in some kind of historical deduction, extrapolating the modem 
'institution' of legal aid backwards into medieval society. Finding institutionalised 
legal assistance in the post-war world, they have assumed that its 'ancestors' were 
the poor persons institutions of medieval and early modem Western society. This is 
misconceived 'history', exhibiting all the flaws of reductionist accounts of the 
'historical' origins of modem Western institutions.920 Conversely, Cappelletti and his 
fellow travellers have assumed the 'legal continuity' or survival of the original poor 
persons institutions into modernity. If so, they have overlooked the consequences of 
legal modernisation. The legal assistance institutions did not enjoy an uninterrupted 
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passage from medieval and early modem times into the modem Western world. Its 
poor persons institutions, like all its legal institutions and law, were a product of the 
legal modernisation of Western society. 
The Legal Modernisation of Western Society 
Legal modernisation began in the I 8th century and was part of the transformation of 
Western society, government and political economy, wrought by the demise of 
feudalism, and the emergence of new legal and political ideals, technological 
innovation, industrialisation and modern capitalism. In England, early indicators of 
legal modernisation were evident by the 1750s. 921 In the next 150 years, comparable 
experiences of legal transformation, change and refonn occurred throughout the 
Western world.922 
In both England and Western Europe, legal modernisation was accompanied by the 
subjugation and gradual elimination of non-concentric and social types of law.923 
Anglo-American legal historians have familiarised us with the English experience of 
the destruction of its pre-modern types of de-centralised and 'non-state' legal 
ordering.924 We are less familiar, at least in the Common Law world, with the 
Western European experience. The pre-modern legal systems in these countries also 
contained significant non-centralised plural elements, which similarly gradually fell 
prey to the influences of legal modernisation.9'-' 
By 1900, modern types of government and centralised legal systems existed in 
Britain and Western European countries like Belgium, France, Germany and Italy. 
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Furthermore, many of these countries had exported their new modes of legal 
regulation to their overseas colonial dominions. The process of legal modernisation 
transformed the existing law and institutions of the 'old' Western central system of 
state legal administration. The result was, as Galanter describes it, the emergence of: 
... those institutional-intellectual complexes ... connected to the state, guided by and 
propounding a body of nonnative learning, purporting to emfompass and control all 
the other institutions in the society and to subject them to a regime of general rules.926 
These new national systems of legal administration and government were not simply 
revitalised and reformed versions of the 'old'. They were different types of legal 
systems which made and projected new and enforceable claims for the exclusivity of 
their modem, centralist-types of law. These claims were intolerant of - and 
ultimately rejected - the legitimacy of all competing forms of legal ordering. The 
emergence of the modem national legal systems, in other words, cannot be 
understood solely as a supreme illustration of legal and political reform. Legal 
modernisation introduced a new ideological basis to the legal administration of 
modem Western society. The modem state - and its central-type of law and 
institutions and systems of legal regulation - became the sole preserve of legitimacy, 
and the central fulcrum of the modem Western system of government. 
The Impact on the 'Original' Legal Assistance Institutions 
Legal modernisation also laid the foundations for modem legal aid. Variations of the 
legal assistance institutions, whereby lawyers' services, other legal representation, 
special procedures or concessional rates were 'given' to poorer litigants or accused, 
appeared in the modern legal systems in Australia, Canada, England, France, 
Germany, Italy, the United States and other Western countries.927 The new, 
institutional forms which resulted were not merely 'hybrid' or modified versions of 
the ·old', as Cappelletti and liberal 'history' encourage us to believe.928 The legal 
assistance institutions in the modem Western legal systems were new and different. 
They were a definite, clear and sharp departure from their medieval ancestors, and 
early modern predecessors. The establishment of the modem national legal systems 
transformed the 'original' legal assistance institutions, and the reasons 'why' and . 
'how' this occurred can be explained in alternative ways. 
Tlte /11stit11tio11al Novatio11 E."rpla11ation 
One explanation is that the incorporation or absorption of the 'original' legal 
assistance institutions into the modem national legal systems constituted an act of 
novation. In this interpretation, incorporation established a 'screen' through which 
the 'old' poor persons institutions passed, to emerge anew in the modem Western 
legal systems. Thus, the 'original' institutions disappeared, were transformed, and 
reappeared in the totally new context of the exclusive regulatory preserves of modem 
926 
927 
928 
M Galanter. above n 879 at 19. 
M Cappelletti. above n 117 at 18-21: F H Zemans (cd), above n 2 at 77-78 (Austria), 2S4 (Denmark). 265 
<Norway) & 302 (Spain). 
M Cappelletti. above n 117 at 29. 
165 
centralist law. In this role, the 'new' modem poor persons institutions became part 
of the legal machinery of the modem Western state. 
Tiie Functional Transformation Explanation 
The other explanation draws upon the functional transformation perspective included 
in the new analytical framework above. In this interpretation, the significance of the • 
'new' poor persons institutions was their similarity to the 'original' legal assistance 
institutions. Incorporation or absorption into the modem legal system was generally 
accompanied. by variation, modification or other reforms intended to improve the 
reach or accessibility of legal assistance for poor people. However, the institutional 
constitution, structure or design of the 'original' legal assistance institutions 
remained intact. To the observer, the 'new' institutions in the modem legal systems 
were generally indistinguishable in 'shape' or 'construction' from their immediate 
predecessors. In these circumstances, the preconditions for functional transformation 
were present, i.e., development without overt change to the integrity, legal form or 
r 'appearance' of a legal institution. 
~ 
In this context, the establishment of the modem legal systems can be interpreted as 
changing the social function of the 'original' legal assistance institutions. It was a 
legal development which satisfied the requirements of Renner's third category of 
circumstances when functional transformation occurs, namely when there is a near 
contemporaneous change within the 'legal' realm and society itself.929 To understand 
'how' this occurred, we need to explain the dual impact of establishing the modem 
legal systems on the legal assistance institutions 
In the first place, this development altered the constituent norms of the 'original' 
legal assistance institutions. The original 'charitable' ideals of assisting the poor 
were replaced by the new regulatory norms of the "institutional-intellectual [legal] 
complexes . . . guided by and propounding a body of normative learning" which 
constituted the modern legal systems.930 This experience was only a small part of a 
general modem transformation of the 'old' legal institutions of Western centralist 
law, as we consider below. Nevertheless, normative transformation had a particular 
effect upon the legal assistance institutions. It displaced - or at least created the 
potential to displace - their original constituent norms or ideals. For the present 
purpose, we need not explain their 'new' normative or ideological character or 
constitution. It is sufficient to have demonstrated that the 'original' legal assistance 
institutions fulfilled - or had the potential to fulfil - new and different social functions 
in Western societies now governed by modern legal systems. 
Secondly, the establishme.1t of the modern legal systems changed the regulatory 
functions of these institutions, as it did for all the institutions of Western centralist 
law. It did so by changing the functions actually performed by the 'original' poor 
persons institutions in modern Western society. Like other modern legal institutions, 
they became "connected to the state" in a new - and dramatically different - way than 
929 Above at pp IS6·158. 
930 M Galanter, above n 879 at 19. 
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in the past.931 The state not only controlled the modem legal system, but used its 
institutions and centralist law to create its unprecedented, modem omnicompetence, 
progressively arming itself with 'legal instruments' to intervene in every reach of 
social and economic life. Consequently, the 'original' legal assistance institutions, 
irrespective of the fact that they ostensibly served the 'poor', were - like their more 
prominent institutional comrades - enlisted into the service of the state. Thei:~by, 
once again, transfonning - or potentially - transforming their social function. 
Linking These Modern Transformations with Legal Aid 
This first application of the redesigned analytical framework has provided several 
important new insights. It demonstrates that there is an alternative history of the 
origins of legal aid in modem Western society which locates its origins in modernity 
itself. The analysis above also revealed the modem poor persons institutions - the 
progenitors of modem legal aid - as products of the legal modernisation of Western 
society, and the subsequent establishment of its national legal systems. It also 
highlighted the links between the origins of modem legal aid and the state, and the 
role and functions it assigned to its new legal machinery. From a histodcal 
perspective, therefore, the new analytical framework has allowed us to remedy the 
shortcomings of the legal aid orthodoxy, and to resolve some of the 'missing' links 
in the modem background to the post-war experience. 
More importantly, the new framework has enabled us to identify modernity as the 
investigative base for understanding the post-war experience of legal aid. For the 
remainder of this chapter, therefore, our focus will be upon modern Western society, 
its law and central legal systems. However, linking the origins of post-war legal aid 
to the modern transformation of the poor persons institutions is not without 
problems, and these must be addressed before we can safely proceed. 
Initially, the modem poor persons institutions did provide the basis of legal 
assistance in the machinery of the new Western legal systems. By the 1940s, 
however, these institutions had ceased to describe the organisational basis of legal 
aid in many of the countries shortly to undergo the post-war experience. We know 
that the poor persons institutions had gradually developed into legal aid in the 1900s, 
191 Os, 1920s and 1930s, as the Australian experience and the legal aid literature 
have shown. What we do not know for certain, at this stage, is 'how' and 'why' this 
legal development occurred. To a considerable degree, as is explained below, we 
can tell its story with the aid of the historical 'database' in the explanatory literature. 
However, for the reasons explained above, this literature does not provided us with 
an adequate analytical framework to trace the transition of the poor persons 
machinery into modern legal aid. 
To some extent, the explanations of the modern transfonnation of those institutions 
above remedy this problem. The institutional novation and functional transformative 
interpretations provide us with alternative explanations of the origins of the modern 
931 Ibid. 
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poor persons institutions. However, at this stage it is not clear which of these two 
interpretations provide us with an appropriate platform to explore the subsequent 
development in late 19th and early 20th century Western society. This question must 
be answered before we can proceed further. 
The Disadvantages of the Institutional Novation Explanation 
In this context, the institutional novation explanation has two principal limitations. 
As an explanatory tool, its value is exhausted in explaining the modem 
transfonnation of the 'old' poor persons institutions. In this role, it has been valuable 
and useful, for the reasons explained above. Thereafter, however, the value of the 
institutional novation explanation is diminished because it lacks a developmental 
capacity. It cannot explain the transition of the modem poor persons institutions into 
legal aid, other than by reference to changes in the legal machinery of the state. 
Therein lies the second piincipal limitation of the institutional novation explanation. 
Whatever else modem legal aid may be, it is certainly more than the sum of the legal 
assistance machinery of 20th century Western society. Clearly, this institutional or 
'machinery' dimension is part of "legal aid". Since the 1910s and 1920s, the 
machinery of legal assistance in many Western legal systems has been denominated 
or described as "legal aid". The history of modem legal aid is replete with instances 
of "legal aid" being identified with organised, institutionalised provision of legal 
assistance for poorer people. The Australian experience in the 1960s, its national 
scheme in the 1970s and in 1980s and 1990s are but some examples.932 In the post-
war Western world generally, modern legal aid 'existed' in this 'concrete' 
dimension, and has continued to do so.933 
Clearly, however, it also 'existed' as an 'ideal' or normative dimension in 20th 
century Western society. In this dimension, modern legal aid is a vibrant, multi-
faceted, chameleon-like ideological construction. In the post-war experience, for 
instance, "legal aid" was widely descri@ed as a political, social or quasi-legal 'right', 
entitling citizens to assistance to enable them to conduct transactions in the legal 
system. It was conceived of as a civil right, giving rise to concomitant obligations on 
the part of governments and the state.934 Its 'existence' as a 'right' was, moreover, 
asserted, justified and defended in the context of a disparate collection of socio-legal 
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ideals, amongst which the "image of legal aid as equal access to the law (embodied 
in the courts) [was] the dominant conception".93' 
By the post-war period, this image of "legal aid" had become suffused into reality. 
This is one reason why Cappelletti was so successful in promoting his claim that 
legal aid was the 'answer' of the modem wor~~ to the ancient "problem of providing 
lawyers for the poor".936 This ideological construction of "legal aid" became the 
basis of an assumption that it was an inherent institutional component of modem 
Western society. A key part of the normative dimension had become 'reality' - a 
central assumption of modem Western law. This 'institulional' dimension of"legal 
aid" was not restricted to Cappelletti and liberal legalism. Neither was its ideological 
construction restricted to the 'provision of lawyers for the poor'. It embraced the 
idea that organised provision of legal assistance for poorer people was a deeply 
implicit part of modem Western society. 
The complexity of the ideological construction of modem legal aid was increased by 
its link with lawyers. Throughout the 20th century, the modem legal profession, 
most markedly in the modem Anglo-American countries, has seen "legal aid" as its 
premier social obligation. On the other hand, for its Marxist-oriented critics, like 
Bankowski and Mungham, this professional 'obligation' was construed as a device to 
promote lawyers' market competence and dominance. This is yet another illustration 
of the 'ideal' or nonnative dimension of modem legal aid, albeit of a negative or 
critical kind. The institutional novation explanation does not easily accommodate 
this other dimension of modem legal aid. Thus, it does cannot provide us with an 
appropriate platform to explore the subsequent development of the modern poor 
persons institutions. 
The Advantages of the Functional Transformation Explanation 
In the functional transformation explanation, the modern poor persons institutions 
were differentiated from their predecessors by the new social functions which they 
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performed. Incorporation was said, first of all, to have altered the constituent norms 
of the 'original' institutions, replacing them with the new regulatory norms_9f the 
modern legal systems. It also placed the poor persons institutions into their new, 
legal servitude to the modern state. As an explanatory tool, the functional 
transformation explanation has two important advantages. First, it proceeds from the 
I 
dynamic premises of Renner's theory of modem legal development, as sketched in 
the redesigned framework above. Inherently, therefore, the functional transformation 
explanation provides us with an analytical platform to explore the transition of the 
poor persons institutions into modern legal aid. 
Secondly, it also gives us a bifidial 'picture' of the social construction of the modem 
poor persons institutions. On the one hand, the functional transformation 
explanation shows their normative, ideological or 'ideal' social construction. In 
Renner's terms, their institutional constitution within the 'legal' realm. On the other 
hand, the functional transformation explanation ·demonstrates the regulatory, 
functional or 'concrete' modern social construction of the 'new' poor persons 
institutions. This was their modern role as part of the legal machinery or 
'equipment' of the state. The advantage of this 'picture' is that it closely 
corresponds to the bifidial social construction of modern legal aid which we 
described above, i.e., its dual •concrete' and 'ideal' dimensions. It provides us with 
the link between the modern transformation of the poor persons institutions and legal 
aid as we knew it in post-war society - and thereby with a further reason why the 
functional transformation explanation provides an appropriate explanatory tool with 
which to continue the work of the chapter. 
It also allows us to define the two questions from which this work can proceed. The 
first question is: .. \Vhat explains the transition of the machinery or 'concrete' 
dimensions of the modem poor persons institutions into the legal machinery of legal 
aid in 20th century \Vestern society?" 'How' and 'why', in other words, did state 
poor persons assistance develop into the legal aid schemes which preceded the post-
war experience? The second question is: "What explains the transition of the poor 
persons institutions into the normative or 'ideal' dimensions of modern legal aid?" 
'How' and 'why' did their initial modem normative social construction develop into 
the legal aid ideals of post-war modern Western law? 
The Transition of the Machinery or 'Concrete' Dimensions 
The story of the transition of the machinery or 'concrete' dimensions of the poor 
persons institutions is relatively unproblematic. It is recorded in many parts of the 
scholarly and legal aid literature.937 Essentially, these institutions remained part of 
the legal machinery of the modern Western legal systems until well into the 20th 
century.938 Indeed, in some countries, like Australia, they remain in remnant forms.939 
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The general pattern, however, was one of gradual adaptation, refonn and legislative 
or administrative reconstruction. New types of legal assistance schemes emerged, 
although often retaining elements of their modem predecessors in legislative 
structure or administration. 
The objectives of this chapter do not dictate describing the history of 'how' these 
developments occurred in any detail. We can, however, point to the Australian 
experience described above as one instance. In Chapters Two and Three, we 
described the modem transformation of the informd pauperis procedures in colonial 
law and government, and their subsequent development in the legal aid legislation of 
the Commonwealth and the States."° Other modem Western countries - including 
Canada, England, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, The Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United States - made comparable legislative or administrative changes to the poor 
persons legal assistance machinery.941 Neither do the objectives require us to explain 
in detail 'why' these developments occurred. Nevertheless, it is useful to briefly 
outline the major causal factors in the transition to the modem national legal aid 
schemes. 
In the mid and late 19th century - the early decades of the new, national legal 
systems - the modem-type of poor persons institutions was semi-dormant, their new 
social functions remaining more immanent than real. Most Western countries did 
little to either enervate their legal procedures or to encourage citizens' access to law. 
Many factors contributed to this initial neglect. No doubt, in part it reflected the 
degree of satisfaction with the achievements of the new legal systems - amongst the 
''governors", if not the "govemed".942 In the words of Cappelletti, "the equality 
sought was formal rather than actual; it was enough that all citizens had a legal path 
open to them by which they could receive a lawyer".90 However, not all 
contemporary Western states had governments which actively applied these liberal 
democratic principles in legal regulation. Indeed, even the modem liberal 
democracies, like England, its British colonies and the United States, neglected legal 
assistance for their poorer citizens. 
~foreover, initial popular expectations of the new legal systems were not as great as 
centralist accounts of modern legal development would have us believe. 
Universally, the historical experience of pre-modem Western legal ordering and 
regulation had · :een pluralist, and "pluralism itself persisted and indeed flourished" 
in the modem legal domain - not only in the Common Law world.9olol The adage of 'a 
law for the rich, and one for the poor' often very accurately described both the actual 
.:ocial experience of the poor and less powerful, and their collective memory. In the 
939 In 1993. the Rules of the High Coun of Australia still made provision for civil proceedings conducted in 
in formd pauperis. 
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Common Law world this was demonstrably so. Since the 1770s and 1780s, a new 
emphasis on private property had further diminished the relevance of its modern 
central courts and their judicial law for poor litigants, and the legal problems of 
poorer people. 945 The reorganisation of civil justice in England, and the colonial 
reforms which this spawned, had done little to alleviate their plight. Indeed, as 
Weber has remarked, the fact that "capitalism could nevertheless make its way so 
well in England was largely because the court system and trial procedure amounted 
until well into the modern age to a denial of justice to the economically weaker 
groups".946 Quite apart from the unpopular character of the modem legal systems, its 
agents in the· lawyers of 19th century capitalist society were uninterested in the 
newly defined legal problems of the poor. They inevitably tended to "concentrate 
[their] time, effort, and skill on the remunerative business" provided by business and 
the middle classes.941 
The early 20th century was the turning point in the development of the modern 
machinery of legal aid. As, indeed, it was for the modem Western state and its entire 
legal system. In stops and starts, and with no apparent or predetermined pattern, this 
period saw Western governments slowly invigorate, reform, adapt and reconstruct 
the poor persons institutions. To explain why these legislative and administrative 
changes occurred, we first need to recognise that they were results of state decision-
making. Consequently, like all other developments in the state legal system, they 
were a product of changed public policy towards - in this instance - the provision of 
legal assistance and the organisation of legal aid. Public policy was therefore the 
primary cause of the conversion of the poor persons institutions into the machinery 
of legal aid. 
In this context, we can make some general observations about the causes of these 
changes in legal assistance policy. There was, in the first place, no single cause. 
Abel has amply demonstrated how modem capitalist countries had different - and 
sometimes inconsistent - reactions to the background social forces, including 
urbanisation, migration, capitalisation and political movements, which shaped 
modem national responses to legal assistance.cu• These social forces were, moreover, 
often subject to significa!lt national variations.949 This is a fact to which both 
Blankenburg and Cousins have attested in the context of the post-war welfare 
states.950 
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Beyond this, the causes of state action to change legal assistance were manifold. 
Certainly, they were not restricted to the personal plight of individual poorer litigants 
and accused. The Australian experience demonstrates, for instance, that refonn or 
expansion was sometimes associated with public a~~inistration, and the operations 
of the legal system.'" There were, however, three major and inextricably interrelated 
causes of changes to state legal assistance policy. The first and most significant was 
the ever-increasing potency of the legal capacity of the state, and the ever-expanding 
scope and social penetration of its centralist-types of law and administration. The 
social transformations of capitalism, referred to above, had increased both the "size 
and complexity" of early 20th century Western society and thereby the demands and 
opportunities for state legal intervention.952 Modem state law and its legal system 
mattered more than it ever had before - to both the state and its citizens. 
The second major cause was the growth of modem conceptions of social citizenship, 
defining the relationship between the state and its citizens as a reciprocal matrix of 
civil and political rights and obligations. These were, in part, as Cappelletti records, 
a product of developments in political ideology: 
... the moral and ideological basis of the laissez-faire world was steadily eroding ... 
modern nations turned to various combinations of the old vision \\ ith new and often 
inchoate ideas of social and economic welfare [which] ... varied from that of post-
Depression America, which often seems like an attempt to bring an older 
individualism within the reach of all, to those of modem Scandinavia, which often 
seems like a kind of state patemalism.9' 3 
These new 'social visions' saw communitarian conceptions of human rights begin to 
replace the individualism which had hitherto dominated modern Western 
government, politics and legal administration.9'°' In England, for instance, modem 
social citizenship had its origins in the "growing interest in equality as a principle of 
social justice and ... appreciation ... that ... formal recognition of an equal capacity 
for rights was not enough''.m It "grew out of a conception of equality [as] equal 
social worth, not merely of equal natural rights" which advocated "the complete 
removal of all the barriers that separated civil rights from their remedies".9'6 
However, modern social citizenship was only in part an ideological phenomenon. It 
was also a product of modem social transfonnations and of the development of the 
advanced capitalist economy. In England, for instance, the spread of its ideals was 
encouraged by economic and industrial factors, including changes in the labour 
market, reduced income differentials through the introduction of graduated tax scales 
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and mass production of consumer goods for popular consumption.957 The cumulative 
effect of these economic, fiscal and social changes reduced obvious social 
differences between 'rich' and 'poor', and helped "guide progress into the path 
which led directly to the egalitarian [social] policies of the twentieth century"."' Or, 
less romantically, it increased the pressures on the state for material reform~ and 
improvements to popular social welfare and: 
... profoundly altered the setting in which the progress of citizenship took place. 
Social integration spread from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of 
material enjoyment. The components of a civilised and cultured life, formerly the 
monopoly of the few, were brought progressively within the reach of many, who were 
encouraged thereby to stretch out their hands towards those that still eluded their 
grasp. The diminution of inequality strengthened the demand for its abolition, at least 
with regard to the essentials of social welfare". 959 
The third major cause of changes to state legal assistance policy was the growing 
influence of 'modem Western law', in other words, of the social constructions of 
'law' in the modem societies of the Common Law and Civil Law worlds which are 
discussed below. The growing popular demand for 'access to law' was another 
significant source of political pressure on the state to change legal assistance 
policies. Moreover, the growing social significance of 'modem law' also influenced 
the change in nomenclature of the poor persons machinery. Gradually, the 
terminology of "legal aid" replaced the concept of "poor persons" in the 20th century 
legal aid machinery. 
Ultimately, however, the story of the transition of the modem-type of poor persons 
institutions into the machinery of modem legal aid is one of national experiences. In 
pre-war Western society, the role of the state, the scale and scope of its legal system, 
the impact of social citizenship and the role of 'modem law' were subject to 
significant national variations; and this not only in different trends in the Common 
Law and Civil Law world, but also between countries like Australia. Britain, Canada 
and the United States, which had comparable legal and political traditions. 
Moreover, 20th century developments in the machinery of legal assistance were 
influenced by differences in the political economy of the emerging welfare states. 
Even in the pre-war world, different political philosophies shaped the size and 
functions of the ·corporate' welfare states in Western Europe, the •socially 
defensive' systems in Australia and Britain, and the typically minimalist welfare 
state in the United States.960 
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The Transition of the Normative or 'Ideal' Dimensions 
The second question pol'~d above asked: "What explains the transition of the poor 
persons institutions into the normative or 'ideal' dimensions of modem legal aid?" 
Answering this question is not as straightforward as the story of the development of 
the machinery of modem legal aid above .. · To explain the development of its 
normative or 'ideal' dimensions, which is hereafter referred to as 'legal aid', we must 
first return to the functional transformation explanation and to its interpretation of the 
impact of Western legal modernisation upon the 'original' poor persons institutions. 
This explanation showed how legal modernisation changed their normative content, 
replacing them with the regulatory norms of the modem Western legal systems. At 
the time, we did not pursue the significance of this ideological dimension of the 
modem transfonnation of the poor persons institutions. There was no need to do so: 
the primary object was to establish that these institutions, as they appeared in modem 
Western society, were creations of modernity. 
However, our present purpose is different. If we are to explain the transition of the 
nonnative or 'ideal' dimensions of the poor persons institutions into 'legal aid', we 
must now pursue the significance of the ideological dimensions of their modem 
transfonnation. So far, we have described this as a 'replacement effect', i.e., their 
'original' institutional nonns were replaced by the regulatory norms of the modem 
legal systems. In retrospect, this description is adequate, for it defines - as we 
explain in detail below - the historical basis of the transition of the 'new' norms of 
the poor persons institutions into 'legal aid'. However, the contemporary reality was 
more complex and must be explained, if we are to make the explanation of this 
transition convincing and historically credible. 
The 'original' constituent nonns of the poor persons institutions were not 'replaced' 
overnight - and neither were the modem legal systems, as we knew them in the 20th 
century Western world. Nor did the 'productive capacity' of their "institutional-
intellectual complexes" emerge in a blinding flash of light, immediately transforming 
the legal reguiation of modern Western society.961 The norms of the new legal 
systems were a product of ongoing development, particularly, during the decades of 
the late 19th and early 20th century, as the story of the 'concrete' dimensions of 
modern legal aid revealed. Thus, the 'moment' or 'instant' of the modern 
transformation of the poor persons institutions did not see their constituent norms 
·replaced'. Their normative content, however, was instantly subject to the immanent 
possibility of reconstruction or change, at the orchestration of the state through the 
new 'normative engines' of its modern legal system. 
When 'replacement' actually occurred, it did so in the context of the modem legal 
systems, and within the new legal norms they engineered. The focus of the 
'normative engines' of the new Western legal systems, however, was not upon the 
poor persons institutions. These 'engines' focused upon engineering the construction 
of the ideological dimensions of 'law' in the modem societies regulated by the new 
961 M Galanter. above n 879 at 19. 
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legal systems. The 'product' of this great enterprise was the social construction 
which we knew as 'modem law' in the post-war Western world. This 'modern 
Western law' was constituted by the legal centralist nonnative constructions which 
fixed the identity of law in the societies of the 20th century Civil Law and Common 
Law worlds. 
If we need to defend the proposition that 'modem law' in Western society, i.e., how 
'it' 'sees', identifies and celebrates law, is an ideological construction we can do so 
from four different bases within this chapter . In the first place, the review of the 
explanatory literature above demonstrated how centralist ideals of 'law' dominated 
its explanations of the post-war experience, in the face of the legal plurality of the 
post-war world.962 Secondly, in identifying the 'missing' political dimensions of 
modern law in the explanatory literature, we highlighted the plurality of the modern 
Western legal domain.963 Thus, in ascribing monotypicality to its multitudinous 
dimensions, the centralist monotypes of 'modern Western law' are signalling their 
origins in ideology or 'belief, and not as social descriptions of law itself. The third 
basis is that the 'missing' political dimensions of law also showed that the law and 
institutions of the modern legal system were popularly perceived as having a 
'separate' existence. This perception, moreover, was shown to have solid 
foundations in the modern reality of central regulation, and the role of its centralist 
law in the public policy of the welfare state.964 The 'content' of this 'separate law' 
closely corresponds to the legal centralist constructions of 'modern Western law'. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the modern Common Law world, where the 
association of 'law' with lawyers, courts and legislation "has become part of the 
general culture" - notwithstanding the plurality of the modem Anglo-American legal 
domain and the social significance of administrative centralism, its law and 
institutions in the Common Law countries. 96s Fourthly, as we have several times 
shown Galanter to describe, the modern Western legal systems are "institutional-
intellectual complexes .. . guided by and propounding a body of normative 
learning·'.966 In the context of modem legal plurality, the "regime of general rules" to 
which this bifidial matrix subjects "the other institutions in society" - and Western 
social life itself - are inherently ideological constructions.967 
On whichever grounds one demonstrates the construction of 'modem law', its 
'production' in the new national legal systems was the seminal legal development of 
the modem Western world. Its 'manufacture', moreover, was inextricably linked 
with the 'replacement' of the constituent norms of the poor persons institutions. 
Therefore, before we can explain the significance of this 'replacement', and thereby 
961 Above at pp 146-151. 
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the origins of the nonnative or 'ideal' dimensions of modern legal aid, we must first 
explore the basis of the social construction of'modem Western law'. 
The Basis of the Social Construction of 'Modern Western Law' 
Like its modem legal systems, the origins of its 'modem law' are to be found in the 
legal modernisation of Western society described above.961 'In both the Common 
Law and Civil Law world, legal modernisation saw the institutions of the 'old' 
central type of legal systems refurbished, redesigned and reconfigured, and its 
centralist-types of law consolidated, codified or reformed. Across Western society, 
the outcome was highly comparable, notwithstand;ng the tendency of modem 
centralist scholarship to differentiate development in the Common Law and Civil 
Law types of legal system, and their distinctive categories of legal thought.969 Older 
forms of plural legal ordering were suppressed, and eventually eliminated, and 
modem legal domains, in which centralist-types of law were pre-eminent and pre-
dominant, emerged.970 There was, however, one key difference in the experience of 
legal modernisation in the Common Law and Civil Law worlds. It had the effect that 
the basis of their respective social construction of the legal centralist norms which 
constituted 'modem Western law' was significantly different. 
In the Western Civil Law world, legal modernisation did not alter the basic 
composition of the central component of its legal domain. Administrative centralist 
or bureaucratic types of law and their institutions remained as the exclusive 
centrepiece of the national central legal systems. These institutions and theh: 
administrative-types of centralist law were 'modernised' to match the new regulatory 
requirements of modern capitalist society. But the essential character and 
constitution of the central component of the legal domain in the Civil Law world was 
unaltered by legal modernisation. Neither were its 'internal' politics changed, save 
that, as in the Common Law world, its centralist-types of law rapidly achieved their 
modern hegemony. 
The 'stability' of centralist law and its domain in the Civil Law world had significant 
implications for the construction of 'law' within the ideological 'engines' of its 
modern legal systems. Its 'old' legal institutions and administrative centralist-type of 
law faced no new competition. The new legal nonns of the Civil Law societies were 
'engineered' by the 'architects' of its modem legal system on the basis of the existent 
legal institutions of the state. Their version of 'modern Western law', therefore, was 
'constructed' in the image of the state and its legal machinery. In the Common Law 
world, however, the experience of legal modernisation of the central legal domain 
was different. And so, accordingly, was the basis of its social construction of its 
versions 'modem Western law'. 
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The Experience in the Common Law World 
The experience of legal modernisation in the Common Law world is generally 
portrayed as similar to its Civil Law counterpart, i.e., as a period of reform of the 
'old' centralist-type of legal systems. Historians acknowledge that the Common Law 
countries had distinctive social experiences. In Britain, for instance, legal 
modernisation was evolutionary and adaptive, whereas in the United States, it was 
revolutionary and - by reason of social necessity - iMovative and creative. For legal 
historians, however, the outcomes in the Anglo-American world were similar: 
legislatures ~.ere created or reformed, government democratised, the courts and their 
procedures streamlined, and its legislative and judicial-types of centralist Jaw 
revised. 971 
In Britain, legal modernisation is usually seen to have culminated in the 1870s when 
"the shiny new components of an integrated national legal system" were "bolted into 
place".972 Complete 'kits' or 'packages' of its developing modem type of legal 
regulation had already been 'exported' to the self-governing colonies of the British 
Empire, a process which continued into the 20th century. In the United States, in 
contrast, the final events in the shaping of its modem legal system caMot be dated so 
precisely.973 Nevertheless, by the 1850s the modern transformation of its courts and 
their judicial law was substantially complete. Whilst the next 50 years saw "rapid, 
unprecedented change", even the "the most important of these changes continued 
trends set earlier in the century".9" Moreover, by the 1860s the superior court judges 
had come "to play a central role" in American society, increasingly employing "the 
common law as a creative instrument for directing men's energies towards social 
change".975 
For most purposes, the picture presented by centralist legal history is adequate, 
useful and informative. It reveals much of what we need to know about the origins 
of the modem legal systems, and its courts, legislation and judicial law, in Australia, 
Britain, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and other Common Law countries. 
However, centralist legal history overlooks one vital feature of the experience of 
legal modernisation in these countries. It was also a time of significant new 
developments in the technology and politics of modern centralist law. It is within 
these changes that we find the distinctive character of the experience of legal 
modernisation in the Common Law world. 
The Appeara11ce of a Modern Administrative-Type of Centralist Law 
The first new development was the appearance of a modem administrative-type of 
centralist law. By 1850, administrative or bureaucratic modes of legal regulation 
\Vere evident in government and the administrative organs of emerging modem 
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Anglo-American societies. This new administrative law was not a refurbished or 
redesigned modern version of the decentralised, 'unsystematic', partial and 
patriarchal forms of administration of late medieval and early modem British society. 
It originated within the new administrative ideologies of centralised public 
administration in the modem state which generated new types of legal institutions 
and technologies. The result was a new, modem administrative-type of law, quite 
different in conception and design to the judicial-types of law of the courts and the 
legal profession.976 
The focus of modern Anglo-American legal history on this latter type of law, the 
disciplinary divide between 'law' and 'administration' and the influence of the courts 
and legal profession have conspired to obscure the origins of administrative law, its 
content and functions. The legal historians have generally relegated administrative 
law to the 'non-legal' world of 'administration'. The scholars of public 
administration, on the other hand, have similarly generally acquiesced in the 'non-
lawness' of administrative Jaw, and developed their own typologies of its institutions 
and systems of legal ordering. Both of these approaches have suited the interests of 
the judges and the lawyers, who have thereby been justified in subjecting 
administrative law, its actors and actions to the processes of judicial review of 
administrative action. In the few cases where the lawyers have acknowledged 
administrative law, notably Dicey and Lord Hewart, its significance has either been 
deliberately downplayed, or demonised as an ilJegitimate - often dangerous - ward of 
the courts, judges and lawyers.977 Consequently, we have no comprehensive account 
of its origins the Common Law world. The major historical account is Arthurs' 
investigation of the emergence of administrative law in England in the 1830s and 
1840s. This serves to demonstrate its origins in legal modernisation, and the 
distinctive character of this new form of modem Anglo-American centralist-type of 
law. 
Arthurs begins by recording that, by 1830, industrialisation had "significantly altered 
all aspects of ... life" in England, and its "social consequences ... was attracting 
considerable concem".978 One response of the central government to this social 
problem was to assert a new role in articulating national social policy.979 However, it 
faced the threshold difficulty that it lacked the administrative machinery to 
implement these new types of policies. 980 The solution was not to be found in the 
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institutions of judicial law. The central courts were still recovering from the 
"disastrous period" of the previous 40 years, and the civil jurisdictions and judges 
were preoccupied with property and commercial law, displaying little interest in 
social administration or governance. 981 
In the 1830s, therefore, the British Parliament and the national government were 
compelled to find an alternative solution to these emerging, new legal regulatory 
demands. The answer took the form of the establishment of new and modem 
administrative-types of legal regimes. Sometimes, these new legal regimes were 
merely temporary adaptations of existing legal institutions and law.912 In other 
instances, the legislators were innovative, establishing new types of administrative 
institutions, like the statutory regulatory commissions and factories and mines 
inspectorates. 983 The statutory legal powers and functions invested in these 
administrative agencies permitted them to produce their own schemes of legal 
regulation. Officials in the factories and mines inspectorates, for instance, were 
authorised to make delegated legislation, and independently enforce, through fines 
and a criminal jurisdiction, both their regulations and the legislation constituting the 
inspectorates, free from judicial supervision and review through appellate or 
prerogative writ proceedings.9U Moreover, these officials, along with their 
counterparts in the new regulatory commissions: 
... drafted statutes which parliament enacted ... interpreted legislation ... adumbrated 
it in advice, rulings, and bulletins; above all, they secured, through [their] fonnal and 
infonnal activities ... adherence to law's purposes and policies.915 
These new administrative agencies generated an alternative modem centralised legal 
system, with its own type of law, unique legislative and adjudicative techniques, and 
its own legal values.986 Importantly, these developments in administrative were not 
merely a flash in the pan. In the 1850s and 1860s, the factories and mines 
inspectorates, for instance, laid "the practical foundations of modem administration 
and social policy", a "new administrative technology" which was subsequently 
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through modern forms of self-government under the 'rule of law' to British colonies 
in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.917 
Arthurs' account is invaluable in telling the story of the English experience. 
However, it also serves as a case study illustrating the conditions in which new and 
modern administrative-types of centralist law .appeared in the Common Law world. 
Moreover, by clearly linking its development with new and expanding functions of 
modern government, the evidence elsewhere suggests that it is likely to be a 
representative study. In the United States, for instance, V!e know that administrative 
centralist-types of Jaw had their "birth in necessity" in early 19th century 
government, assuming their modem significance with the expansion of the powers of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission in the 1900s, "and the establishment of similar 
state agencies [which] made increasingly manifest the place of administrative 
agencies in enforcing legislative policies".981 In Australia, the expansion of modem 
administrative law occurred in the context of the growing functions of the state 
capitalism colonial governments in the 1880s and 1890s. Indeed, throughout the late 
I 9th century and early 20th century Anglo-American world "the increased functions 
of government (and] the ... tremendous growth in administrative agencies" and their 
"extensive investigative, rulemaking, and adjudicating powers represented a [new 
and] provocative fusion of different powers of govemment.•'919 
Tiie C/1a11ged Politics oft/1e Emergi11g, Ce11tral Legal Domai11 
In both the Common Law and Civil Law societies, as we indicated above, legal 
modernisation saw Western centralist-types of law and their institutions achieve their 
modem pre-eminence and pre-dominance.990 It was, moreover, inextricably linked 
with social transformation.991 The developing political economy of modern 
capitalism, and its social reforms, industrialisation and new business cultures, 
organisations and transactions, demanded new legal technologies, solutions and 
options. These developments generated a new degree of flux and fluidity throughout 
the diverse components of the emerging modem Western legal domain. In England, 
for instance, new legal types of commercial regulation and dispute resolution 
developed and "flourished" in the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s.992 In the Common Law 
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world, however, there were two distinctive new developments, both in the politics of 
modem centralist law. 
The first was within the central component of its emerging modem legal domain. 
Administrative law introduced a competitive dimension to the 'internal' politics of 
centralist law in the Common Law societies. By the 1850s, it had established the 
basis of an alternative central legal system with the capacity to provide new modes of 
national legal regulation. This legal system and its administrative-type of law had 
the potential to replace or change the role and status of the existing types of Anglo-
American centralist law - its legislative and judicial-types of law. In the case of the 
former, these 'threats' were only nominal. By the 1850s, the power and authority of 
legislatures and legislators to dominate or control administrative law and its agencies 
was already constitutionally inviolable. In the United States, this was profoundly so. 
In the case of judicial-types of law, however, the situation was different. Throughout 
legal modernisation, the courts, judges and the lawyer-administered parts of the 
Common Law legal systems were deeply entrenched - and irrevocably implicated -
social institutions. We cannot credibly claim - and it would fly in the face of history 
to do so - that the existence of these institutions and their law was seriously 
imperilled by administrative law. The courts, the judges and the lawyers were 
destined to - and in the United States had already - become the major public face of 
the modem Anglo-American legal systems. However, their transition to this ultimate 
modem role was not automatic, or without the need for precautionary responses to 
maintain social relevance and hegemony. In both England and the United States, the 
early decades of the 19th century were a period of vigorous adaptation of the 
institutions, ideology, processes and content of judicial law to accommodate the 
changing needs of developing capitalist societies.993 Although, as we have indicated 
above, the different modem legal origins of the United States meant that these 
adaptations were far less institutional in character than in England.99.1 
Administrative law did, however, pose a potential threat to the status of judicial-
types of law and legal ideology. In particular, it threatened the power and function 
of the courts, judges and lawyers in the legal regulation of modem Anglo-American 
society. The contemporary English experience is one illustration. Whilst by the 
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1850s, administrative law, its legal system and agents has suffered some setbacks -
with, for instance, the lawyers "[shunting] railway regulation into Common Pleas in 
1854, [demolishing] the privative clause of the Railway and Canal Commission in 
1873, and ultimately [harassing] that body into a state of virtual paralysis":99' 
... [g]radually, and for the most part unnoticed, [the central administration was] 
gaining judicial powers as well as legislative powers, thus laying the basis of the 
modem administrative state, with its characteristic and wholly necessary extension of 
wide discretionary powers'. 996 
It was, furthermore, perceived by the judges and lawyers - at least in England - to be 
a real threat, with Dicey's warnings in the 1880s followed by the call to the judicial 
arms issued by Lord Hewart in the 1920s - the spectre of the "new despotism". 997 
Moreover, as we record below, this perception proved to have a real foundation, as 
the subsequent experience of Anglo-American government in the 20th century was 
to demonstrate, particularly in England and the British Commonwealth welfare 
states. 
The appearance of administrative law also changed the 'external' politics of the 
central legal domain. Its alternative legal systems and modes of administration 
introduced a new 'choice' factor. The modernising, mid-19th century societies of the 
Common Law countries were presented with new options for legal regulation. Of 
course, it is once again inconceivable that its governments and legislators would 
have - or could have - 'chosen' to replace judicial-types of law, its courts and legal 
system. Nevertheless, the presence of administrative law provided them with an 
alternative, especially in the field of managing the growing social functions of the 
modern Anglo-American state. It was an alternative, moreover, which the law-
makers 'chose' to exercise. As foreshadowed above, by the 1920s in England and in 
its modern Western dominions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, 
administrative law, its institutions and modes of regulation had become: 
... the means of providing services for the greater part of its subjects - not only 
services like the armed forces or the police ... but social services such as education, 
public health, housing, medical attendance, [various types of social insurance] ... gas, 
water and electricity ... and regulatory services which control the development of land 
and the road transport industry.991 
Even in the United States, where early 20th federal governments concentrated "on 
protective measures (such as anti-trust legislation designed to restore a system of 
competitive enterprise)": 
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... numerous economic enterprises [were) publicly owned and controlled, either 
directly by the federal or State governments or by independent public authorities such 
as the TeMessee Valley Authority."999 
Furthermore, modem governments in the Common Law world persisted in these 
'choices'. The size of its administrative legal systems continued to grow, especially 
in the post-war period, when it formed a vital part of the legal fabric of the welfare 
state. Moreover, the administration of its modem legal systems provided a fertile 
breeding ground for administrative centralism, the ideology behind administrative 
law and its regulatory modes. Administrative centralism prospered, initially through 
the embrace of the new discipline of 'public administration', and later as the "growth 
of administrative tasks" spawned "a vast new complex of relations between public 
authority and the citizen". 'oro The "steady extension of state control and planning 
activities" in the welfare state increased the influence of administrative law and its 
ideologies in the politics of the central legal domain in the 20th century Common 
Law world. 
Tiie Grand Alliance of '!rlodern A11glo-American Law' 
The third distinguishing feature of legal modernisation in the Common Law world 
was also evident in the politics of its centralist law. Legal modernisation saw the 
negotiation of a new political alliance between the state, the judges and the couns, 
the organised legal profession and lawyers. This was the liberal legal centralist 
alliance, which was to prove to be the grand alliance of 'law• in the modem Anglo-
American world. The alliance was a political compact or 'bargain' struck between 
.the parties, in which the social construction of law and the administration of civil and 
criminal justice were its governing concerns. It resulted, on the one pan, in 
governments and legislatures in the modernising Anglo-American societies 
acquiescing in the social projection of legalism and its ideals through the ideological 
'engines' of their new modem legal systems. Legalism had emerged during legal 
modernisation as a powerful ideology of law originally serving to give coherence to 
the disparate social fields occupied by the legal profession and its lawyers. 1001 As 
Arthurs describes, by reference to the English experience: 
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. . . legalism - the notion of law as ideology - performed this function. Victorian 
lawyers seem generally to have had a relatively fixed notion of law as a fonnal 
system, a conception that such a system ought to work in its familiar mode (albeit with 
greater efficiency), and the conviction that the functioning of the formal system was 
indispensable to national purposes. The ideology of legalism had adjectival rather 
than substantive content. Its impact therefore was greatest in defining lawyers' 
attitudes toward the legal system as such, toward the relationship of laymen and other 
actors to the system, and toward state action affecting the system. When this powerful 
social field, energised by its ideology, projected it indigenous law, it was able to 
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influence the Jaw of other social fields, and even the law of the state, especially in 
adjectival matters. 1002 
Legalism, and its description of an ideal, modem judicially-administered system of 
civil and criminal justice, in which the superior courts and their judges played the 
central role in superintending state legal regulation, was adopted by the state ... For 
their part of the 'bargain', the judges, the legal profession and the lawyers aligned 
their worldview of law-legalism - with the political interests of governments and 
legislatures in the emerging modem state. The quid pro quo was that the latter 
'delegated' the function of administering civil and criminal justice to the courts and 
the judges, and regulation and provision of lawyer services to the organised legal 
profession and the lawyers. 
For the immediate purpose, the existence and content of the liberal legal centralist 
alliance needs no defence or further explanation. The subsequent history of the 
administration of the modem legal systems in the Common Law world provides 
ample evidence of the existence of the special relationship it created between the 
state and the legal profession - and its judges and lawyers - in the administration of 
justice, legal services and the market for lawyer services. Moreover, it is abundantly 
clear that the "paradigm of law ... identified as 'legal centralism';' emerged from 
within the machinations of the alliance. 1003 This paradigm was the basis of the social 
construction of 'law' in modern Anglo-American society, as Arthurs' description 
reveals: 
... the central assumption, the crucial structure that dominates the way most lawyers, 
judges, law professors - even most people - think about law is this: law is formal; it 
exists as a thing apart from society, politics or economics; law has the capacity to 
achieve, and does achieve, results by encouraging and discouraging behaviour, by 
attaching specified consequences to behaviour that facilitate it, deter it or undo its 
harmful effects; law is made and administered by the state; and access to law is 
provided in courts by legal professionals - lawyers and judges - who invoke a body of 
authoritative learning in order to argue and decide cases.•~ 
For other purposes, however, it is necessary and important to momentarily dwell on 
the 'proof of the origins of the aJiiance and its essentially political character. It was, 
after all, the grand alliance of' Anglo-American law' in the 20th century Western 
world. Conseq ucntly, its origins and character form an important part of the 
background to the post-war experience of legal aid, which we revisit in Chapter 
Seven. Moreover, the Australian version of the alliance plays a central part in 
unravelling the implications of the post-war experience in the context of the response 
of its welfare state to the social 'problems' in 'access to justice' in the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s. This task is the subject-matter of both Chapter Eight and of the 
conclusion to the thesis. 
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The grand alliance of 'modern Anglo-American law' was not an accident of history. 
As Arthurs reminds us, "[l]egal institutions and ideas do not simply emerge, evolve, 
reshape themselves, deteriorate, or disappear of their own accord."1005 However, 
there is little, if any, primary or ~direct' evidence of 'how' or 'when• the alliance first 
emerged. Nevertheless, the appearance of administrative law and the changed 
politics of the central legal domain discussed above provides some powerful 
'circumstantial' evidence. This contemporary evidence goes to both the origins of 
the liberal legal centralist alliance, and its essential character. 
In the first place, during the legal modernisation the legal profession did not only 
actively participate in the shaping of the modem processes and doctrines of the 
courts. Its members were also active participants in the administration of the 
modernising Common Law societies. In England, the legal profession occupied "key 
positions" in mid-19th century social administration, where its judges, as Arthurs 
describes: 1006 
... pronounced authoritatively upon the meaning of statutes, instructed local justices 
and administrative officials in the proper performance of their duties, and influenced 
the direction of legal change by speaking writing, and serving on committees or as 
members of the House of Lords. 1007 
Similarly, English lawyers were active "everywhere [helping] to shape basic public 
policies, to translate these into legislative form and ultimately practical reality, and to 
resist both enactment and implementation of policies" .1008 In the United States, a 
comparable situation - in a different social context - obtained before !he 1860s, as 
Howe observes: 
The legislative responsibility of lawyers and judges for establishing a rule of law was 
far more apparent than it was in later years. It was a clear to laymen as it was to 
lawyers that the nature of American institutions, whether economic, social, or 
political, was largely to be determined by the judges.1()0i) 
In helping to configure modem Anglo-American society, the judges and the lawyers 
were not only concerned with short-term advantages for the courts and legal 
profession, or personal self-interest. They were also proselytisers of legalism and its 
modem ideology of centralist law. The legal profession deployed legalism and its 
social ideals when they confronted the ideological modes, institutions and actors of 
administrative law in the modem competitive politics of the central legal domain. 
By the 1870s, the English legal profession had succeed in both propounding its 
version of modem centralist law, and effectively policing its social paradigms: 
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... for example, by disparaging overt attempts to depart from the formal model as 
'unconstitutional,• by treating departures as a ground for judi~ial review that 
delegitimated the offending social technique, any by seeking to ensuu:: that those who 
participated in law as a social technique were either themselves lawyers or under the 
close control of legal advisers. Familiar episodes epitomize each tactic: arbitrators 
were denounced for their tendency to deciqc; cases in derogation of 'law'; the factory 
inspectors and the Railway Commission were harassed in judicial review proceedings; 
and the courts of requests were manoeuvred first into the control of legal assessors and 
then out of the hands oflay judges altogether." 1010 
.. 
By the time legal modernisation was complete in the 1880s, English administrative 
law and its regulatory modes had been 'de-legitimated'. Its law of administration 
converted by the judges and lawyers - with the sanction of the state - into 'public 
administration', thereafter subjugated to the supervision and control of the courts 
through the 'administrative law' of judicial review. A comparable outcome -
although in a less dramatic or contested context - resulted in the United States, where 
its judges and lawyers similarly relegated the role of administrative agencies and 
their law to "a mere transmission belt for implementing legislative directives in 
particular cases. " 1011 This was an activity in which, as in the modem British 
Common Law world, they were at least notionally to be supervised through "a 
coherent set of principles" developed and policed by the courts. 1012 
The second source of contemporary 'circumstantial' evidence lies in the reaction of 
the state to •delegitimation'. In failing to intervene to 'protect' the social standing of 
administrative iaw, governments and legislators made a 'choice' - a negative type of 
public policy decision. They acquiesced in both the relegation of administrative law 
to 'public administration' and in the superintendence of the courts and the legal 
profession in managing administration. The 'choice' made by the state is consistent 
with it having reached a modus operandi with the latter with respect to the future 
social pre-eminence of judicial-types of law and regulation and to the functions of 
judges and lawyers in the legal regulation of modern Anglo-American society. This 
new operational accord is significant 'inferential' evidence of the existence of the 
liberal legal centralist alliance. 
On the other hand, state acquiescence in the • delegitimation' of administrative law 
seems contradictory. Modem governments and legislators continued to endorse its 
institutions and regulatory modes as administrative instruments in the many 
important arenas of public administration outside the civil and criminal justice 
systems. Administrative law remained an essential part of the modern Anglo-
American legal systems, as we have described above. However, state acquiescence 
in 'delegitimating' administrative law, whilst persisting in using it for administrative 
purposes, is only contradictory from the liberal centralist perspective. It is only 
liberal legalism - and 'modem Anglo-American law' itself - which pretends that the 
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state is obliged to remain loyal to the one type of modern law. In reality, the 
'appetite' of the modern state for law, and, for that matter, whether it 'chooses' to act 
with any type of law, is fundamentally pragmatic and catholic, and driven by 
political expediency. Moreover, the acquiescence of the state in 'delegitimating' 
administrative law is only contradictory if we overlook 'its dual ·interests in legal 
regulation. One of these interests is the administration of society and its economy. 
Modern governments and legislators in Anglo-American society have pursued this 
state interest via its three types of centralist law - administrative, judicial and 
legislative - and their different modes of social regulation. The other administrative 
interest of the state is the use of legal regulation for the purposes of governing 
modern society. If we consider its 'decision' to acquiesce in the 'delegitimation' of 
administrative law in this context we can identify other aspects of the contemporary 
'circumstantial' evidence which go to support the presence of the liberal legal 
centralist alliance. 
For several reasons, the medium of governance offered by the courts, judges and 
lawyers was inherently more attractive to modernising states in the Common Law 
world. As elsewhere, the final phases of legal modernisation coincided with 
embryonic demands for greater state intervention in modem social governance, from 
a variety of sources. The mid-19th century Anglo-American states, however, were 
unwilling to shoulder responsibility for the expansion of public functions required. 
Moreover, even if their liberal capitalist governments had been fiscally equipped and 
competent, the contemporary political climate was against intervention on the social 
scale required. As Cappelletti pointed out, in a related context, "it required 
affirmative state action that contemporary political thought regarded with 
hostility". 1'> 13 Thus, the delegations of responsibility and functions which the liberal 
legal centralist alliance entailed were consistent with the governmental philosophies 
of the modernising states in the Common Law world. It was cheaper to vest 
responsibility for the administration of civil and criminal justice in the modem legal 
system in the courts and judges, and to maintain a privatised market for lawyers' 
services in modem Anglo-American society. It was also consistent with its modem 
constitutional spirit of the separation of powers in capitalist societies where 
institutions and people operated under the mantle of the 'rule oflaw'. 
At least equally significant, however, were the attractions of legalism - the 
professional ideology of the judges and lawyers - to the state. Administrative law 
and its new modes of regulation had brought "specificity, predicability, unifonnity 
and rationality" to modem Anglo-American law.101" As the state and its agencies 
recognised, these virtues were ideally suited for social administration. However, 
they were far less appropriate for their new role in the government of modem Anglo-
American society. Legalism, in contrast, as Arthurs has described above, was an 
·•adjectival" social ideology. Its comprehensive, descriptive normative framework of 
an idealised system of justice offered the modernising Anglo-American states a 
desirable legal medium for modern social governance. This framework was ideal for 
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their perceived, self·restricted governmental 'needs', yet retained a sufficient 
approximation of the everyday reality of civil and criminal justice to impress the 
populace. Its nonnative content, moreover, emphasised the importance of personal 
rights, enforceable in the courts by the judges with the aid of lawyers on an 
individual basis. Whilst these paradigms were derived from the modern law of 
property in its many and various fonns and from the crimin~I law, they projected 
images of law and dispute resolution which were readily adaptable to the 
individualist ethos of modem liberal political ideals and citizenship. Furthennore, 
legalism was aspirational and national in conception. It had the additional attraction 
for the state that it carried with it the zeal of its designers, and their modem 
conviction that "things ought to be done according to 'law, in the fonnal sense, as it 
was understood by lawyers ... (albeit with greater efficiency), and ... that the 
functioning of the formal system was indispensable to national purposes'' .10" 
Legalism was, therefore, an irresistible enticement to the state to establish its grand 
modem alliance with the legal profession, and its judges and lawyers. 
The Transition of the Norms of the Poor Persons Institutions 
In several important respects, the links between the social construction of 'modern 
law' and the 'replacement' of the nonns of the poor persons institutions in their 
transition into 'legal aid' were similar across the Western world. Everywhere, the 
'ideological engines' of its modem legal systems transfonned the social function of 
the nonnative dimensions of the 'legal' institutions from which they 'engineered' the 
social construction of 'modern Western law'. In the case of the Civil Law world, as 
we have seen above, its constituent 'modern legal institutions' were modelled upon 
those of its existing administrative.type of centralist law and regulatory machinery. 
In the case of the Common Law world, it was the courts and judicial·type law which 
provided the basis of the modern social construction of' law'. In both legal worlds, 
however, the outcome of this modem functional transformation was the same. The 
normative dimensions of the constituent 'modern legal institutions' now functioned 
as national paradigms of idealised systems of law and legal regulation in the modern 
societies of the Western world. 
\Vithin these idealised systems of law and legal regulation, the normative dimension 
of the poor persons institutions now served a new and different social functio~. The 
new Western social constructions of 'law', based as they were upon extant or real 
legal systems and institutions, incorporated institutionalised provision of legal 
assistance for the 'poor'. These were modelled· in the case of the Civil Law world -
upon its poor persons legal assistance institutions and - in the Common Law world -
upon its in form a pauperis procedures. The normative dimension of the poor persons 
institutions functioned to define, constitute and describe the institutional paradigms 
of legal assistance within the 'law' being newly 'engineered' by the modern legal 
systems. Thus, 'legal assistance institutions' for the 'poor' became part of the social 
construction of 'modern law' in both the Civil Law and Common Law worlds. 
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The result also changed the nonnative content or 'constitution' of the modem poor 
persons institutions. Their 'original' charitable ideals were 'replaced' by the nonns 
of the new 'legal assistance institutions', i.e., the norms which constituted the 
idealised poor persons institutions with 'modem Western law'. The re-constitution 
of the norms of the modern poor persons institutions was not discernible 
superficially. Initially, the nonns of the new 'legal assistance institutions' remained 
configured around charitable ideals and functions similar in design to those of the 
poor persons institutions. However, their actual content had changed, being 
'replaced' by the ideals of the 'legal assistance institutions' of 'modem Western 
law', which _-·for the moment - were themselves dertned by reference to charitable 
ideals and functions. In this respect also, the experience in the Civil Law and 
Common Law world was similar. 
It was also similar in the case of the transition of the 'legal assistance institutions' 
and their normative content into modem 'legal aid'. In both the Civil Law and 
Common Law world, the development of 'modem law' and its 'institutions' did not 
end with the first products of the 'ideological' engines of the modem legal systems. 
In the late· 19th and early 20th century, the social constructions of 'modem Western 
law' - like their 'concrete' or machinery counterparts - continued to undergo further 
development. The 'legal assistance institutions' were not immune from these 
processes. Gradually, their ideological links with the poor persons institutions were 
broken down. The 'legal assistance institutions' of 'modem law' ceased to be 
constituted or defined solely by reference to the 'poor' and gradually assumed new 
'functions' towards the poorer citizens of Western society. Charity was displaced as 
their central norm and replaced by the disparate collection of socio-legal ideals we 
associate with modem 'legal aid'. These particular legal developments occurred 
because the original institutional paradigms of legal assistance in 'modem law' were 
no longer adequate for the changing social circumstances of state legal regulation in 
modem Western society. The original charitable design of the norms of its 'legal 
assistance institutions' had also become inadequate. 
The events behind this 'redevelopment' of the 'legal assistance institutions' were 
similar to those influencing the transition of the 'concrete' or machinery dimensions 
of the poor persons institutions. Earlier, we attributed this transition into the 
machinery of legal aid in the 20th century Western legal system to three major causal 
factors: one, the transformative social forces chronicled by Abel; two, the growth in 
modem conceptions of citizenship; and, three, the growing influence of 'modern 
Western law'. 1016 In the current context, the pressures on the state generated by the 
first two factors prompted the 'operators' of its 'ideological engines' to modify the 
construction of 'law' to meet changing social and economic expectations. The 
influence of the third factor, i.e., the growing influence of 'modem law' itself, was 
expressed through its role shaping popular expectations of the state, its legal system 
and its governmental 'responsibilities'. These expectations were 'felt' by the state 
through the politics of social and economic change, and acted as a further prompt to 
its 'legal engineers'. To an extent, however, the politics of Western society itself 
1016 Above at pp 169-174. 
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was also now beginning to shape, modify and adapt the first 'designs' of the modem 
social construction which was 'law', and the role and content of its 'institutions'. It 
was these developments which accounted for the transition of the normative or 
'ideal' dimensions of its modem poor persons institutions into 'legal aid'. 
Comparing the Origins and Social Functions of Legal Aid. 
As we have explained at some length, modern legal aid in Western society originated 
in the functional transformation of the poor persons legal assistance institutions when 
they were incorporated into its modem legal systems. By the early 20th century, it 
had assumed its familiar bifidial fonn as we knew it in the post-war period. One 
branch of legal aid was its 'concrete' or machinery dimensions in the legal systems 
of the modem Western or Westernised societies. The other branch was its normative 
or 'ideal' dimensions in the ideological construction which was 'law' in the modem 
Western world. This bifidial social institution was highly comparable in the Civil 
Law and Common Law worlds, as were the origins, role and functions of its modem 
progenitors in the legal systems and 'law' of Western society itself. This 
comparability did not disappear in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s in the lead-up to the 
post-war experience. Indeed, the comparability of modem legal aid was reinforced 
through the growing similarity in state legal regulation in the increasingly congruent 
welfare capitalist economies of the Western world. Thus, when the post-war period 
began, its role and function in the Civil Law and Common law societies had a great 
deal in common. This fact accounts for the coherence of the explanatory literature, 
the claims of some of its contributors to present 'universal' explanations and its 
significance as an historical resource. There was, however, one important difference 
in the modem institution of legal aid in the Civil Law and Common Law societies, 
which must be explained before revisiting the origins and significance of the post-
war experience. 
The Difference benveen the Civil Lalv and Common Law Societies 
The important difference was in the character and social function of 'legal aid', i.e., 
its normative or 'ideal' dimensions in 'modem law', in the mid-century Civil Law 
and Common Law world. This difference originated in the different bases of the 
social construction of their 'modem Western law', which was described above. 
Tlze Character and Social F1mctions of 'Legal Aid' in tile Civil Law World 
In the Civil Law world, its 'modem law' had been 'engineered' by the state, using 
the law and institutions of its modem legal system as the 'template'. In this respect, 
its social construction of 'law' differed from the Common Law world, where the 
'template' was supplied through the liberal legal centralist alliance. The Civil Law 
states, moreover, were not constrained by an alliance with the judges and lawyers in 
either designing 'modem law', or in deploying their administrative-types of modem 
legal system, and in defining its functions. These differences resulted in two 
distinctive features of the social construction of 'modem law' in the Civil Law 
world. First, the fonn or type of its 'institutions' were highly correspondent with the 
administrative reality of the legal machinery of its modern states. Secondly, the 
'production' or 'projection' of 'modem law' in the legal systems of the Civil Law 
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world was primarily an incident of the expanded administrative and governmental 
functions of the modem state. The Civil Law states remained more closely and 
directly identified with the control of social administration than in the Common Law 
world, where the liberal legal centralist alliance and its 'law' provided a convenient 
'blind'. 
The distinctive basis of the construction of 'modem law' in the Civil Law world had 
implications for the social character of 'legal aid', i.e., for how it was 'built' or 
'constructed' in the 'law'. As a 'legal institution', 'legal aid' was designed by 
reference to the legal machinery of its modem states. Consequently, in the idealised 
'legal systems' of the Civil Law versions of 'modem Western law' 'legal aid' bore 
the hallmarks of the machinery of state legal assistance. It was 'built' or 
'constructed' as if it were an institution of the 'state', albeit in an idealised form. 
Thus, 'legal aid' in the 'law' of the Civil Law societies had an essentially state 
character, which performed the 'function' of providing assistance for the legal 
problems of their poorer citizens. 
The different construction of 'law' in the modem Civil Law world also had 
implications for the mid-century social role of 'legal aid'. The high degree of 
correspondence between its 'institutional' types and forms, and the structures of the 
modem Civil Law legal systems, combined to give 'law' a relatively low social 
profile. Its 'institutions' had a greater degree of social synonymy with the legal 
institutions of the modern state than was the case in the Common Law societies. In 
the Civil Law world, therefore, it was more difficult to distinguish between an 
expression of the legal ideology of the state and the social politics of its actions or 
interventions through its legal system. Neither was it socially significant for the state 
to pr<'mote this distinction, as it was unabashedly both 'engineer' and manager of the 
system of legal regulation. Thus, 'modem Western law' and its 'institutions' did not 
play the same role as mediums or intermediaries of government. In the Civil Law 
societies, 'legal aid', like other 'legal institutions', did not perform the function of a 
social 'institution' standing between the populace and the state. It was nowhere near 
as prominent as a socio-legal institution of 'modem law' as it was in the Common 
Law societies. 
Instead, citizens turned to an alternative medium to define their relationship with the 
modern state and its legal system. In the modern Civil Law societies, this 
relationship was expressed by reference to the social rights of citizens. These rights 
were defined in the 'face' of or against the state, and expressed the political 
expectations of its citizenry that it would provide the legal rights or material benefits 
necessary for social justice. In the Civil Law world, as elsewhere, as Cappelletti and 
Garth point out, by mid-century these 'expectations' had begun to include the 
assertion of a social 'right' of citizens' access to law. 1017 In the Civil Law societies, 
the 'institution' of 'legal aid' became identified with these expectations. Its idealised 
image of •state legal assistance machinery' became the vehicle or social medium 
1017 M Cappellcni &: B Garth. above n 2 at 7-9. 
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whereby citizens expected the state to take the "affirmative action ... necessary to 
ensure the enjoyment by all of' its modem legal system.1011 
Tlte C/1aracter and Social Function of 'Legal Aid' in t/1e Common Law World 
In comparison, the character and social function of the normative or 'ideal' 
dimensions of legal aid in the Common Law world were quite different. In its 
societies, the state - through its modem legaf system - was also the 'engineer' of 
'law', but it was not its 'architect' or 'designer'. In the Common Law world, as we 
have seen, the basis of the social construction of its 'modem Anglo-American law' 
was the liberal legal centralist alliance. The 'product' of this alliance was the legal 
centralism described by Arthurs above, with its idealised judicially-administered 
system of civil and criminal justice where the superior courts and their judges play a 
central role in superintending state legal regulation. However, as we have shown, 
this 'legal system', did not represent the regulatory reality of the modern Anglo-
American legal systems, in which administrative law and its institutions played a 
significant role. Thus, in contrast to the Civil Law world, the 'law' 'engineered' by 
the state did not enjoy the same degree of correspondence with its modern legal 
institutions. There was a significant degree of disjunction. In this context, and 
against the background of its alliance with the judges, legal profession and lawyers, 
when the modern state in the Common Law societies was 'producing' and 
'projecting' 'law', it was purposefully promoting ideology, as a conscious and 
deliberate adjunct to the performance of its administrative and governmental 
functions. Moreover, the content of 'modem Anglo-American law' - with its focus 
on the courts, judges and lawyers - permitted the state to 'disguise' the locus of 
control over social administration in a way which was unavailable to its counterparts 
in the modem Civil Law societies. 
As in those societies, the social construction of 'modern law' in the Common Law 
world had implications for how 'legal aid' was 'built' or 'constructed', i.e., for its 
social character. In the Anglo-American societies, 'legal aid' bore the hallmark, not 
of the legal machinery of the state, but of the liberal legal centralist alliance, and its 
idealised 'legal system'. Within that 'legal system', it was the legal assistance 
'institution', which was shaped in the mould of the in forma pauperis procedures, 
which was the traditional vehicle of legal assistance in civil and criminal proceedings 
in the superior courts. The principal 'operators' of those procedures - the poor 
persons institutions of the Common Law world - were the judges and practising 
lawyers. Thus, the 'institution' of legal aid in 'modem Anglo-American law' was 
not 'built' or 'constructed' as though it were an 'institution' of an idealised form of 
the 'state'. 'Legal aid' in the Common Law societies had the character of an 
institution of the 'courts', to be administered by the judges and lawyers. Moreover, 
its 'function' was not to provide assistance in association with the legal problems of 
poorer citizens, which was its emphasis in the Civil Law societies. In the Common 
Law world, the core 'function' of 'legal aid' was to provide legal representation for 
1018 Ibid at 8. 
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poorer litigants and accused in connection with judicial proceedings, especially in its 
superior civil and criminal courts. 
The different social construction of 'modem law' gave 'legal aid' a very different 
profile in the Common Law societies. The liberal legal centralist alliance, and the 
'engineering' of its legal ideals as a central medium of government - particularly in 
the United States - had given 'law' itself a high social profile in the Common Law 
world. 'Modern law' and its 'institutions' were far more socially prominent and 
socially significant in the Anglo-American societies than in the Civil Law world. In 
the I 940s, the commitment of its governments, courts, judges, organised legal 
profession and lawyers to their modem 'bargain' in the liberal legal centralist 
alliance was substantially intact. Moreover, its idealised court, judge and lawyer-
centred vision of 'legal system' had become entrenched and omnipresent throughout 
Anglo-American society in the decades since the Common Law states first began to 
'engineer' 'law' through their modern legal systems. The paradigms of legal 
centralism which Arthurs described above had: 1019 
... become part of the general culture. Law and lawyers, law and courts, law and 
legislation - these associations spring immediately to mind and are reflected in school 
texts, novels, newspaper editorials, and popular speech. 1020 
Thus, the 'existence' of 'modern law', its 'legal system' and 'institutions' had 
become domain assumptions of the modem Common Law societies. 1021 Their images 
of 'law' were so deeply and indelibly imbedded that its assumptions are rarely fully 
articulated, never appearing in "a pure or complete form" amongst its millions of 
disciples. 1021 In this context, it was 'law' - and not social rights - which was the core 
medium of the modern interface between the citizens and the state. In societies 
where - in reality - courts, judges and lawyers played a central role in the 
administration of justice and where - in ideality - courts and judicial-types of law 
were the dominant paradigms of the 'legal system', it was inevitable that the 
'institution' oflegal aid would enjoy a high profile. For in both the realpolitik of the 
machinery of its legal systems and ideological realms of 'law' in modem Anglo-
American society, courts, judges and lawyers performed a special and distinctive 
role. Thus, its 'institution' of 'legal aid' was not only more prominent than in the 
modem Civil Law world, it was also notably more socially significant. Moreover, its 
character as an 'institution' of the 'courts', administered by the judges and lawyers 
for the 'purpose' of providing lawyer representation in the courts, meant that 'legal 
1019 
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Above at pp 184. 
H W Arthurs, above n 882 at 4. 
.. Domain assumptions" is a sociological concept which describes implicit styles of 'thinking' which 
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A Hunt. The Sociological lvlo~·ement in law, (1978) at 141. 
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aid' was identified by the populace within the Common Law societies as an 
instrument to assert their 'rights' of modem citizenship, and express their demands 
against the state. To assert those rights, however, through the medium of the courts, 
and to express their demands through 'law', or their hopes of what it might become, 
in a way which was quite different to the experience of 'legal aid' in the modem 
Civil Law societies. 
Tlie Otlter F11nctions of 'Legal Aid' witliin tire Common Law World 
The different basis of its social construction of 'modern Western law' had other 
implication for the functions of 'legal aid' in the Common Law world . 'Legal aid', 
like the other 'institutions' of 'modem Anglo-American law', was a product of the 
liberal legal centralist alliance. As we have shown, this alliance constituted the 
seminal relationship between the state, the courts, judges, the organised legal 
profession and the lawyers in the modem Anglo-American world. However, the 
'bargain' reached by its parties did not establish a permanent, modern status quo. 
From its inception, the alliance was essentially a coalition of convenience, matching 
what was practicable in legal modernisation, the refonn of social administration and 
competing political demand for effective governance in modern capitalist society. 
Above all, it was a coalition of political interests, and the relationships amongst its 
members· and their 'collective' or 'corporate' relationship with the society 'outside' 
• required the constant "detennination of rights and the accommodation of interests" 
we find elsewhere in modern politics.10.._3 Thus, both the 'internal' relationship 
between the state and the courts, judges, the legal profession and lawyers, and the 
'external' relationship between the 'law' and the 'state' 'engineered' through its 
legal system and modem Anglo-American society itself, had a considerable degree 
of fluidity. In these contexts, the 'institution' of legal aid and its court, judge and 
lawyer focused ideals also played the role of a domain ideal - or essential, 
uncontested 'condition' - of the liberal legal centralist alliance. In this role, 'legal 
aid' served two related and complementary functions. 
In the first place, it functioned as a mediative ideal or norm. The liberal legal 
centralist alliance defined and regulated the 'boundaries' of the modem relationship 
between governments, courts, judges, the organised legal profession and lawyers in 
the administration of justice, legal services and the market for lawyers' services. 
However, neither the 'intemalities' of this relationship, nor the politico-economic 
interests of the parties to the alliance or the 'external' social demands upon 
governments or the legal profession were unchanging. Nor were the political 
interests of the modern Anglo-American state and its governments always 
necessarily aligned with the economic and ideological interests of the legal 
profession, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the parties to the alliance shared an 
overarching interest in maintaining the mutuality of their 'bargain', ensuring the 
integrity and survival of the alliance and the social efficacy of 'modem Anglo-
American law'. 'Inside' the alliance, therefore, 'legal aid' - and its 'institutional' 
apportionment of the functions of legal assistance to the courts and lawyers • 
IOZJ H J Morgenthau. Politics Among A'ations, 4th ed. ( 1967) at 411. 
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provided the mechanism to renegotiate responsibility for 'performing' those 
functions, as new 'external' social pressures on the parties emerged. In this 
'internal' mediative role, 'legal aid' also served as a forum to negotiate the ongoing 
tenns and conditions of the 'delegation' of the administration of civil and criminal 
justice to the courts and the legal profession, and any changes to the role of lawyers 
in legal services delivery and in the market for lawyers' services. 
Secondly, 'legal aid' also performed the function of 'external' legitimation. As we 
have described, one objective of the liberal legal centralist alliance was the social 
construction of 'law' and its continued efficacy as the hegemonic type of legitimate 
ordering in modem Anglo-American society. The social functions reposed in 'legal 
aid' made it an ideal candidate as a legitimating ideal, in circumstances when either 
the basis of the social construction of 'law', i.e., the 'corporate' or 'collective' 
interests of the parties to the alliance, or its regulatory hegemony were threatened. 
As Abel tells us, "social scientists frequently attribute the existence of institutions to 
the need for legitimation" when "they fail to fulfil their declared purposes". 1024 In the 
case of legal aid schemes, he convincingly demonstrates that the arguments adduced 
to verify legal aid as social legitimation ultimately rest "on the patronizing 
assumption that the poor are somehow fooled by legal aid."1025 However, the 
'external' legitimating function performed by 'legal aid' for the purposes of the 
alliance was not the legitimation of the legal system. In 'projecting' or 'promoting' 
its ideals into the society, governments and the legal profession were not primarily 
seeking to legitimate the "state", its "welfare apparatus", "the legal profession, social 
inequality [or] capitalism."1026 Although, inevitably, to some extent this was a side-
effect. They were instead deploying 'legal aid' as a political 'weapon' or 'tool' in 
defending, protecting or reinforcing the alliance against 'external' threats, namely 
changes in modern Anglo-American society - or 'within' its modem legal domain -
which threatened or impinged upon the 'corporate' or 'collective' interests of the 
parties to the alliance, and its 'modem Anglo-American law'. Nor is it contended 
that this 'legitimation' was necessarily effective or convinced the populace of the 
virtues of the alliance or its 'law'. Nevertheless, 'external' legitimation was the 
other function of 'legal aid' within the liberal legal centralist alliance. 
Conclusion 
In reconsidering the theory of legal aid, this chapter has demonstrated an alternative 
explanation of the origins of modem legal aid. Its institutions in post-war society, 
like the other legal institutions of the modem state, originated in the establishment of 
the modem Western legal systems. These 'concrete' or machinery dimensions of 
modern legal aid 'evolved' in response to the demands made of the modem state in 
the 20th century to increase its participation in social governance, providing material 
fonns of social justice and acknowledgment of the 'rights' of social citizenship. The 
1024 
1025 
1026 
R L Abe,, above n 2 at 601. 
Ibid at 60.i, 601-606. 
Ibid at 601. 
196 
legal development of the 'ideal' or normative dimensions of modem legal aid 
displayed a similar evolutionary pattern across the 20th century Western world. 
However, as we have demonstrated above, the different basis of the social 
construction of 'modem Western law' in the modem Civil Law and Common Law 
legal systems had implications for the character and social functions of 'legal aid'. 
In the former, the 'institution' of 'legal aid' developed, and was perceived with the 
Civil Law societies, as a social 'right' to expect affirmative state intervention to 
facilitate the resolution of citizens' legal problems. Whereas in the modem Common 
Law societies, 'legal aid' developed as the socio-legal 'institution' which charged 
governments and the legal profession with the responsibility for ensuring citizens' 
access to the courts for the purposes of defending or protecting their legal rights, and 
pursuing their expectations of 'modem Anglo-American law' and its 'legal system'. 
In explaining the modern origins of legal aid, its bifidial identity and different 
character and functions in modern Western society we have only partially answered 
the question which defined the objectives of this chapter. The explanatory 'gap' in 
the Australian experience which limits our ability to explain the origins of the 
national scheme, and its significance in post-war society is yet to be fully remedied. 
We have, however, made considerable progress. The chapter has not only presented 
alternative explanations of the political dimensions of modern legal aid. Its 
redesigned analytical framework also provides us with an alternative model to 
investigate legal phenomena or developments in modem Western law and society. 
Thus, armed with both these new and - potentially - insightful explanatory 'tools' we 
are now in a position to commence the process of revisiting the origins and 
significance of the post-war experience oflegal aid. 
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Chapter Seven 
Revisiting the Experience· 
The argument we have just quoted from adds a further dimension to the discussion, 
namely .by recognizing that any gesture towards helping the poor ends by helping 
law much more, by increasing its domination-legitimacy, though making it - law -
'accessible'. Any extension of the legal franchise, via the device of the duty 
solicitor or the law centre, ultimately strengthens the hand (and pocket) of 
lawyers". 
Z Bankowski & G Mungham, Images of Law, (London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1976) at 77 
Introduction 
This chapter pursues the three objectives of Part II by revisiting the origins and 
significance of post-war legal aid in the light of the t;xplanatory insights and 'tools' 
developed in Chapter Six. It begins by clarifying the meaning of the "post-war 
experience of legal aid" as a preliminary step in reconsidering its origins and 
significance. The opening contention of this chapter is that this "experience of legal 
aid" had dual aspects. On the one hand, it was constituted by the appearance of new 
legal aid schemes in a number of welfare capitalist countries. On the other hand, 
"'the post-war experience" was an ideological phenomenon, which saw the 'legal aid' 
ideals of 'modem Anglo-American law' assume a new social prominence in the 
Western world. 
From these premises, the chapter proceeds to revisit the post-war experience. Its 
investigation is organised around the two questions implicit in its dual character: one, 
what were the origins and significance of the post-war schemes; and, two, what were 
the origins and significance of the social prominence of Anglo-American 'legal aid' 
in the Western world? To facilitate the investigation, these questions are divided into 
two component parts. Thus, the chapter proceeds, first of all, to revisit the origins of 
the post-war schemes, together with the origins of the new prominence of Anglo-
American 'legal aid', both in the Anglo-American welfare states and in other parts of 
post-war Western society. The chapter then investigates the significance of these 
two different parts of "the post-war experience of legal aid", once again in the case 
of the Anglo-American 'legal aid' ideals, both 'inside' and 'outside' the post-war 
Anglo-American world. 
An earlier version of this chapter was included In a draft paper "The Post· War Experience of Legal Aid 
Revisited" presented at the BieMial Meeting of the Working Group on Comparative Legal Professions. 
International Sociological Association Research Committee on the Sociology of law, Onati. Spain. 13-15 
July 1998. 
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The chapter concludes by considering the major implications of the analysis it 
contains, and what these implications mean for the objectives set at the beginning of 
Chapter Six. 
The "Post-War Experience of Legal Aid" 
The nature or character of "the post-war experience of legal aid" must be clarified 
before we can usefully address its origins and significance. Obviously, 'the post-war 
experience' was partly constituted by the series of national developments we 
identified in Chapter One. Beginning with Britain in 1949, and continuing in the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s with Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, 
Sweden, The Netherlands and the United States, a number of welfare capitalist 
societies reconstructed the administration of legal aid.1027 In Australia, as we saw in 
Chapters Four and Five, 'the post-war experience' was constituted by 1976 national 
scheme, and by the changes in Federal policy and Commonwealth administration 
since 1973.102' The fonnative events in other countries have been described in the 
explanatory literature, especially in Abel's 1985 article and Zemans' edited 
collection. 1029 
However, the 'post-war experience' was not only another development in the 
machinery or 'concrete' dimensions of legal aid in the countries of the weJfare 
capitalist world. 1030 It was also a social phenomenon of the Western world and of 
other countries within its politico-economic thrall. Scholars and lawyers who remain 
interested in the administration, politics or theory of popular access to 'law' in 
contemporary Western society look back to the 1960s and 1970s as an especially 
significant period. 1031 These decades - the highpoint in the 'post-war experience of 
legal aid' - were a time when in the United State.s and in many other societies in the 
Western world modem legal aid was perceived to be "guided by a [new] sense of 
mission of purpose". 1032 
\Ve can illustrate the 'special' character of developments in legal aid in this period by 
again referring to the explanatory literature. Chapter Six showed that one of the 
functions of the literature was t,J define and constitute the 'post-war experience of 
legal aid' as a series of interconnected and unprecedented developments in its signifi-
1027 
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n 844, cunently in press. 
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cance in modem Western society. 1033 In this respect, there was unanimity amongst all 
the contributors. In the case of both Abel and Cappelletti, the novelty and 
significance of the post-war developments in legal aid were an overt assumption, 
central to their investigations and hypotheses. In Cappelletti's case, their 
phenomenal dimensions underpin his metaphor of the post-war schemes signalling a 
"first wave" of fresh Western responses to the problem of social inequality in access 
to law.1034 For other contributors, like Blankenburg, Cousins, Paterson and Nelken, 
Regan, and even Alcock, the special character of the 'post-war experience' was 
implicit, but equally significant in the attention they paid to the new developments in 
legal aid in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. 103' 
The significance of the literature in demonstrating the presence of a phenomenal 
dimension to the 'post-war experience' goes beyond its content. The very existence 
of an identifiable, discrete and voluminous literature of legal aid written in - or else 
referring to - the 1960s and 1970s shows that governments, administrators, legal 
scholars, lawyers and others perceived something new and different to be happening, 
or to have occurred. Thus, the literature both recorded, and was itself part of the 
'post-war experience of legal aid'. Furthermore, its "extensive case studies of 
particular legal aid offices, histories and surveys of national legal aid programs, and 
comparative and theoretical reflections" were unprecedented. 1036 The literature 
could, moreover, "fill an entire library section" and was quite disproportionate 111 
scale to the significance of the 'concrete' dimensions of post-war legal aid, namely 
the actual changes to it organisation, funding and administration in the participant 
Western countries.1037 These changes were, in any event, relatively insignificant in 
the global context of post-war society .1011 Nevertheless, legal aid achieved a new and 
unprecedented prominence throughout the Western world, even though the "actual 
events" which constitute our standard conception of its 'post-war experience' were 
"limited to a few countries in northern Europe, North America and the 
Commonwealth countries. "1039 
The phenomenon of the 'post-war experience' also displayed a particular ideological 
character. The fact that the post-war developments in legal aid in the participant 
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Western countries possessed ideological dimensions comes as no surprise. The 
'ideal' or nonnative dimensions of modern legal aid continued to fonn part of post-
war Western society. Thus, we could anticipate that the changes to its machinery or 
'concrete' dimensions would be reflected in the ideological realm. Moreover, 
governments in the participant countries continued to operate through their modern 
Western legal systems in the increasingly congruent social climate of the post-war 
welfare capitalist world. Therefore, we might expect the presence of these 
comparable features to be mirrored in the ideological dimensions of post-war 
developments. And this is, indeed, what Denti found in I 979 in his overview of 
international developments in legal aid: 
The picture emerging from a study of the evolution of legal assistance in the 
contemporary world is highly differentiated and reflects the political positions of 
diverse societies. The reforms carried out in capitalist societies show basically 
homogeneous trends, since they all move from the assumption, derived from liberal 
ideology, that de facto inequality of access to justice is principally due to the lack of 
adequate legal assistance. Reforms thus· aimed at improving the existence assistance 
systems and extending their benefits not only to the poor, but to the lowP.r micldle 
class, for whom the cost of legal assistance remains too high. 1o.io 
Furthermore, we would expect to find a similar comparability in the origins of the 
post-war changes in 'legal aid' in the participant countries, after taking into account 
its different character and social functions in the Civil Law and Common Law 
societies.1041 If this were our concern, we could explain these changes by reference 
to similar modem explanatory matrices as evident in the transition of the poor 
persons institutions above, and the origins of the post-war legal aid schemes below, 
i.e., social transformation, developments in social citizenship, the significance of 
'modern law' and public policy in the welfare state.1042 However, the national 
developments in post-war legal aid were not synonymous with 'the post-war 
experience', as we have indicated above in referring to the literature of the 1960s and 
1970s and its content. 
As a social phenomenon, "the post-war experience of legal aid" was a cross-national 
experience of post-war Western society. Or, more precisely, it was an experience of 
the social fields of the Western world 'inhabited' or 'defined' by legal scholars, 
liberal social refonners and the legal profession and its lawyers, especially in the 
Anglo-American countries.'°"' Within those social fields, the post-war national 
developments were interpreted from the vantage point of 'legal aid', in its different 
forms in the 'modern Western law' of the Civil Law and Common Law societies. 
However, one interpretive perspective was at the forefront amongst the parties 
JOJO 
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actively involved in this new experience of the Western central legal domain. It 
referred to the social paradigms which constituted 'legal aid' in the modem Common 
Law world, and particularly in the Anglo-American welfare states. These - the ideals 
of 'legal aid' as an 'institution' of the 'courts', administered by the judges and 
lawyers, for the 'purpose' of providing lawyer representation in the courts· became 
pre-eminent as the social fields of the Western central legal domain worked to 
'constellate' the national developments in legal aid within post-war Western society. 
Those ideals permeated the social fields of Western centralist Jaw and its actors 
which attributed significance to the national developments in legal aid in the social 
climate of the post-war Western world. As Abel surmised in his review of the cross-
national literature, "[the] image of legal aid as equal access to law (embodied in the 
courts) probably is the dominant conception today".1oc.c The contention that the 
ideological character of "the post-war experience'' was fixed by the 'legal aid' ideals 
of the common law societies is defensible on several fronts. In the first place, it was 
Anglo-American lawyers and English-speakers who were most active in 'defining' 
the interpretive paradigms of the post-war developments. This is not to claim that 
there was no significant literature in languages other than English, for this was 
clearly not the case. However, English was the 'defining' discourse of "the post-war 
experience". In part, this was a result of deliberate 'projects' by scholars. Zemans' 
collection of national reports of lawyers and scholars from Austria, France, 
Gennany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and 
Spain who attended the first International Conference on the Law of Civil Procedure 
in 1977 is one instance. 1045 International Perspectives on Legal Aid compiled and 
structured these experiences around the domain assumptions of law in the Anglo-
American societies. As Zemans and Weiss reveal in their introduction: 
True access to justice is achieved only when no person is deterred by financial, 
psychological, or physical barriers from seeking a legal solution for the assertion of a 
right, for making a claim, or for defending a civil claim or a criminal charge. While 
the ultimate realization of this goal may indeed be Utopian, it can be partially 
achieved by making the path to the coun, the nonnal dispenser of justice, easier for 
the underprivileged, by ensuring equality before that court, or by creating new 
methods of dispute resolution that do not embody the inequalities inherent in the 
adversarial court structure. l°'6 
In any event, the very use of English as the conduit for constructing a "post-war 
experience of legal aid" transmitted the linguistic structures and social associations 
of 'modem Anglo-American law'. The transmissions of these images of law and 
society were exacerbated by the spread of Anglo-American cultural ideals in the 
1950s and 1960s discussed later in the chapter.'047 Moreover, the idea that legal aid 
·~ 
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was about lawyers and courts as vehicles for social and political refonn penneated 
the literature of"the post-war experience", as Abel describes: 
In summary, legal aid is a social refonn that begins with the solution - lawyers - and 
then looks for problems that it might solve rather than beginning with the problem • 
poverty, oppression, discrimination, or alienation • and exploring solutions ... the 
demand is always for more of the same: more laws, more lawyers, more courts, and 
now more alternatives to courts.'°" / 
Revisiting the Origins of the Post-War Experience 
Recognising the nature or character of the post-war experience has implications for 
the organisation of this chapter. Its dual aspects mean that we must address two 
different questions, if we are to revisit its origins and significance in post-war 
society. The first question is: "What were the origins and significance of the new 
legal aid schemes in the countries which reconstructed or reorganised legal aid in the 
30 or 35 years following the end of World War II?" The second question is: "What 
were the origins and significance of the social prominence of the Anglo-American 
'institution' of 'legal aid' in the post-war Western world?" 
For the purposes of the chapter, we will divide these questions into their two 
component parts, i.e., one, the origins of the post-war legal aid schemes and the 
social prominence of Anglo-American 'legal aid'; and, two, the respective 
significance of these developments in the post-war Western world. The next section 
of the chapter begins these investigations by asking, first of all, what the origins of 
the post-war schemes were, and, secondly, what the origin of the social prominence 
of Anglo-American 'legal aid' in the post-war Western world was. 
The Origins of the Post-War Legal Aid Schemes 
The answer to the former question regarding the origins of the post-war legal aid 
schemes is simple and straightforward. The new schemes were a product of changes 
in public policy in the welfare state, like other post-war developments in legislation, 
administration and social policy in the participant countries. By comparison with the 
liberal legalist accounts, this is an unspectacular conclusion, having nothing of the 
glamour a 'movement towards equal access to justice'. It is, moreover, far less 
dramatic than explanations which - like the Australian orthodoxy - locate the origins 
of the post-war schemes within particular national matrices of the state, the legal 
profession, la·wyers and social reformers. 1049 The national politics of legal aid, the 
legal profession and 'law' all played their part, but in the context of the politics of 
legal regulation in the post-war welfare state. 
Locating the origins of the post-war legal aid schemes within public policy has 
several important implications. In the first place, it restricts our capacity to 
generalise the origins of the 'machinery' aspects of the post-war experience. The 
10"8 
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formative influences on the decision-making processes of the welfare state from 
which public policy emerges are national or local politics. Thus, participant 
countries - like Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States - each have their own and 
unique explanatory cocktail of the politics of post-war national developments in legal 
aid. There are, therefore, ultimately no single, universal explanations which provide 
answers to 'why' governments in particular welfare states acted, or when they did. 
This does not mean, however, that the post-war experience did not witness 
comparable factors at work in the shaping of the public policy of legal aid. In the 
post-war period, the participant countries retained the same systems of government 
and legal regulation they had in the 1940s. Consequently, the same collage of social 
factors which saw the transition of the poor persons institution.s continued to 
influence developments in modern legal aid in the Civil Law and Common Law 
world. Moreover, the social significance of those transformative forces, the 
expectations of modem social citizenship, the penetration of 'law' and state legal 
regulation grew in the post-war years. The size of the welfare state increased, its 
regulatory and social welfare functions increased dramatically, the system of legal 
regulation increased correspondingly and new levels of economic prosperity spread 
throughout many parts of society, creating new and heightened expectations of 
material government intervention in popular well-being and social justice. Across 
the Western world, this were clearly all factors influencing state decision-making 
towards legal aid. 
Moreover, the politics of social reciprocity in legal regulation were not the only 
comparable, cross-national factors. In different ways, Abel, Alcock, Bankowski and 
Mungam, Blankenburg, Cousins and Paterson and Nelken alerted us to the impact of 
other comparable factors influencing the development of the post-war legal aid 
schemes. '050 One set of comparable factors was the influence of lawyers and the 
political economy of the legal profession. Within the participant countries, the 
national culture and social attitudes of the legal professions and the availability and 
content of legal education were significant. As were factors like the demand for 
lawyers' services and the success of lawyers in defending their professional 
privileges. Other relevant comparable factors were national variations in overall 
social welfare expenditure and the relative level of economic prosperity. Another set 
of comparable factors were the p:t.'1icular national social dimensions identified by 
Cousins. These included the historical and cultural environment; industrialisation, 
modernisation and development; marital breakdown and divorce; religion; political 
conflict and political violence; developments in national legal systems; the influence 
of the 'access to justice' interest groups and public administration. In developing 
this taxonomy, Cousins was clearly inspired by Abel, whose classification of the 
transformative and contextual dimensions of the origins of the post-war schemes is 
summarised in Table 2. 
IOSO Abo\•e at pp 142·146. 
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However, the public policy 'solution' does imply that before we can usefully explain 
the origins of the post-war schemes we must first investigate their decisional history 
in each participant country. As we have seen in various contexts, the post-war 
Western experience of the welfare state, legal regulation, legal services and legal aid 
was in many respects highly comparable, notwithstanding inherent and significant 
national differences. Thus, we can still safely and reliably have resort to the 'data 
base' function of the cross-national explanatory literature to provide a general, 
international •story' of the origins of the post-war schemes. In this respect, Abel's 
classification of the political dimensions of the 'machinery' developments in post-
war legal aid remains the single most valuable explanation. The transformative and 
contextual dimensions portrayed in Table 2 draw together many of the background 
and immediate cross-national comparable factors. Together, they provide us with a 
useful and informative explanation of the origins of the post-war schemes, subject to 
the qualifications mentioned below. 
Table 2: Abel and t/1e political dime11sions of tile post-war scltemes 
Transformative dimensions Contextual 
dimensions 
Social transfonnations Post WW ll welfare Legal profession and Concrete 
capitalist state legal system historical 
circumstances 
Industrialization and Changes to family Legitimation of criminal World War II 
urbanization structure justice system 
Contemporary 
Economic migration Reproduction of labour Legal profession social 
movements 
The role of capital Expansion of state legal 
and administrative The election of 
Social movements machinery social 
democratic 
governments 
Source: R L Abel "Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism", (1985) 
32 UCU Law Review 414 at 586-592 
The qualifications to Abel's classificatory model as the basis for explaining the 
origins of the post-war schemes are threefold. The first is more by way of a quibble 
than a qualification and relates to his interpretation of the role of changes to family 
structure and reproduction of labour in the post-war welfare state. This qualification 
is pursued below, in considering the social significance of the post-war schemes.1051 
The second qualification is substantial, and proceeds from a general criticism of 
Abel's explanation first presented in Chapter Six. The criticism is that his 
international 'overview' seriously downplays the role of developments in social 
welfare policy and programs in the post-war welfare states. To sustain the credibility 
of Abel's classificatory model, we need to inject the explanatory focus of 
1051 Below at pp 222·223. 
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Blankenburg, Cousins and Regan, and significantly increase the weighting given to 
this key comparable, cross-national originating background factor in the origins of 
the post-war schemes. As Regan explained in his 1993 paper: - ·· 
... the historical data suggests ... that the periods of expansion of legal aid coincided 
closely with expansion of the welfare state. This occurred in many societies in the 
immediate post-war period ... For example, the USA legal aid scheme emerged in the 
early 1960s during a period of massive expansion of welfare programs directed at the 
poor, under the OEO's War on Poverty. In the UK the legal aid scheme was 
established in 1949 in a period of major expansion of welfare programs in the 
immediate post-war period ... The Swedish legal aid reforms of the early 1970s were 
undertaken in a period of major expansion of the welfare services in that country that 
both extended the range of services and the proportion of the society covered by them. 
In Australia the national publicly funded scheme emerged during a period of 
expansion of welfare state programs in the period 1972-75, under a newly elected 
social democratic government. During this period major reforms included the 
following: a universal 'free' health system in 1975; free university education was 
introduced in 1973; etc. 10' 2 
The third qualification to the credibility of Abel's model takes us back to the public 
policy 'solution'. As useful and informative as it may be, in the end the reasons why 
the participant countries expanded legal aid in the post-war welfare state are national 
and local. In a real sense. therefore, neither Abel nor any other contributor to the 
explanatory literature actually offers us an adequate comprehensive explanation of 
the post-war schemes. For none deliberately engage with the analytical techniques 
of Public Policy, taking state decision-making as their investigatory focus. Thus, in 
an ideal world - untroubled by time, teaching or research funding - we could visit the 
origins of the post-war schemes totally afresh. However, as this is unlikely to 
eventuate, the practicable solution is more detailed national studies, like Alcock's 
case-study of the English interwar experience and Mumford's study of South 
Australia in the l 920s.1053 These types of investigations should be blended with 
welfare state and social policy perspectives of the kind offered by Blankenburg, 
Cousins and Regan. This will enable us to develop better and increasingly realistic 
and useful explanations. Like the Australian case study in Part I above, these 
blended approaches are likely to confirm the origins of the post-war schemes in the 
formative influences of the political matrix of poverty, 'law', social welfare, 
economic policy, the legal profession and lawyers in the legal systems of welfare 
capitalist society. 
The Origins of the Prominence of Anglo-American 'Legal Aid' 
The second subsidiary question above asked what the origins of the social 
prominence of Anglo-American 'legal aid' in the post-war Western world were. In 
turn, this question resolves into two further sub-sets. The first sub-set is the 
experience of the Anglo-American welfare states, including Australia, Britain, 
Canada, the United States and, to a lesser extent, other parts of the Common Law 
IOS2 F Regan, above n 831 at IS. 
10~3 PC Alcock. above n 245; L Mumford above n 169. 
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world. The second sub-set is the experience 'outside' the Anglo-American world, in 
the non-English speaking European welfare states like Denmark, Finland, France, 
The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, and in the developing countries in the global 
domain of the post-war West. 
Tlte Origi11s 'Witlzin' tlze Anglo-American Welfare States 
Generally, schola1s and other commentators have tended to assume a high degree of 
comparability - if not similarity - in the post-war experience amongst the Anglo-
American welfare states. To a considerable extent this was inevitable, given the 
common origins of their 'modem law', comparable systems of government and 
welfare states, and common social and political traditions. It was a tendency, 
moreover, which was fostered - as elsewhere in the post-war Western world - by the 
sheer size, scale and vigour of the American legal academy shaped by the intellectual 
paradigms of the 'problems' of access to law in the 1960s and 1970s.10$4 Thus, 
scholars and commentators in Australia, Britain and Canada were encouraged to 
'measure' national developments in post-war legal aid by reference to the mid-l 960s 
United States experience. This approach to the assessment of social developments in 
the post-war Anglo-American world formed part of a growing pattern fixed by the 
global explosion of' American' culture in the 1950s and 1960s discussed below. In 
Australia, for instance, the 'presence' of the 'American' experience of post-war 
"legal aid' has sometimes been quite marked, especially in the community legal 
centre 'movement'. At least to an observer, it appears that a similar situation 
obtained in the community legal services 'movement' in Canada. 
It is indisputable, moreover, that the social prominence of the ideals of 'legal aid' did 
increase across the Anglo-American world during the post-war experience. 
However, we have been mistaken in too readily assuming that its new social 
prominence had similar - or even highly comparable - causes. There was a 
significant difference in its origins amongst the Anglo-American welfare states. 
Specifically, as between the post-war prominence of 'legal aid' in the United States 
and its origins in countries like Australia, Britain and Canada. 
The key to explaining why this is so lies in the dual functions of 'legal aid' within 
the post-war national versions of the grand alliance of 'modem Anglo-American 
law'. 'Inside' the liberal legal centralist alliance, as we explained in Chapter Six, 
'legal aid' served as a mediative ideal or norm. It provided a mechanism for 
renegotiation between governments and the organised legal profession and lawyers 
of responsibility for the provision of legal assistance. 10" The other function 
performed by 'legal aid' was 'external' legitimation of the 'corporate' or 'collective' 
interests of the alliance, which was also explained in Chapter Six. In this role, 'legal 
aid' acted as a political 'weapon' or 'tool', defending, protecting or reinforcing the 
alliance against 'external' changes, threatening either the integrity of the alliance, or 
impinging upon the hegemony of its 'modem Anglo-American law'. 
10,S.I 
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In the United States, the ideals of' legal aid' first achieved their post-war prominence 
in the 1960s, when the country was sharply reminded "that there are underclasses in 
America". 1056 The social prominence of 'legal aid' was clearly inextricably 
associated with the creation of the Legal Services Corporation in 1965, which 
reflected new social policies adopted by the Federal government in its 'War on 
Poverty'. 1057 However, the establishment of the American post-war scheme was itself 
a symptom of a wider cause. The real significance of the prominence of 'legal aid' 
was that it reflected a crisis in the role and functions of the national legal system in 
post-war society in the United States . 
. ·
In modem America, as Hurst explains, "[t]he central job of law" had been "to bring 
power into balance sufficiently so that particular blocs could not ride roughshod over 
other interests in society". 1051 In the 20th century, however, the ability of the modem 
legal system and 'law' to perform this function had progressively been diminished. 
Its progressive disfunctionality had many causes, but "no factors bore so powerfully 
upon the legal order, or so much shaped its problems, as the main currents in the 
growth of the economy". 1059 Foremost amongst these economic factors was the 
impact of the decisive "change from a subsistence to a market economy" in the 
1870s. 1060 Thereafter, production - and "the getting of income and the power that 
symbolized" - became the dominant imperative in American society, and it was, 
according to Hurst: 1061 
... an emphasis which divided men; the aim was to win as big a share of the 
consumer's dollar as one could, as against not only other sellers in the same industry, 
but also as against other industries, and also to do whatever was necessary to protect 
and strengthen the particular bastion from which one sallied forth into the market. 1062 
In this respect, the United States were not unlike other modem capitalist societies. 
However, Hurst contends in the American context the 4 newness', "richness and 
rawness" of its society, and the huge scale of national building which it faced. The 
market economy meant that "men" became preoccupied "with the economy above all 
other aspects of the society they were forming": 1063 
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conscious purposes and their deep-felt emotions should center on economic affairs. 
"Getting ahead" meant just one thing in this society. 1064 
The effect was to distract people from social responsibility for government - to 
"drain off the best part of our talent'' - and thereby further weaken the administrative 
effectiveness of the legal system.106$ Furthermore, progressively urbanisation and the 
development of mass transport, mass production and cheap mass communication 
combined to create a sense of popular disconnection with the 'community', and local 
and regionally based state legal regulation. 1066 By 1950, according to Hurst: 
... it was apparent that these currents had moved far enough to call into question the 
capacity of our main legal institutions to mediate . . . The rise of great organised 
pressure groups, given thrust and continuity by their own bureaucracies, created 
something like a concurrent majority ... Organized spokesmen for industry, 
commerce, labor, and agriculture wielded a practical veto on measures adverse to their 
separate concerns, or at least had enough force to modify pending public measures to 
their own liking. They used their veto frankly and bluntly in their own interests, and 
not as trustees for a broader public ... The forces in the society which drove in 
directions away from the central core of common concerns seemed steadily to gain 
strength relative to the forces that drove towards the center. As blocs pushed their 
particular programs in legislative chambers, they made a picture of a society which 
seemed Jess like a structure of interlocking, mutually supporting parts, than like 
billiard balls on a table, knocking against each other and rolling from the impact, to hit 
and rebound from others. 11167 
In the 1950s and 1960s, therefore, the modem legal system in the United States 
confronted a crisis in its social functions. Alternatively, we could describe its plight 
as evidencing a significant shift in the politics of the modern American legal domain. 
In either event, the outcome was the same. The modern hegemony of the American 
version of the liberal legal centralist alliance was threatened, and its 'corporate' or 
'collective' interests in need of defence. Thus, the new social prominence of 'legal 
aid' in American society was an expression of its 'external' legitimation function. 
The role of 'modem American law' was being seriously challenged, if not worse, its 
mediative role in social governance was in decline and modem legal centralist-types 
of legal ordering under challenge. One response of American governments, judges, 
the organised legal profession and lawyers was to deploy 'legal aid' in an attempt to 
reinforce the social legitimacy of the legal system, its 'modem law' and the 
'corporate' or 'collective' interests of their modem alliance. 
In contrast, the post-war prominence of the ideals of 'legal aid' in the other Anglo-
American welfare states had a different explanation. There, its ideals were not as 
socially prominent as in the United States. In Australia, Britain and Canada, neither 
'modern Anglo-American law' nor its 'institutions' had been required to perfonn the 
core mediative role demanded of their counterparts in modem America. These 
1064 Ibid. 
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societies had developed 'socially protective' types of welfare state, with effective 
and extensive systems of state administration managed through modem paradigms of 
'public service' .1068 In combination, these and related factors gave their governments 
a higher social profile in legally regulating improvements to the material well-being 
of their citizens. Whilst this profile did not disqualify 'law' from its mediative role, 
it significantly diminished it, by comparison with the United States. Thus, in the 
other Anglo-American welfare states the post-war experience of 'legal aid' and its 
court-centred, lawyer-focused ideals were inherently less sociaIJy prominent. 
Secondly, in these welfare states 'legal aid' was not called in aid of the 'corporate' or 
'collective' interests of national versions of the liberal legal centralist alliance. In 
Australia, Britain and Canada, the originating relationships created by the alliance 
between governments, the courts, judges, the organised legal profession and lawyers 
remained substantially intact in the 1950s, 1960s and I 970s. In these societies, the 
20th century had been a far less tumultuous period for the alliance, the legal system 
and 'Jaw' than in the United States, which had seen the consistent and constant 
reinvention of the social basis of its 'law' and systems of central legal regulation. 1069 
Moreover, neither these comparable legal systems, their 'law' nor the social 
hegemony of the liberal legal centralist alliance appeared to be under threat during 
the post-war period in the other Anglo-American welfare states. The ideals of 'legal 
system' in 'modem Anglo-American law', liberal legalism and its detached positivist 
conceptions retained their stranglehold over the social fields of law. This was the 
case not cnly amongst the parties to the alliance, but throughout the legal domain 
where those legal ideals and associated configurations of government remained 
socii:illy omni.;:iresent and efficacious. 
In these contexts, 'legal aid' had little need to perfonn its 'external' legitimating role. 
Instead, the post-war social prominence of 'legal aid' in the other Anglo-American 
welfare states was an expression of its 'internal', mediative functions within the 
liberal legal centralist alliance. In these societies, the public policy pressures which 
prompted state action to establish the post-war schemes - and the schemes 
themselves - had the potential to change the horizon of the relationship between 
governments and the legal profession and its lawyers. State action - and uncertainty 
about what form that action would take - 'shook' the 'bargain' between the parties to 
the alliance. The new interest of the post-war welfare state in Australia, Britain and 
Canada in legal services raised the spectre - whether well-founded or not - of 
renegotiation or significant readjustment of the tenns and conditions of the alliance. 
In particular, its 'delegation' of the administration of civil and criminal justice to the 
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courts and the legal profession, the role it assigned to lawyers in the legal services 
delivery and the organisation of the market for lawyers' services. Thu.;, the social 
prominence of 'legal aid' in the other Anglo-American welfare states reflected these 
'internal' political shifts, possible changing expectations and uncertainties. It was 
not the legal system or its 'modem law' which was threatened, but the modem 
distribution of power and functions between the state and the legal profession within 
the alliance. " 
Tiie Origilts 'Outside' tlte Anglo-American World 
The other sub-set of the social prominence of' legal aid' was the experience 'outside' 
the Anglo-American world, in the European Civil Law societies and in the 
developing countries in the post-war Western oriented world. In these countries, as 
we argued above, governments scholars and commentators displayed a willingness to 
express and define post-war developments in legal assistance and legal aid in tenns 
of the paradigm of Anglo-American law. The ideals of Anglo-Americar. law spread 
in the post-war period and people were increasingly willing to describe national 
developments in legal assistance in terms of the Anglo-American ideals of legal aid. 
Why did this occur? What were the reasons for the new prominence of the Anglo-
American ideals of legal aid? Why were there five key post-war legal developments 
which together account for the new prominence of the 'legal aid' outside the Anglo-
American world? 
The first relevant post-war development was the expanded global significance of 
modem centralist-types of \Vestem law. In the welfare capitalist countries, the "CW 
significance of centralist law was a product of the expansion of the role and functions 
of the state. The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s saw their modem legal systems develop 
into truly "giant machine[s] for making and applying law ... a giant machine of 
social control ... exercised through law". 1070 Across Western society, therefore, the 
state legal system and its law became more socially significant than ever before. 
The new significance of modem Western centralist law was not restricted to the 
advanced capitalist and developed countries. The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were also 
decades of decolonisation, when subject non-Western societies were released from 
European political rule. One consequence was a devolution of legal and 
governmental power, which frequently saw modem democratic forms of 
constitutional law and administration established in new nation states on the Indian 
sub-continent, .and in Africa and South Asia.1011 Many of these new states were 
farmer British colonies, and adopted modern Anglo-American configurations of 
legal system and 'law'. Those states which had other colonial overlords were 
nevertheless incorporated into the fabric of modem Western central law, through 
new, Civil Law type systems. 
The second key post-war legal development was the global projection of 'modem 
Anglo-American law', its 'institutions' and ideals. Generally, for understandable 
1070 L M Friedman, above n 999 at 2. 
1071 F Reyntjcns. '"Africa-South of the Sahara" in F Zemans (cd), abo,·e n 2 al 15-16. 
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reasons, the legal aid literature takes the decades of the 1960s and 1970s as its 
expl&1ll:ltory focus. However, the growth in the global hegemony of 'modem Anglo-
American law' began in the immediate post-war period of the late 1940s and the 
1950s. Indeed, one could reasonably claim that the conduct of the war crimes trials 
in 1945 and 1946 against Nazi defendants and against Japanese defendants in 1945 
stamped the post-war world with modem Anglo-American legal ideals. The reasons, 
how~ver, for their new, post-war prominence outside the Common Law world are 
more complex, and the process was far more prolonged than these particular events. 
The growing hegemony of 'modem Anglo-American law' was also a product of 
post-war global politics. At the end of World War II, the military and political 
alliance between Britain and tiie United States dominated the Western world. This 
military and political hegemony certainly promoted the global influence of British 
and American culture and social ideals, including its 'modem law'. This was, 
however, not the only factor contributing to the global P,rojection of 'modem Anglo-
American law'. The rest of the story is complicated - a variety of influences were at 
work. 
Victory in World War II had left Britain in economic servitude to the United States, 
and facing the prospect of the destruction of its colonial empire as well as changed 
relationships with its dominions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South 
Africa. Nevertheless, in the late 1940s and in the 1950s and 1960s, Britain remained 
a major political and cultural force throughout the world. It continued to project its 
version of 'modem law' into the newly liberated societies of its former non-Western 
colonies through education of governing elites, and through its role in the British 
Commonwealth and later the Commonwealth of Nations. Moreover, even in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, significant remnants of the imperial legal 
dominion existed until at least the mid-1980s.1072 
In 1945, Britain had been replaced as the Western imperial power. The United States 
had emerged from World War II as the source of its principal military power, and it 
assumed primary responsibility for the husbandry of Western interests in the global 
politics of the Cold War. In discharging these new responsibilities in the 1950s and 
1960s, the United States played a major role in projecting its modem legal ideals 
throughout the world, including the English-speaking Western countries. 
Sometimes, this was a deliberate and conscious process.1073 More often, it was 
1072 
1073 
Eg. i!l Australia, rights of appeal to the Privy Council still existed until the mid-1970s. and the ultimate 
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subtle, indirect, disorganised and consequential, with the projection of modem 
American 'law' and its ideals following as an incident of cultural expansion. 
A major instance was the pursuit of foreign policy. In the late 1940s, 1950s and 
1960s the global projection of military power was the primary instrument of United 
States foreign policy. This necessitated the stationing and movement of hundreds of 
thousands of its anned services personnel around the world ... These personnel, and 
their families, carried their culture with them. The expansion of global American 
cultural influence also had its roots in post-war economic developments. The United 
States, from the time of the Breton Woods agreement in 1944 and its massive 
financial commitment to the economic reconstruction of Western Europe through the 
Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, dominated the global capitalist economy. This 
continued into the 1950s with the emergence of American-owned multinational 
businesses, and further with the establishment of GA TT in the 1960s. 107' In the post-
war period, therefore, these various fonns of social projection saw an unprecedented 
expansion of American ideals of 'modem law' and modem civil society, with its 
attendant liberal centralist assumptions about the social significance of human rights, 
civil liberties, due process and the role of lawyers throughout the Western world.1075 
Moreover, the powerful proselytising aspects of modem American society and its 
culture meant that the post-war projection of its version of 'modem Anglo-American 
law' was remarkably effective and penetrating.1076 
Thirdly, the post-war period saw the increasing use of English as the linguafranca of 
Western society in cross-national governmental and commercial transactions, and as 
a second language of the elites in non-English speaking Western countries. In the 
developing world, the latter was closely associated with Westernisation of law and 
government through decolonisation. Generally, however, throughout the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s the increasing use of English as the global common language 
facilitated and encouraged access to the ideas of the domain of its native speakers, 
namely modern Anglo-American society and its ideals and culture, including its 
'modern law'. 
Fourthly, the post-war period saw a transformation of Western human rights ideals 
into a new regime of public international law. In 1948, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provided 
the foundation for recognition of a core of existing individual political rights, 
1074 
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1076 
In Australia, in 1964 the Chicago-based transnational law tinn Baker & McKenzie opened an office in 
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together with new types of social and economic human rights.1077 This marked the 
beginning of "labors extending over a period of 30 years" towards a global system of 
international protection of human rights, culminating in 1976 when 46 countries 
ratified the Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and 
Political Rights. 1071 The development of this new international legal regime not only 
paralleled the formative years of the origins of the ideological dimensions of post-
war legal aid. Its law also relied heavily upon modem American legal ideals "based • 
on the first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the voluminous body of 
legislation and jurisprudence derived from them". um 
.· 
Comparable new developments in the legal regulation of human rights also occurred 
in Western Europe in 1950, and in the Americas in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 
former case, the procedures, ideas and enforcement mechanisms of human rights law 
promoted Anglo-American conceptions of fair process and of the independent role 
and functions of courts and lawyers in conflicts with the state. Complainants and 
parties invoking the jurisdiction of the European Commission on Human Rights, for 
instance, were granted standing as individuals. 1080 Western international NGOs - like 
Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the International 
League for Human Rights - also promoted modem Anglo-American legal ideals in 
the 1950s and 1960s in fostering the protection and promotion of human rights. 1081 
Finally, all these developments occurred in a highly favourable social context. The 
1950s and 1960s saw the beginnings of globalisation.- They were the decades in 
which "the revolution of modernization entered its most intense worldwide 
phase".1082 Throughout the Western world and its economic realm: 
... [an] unprecedented lowering of tariff barriers ... made possible a far more 
intensive worldwide division of labour. Multinational corporations, escaping heavy 
taxes and high labor costs in the older industrial countries, spread their manufacturing 
to new locations such as Brazil, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan ... [Cheap] and 
rapid air travel brought the upper classes of all countries into closer contact than ever 
... [Cinema] and television made audiences around the world vividly aware of each 
other's consumption habits. 1083 
The social impact of these economic transformations was of a scale comparable to 
the first phase of Western modernisation discussed in Chapter Six. '084 Above all else, 
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the outcome was "more mutual contact, interdependence, uniformity ... a spreading 
awareness, however hesitant and painful, of the commonness of human 
problems.,,1°'5 This increasingly internationalised environment provided a fertile 
context for a powerful, coherent body of social ideology like 'modem Anglo-
American law' to prosper, as it demonstrably did. 
It was these and similar kinds of developments which provided a favourable climate 
for the growth of the already coherent and powerful ideals of Anglo-American law, 
By the 1960s and 1970s, the outcome of these and related developments was that the 
ideals of modern Anglo-American law had colonised significant parts of the modem 
legal domain in the non~English-speaking world. It was this colonisation and the 
spread of the paradigms of legal centralism throughout Western society which was 
the cause of the new prominence of 'legal aid' outside the Anglo-American world. 
Revisiting the Significance of the Post-War Experience 
The other sub-component of the two questions posed above queried the significance 
of the post-war schemes and of the new social prominence of Anglo-American 'legal 
aid' ideal in the Western world. What, in other words, was the real importance or 
noteworthiness of the post-war experience of legal aid in the Western world? Thus, 
this second part of our investigation asks, first of all, what the significance of the 
post-war schemes in the participant welfare states was. What did the legal aid 
schemes achieve, and 'who' did they assist? Secondly, this section of the chapter 
investigates the importance of the social prominence of the legal aid ideals of 
'modem Anglo-American law'. What did this signify, both 'within' the Anglo-
American welfare states and 'outside' in other parts of the post-war Western world 
and its legal domain? 
The Significance of the Post-War Legal Aid Schemes 
For liberal legalism and its adherents, the significance of the post-war schemes is 
unproblematic. The expansion of legal assistance was significant because it 
benefited the 'poor', who achieved greater access to the legal systems of the welfare 
states. In part, this liberal interpretation is correct. The post-war legal aid schemes 
\vere designed to help poor accused and litigant .. , and poorer and ordinary people 
with other types of legal problems. Moreover, as we discuss below, in varying 
degrees they generally achieved these objectives. 
However, the post-war schemes also served other objectives. As we saw above, the 
post-war schemes were emanations of public policy. In Australia, for instance, the 
new legal aid policies of 1973-75 also served the administrative demands of new 
social welfare and regulatory functions in the welfare state. 1086 The schemes were, in 
other words, instruments of state legal regulation in the societies of the participant 
welfare states. Therefore, in asking 'what' the post-war schemes achieved, and 
1085 
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'who' they assisted, we must proceed from the perspective of the major parties to the 
expansion of legal aid. We must consider these questions from the different vantage 
points and interests of poorer people, the welfare state and its organs, and lawyers 
and the legal profession. 
Tiie Significance oft/re Post-War Sc/1emesfor Poorer People 
The conventional interpretations of the social significance of the post-war schemes 
emphasise the importance of the benefits thereby bestowed upon th~ poor. There can 
be no doubt that the reorganisation of legal assistance did benefit the poorer citizens 
of the post-war welfare states. Indeed, all the explanatory perspectives agree that it 
'helped the poor'. The operations of the post-war schemes demonstrated, as Abel 
contends, a persistent "association between poverty and legal aid", attributable 
primarily to the adoption of "eligibility criteria phrased largely in terms of income 
and wealth", but also to other factors, including the preference of the "better off'' for 
services provided by private lawyers. 1081 Low-income people - including women, the 
young, the old and ethnic minorities - were demonstrably major beneficiaries of the 
expanded availability of legal aid. 
However, as we have indicated above, this fact alone does not adequately explain the 
social significance of the post-war schemes. In the first place, low-income and 
poorer people were not the only groups to benefit from the increased availability of 
legal assistance. Actual eligibility for legal assistance varied according to prescribed 
income and assets criteria, and according to types of legal problems or proceedings. 
In the more generous versions of the post-war schemes, like those operating in 
England in the 1950s and in Sweden in the 1970s, this meant that many ordinary, 
waged citizens also became eligible for legal aid.'°" Moreover, the application of 
these differential criteria also meant that a significant minority of ordinary and 
middle-class people often qualified for legal assistance on payment of a financial 
contribution. '089 In other words, the post-war expansion was important to citizens 
other than the poor. 
Secondly, acknowledging poorer citizens as the principal recipients of legal 
assistance only serves to identify them as major beneficiaries of the post-war 
schemes. It does not explain why access to legal aid was important to the poor. The 
conventional answer, as we have indicated above, is that the post-war expansion 
benefited the poor because it improved their access to the legal system. We cannot 
quibble with this answer, provided we treat it as a generalised description of the 
outcome for the poor. The establishment of the post-war schemes in Australia, 
Britain, Canada, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, the United States and 
comparable countries did see a dramatic increase in public expenditure on legal 
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aid. 1090 This led to corresponding increases in the availability of legal assistance, 
which consequently improved the access of poorer citizens to their national legal 
systems. 1091 However, general descriptions of this kind are inadequate as the basis 
for assessing the importance of the post-war schemes for the poor. 
There are a number of reasons why this is so, none of which we will explore in any 
detail in this chapter. One is that the post-war' expansion of legal aid did not change 
the essential functions of the legal systems in the welfare capitalist countries. These 
modem legal systems retained their primary functions as servants and instruments of 
the modem state. Consequently, poorer people remained in a relatively marginal 
relationship to the legal system, continuing to "experience law only as constraint, not 
power". 1092 For instance, as we have seen, whilst spending on legal assistance 
increased, it remained an insignificant percentage of national GDP and a small 
proportion of public expenditure on the national legal services system.1093 
A related reason is that generalising the post-war expansion of legal aid in this way 
misinterprets its importance for poorer people. Poverty alone did not generate social 
cohesion amongst low-income and disadvantaged people.1094 Therefore, it is not 
terribly useful to describe the outcomes of the post-war expansion in general, 
undifferentiated terms. Furthermore, to the extent that poverty does generate 
cohesive social interests, to say that post-war legal aid was important to the poor 
because it improved their access to law proceeds from a mistaken assumption. It 
assumes that the poor are interested in better access to the legal system. In some 
instances, like legal representation in criminal and family law proceedings, improved 
levels of access were clearly important to low-income defendants and parties. 
However, the reality of the post-war developments was that poorer people were 
"rarely ... actively ... involved in creating legal aid programs", and have since been 
generally been indifferent to preserving the benefits bestowed on them.109S 
Moreover, their marginal social status meant that improvements in access to law 
generally had "low salience" for poorer people because they "correctly [concluded] it 
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[was] unlikely they [would] get what they want[ed] from legal institutions" in 
welfare capitalism". 1096 
Another reason why we cannot usefully generalise the importance of the post-war 
expansion is that its social significance for the poor depended upon several different 
variables. The scale of increased public funding of legal aid was not uniform. 
Therefore, the post-war expansion had a differential impact on poorer people in the 
welfare capitalist states. For instance, in Britain, Canada and The Netherlands, 
higher levels of national per capita expenditure suggest that their poorer citizens may 
have fared relatively better than their counterparts in Australia, Ireland and 
Scandinavia. 1091 Furthennore, the actual social penetration of increased spending on 
legal aid depended on national variables influencing the cost of legal services, 
including court and tribunal procedures, substantive criminal and civil law, the role 
of lawyers and the types and unit costs of legal transactions. '098 The importance of 
the post-war expansion was also dependent upon differences in the types of services 
provided to the poor. In the English-speaking countries, the new legal aid schemes 
generally aimed to provide a wide range of services, including legal advice, 
community legal education and promoting law reform, even though legal 
representation in family and criminal law court proceedings was the predominant 
type of service delivery. 1099 In contrast, the post-war schemes in the Civil Law 
countries of Western Europe "usually assist[ ed] their citizens primarily in relation to 
court cases". 1100 
Furthermore, the post-war expansion generally channelled the greater part of new 
public spending on legal aid into fields of legal work in which lawyers were already 
both familiar and professionally competent. This clearly benefited poorer accused 
and parties seeking legal representation or advice in criminal and family law and 
other types of civil proceedings. However, it generally worked to the detriment of 
those facing housing, debt, welfare and other legal problems associated with poverty. 
Practising lawyers were unfamiliar with these new fields of legal work, and sought to 
·'structure the content of legal aid simply by offering poor people the same services 
they provided paying clients". 1101 Moreover, typically private lawyers were 
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incompetent at understanding the social context in which the poor confronted the 
legal system.1102 
Concentrating on the improvements in legal access for the poor also overlooks a 
notable deficiency in the expansion of legal aid. In important respect, the legal needs 
of the poor were not unlike those of waged, ordinary citizens. The operations of the 
legal systems in post-war society generated an enormous demand for access to 
lawyer functions and information about law. By the post-war period, everyone was: 
... involved with law ... people advise[d] themselves and others of their legal rights 
and remedies in consumer disputes ... interpret[ed] legislation and other legal 
documents in order to ascertain their taxes or payroll deductions, or their entitlement 
to benefits ... appear[ed] on their own behalf or on behalf of others in small claims 
couns, welfare offices, traffic couns, grievance proceedings, labour arbitration boards, 
zoning and assessment bodies, and domestic tribunals such as university disciplinary 
committees. 1103 
The post-war expansion did little to redress the ordinary, everyday needs of poorer 
citizens for legal access. Therefore, it is for these reasons that to describe the 
outcomes of the post-wear expansion in terms of improving the access of the poor to 
the law is inadequate. Whilst the post-war expansion of legal aid clearly helped 
poorer people, its actual social significance for the poor remains somewhat 
problematic. Indeed, it is very clear that the improvements to legal access it 
produced were less spectacular and far reaching than the conventional interpretation 
suggests. 
Neither was greater public expenditure on legal aid necessarily translated into 
correlative levels of significance measured by reference to 'social benefits' conferred 
upon the citizens of the participant welfare states. As Esping-Andersen and other 
social policy analysts have shown, higher "levels of expenditure [do not] necessarily 
reflect a greater [state] commitment to social well-being."11<M Therefore, we need to 
consider other criteria if we are to assess the impact of the post-war legal aid 
schemes on social citizenship. In his 1994 paper, Regan pioneered the use of the 
application of the alternative measures of •welfare effort' developed by Esping-
Andersen to portray legal aid schemes in a social policy context. 110$ These measures 
are: 
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... less immediately concerned with re-distribution than with rights-conferring aspects 
of welfare provision - his organising problematic is a notion of welfare 'de-
commodification', defined in tenns of welfare 'rendered' as a matter of right. 1106 
Esping-Andersen also developed three other "measures which supposedly tap salient 
dimensions of welfare-state stratification", a term which he used to "denote ways in 
which the welfare state serves to structure the quality of social citizenship" .1107 • 
Combining these 'de-com.modification' and stratification indices, Esping-Andersen 
constructed, as Table 3 below illustrates, a matrix of three different types - or worlds 
- of welfare states: the Liberal, Conservative and Social Democratic types of welfare 
capitalism. ·· 
Tah/eJ: Espi11g-Anderse11 's matrix of the three worlds of welfare capitalism 
Type Political principles Degree of Principles of 
'de-commodification' stratification 
Liberal Liberal Low Means tested/allied with 
significant private 
expenditure on health etc 
Conservative Corporatist/associated Medium Contributory/earnings 
with high degree of state related 
authority over citizens 
Social Socialist High Universal benefits/high 
Democratic degree of benefit equality 
Source: F G Castles & D Mitchell, "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or Four?'', 
Australian National l Tniversity Public Policy Program, Discussion Paper No. 21, Oct 
1990 (as amended June 1991 ) at 10-11 
Regan used the typologies described in Table 3 to construct alternative 'models} of 
legal aid in welfare capitalist states. 1108 However, Esping-Andersen's matrix also 
provides us with an alternative means of portraying the social significance of the 
post-war schemes. For instance, in the paradigmatic Social De_mocratic welfare 
capitalist societies - those where high levels of 'de-com.modification' and benefit 
universality correspond, like Sweden, The Netherlands and Norway - the provision 
of legal aid as a right of citizenship in conjunction with high popular eligibility 
meant that the reforms to legal aid saw a significant increment in the quality of social 
citizenship. In comparison, in the Liberal welfare states - like Australi~ Britain, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States - the focus of legal aid provision on 
poorer people, combined with means-tested eligibility, meant that the enhancement 
of the quality of social citizenship was correspondingly less. 
1106 
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Country 
Sweden 
The 
Nether-
lands 
Britain 
Australia 
United 
States 
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National variables affecting t/1e social significance of t/1e post-war 
scl1emes 
Variables affecting the social significance of the post-war schemes 
Type of Legal aid provision National legal system 
welfare Eligibility Scope Legal Legal Opportunities state (proportion (Type oflegal services) family services for citizens 
of the 
'in· litigation' 'outside system to ·mobilise pop.) I litigation' 2 law' 
Social high extensive Nil civil state- low 
Democratic range of dominated 
cases 
Social high extensive limited civil low 
Democratic range of 
cases 
Liberal low restricted limited Common market- high 
Law dominated 
Liberal low narrow substantial Common market- high 
Law dominated 
Liberal low narrow extensive Common market- high 
Law dominated 
Notes: I. Legal advice and representation to assist citizens in court cases. 
2. including legal advice and information by way of interview and over the 
telephone, legal education and training, and law reform. 
Source: F Regan, "Are There 'Mean' & 'Generous' Legal Aid Schemes' in Legal Aid in the 
Post-Welfare State Society, Legal Aid in the Post-Welfare State Society, {The 
Netherlands Ministry of Justice, 1995) at 17-20; F Regan, "Why Do Legal Aid 
Services Vary Between Societies? Re-Examining The Impact Of Welfare States And 
Legal Families", draft paper to be published in F Regan, A Paterson, T Goriely & D 
Fleming (eds), The Transformation of Legal Aid, (in press), 12-19 and Tables I & 2 
However, measuring 'welfare benefit' is notoriously difficult, 1109 and Esping-
Andersen is not without his critics. 1110 Regan's work in 1994 and 1998, however, 
provides some useful indicators for considering the impact of the post-war schemes 
on social citizenship. In 1994, he sought to test the validity of his initial hypothesis. 
by comparing the post-war experience of legal aid in Sweden - one of Esping-
Andersen' s Social Democratic welfare states - and Australia - one of its Liberal 
counterparts. Regan concluded that, whilst legal aid in those two countries could 
broadly be characterised: 
1109 
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better. It depends at least partly upon how the legal system works, what matters are 
processed as legal and what are labelled as something else.1111 
Regan has pursued this line of inquiry in his most recent paper, investigating "the 
impact of welfare states and legal families on legal aid services."1112 In this case, he 
concluded inter alia that legal aid schemes in welfare capitalism produced significant 
differences "for the citizens opportunities to mobilise the law", i.e., significant 
differences in the qualitative outcomes for social citizenship. 1113 His analysis tends to 
confirm our conclusions about the origins of the post-war schemes, namely that there 
are distinctive national stories, which produced distinctive national outcomes, 
including those affecting social citizenship. 1114 However, Regan's work in these two 
papers does indicate that we can extend the insights offered by Esping-Andersen in 
descend into the operational details of legal aid provision, and factoring in the impact 
of the national legal systems of the welfare states. The matrix in Table 4 
demonstrates, that like all public policy initiatives, the social significance of the post-
war expansion was complex, relative and, above all, dependent upon the role and 
functions of law in the welfare states. 
The Sig11ijica11ce oft/ze Post-War Sc/zemesfor tlze Welfare State 
There is a third reason why the conventional explanation is inadequate. Its focus on 
the poor distracts us from the fact that others also benefited. The poor and other 
legally-assisted citizens who were the clients of the post-war schemes were not the 
sole beneficiaries. They were only one element of the political matrix which 
surrounds the provision of legal aid in modern Western society. 1115 In the post-war 
expansion, the other most visible and active members of this matrix were the state 
and the legal profession. As we have seen above, and Abel reminds us, the '"state' is 
a reified label, concealing [a] great diversity of interests amongst various government 
officials". 1116 Nevertheless, we can safely generalise some of the benefits received by 
its \'arious organs and actors. 
The post-war expansion saw the legal machinery of the welfare states grow, and 
hence increase its social significance. Therefore, if nothing else, the reconstruction 
of the machinery of legal aid reinforced the legal systems of the state. However, the 
post-war schemes, like other parts of these legal systems, were also instruments of 
state policy, enabling its various organs to ~roject their public policy objectives. In 
some instances, those objectives were clear and readily identifiable. For example, 
Abel has suggested that legal aid was "an essential means of rationalising the chaotic 
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and often arbitrary welfare bureaucracy". 1117 Less contestable examples are evident 
in the Australian experience. The operations of its interim national scheme in 1973-
75 were clearly meant to facilitate new policies aimed at improving the social well-
being of both poorer people and all citizens seeking to participate in national legal 
system and its law.1111 Furthermore, other developments in post-war legal aid were 
also linked to changes in the functions of the Federal welfare state. For instance, its 
new ability to intervene to protect the socii!l welfare of indigenous peoples, the 
adoption of new environmental functions, the pursuit of international obligations in 
war crimes, family law and civil justice and facilitating the operation of trade 
practices, industrial and courts-martial legislation. 1119 .. 
The rost-war expansion alsQ promoted the performance of core objectives and 
functions of the modem state. For instance, it once again helped to facilitate and 
legitimate the prosecution of those charged with criminal offences, while 
simultaneously publicly reinforcing the legitimacy of the exercise of coercive 
governmental power. 1120 :Moreover, the "most invariant feature of all legal aid 
programs [was] their preoccupation with family matters". 1121 Abel speculated that 
this was a response "to the crisis of reproduction posed by the dissolution of the 
extended family and the breakdown of lifelong parental union", reflecting the interest 
of the welfare capitalist states in the reproduction of labour power. 1122 In fact, the 
involvement of the modem state in divorce and family matters embraces many public 
policy interests, include the public interest in the related processes of marriage 
formation and remarriage, 'family' policy, the public interest in social protection and 
public morals and the political significance of private interests in the equitable 
termination of marriage.11?3 Nevertheless, Abel has directed our attention to the links 
between the post-war expansion and broader agendas of the welfare state. In yet 
other instances, the changes to legal aid benefited the post-war state in ways which 
were "both paradoxical and complex".1124 For example, whilst its judges in the 
family and criminal trial courts generally welcomed the greater availability of legal 
assistance, other judges, especially conservatives and some in the appellate courts, 
objected. The latter ostensibly on the grounds that greater access to legal aid clogged 
up the courts by financing spurious appeals, especially in criminal matters. Nor was 
the post-war expansion always welcomed by all parts of the state, with sometimes 
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visible tensions between national and regional or local govemments.1115 
Nevertheless, it was generally a significant and favourable development for most 
political and institutional interests within the post-war welfare states. 
Tile Significance of t/1e Post-War Sc/1emes/or Lawyers 
The lawyers and the legal profession were the other major non-recipient 
beneficiaries. Behind the post-war expansion were new or increased levels of public 
expenditure. This both increased the income of the legal services industries, and 
expanded national markets for lawyers' services. Whilst this notionally benefited all 
lawyers, the actual economic significance of these developments was dependent on 
several factors. In increasing opportunities for legal assistance in criminal, family 
law and social welfare matters, the post-war expansion changed the market serviced 
by 'personal plight' private lav.'Yers.1126 It not only created new paying clients, but it 
also increased the economic value of the existing market. For instance, in Australia 
and Britain lawyers were paid to provide legal aid services previously performed on 
a charitable or semi-charitable basis in law society schemes. 
The economic impact was also influenced by the rates of remuneration paid to 
lawyers in the post-war schemes. Nowhere did these match fees charged to private 
clients, although Abel probably overstates this when he claims that remuneration 
levels were "deliberately ... depressed (to protect the public treasury, stigmatize 
clients, and keep legal aid at a competitive disadvantage with respect to the private 
sector)". 1127 Those private lawyers who subsequently developed extensive legal aid 
practices generally experienced difficulty in achieving adequate levels of 
profitability and income. 1121 
The scale and scope of particular national schemes was also an important variable 
factor. For instance, in the late 1970s and early 1980s legal aid was a major source 
of income for many barristers and solicitors in England, and accounted for "one-
fourth to one-third of the total revenue" of all lawyers in The Netherlands.1129 
\Vhereas in both Australia and the United States it represented only an insignificant 
part of the income of the legal services industry. 1130 Increased public spending on 
legal aid also created new or wider opportunities for salaried employment for 
lawyers. In Australia, Canada, The Netherlands, the United States, Scandinavia and 
elsewhere, small but significant numbers of lawyers were employed in the new 
national schemes, or in 'community' based legal aid services. 
The legal profession itself also benefited from the post-war expansion. However, we 
face a number of difficulties in attempting to generalise its significance. The legal 
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profession in each society is constituted by a variety of lawyer interests.1131 
Moreover, national differences clearly existed in its functions, culture and 
educatiol1al traditions across post-war western society.1132 In part, these reflected its 
contrasting modem paradigms of the Anglo-American private lawyer advocate, and 
the European judge or civil service administrator. National differences in the 
political economy of the legal profession were also evident within Europe itself. For 
instance, in the different attitudes of the legal profession in Germany and The 
Netherlands to post-war developments in legal aid. 1133 Nevertheless, we can make 
some general observations about the importance of the post-war expansion. 
Everywhere, it promoted the ideology and interests of the modem legal profession. 
In particular, the post-war expansion served its socio-economic interests in fostering 
the social construction of 'legal' problems around established lawyer paradigms. It 
achieved this directly by reinforcing the role of private sector lawyers. In most 
countries, the organised profession had initially opposed the expansion of legal aid. 
However, once "state subsidies became inevitable, professional suspicions about 
'officialism' rapidly dissolved,'' the organised legal profession in the welfare 
capitalist countries generally embraced the post-war schemes. 1134 Thereafter, it 
aimed to maximise spending on services provided by private lawyers and "to 
minimize the state funds available to salaried lawyers (staffed office programs)".1135 
This certainly had the effect of reinforcing the interests of the 'personal plight' 
lawyers in the mainstream of the private legal profession. However, as we have also 
seen, it did not prevent the emergence of professional sub-groups in the fonn of legal 
aid lawyers specialising in legal assistance, employed in public agencies and working 
in the community sector. The post-war expansion gave a new credence or cohesion 
to these sub-groups, who themselves identified with the legal profession. In doing 
so, their members were gradually coopted into the organised profession, and 
therefore indirectly contributed to its objectives in maintaining professional control 
over the social construction of 'legal' problems. 1136 
The lawyer-focused operations of the post-war schemes also served to reinforce 
professional control over the operations of the market for legal services. Moreover; 
in various ways - and especially in the Anglo-American countries - the post-war 
expansion entrenched the position of the organised profession. The involvement of 
its organisations and agents in the administration of the post-war schemes enabled it 
to project and protect agendas of the professional mainstream. For instance, the 
English Law Society, through its involvement in administering regional duty lawyer 
schemes in the 1970s, was able to regulate the work practices of local solicitors and 
Ill I 
113;! 
1133 
1134 
1135 
1136 
R L Abel, above 2 at 499 &: 510-519; M Hethenon, above n 473, (1981) at 99·112; R Tomasic, "Social 
Organisation Amongst Australian Lawyers", ( 1983) 19(3) ANZJS 447. 
E Blankenburg, above n 852 at 250-25 I. 
Ibid. 
R L Abel. above n 2 at 503. 
Ibid. 
Z Bankowski & G Mungham, n 834 above at 75-76. 
225 
thereby reinforce the professional culture protecting the economic terms of work of 
private lawyers.1137 A comparable situation existed in Australia in the late 1970s and 
the 1980s via the dominant role of the professional organisations and their agents in 
the management of the State and Territory legal aid commissions. The post-war 
expansion also provided a vehicle for these organisations to hannonise internal 
conflicts between different interests and actors within local or national legal 
professions. In part, this was a by-product of increased public spending on legal • 
assistance which enabled more of its members to actually participate in 'helping the 
poor'. This had the effect of promoting internal cohesion by celebrating the 
professional· "ethics of public service", and fostering a sense amongst the 
professional mainstream of "personal satisfaction accruing from a good job well 
done". 1131 Increased mainstream professional involvement in legal aid also acted to 
moderate the complaints of a few dissidents who historically had been active critics 
of its failure to adequately assist the 'poor' .1139 
The post-war expansion also presented professional organisatio~ ·~ with opportunities 
to institutionalise the dissenting voices amongst a new generation of lawyers. In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s a significant minority of young lawyers, legal academics 
and law students were articulating new and 'radical' social expectations of Jaw. In 
Australia, Canada, The Netherlands and the United States, the creation of new legal 
aid sectors provided new types of employment for some of these potentially 
disaffected members and embryonic members of the legal profession. At least for a 
few years, the internal culture of these organisations was subordinated to the ideals 
and norms of the legal profession. 1140 The result was to produce a new segment of 
the legal profession - critical, reformist and sometimes radical, but nevertheless 
always within its broad church. A similar result obtained :n England, where the 
private sector had largely absorbed the post-war expansion. In the early 1970s, the 
Law Society played a powerful - if passive - role in the establishment of 
neighbourhood law centres, and these too worked to its advantage, inter alia by 
creating new and alternative avenues of professional work. 1141 
The role of the post-war schemes in institutionalising dissent was not restricted to 
diverting the energies of those lawyers actually employed in legal aid agencies. 
They also served to demonstrate, both to the public, and all lawyers, the role of the 
organised profession in legal assistance, and the continuing significance of the 
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lawyer paradigm in post-war society. Moreover, the presence of the new legal aid 
agencies benefited the organised profession in other ways. In the 1980s and 1990s 
the Western legal profession has had to adapt to new social and political demands for 
it to make a greater contribution to improving 'access to justice'. Legal aid lawyers, 
the reformist and critical sub-culture their "daily encounters with deprivation, 
oppression, and injustice" has engendered and the adaptation of the profession itself 
have provided an important repository of ideas and experience to enable· the 
profession to respond to these pressures.11"2 As Abel concluded, the "idealism that 
inspires lawyers everywhere, because it is inherent in Jaw, should be mobilized by 
making exposure to legal aid an intrinsic part of professional socialization."11"3 
The Significance of the Social Prominence of Anglo-American 'Legal 
Aid' 
It remains to consider the significance of the social prominence of the 'legal aid' 
ideals of 'modem Anglo-American law' in the post-war Western world. Once again, 
we must distinguish between the Anglo-American welfare states, and other Western 
or Westernised societies. In the case of the latter, the prominence of the Anglo-
American 'legal aid' ideal reflected the ongoing "compression of the world" through 
"global interdependence and consciousness", which itself became an increasingly 
prominent feature of late 20th century society.1144 In particular, as we saw above, 
the new prominence of Anglo-American 'legal aid' indicated the internationalisation 
of its 'modern law• and regulatory paradigms, especially those of the modem 
American state and its post-war society. 
'Within' the Anglo-American welfare states themselves, the significance of the post-
war social prominence of the ideals of 'legal aid' was as a 'litmus paper' or 'litmus 
test'. Its court-focused, lawyer-administered paradigms were not only key 
organisational ideals of the liberal legal centralist aUiance. The 'internal' mediative 
and 'external' legitimating functions which 'legal aid' performed had significant 
social ramifications in societies which officially celebrated governance through 
'modem Anglo-American law'. As we have shown, courts, judges and lawyers, and 
'access' to the courts through lawyers, and the social 'benefits' this promised, were, 
to varying degrees, vital social axes in post-war Australia, Britain, Canada and the 
United States. The ideals of 'legal aid' were a high-profile 'embodiment' of the 
institutional reality and the ideological 'promise' of the modern legal systems, its 
'law' and the liberal legal centralist alliance in these countries. They were, if you 
like, a 'lubricant' of the axes of 'justice'. Thus, the social prominence of 'legal aid' 
during the post-war experience served as an 'indicator' of the condition or 
'chemistry' of 'modem law' and its political and institutional associates in the 
Anglo-American welfare states. Once again, however, there were appreciable and 
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important differences in the changes revealed by the 'litmus test' of post-war 'legal 
aid' in the United States, and elsewhere in Anglo-American society. 
In the United States, as we saw above, 'legal aid' ideals rose to prominence in the 
1960s as part a defensive reaction of the governments and the legal profession to 
threats posed to their 'modem law', including the growing power of other forms of 
social ordering. 1145 Hunt has observed that developments evident in sociological 
jurisprudence by mid-century: 
... marked the close of the development of Western jurisprudence ... [What] came 
after [was] concerned to find new ways of expressing this 'same' solution to the 
legitimacy of the legal and social order. 1146 
Very much the same can be said of developments in modem American law following 
the post-war experience of legal aid. The social prominence of its 'ideals' in the 
1960s was an indicator of the declining social hegemony of the system of legal 
ordering 'engineered' by the modem American legal system. It was a final attempt 
to defend a social construction of 'law' and 'legal system' which no longer 
effectively fulfilled its modem functions in social governance. The capacity of legal 
scholars, judges and lawyers to convincingly 'reinvent' or adapt the social 
construction of 'modem Anglo-American law' was exhausted. The post-war 
experience of 'legal aid' had signalled the final demise of the modem phase of social 
ordering officially orchestrated by the parties to the liberal legal centralist alliance. 
By 1970, "the great quinqueMium ... of reform and concern in the area of legal aid" 
was over. 1147 The focus of legal reform in the United States had shifted to addressing 
the problem of "representing group and collective - diffuse - interests other than 
those of the poor".1141 For liberal legalist scholars like Cappelletti and Garth, this 
new focus was part "of a worldwide movement" towards representing "important 
public policy issues involving large groups of people" through "public law" 
litigation".'"9 Representing 'diffuse interests' demanded 'mass procedures' and was 
said to have "forced a rethinking of very basic traditional notions of civil procedure 
and the role of the courts. " 11.so The new focus of reform was also said to generate an 
increasingly popular edge to the control of civil procedure, allowing "private 
individuals and groups to act as champions of diffuse interests", thereby impacting 
upon the modern role of the courts, judges and lawyers. More importantly, 
according to the liberal legalists, these reforms were followed by a new and broader 
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'wave' of reforms to the modem legal systems of post-war Western society - the so-
called "access to justice approach". 1151 
The political background of this new phase of the Western post-war response to 
'access to law' does not concern us here, and is pursued in the Australian context in 
Chapter Eight. 1152 Whatever the originating politics of 'access to justice' in the 
United States, in the 1970s and 1980s its modem legal system and 'engineers' of 
centralist law explored: 
... a wide-variety of reforms, including change in form~ of procedure, changes in the 
structure of courts or the creation of new courts, the use of laypersons both on the 
bench and in the bar, modifications in the substantive law designed to avoid disputes 
or to facilitate their resolution, and the use of private or informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms. us3 
These new legal developments changed the politics of the legal domain in post-war 
American society. The 'old' modem assumptions about the role and functions of 
courts, judges, lawyers and judicial-types of centralist law came increasingly under 
challenge. •Alternative dispute resolution' and its informal modes of ordering was 
officially sanctioned within the legal system, increasing the diversity of the central 
legal domain. The social significance of modem centralist-types of law of all kinds 
declined, in the face of the resurgence of 'lesser' forms of legal ordering, thereby 
according a more plural type of ordering. Generally, the modem configurations of 
law and legal regulation in the United States shifted, and saw the emergence of new 
legal ideologies, as Galanter describes: 
We shifted from the centripetal image (implicit in the idea of "access to justice") of 
courts as resolvers of those disputes which come before them, to a centrifugal image 
of courts as one component of a complex system of disputing and regulation. In that 
system, couns (and other official institutions) are not the only sources of normative 
messages, just as they are not the only arenas in which controls are directly applied. 
We must examine the couns in the context of their rivals and companions. To do so 
we must put aside our habitual perspective of "legal centralism," a picture in which 
state agencies (and their learning) occupy the center of legal life and stand in a relation 
of hierarchic control ... to other, lesser nonnative orderings such as the family, the 
corporation, the business network. ll5-I 
In the other Anglo-American societies, the results of the 'litmus test' were different. 
The post-war prominence of 'legal aid' signalled the essential integrity of the modem 
'bargain' between governments, the courts, judges, the organised legal profession 
and lawyers. In the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, the parties to the national versions 
of the liberal legal centralist alliance in Australia, Britain and Canada retained their 
modern mutuality. The hegemony of the social construction of 'modem Anglo-
American law' and its governmental configurations had not been assailed, as it had 
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in post-war America. Nor, as we have seen, had these societies undergone 
comparable experiences in the 'reconstruction' of the social efficacy of 'law' through 
developments in sociological jurisprudence. In Australia in the mid-l 970s, for 
instance, 'analytical', asocial, 'apolitical' jurisprudence remained the paradigm of 
judicial reasoning, and of social expectations of the courts and judges. rn' The legal 
profession and lawyers, moreover retained their control of the systems of civil 
justice, and there were few discernible changes to the politics of modern law, either • 
in the central legal domain or in pluralism. Thus, 'legal aid' really served to 
demonstrate the stability or continuity of modern legal ordering. 
This was to prove to be an illusion, as we demonstrate below in the Australian 
context in unravelling the origins of its 'problems' in 'access to justice' in the 1980s, 
and the state response. Administrative law and its modes of ordering had already 
assumed a greater public significance with the expansion of the post-war welfare 
state. Moreover, by the early 1970s, as we discuss in Chapter Eight, an economic 
'crisis' in the Western economy was pending. '"6, This would produce changes in the 
political economy, public policy and functions of legal regulation in the English-
speaking welfare states. However, at the time of the post-war experience of legal 
aid, the modem configurations of law and government were substantially intact in 
the Anglo-American societies outside the United States. 
The 'Benefit' of Revisiting the Post-War Experience 
Revisiting the post-war experience of legal aid has shown it to be a complex 
phenomenon. However, we already knew this before we revisited its origins and 
significance in this chapter. Part I of the thesis showed how the Australian post-war 
scheme originated in an amalgam of social factors, including the fading of the 
existing legal aid schemes, changes since the late 1950s in the political economy of 
the legal profession, acknowledgment of the social entrenchment of poverty and 
developments in public policy. 1157 Moreover, the legal aid literature, save for its 
cruder and less considered liberal legalist components, had alerted us to the presence 
of links between the post-war experience and social change, politics and government 
in the welfare state. This was especially true of the majority of the contributors to 
the explanatory literature reviewed above. ma Furthermore, Chapter Six had 
illustrated the diversity and complexity of the social and political forces which 
shaped the transition of the poor persons institutions into modem legal aid.'m 
What, then, has been the 'benefit' of the analysis in this chapter? How has it 'added 
\•alue to' our understanding of the origins and significance of the post-war 
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experience? The chapter began by 'de-constructing' "the post-war experience" into 
its two phenomenological elements: the establishment of the post-war legal aid 
schemes and the social prominence of the Anglo-American 'legal aid' ideals. This 
'separation' employed the explanatory model of the origins of modem legal aid 
developed in Chapter Six, and parts of its revised analytical framework. It provided 
a new 'sorting table' on which to throw the 'fleece' of legal aid, to examine its 
origins and significance. Thus, the first 'benefit' of the analysis in this chapter was 
its new analytical assumptions and methodology. It provided a means of 'seeing' the 
post-war experience in a fresh light, not available from the perspectives of the 
existing explanatory frameworks. 
So, what then, are the insights offered by this alternative methodology? In the first 
place, the analysis in the chapter confirmed the social complexity of the post-war 
experience. What we knew at the beginning was even clearer at the end. Indeed, the 
origins and significance of the post-war experience were shown to be even more 
complex than we imagined. Secondly, the alternative methodology applied in the 
chapter has offered us important new insights into the post-war experience of legal 
aid. It has shown that to explore its origins is to descend into the maze of the modem 
\Vestern legal domain. Acknowledging the dual aspects of the post-war experience 
took us first into the politics of public policy in the participant welfare states to 
explain the origins of the post-war schemes. It then carried us into the post-war 
politics of the modern legal systems, 'law' and social governance in the Anglo-
American welfare states. And finally the inquiry into the origins of the social 
prominence of Anglo-American 'legal aid' elsewhere in Western society moved into 
the international realm of its post-war legal domain. In various ways, the post-war 
experience was shown to originate in the politics of law in the modem state and its 
schemes of legal regulation in post-war Western society. In this respect, therefore, it 
was an 'experience' of legal aid not unlike its origins in the modem Western legal 
systems, or its initial modem development through the transition of the poor persons 
schemes. An 'experience' which in this case was located within the politics of law in 
the participant welfare states, and the wider politics of the Western legal domain. 
Applying an alternative methodology has also produced new 'benefits' for 
understanding the origins of the post-war experier::e. They are, however, something 
of a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the 'story' which emerges from revisiting its 
origins overcomes the shortcomings of the existing explanatory literature discussed 
earlier. 1160 By adopting the explanatory base and 'tools' developed in Chapter Six, 
this chapter has factored in the political dimensions of law 'missing' from those 
analytical frameworks, i.e., the contributors' neglect of modem legal plurality, the 
presence of the modem Western legal domain and the modem dynamics of centralist 
law. 1161 In doing so, it has produced a 'story' which, whilst more complicated, is 
nevertheless far more consonant with the modem political reality of law in the 
Western world. This was a positive 'benefit' of having revisited the origins of the 
post-war experience. 
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On the other hand, factoring in its political dimensions also produced negative 
'benefits'. Acknowledging these dimensions highlights limits implicit in our 
capacity to explain the origins of the post-war experience. In the first place, it 
demonstrates what we cannot 'know'. Locating the post-war schemes in the public 
policy of the participant welfare capitalist states renders them subject to the 
explanatory brake identified in the revised analytical framework. 1162 As such, we can 
make the background decision-making process more transparent, as we have done in 
this chapter. However, aspects of this process will inevitably always remain 
inexplicable, for the reasons which the Public Policy scholars and ReMer adverted 
to. Secondly; the chapter has highlighted the limitations on generalising the origins 
of the post-war experience across the Western world. The post-war schemes and the 
social prominence of the Anglo-American 'legal aid' ideals had distinctive national 
origins. Thus, whilst cross-national comparison and theorising is useful and 
informative, each society has its own particular 'story'. Thirdly, the chapter has 
highlighted the fact that there is yet more to 'know' and 'learn' about the respective 
national experiences. Questions will remain to be asked, and new answers 'found', 
until we rehearse their origins in greater detail with the aid of the analytical methods 
of Public Policy which we described in Chapter Six. 1163 
Revisiting the post-war experience has also provided insights into its significance. 
The chapter demonstrated the post-war experience was significant for other reasons 
than 'helping the poor' in the participant welfare states. We 'knew' - or at least 
strongly suspected - that this was so. In different ways, Abel, Alcock, Blankenburg, 
Cousins and Regan had already indicated the diverse significance of the post-war 
schemes}16-I In this respect, therefore, the 'value added' aspects of the chapter are 
marginal. In dissecting the various interests of poorer people, the welfare state and 
its organs, and lawyers and the legal profession in the post-war schemes, it had, 
however, heightened our sense of social ambiguity in understanding the significance 
of the post-war experience. 
Nevertheless, amidst these 'political' insights, we must be careful not to diminish the 
significance of the post-war experience for poorer people and their legal problems. 
The post-war schemes reorganised legal aid and generalJy increased the volume, 
quality and accessibility of publicly-funded legal services in the participant welfare 
states. Moreover, across the Western world, the post-war experience highlighted the 
goals and ideals of citizens' 'access to law', and promoted the values of social 
citizenship. Politically, these related developments contributed to a climate of 
systemic reform, which encouraged and promoted improved effective popular access 
to national legal systems in the Western world. 
However, the 'benefits' of revisiting the significance of the post-war experience goes 
beyond confirming the 'political' insights of the explanatory literature. The chapter 
has shown that, whilst the post-war experience 'helped the poor', it ended, in the 
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words of Bankowski and Mungham, by "helping law much more, by increasing its 
domination-legitimacy.""" To quote from these authors in this context is to take 
some liberties. The analyses in this chapter proceeded from the various premises of 
the revised analytical framework in Chapter Six, and not the legal centralist 
perspective of Marxism. Moreover, its interpretation of the significance of the social 
prominence of the Anglo-American 'legal aid' ideals did not claim the post-war 
experience was an unqualified 'victory' for inodem Western centralist law ancl its 
ideals. Indeed, in the case of the United States, the chapter adopted a contrary 
position, arguing that its post-war experience of legal aid indicated a decline in the 
social significance of 'modem American law'. 
Nevertheless, the polemics of Bankowski and Mungham serve to radically portray 
"what trying to solve the problems of the world with the help of law and men with 
'lawyer-like' skills really means"."" The 'problems' ostensibly sought to be solved 
by Western governments in the post-war experience of legal aid were the legal 
problems of their poorer citizens. The 'equipment' which they used was their 
modern legal systems and its social constructions of 'modem Western law'. One 
outcome was, as we have shown, to 'help' the poorer citizens of the participant 
welfare states, with some 'flow on', indirect effects for other poor people in the 
\Vestem world. The other outcome was to 'help' the legal systems and 'modem law' 
of post-war Western society. This was the major and lasting outcome of the post-
war experience of legal aid. Revisiting its significance in this chapter has allowed us 
to identify three different and important reasons why this was so. 
In the first place, the post-war experience increased and reinforced the scale and 
scope of the machinery of the modern legal systems in the Western world. In this 
respect, its significance for the interests of centralist law was negligible. The modem 
\Vestem legal systems were already large and socially pervasive, and the new legal 
aid schemes did not increase their size or social penetration to any significant degree. 
They merely added to the existing accumulation of Western legal technology. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the post-war experience served to reinforce the 
global significance of modem Western centralist law and its institutions. Its legal aid 
schemes - and the associated new prominence of the Anglo-American 'legal aid' 
ideal - formed part, as we have seen, of the projection and transfer of modem 
Western styles of legal ordering into the de-colonising and developing countries of 
the post-war world. 
Thirdly, the post-war experience of legal aid promoted the interests of the liberal 
legal centralist alliance - the political epicentre of 'modem Anglo-American law' and 
its associated configurations of social governance. It saw, in the case of the United 
States, the defence of the alliance against external threats to its modem hegemony. 
In the other Anglo-American welfare states, the new social prominence of 'legal aid' 
served to consolidate the integrity of the alliance, and the political interests of 
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governments and the JegaJ profession in maintaining the modem social construction 
of 'law'. 'Outside' the Anglo-American welfare states, the post-war experience 
served to project their Common Law version of 'modem law' and its court focused, 
lawyer administered ideals of 'legal system' and social ordering throughout the post-
war Western legal domain. 
Thus, the real significance of the post-war experience was that it advanced the social 
imperium of modem Western centralist law. It enhanced the dominion of centralist 
types of law in Western countries, and increased the global dominion of 'modem 
Western law', predominantly through the projection of the ideals of 'Anglo-
American law'. This was its most significant and lasting outcome, far exceeding any 
short-term benefits it conferred on poorer people. 
However, in adapting the polemics of Bankowski and Mungham we are not obliged 
to adopt their driving premise that the state legal system is solely an instrument of 
ruling class oppression, or their nihilist conclusion that social reform through its Jaw 
is ultimately a "waste of time". 1167 Neither the modem Western legal systems nor 
their law are such singular inventions. Nor can we sensibly attribute to either such a 
singular objective - the "operation [of a modem legal system] is a complex thing: its 
personnel act in different ways and for different motives". 1168 In any event, to claim 
that the real significance of the post-war experience was that it 'helped' the interests 
of modern centralist law more than those of the 'poor' is not as outrageous as it may 
first appear. The raison d'etre of the modern Western legal systems was not to 
ameliorate the plight of the 'poor' or to provide them with 'access' to its courts and 
lav.11ers. It was instead the legal regulation of modern capitalist society, where the 
interests of its poorer citizens were never paramount. As an Australian Attorney-
General lamented in 1943, "in the field of law, from time immemorial the social 
structure has always been so weighted that the poor are at a disadvantage when 
opposed by the wealthy and powerful''. 1169 
However, the actual operation of the modem Western legal systems cannot be said to 
have so consistently disadvantaged poorer and ordinary people. Certainly, their 
poorer citizens have suffered large-scale exclusion from the courts, or, at least, those 
courts with the capacity to 'engineer' or encourage social and political reform. 
Similarly, save for the interventions of legal aid, they have largely been denied 
adequate access to lawyers, or to lawyers with comparable skills to those who serve 
the •rich'. Moreover, the prevailing tendency of the legal institutions of the modern 
state has been against facilitating or protecting the interests of poorer people. On the 
other hand, the modern legal systems have not been solely concerned with 
procedural justice or with deploying courts and lawyers as agents of social mediation 
and reform. The principal agents of reform have been governments, using social 
welfare and economic policies, administrative law and legislation to pursue a greater 
degree of social justice as between 'rich' and 'poor'. The legal system has been used 
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with the intention of ameliorating and improving the social well-being of poorer 
people, while simultaneously serving the 'rich' and powerful. It has, moreover, been 
used to administer access to the various material benefits in education, health, 
welfare, wage regulation, employment and public infrastructure which the welfare 
state has distributed to its citizens. 
Conclusion 
It remains to consider how this chapter has contributed to the three objectives 
defined at the beginning of Part II. The first objec"tive was to complete the 
explanatory 'gap' in our understanding of the origins of the Australian post-war 
experience and its social significance. In Chapter Five, we noted that this 'gap' arose 
because the institutional and ideological record portrayed in Part I explained 
developments in legal aid in a 'legal' context, i.e., it explained the 'story' of legal aid 
within the schema and ideals of the modern Australian legal system. Thus, we 
concluded that it was not possible to adequately explain either the origins of the 
scheme or its significance in Australian society 'within' this self-referential 
framework. 1170 We also concluded that the 'gap' could not be overcome merely by 
adding the other originating factors identified in Chapters Four and Five to the 
explanatory equation. For neither the ideological context of the Australian 
experience nor the background political actors, forces and events of 1973-76 
contested the role and functions of 'modern Australian law'. 1171 
This chapter has remedied the explanatory 'gap' in our understanding of the 
Australian post-war experience. Its 'revisiting' of the cross-national experience has 
sho\\n its national scheme to have similar origins to the post-war legal aid schemes 
in comparable welfare capitalist states. The originating factors identified in Chapters 
Four and Five, i.e., the post-war changes and trends in public policy, politics, the 
legal profession, and the lawyers' services industry, played an important background 
role. As did the presence and social penetration of the liberal legal centralist 
alliance, and the success of governments and the legal profession in dictating the 
construction of 'law' in Australian society in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. 
Similarly, the more immediate background forces in the politics associated with the 
embryonic national scheme in 1973-75 were also clearly influential. However, this 
chapter has shown that the catalyst in the post-war schemes was a change in public 
policy in the participant welfare states. The hopes and dreams of contemporary 
social refonners and lawyers played a part, but in the end the Australian post-war 
scheme as elsewhere was, as Regan explains: 
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citizens well-being by funding a range of welfare programs, including health, housing 
[and] income maintenance" .1172 
The pattern of significance in the Australian scheme was also similar to comparable 
societies. The welfare state, public administration, the organised legal profession 
and lawyers shared in its 'benefits'. So indisputably and importantly did poorer 
Australians, especially those in need of legal advice, duty lawyer services and lawyer • 
representation in family law and criminal law proceedings. However, as elsewhere 
in the Anglo-American world, the real and lasting 'beneficiary' of the post-war 
experience was the legal system and 'modem Australian law'. The national scheme 
'bolstered' the former, and consolidated the political interests behind the latter. The 
result was to demonstrate the continuing hegemony of governments, the courts, 
judges, the organised legal profession and lawyers in the regulation of mid-1970s 
Australian society. 
The second objective of Part II was to defend and explain the opening contention of 
the thesis, i.e., that revisiting the origins and significance of the post-war experience 
holds the key to determining whether fair and effective access to law is a feasible 
expectation of contemporary Australian society. This chapter has defended and 
explained this contention in three ways. In the first place, it located the origins of the 
national scheme in public policy thereby confirming its significance as an 
'intervention' or 'response' of the post-war welfare state. As we described in 
Chapter One, this •intervention' is conventionally interpreted as the first coordinated 
response of the Australian welfare state to the legal problems faced by its poorer 
citizens. In revisiting the post-war experience we have suggested the motives of the 
state were more diverse, and the significance of legal aid more socially ambiguous. 
In both interpretations, however, the national scheme was the 'product' of a 
coordinated state response, and thus its lessons are relevant to whatever future 
'interventions' governments might contemplate. Moreover, irrespective of the 
conclusions reached in this chapter, the national scheme continues to be perceived as 
a state •response' to improve 'access to law' by Australian governments and citizens 
alike. 
Secondly, the analysis in the chapter provided us with a 'profile' of the politics of 
law in Australian society in the mid-1970s. The 'profile' reveals a society which the 
liberal legal centralist alliance, its configurations of modern government and social 
construction of 'law' were paramount. Australia was very much a model of a 
modem society governed under the maxims of 'modem Anglo-American Jaw'. The 
•profile' also revealed a welfare state willing, for whatever combination of reasons, 
to 'intervene' in the legal services system to organise and subsidise lawyers' services 
to benefit its poorer citizens. Since the mid-l 970s, however, the social 
circumstances affecting the politics of law in Australia have changed. Judges and 
lawyers now enjoy a diminished hegemony, and governments appear to be neither as 
committed to the alliance nor to legal aid or its ideals. Yet, as we noted in Chapter 
One, there are ongoing and unresolved 'problems' in adequate provision of legal aid, 
1172 F Regan. above n 858 at S. 
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'access to law' and citizens' access to the legal system. By revisiting the post-war 
experience, and 'de-constructing' its origins and dissecting its significance, this 
chapter has articulated a 'benchmark' for understanding these new 'problems'. It has 
told us what Australian law was 'like' in the mid-1970s and 'why' Australian 
governments 'intervened' to administer a national legal aid scheme. We have a base 
from which to 'measure' what changed in the 1980s and early 1990s, and a political 
matrix in which to portray 'how' those changes occurred. Revisiting the post-war 
experience has provided an analytical platform fixed in time and space from which to 
consider the Australian 'access to justice' response. 
Thirdly, it has also provided us with an explanatory 'key' for unlocking the origins 
and significance of this second 'response' to the problems of 'access to law'. In 
Chapter Six, we first applied the analytical 'tools' of its revised analytical framework 
to develop an alternative explanation of the origins of modem legal aid. This chapter 
used those same 'tools' to reveal the 'benefits' of revisiting the post-war experience. 
In doing so, it demonstrated the 'value' of the revised analytical framework as an 
explanatory model of legal development and change. The social circumstances of 
the politics of 'access to law' in Australia may have changed since the 1970s, but not 
so the constitution of its welfare state, legal system or modem legal domain. The 
explanatory model of the revised analytical framework is prima facie equally 
applicable to examining the origins of the 'new' problems in 'access to law' in 
Australian society in the 1980s, and the significance of the federal 'access to justice' 
response of the early 1990s. Thus, through 'revisiting' in this chapter, we have 
equipped ourselves with an explanatory 'key' to pursue the lessons of the post-war 
experience of legal aid in the context of 'access to justice' in Part III below. 
Part III: 
The Lessons of the Post-War Experience 
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Chapter Eight 
Making the 'Access to Justice' 
Response Transparent 
In the past decade, Australia has experienced a fundamental restructuring and 
strengthening of the economy and a parallel strengthening of social justice and 
democratic rights. Australians have access to the fundamental social services of 
universal education and universal health care. W~ have a safety ~:.;t of social 
security benefits to sustain us through periods of unemployment or illness. We 
also have the right to income support when we are unable to work due to age or 
disability. In key areas of public life, equality of opportunity is protected by law. 
With the help of community education campaigns, the message is getting across 
that discrimination, whether at work or in other areas of public life, is unacceptable 
and will not be tolerated. Government policies across the whole spectrum of 
community life are oriented towards enabling our citizens to participate fully in the 
!if e o(!be..ruition. 
The Rt Hon Paul Keating, Prime Minister in Attorney-General's Department, The 
Justice Statement, (1995) at 1 
Introduction 
Part III proceeds to demonstrate 'why' and 'how' the lessons of re-visiting the post-
war experience enable us to better assess the feasibility of achieving fair and 
effective access to law. It begins by applying the insights, 'benchmarks' and 
analytical methodology of Part II to reconsider the origins of the new 'problems' in 
'access to justice', the jettisoning of the legal aid response and the significance of the 
'access to justice' response of the Keating Government. In doing so, Part III allows 
us to find answers to the remaining unanswered questions of the NLAAC report, i.e., 
those in the fourth category listed in Chapter One, which stemmed from its release in 
mid-1990. 1173 Part III concludes by briefly considering the implications of the thesis 
for the feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to law in the contemporary 
Australian welfare state. 
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This chapter begins by describing the circumstances in which the Keating 
Government decided to adopt an 'access to justice' approach in 1993. It outlines the 
reasons behind the decision, and how the AJAC construed its task as an investigatory 
committee. This first part of the chapter then contextualises the Australian response, 
noting its links with the 'access to justice' approach as defined by Cappelletti and 
Garth and other liberal scholars. It also reminds us of the demonstrated 
shortcomings of liberal analyses of legal developments in the welfare state and 
highlights the paradoxes in the justifications advanced by the Keating Government to 
adopt an 'access to justice' policy. 
The chapter then proceeds to demonstrate 'why' and 'how' the lessons of revisiting 
the post-war experience of legal aid enable us to better assess the feasibility of 
achieving fair and effective access to law. It begins by exploring the wider social 
context of the conclusion reached in Chapter Seven that the post-war experience 
indicated the integrity of the liberal legal centralist alliance, and the continued 
hegemony of its 'law' and actors in Australian society. This part of the chapter 
defends the proposition that the period from the mid-1970s until the early 1980s saw 
the twilight of the modern configurations of Australian law and government. 
There~fter, as the following part demonstrates, Australian society saw the fissuring 
of these configurations, through the sea change in the political economy of the 
welfare state in the mid-1980s, the reorganisation of the welfare state and growing 
state intervention in the affairs of the legal profession. 
The result was to change the politics of law in Australian society. The chapter 
demonstrates 'how' and 'why' this occurred, by reference to the fragmenting of the 
liberal legal cenr .·alist alliance, the emergence of new paradigms of Jaw and 
government, changes to the politics of the central legal domain and the dilution of 
social citizenship. It then continues to explain how portraying these legal 
transformations in the 'new' Australian welfare state of the late 1980s and early 
1990s allows us to give greater transparency to the 'access to justice' response. 
The final part of the chapter identifies the real and ongoing problems in popular 
access to the legal system, and the popular and other perceptions of its growing 
inaccessibility which lay behind the new 'problems' in 'access to justice' in 
Australi1n society. It also reviews the reasons 'why' the Keating Government acted, 
both to adopt an 'access to justice' response and to jettison the legal aid response, 
which Australian governments had pursued as the premier national policy of access 
to law since the mid-1970s. Jn coing so, the analysis in the chapter suggests that the 
government and its advisers acted from mixed motives, some of which genuinely 
pursued the social ideals of 'modem Australian law', and other less noble motives 
consistent with the principles of social governance in the 'new' Australian welfare 
state. The chapter concludes by considering some of the implications of this new 
transparency. 
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The 'Access to Justice' Response 
As Chapter One first indicated, the 'access to justice9 response was the second 
response of the post-war welfare state to facilitating citizens' access to the legal 
system. In 1993, the Keating Government commissioned the AJAC to recommend 
refonns to legal services to "enhance access to justice and to render the system fairer, 
more efficient and more effective."1174 In part, its decision reflected the impact of the 
new consciousness of the cost of legal transactions and the socio-economic 
significance of adequate access to legal services, which had emerged in Australia in 
the mid-I 980s. 1175 The decision also reflected a growing public perception that it was 
no longer just the 'poor' who were disadvantaged by inadequate access to the legal 
system, but increasing numbers of "average income Australians". 1176 The pursuit of 
an 'access to justice' response also reflected the political interest which these issues 
had attracted nationally - especially in the Senate - and the resulting 'Cost of Justice' 
inquiry.1177 However, the Keating Government had its own concerns, as its Minister 
of Justice revealed when establishing the AJAC, referring to: 
. . . the pressing need to address the "crisis of confidence" in the institutions 
fundamental to the rule of law in a democratic society. Opinion polls in Australia had 
suggested a "corrosion of faith" in the integrity of most of our social, corporate, 
economic and political institutions. In his view, public cynicism had extended to the 
very institutions at the hean of the justice system - the legal profession and the 
judiciary. The Minister argued that the erosion of public confidence in the legal 
profession and the judiciary is a matter of critical importance, since: 
"the rule of law can, in the end, only be maintained if it rests on the absolute confidence 
and support of the people. The people must believe that the justice system will given them 
a fair hearing, that rules and procedures will be simple and work in the interests of justice, 
not against it, and that the law will be applied without fear or favour to the strong and the 
weak alike."1171 
These institutional 'crises' were not the government's only concern. The 1993-94 
social justice strategy of the Keating Government recorded its belief that all 
"Australians deserve a fair deal from the justice system ... Access to law and justice 
should be fair, simple and affordable". 1119 These latter concerns were shared by the 
AJAC itself. Its members, in describing the purpose of the inquiry and the approach 
they pursued in their investigations, said: 
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access to justice should attempt to achieve [arc] equality of access to legal services ... 
national equity [and] equality before the law."1180 
In other words, the AJAC interpreted its role in the 'access to justice' inquiry in 
terms of the iC.eals of 'modem Anglo-Australian law' and the liberal legalist ideals 
which were abroad elsewhere in the post-war Western world. In both contexts, 
'access to justice' was used to describe the "two basic purposes" of the modern 
Western national legal systems: one, they "must be equally accessible to all; and, 
two, their processes must lead to results that are individually and socially just"1111 
Contextualising the 'Access to Justice' Response 
How can we explain the origins of the 'access to justice' response in the context of 
the welfare state? Why did the Federal Government take this action? Why did it 
adopt an 'access to justice' approach, given the mid-1970s rhetoric of its 
predecessors supporting 'legal aid' and the relative success of the national scheme in 
the I 980s?1112 
There is one explanation which is consistent with the ideals of promoting fair and 
effective citizens' access to law evident in Commonwealth social justice strategy and 
with the objectives identified by the AJAC. We could say that the early 1990s were 
the time when the "access-to-justice approach" made its first appearance in 
Australian society. 1183 For Cappelletti and the many Western scholars who 
subscribed to his global study in the late-I 970s, this 'approach' marked the 'third 
wave' of post-war reforms taking Western societies towards equal and effective 
access to law. 1114 Like legal aid, which had been the 'first wave', the 'access to 
justice' approach was said to have originated in the new social regimes in pre-war 
Western society defining citizens' 'rights' and legitimate expectations of 
fundamental well-being. 11" 
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, according to Cappelletti and Garth, some 
governments recognised many of these basic 'rights' and made them legally 
enforceable. Official transformation gave renewed significance to the problem of 
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mass inequality in popular access to the modern legal systems of the post-war 
welfare states. For effective access was pivotal, if these new, fundamental legal 
rights were to be socially effective. Consequently, Western countries are said to 
have begun to recognise the existence of effective 'access to justice' as "the most 
basic requirement - the most basic "human right" - of a modem, egalitarian legal 
system which purports to guarantee, and not merely proclaim, the legal rights of 
all". 1186 • 
As a contextual option, the 'access to justice' approach was - like its predecessors -
seen as concerned with bridging the 'gap' between citizens and law. Its approach 
differed, however, from both legal aid and public advocacy in its conception of the 
causes of the 'gap' and the remedies available. The 'access to justice' approach did 
not identify the financial cost and accessibility of lawyers' services as the sole cause 
of the problems in fair and effective access to law in post-war Western societies. 
Whilst embracing "the earlier approaches", the 'access to justice' approach went 
"much beyond [them] ... thus representing an attempt to attack access barriers in a 
more articulate and cl)n1prehensive manner". 1117 The 'access to justice' approach 
was, as Cappelletti describes, "a multi-faceted response to perhaps the most basic 
challenge of our modern legal systems ... who has access to that justice system, i.e., 
'justice for whom?"'1111 
The AJAC inquiry did indeed take a multi-faceted approach. Its report traversed the 
lawyers' services market, information for consumers, regulation of legal costs, 
contingency fees, professional complaints and discipline, tax deductibility of legal 
costs, legal aid refonns, alternative funding for litigation, dispute resolution outside 
the courts, court reform, including fees, civil procedures, criminal proceedings, dress 
and the electronic media, legislation and harmonisation of laws affecting access to 
justice.1119 Therefore, it is open to us to explain the origins of the Australian response 
in the context of the 'access to justice' approach model. If we accept Cappelletti and 
Garth's time table, this response took place some I 0 or 15 years later than other 
\Vestern societies, where the 'access to justice' approach was first evident in the 
early 1970s. But post-war Australian society was also 'behind' with legal aid, so 
lateness in itself does not disqualify the 'access to justice' approach as an 
explanatory model. 
However, explaining the 'access to justice' response as the moment when the 'third 
wave' of a post-war movement towards equal access to law hit Australia is 
unconvincing. As an explanatory model, the 'access to justice' approach originates 
from the same 'stable' as the liberal legalist and legal centralist accounts of the post-
war experience of legal aid. Therefore, for the reasons we outlined in Chapter Six, it 
is an inadequate contextual model, i.e., the analytical framework of the 'access to 
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justice' approach is apolitical, acontextual and ignores the politics of modem law in 
the welfare state. 1190 
Furthermore, in the Australian context, the model is also unconvincing because the 
'access to justice' response had paradoxical features. The extract from the 
ministerial statement establishing the AJAC above revealed the Keating Government 
as primarily concerned with institutional problems - "a crisis of confidence in the 
institutions fundamental to the rule of Jaw"- in Australian society. 1191 The Australian 
people were .said to have 'lost faith' in the "integrity of most of [its] social, 
corporate, economic and political institutions."1192 In particular, the Minister for 
Justice believed that the public had become cynical about the role of "the very 
institutions at the heart of the justice system - the legal profession and the 
judiciary". 1191 
Therein lies the paradox of the Australian experience. Ostensibly, the 'access to 
justice' response was aimed at improving the quality of citizens' access to the legal 
system, yet at the same time the government appeared to doubt the social efficacy of 
the key institutions of its system of civil and criminal justice - the courts - and the 
judges and the legal profession. The latter were not only the principal 'performers' 
in the justice system and the courts, but they had also acted as the stage managers 
and entrepreneurs of 'modem Australian law'. Even more importantly, they had also 
served as the intimate 'legal' allies of modem Australian governments. The 
Minister's statement, moreover, was even more remarkable because it contained 
more than a hint that the judges and the legal profession were somehow culpable or 
blameworthy in the institutional 'crises' afflicting Australian society. This fact may 
account for the often ambivalent attitude of the latter towards the government's 
response and the AJAC report. 
Thus, the Australian 'access to justice' response had two aspects. First, there was the 
desire of the Keating Government to improve equality in citizens' 'access to justice', 
and fairness and accessibility in the legal system. The other aspect was its 
perception of a 'crisis' in the institutions of Australian society. A 'crisis' which the 
Keating Government identified with a failure in the social performance of courts, 
judges and the legal profession. Consequently, we must understand both these 
aspects of the 'access to justice' response, if we are to explain its origins in the 
context of the early 1990s Australian welfare state. 
The explanatory 'key' to the 'access to justice' response lies in the post-war 
experience of legal aid, as we explained regarding its origins and significance in Part 
II. In particular, revisiting the post-war experience provided us with 'benchmarks' of 
the 'condition' of the politics of law in the mid-l 970s, and with a model of legal 
development or change in the welfare state. We can deploy these 'tools' to 
1190 
1191 
1192 
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investigate the changes in the politics of Australian law in the 1980s and to render 
the adoption of the 'access to justice' response more transparent. 
The Twilight of the Modern Configurations of Law 
In Part II, we showed that the post-war experience of legal aid functioned as a 
'litmus test' of the integrity of the Australian version of the liberal legal centralist 
alliance.1194 It measured the 'health' or vitality of two central components in the legal 
regulation of the post-war welfare state. The first was the alliance between the state, 
the courts and the legal profession, which we have identified as the basis of the 
construction of 'law' in modem Australian society!'" The post-war experience 
indicated that the core elements of the liberal legal centralist alliance - its social 
construction of 'law' and 'delegation' of the administration of civil and criminal 
justice to the legal profession - were essentially intact. The establishment of the 
national scheme necessitated some 'internal' readjustment in the relationship 
between the parties. It saw Australian governments intervene in the provision of 
lawyers' services, an arena which was originally 'agreed' to be the realm of the legal 
profession. However, this intervention, whilst unprecedented in scale and intent, did 
not significantly disturb professional control over the delivery of lawyers' services, 
or the role of lawyers in the political economy of the welfare state. The second 
central component which the post-war experience 'tested' was the hegemony of 
'modern Australian law'. The 'test' revealed that its court-centred, lawyer-
administered paradigms remained the dominant and omnipresent conceptions of 
'law' in mid- l 970s Australian society. 
However, neither the alliance, its 'distribution' of responsibility for legal services nor 
its social construction of 'law' existed in isolation. The alliance and its political 
relationships were imbricated in the overall configuration of modem law and 
government, including its legal system, the administration of government and social 
governance. The mid-l 970s Australian system of government remained monarchical 
and parliamentary, its citizens subjects of the British Crown, living under the 'rule of 
law' in a democratic society administered by state officials in the public interest, 
whose actions were supervised by the courts. Consequently, in reaffirming the social 
significance of the alliance and its 'law', the post-war experience was also 'testing' 
this system. The 'test' demonstrated the integrity of its configurations of modem law 
and government and affirmed the continuing significance of its regulatory and civic 
relationships in mid-1970s Australian society. However, in Chapter Seven we 
warned that the post-war experience of legal aid was the zenith of the liberal legal 
centralist alliance. 1196 The alliance was not alone. The years immediately following 
the establishment of the national scheme also proved to be the Indian Summer of the 
modem configurations of law and government in the Australian welfare state. 
1196 
Above at pp 228-229. 
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245 
The changes which brought about this decline were not immediately obvious. In the 
late 1970s, there were no dramatic changes to the constitution of the core institutions 
of the Australian legal system. Neither were there to be any such changes in the 
1980s. In fact, both the Whitlam and Fraser Federal Governments had sought to 
enhance the operation of the national legal system. The former, as we saw in 
Chapter Five, was distinguished by its interest in law reform. 1197 During its term of 
office, there were a number of significant changes, including the establishment of a 
Commonwealth law reform commission in 1973.11111 Three years later, the Fraser 
Government created a new superior federal court, and later streamlined the existing, 
archaic process of judicial review of federal administrative action. 1199 By 1983, it had 
also introduced an ombudsman and freedom of information legislation. 1200 National 
interest in 'improving' the legal system was mirrored in the States, where, in some 
cases, coordinated programs of law reform had been underway since the late 
1960s.1201 
Furthermore, the size and scope of the Australian legal system had continued to 
grow. Its growth was in part a product of new directions in Commonwealth social 
polices and functions. In 1973-75, the new national social welfare programs 
introduced by the Whitlam Government had increased the size and functions of 
Commonwealth departments and agencies. 1202 Try as it might, the Fraser 
Government was unable to significantly reduce the scale of the 'social' machinery of 
the federal welfare state during its six year tenure. 1203 However, the growth in the 
legal system was not only a product of expanded social welfare provision. 
Commonwealth intervention in national economic affairs grew steadily throughout 
the 1970s, adding to the regulatory apparatus of the post-war welfare state.1?CM 
Increasingly, moreover, governments deployed executive, regulatory, commodity, 
service agencies, research bodies and advisory bodies as instruments of regulation 
and administration. 120' 
However, all was not as it appeared to be. In the first place, there was a major 
element of 'catch-up' in these 'improvements' to the legal system, especially in the 
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early to mid-l 970s. In the case of the Whitlam administration, many of its law 
reform initia~1ves responded to the neglect of previous post-war Federal 
governments. 1206 Changes to reflect new styles of legal regulation appropriate to the 
requirements of government in post-war society were necessary and overdue, not 
only in social welfare, like legal aid and family law, but also in business. The 1960s 
had been a decade of significant change in the national ecopomy. 1207 'Much was 
required to be done to achieve effective public intervention in the legal regulation of 
business activity in Australian welfare capitalism.1208 Other 'improvements' to the 
legal system in the mid-I 970s - like the establishment. of the Federal Court, the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and the Ombudsman Act 
1976 - had their genesis either in the 1960s or early in the l 970s. 1209 
Furthermore, the new, national 'social' functions of the welfare state simply meant 
that Australia had 'caught-up' with post-war developments in comparable welfare 
capitalist societies. Countries like England, The Netherlands and the United States 
had already significantly increased national expenditure on social security, health, 
education and legal aid. Neither was the emphasis on administrative law and its 
institutions in the legal system in the 1970s a novel development. Legal regulation 
for the purposes of the welfare state had been a feature of modem Australian law and 
government since the 1880s. 1210 Nor was this the first time that it had so rapidly 
grown in size and significance. Comparable developments had occurred in 1941-45, 
even if fading somewhat in social significance at the end of the war, and in the late 
1940s and early l 950s.1m 
Secondly, almost as soon as it had left its legal imprint on Australian society, the 
mid- l 970s version of the post-war welfare state began its long retreat. One reason 
for this was that the expansion of its social functions in 1973-75 had coincided with 
the end of the great period of economic growth in the post-war Western world. 1211 In 
Australia - and many welfare capitalist states - the result was a reassessment of the 
direction of public policy, the role of the state and existing commitments to social 
expenditure. 1113 Reassessment did not always or inevitably mean retreat from public 
expenditure and the functions of the post-war welfare states, but it did so in 
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Australia. 1214 Since the first days of the Fraser Government in late 1975, the constant 
refrain of Australian governments has been one of 'cuts' in public spending and of 
reductions in public functi~ns. 
Indeed, the post-1975 experience of the national legal aid scheme instances these 
processes of retreat and reassessment. The 1976 inter-governmental agreement 
reflected the 'new Federalism' of the Fraser Government. This was a plan designed 
to limit Commonwealth expenditure and spread governmental functions amongst the 
States. 1m Moreover, the subsequent history of Commonwealth involvement in the 
national scheme demonstrates that it was no longer willing to perform the central 
management and policy-making role envisaged in the inter-governmental 
agreements. 1216 In the late 1970s, the Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission was 
never able to fulfil the supervisory role contemplated by its constituent legislation, 
being constantly plagued with infrastructure, staffing and funding problems. These 
problems were symptomatic of a reassessment of the Commonwealth commitment to 
involvement in the national scheme. When the Commission was abolished in 1981, 
its role was a:;sumed by a succession of statutory committees, comprised of part-time 
members, with ever-diminishing resources and real functions. 1217 
By the early 1980s, Federal Governments had abandoned any pretension at 
perfonning a central management role in national legal aid. Instead, their attentions 
were focused, through a series of reconfigured administrative organs in the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department, upon managing and controlling 
expenditure. In 1983, the Hawke Government established a task force to "examine 
legal aid delivery in all States and Territories to ensure that, where practicable, there 
is uniformity of approach and that cost-effective practices are employed in relation to 
Commonwealth-funded legal aid."1211 In itself, this was not an undesirable 
development. There were 'open-ended' aspects to the first Commonwealth-State 
agreements, which maJe it difficult for Federal Governments to monitor expenditure 
in the national scheme. 1219 But problems in monitoring expenditure also meant 
problems in control, and controlling Commonwealth expenditure in the national 
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scheme became the preoccupation of its managing officials and Federal 
Governments. 1220 
Thirdly, the period from the mid-1970s until the early 1980s also saw shifts in the 
politics of modern Australian law. These changes were not apparent in the 
machinery of the legal system or the retreat of the welfar~ state. They were, 
however, at least equally important in signalling a movement away from the modem 
configurations of law and government in Australian society. One arena of change 
was the legal domain. The expansion of the legal system associated with the growth 
of the welfare state saw a corresponding increase in the significance of modem 
centralist law. This increase, however, occurred largely at the expense of its judicial-
types of law. The 'weapons of choice' of the welfare state - in Australia as 
elsewhere - are legislative and administrative types of centralist law. In the 1970s, 
the volume of legislation and administrative law in Australian society dramatically 
increased. The national legal aid scheme, and its legislative structures and financial 
and other eligibility guidelines, was but a minor instance compared to the great 
legislative and administrative schemes in social security, taxation, health and 
education. 
The late 1970s also saw the beginnings of a reversal in the fortunes of administrative 
law, its legal system and modes of regulation. In judicial review proceedings and the 
interpretation of Commonwealth regulatoiy legislation, the actual tasks performed by 
the judges of the newly-constituted Federal Court were indistinguishable from the 
functions of other senior civil servants. It often became increasingly difficult for the 
judges to convincingly demarcate 'law', public administration and 'policy'. 
Furthermore, the 'new administrative law' of the 1970s - the changes to the 'legal' 
regulation of administrative action - was not only concerned with judicial review. 
The Whitlam Government had also introduced a federal administrative appeals 
tribunal. 1221 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal was incorporated into public 
administration - although presided over by a judge - and was empowered to review 
administrative decision-making on its 'merits', in accordance with 'the law', but not 
constrained by the ideology of judicial review. This further blurred the distinction 
bet\veen 'law' and 'administration' in modem Australian government. 
Furthermore, the establishment of investigative, dispute resolving agencies like the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Human Rights Commission gave renewed 
significance to administrative law and its techniques. These and similar types of new 
agencies were legally required to pursue non-adversarial, purposive, fact-finding 
approaches to problem-solving. Australian governments began to give 'open' 
legislative sanction to administrative styles of civil dispute resolution and legal 
regulation. Generally, the expansion of governmt>ntal functions generated new 
bodies of legal rights, expectations, duties and processes, greatly increasing the 
popular scope and social penetration of Commonwealth administrative law. Its 
changed fortunes led to a growing confidence of its senior 'architects' and actors to 
1220 Ibid. 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). 
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speak out against the influence of the judges and lawyers, as their resistance to the 
mid-1970s refonns of the review of administrative action demonstrated. 1222 
Australian governments also began to take an interest in the affairs of the legal 
profession and lawyers.1223 The national legal aid scheme itself, as we have seen, saw 
governments intervene in an arena which had substantially been the preserve of • 
lawyers in the post-war period. In the late 1970s, however, their interest in the 
profession began to go beyond legal aid. The Law Reform Commission of New 
South Wales ~egan a major inquiry into the organisation of the profession, and the 
regulation and cost of lawyers' work. 1224 Governments had begun to investigate the 
organisation and 'tenns' of lawyers' work, broaching what had hitherto been an 
essential part of its modem alliance with the legal profession. State interest was 
matched by a few - but significant - pieces of research funded by the law foundations 
in Victoria and New South Wales.am Interest groups also began to consider the 
future role of the legal profession.1226 These 'interventionist' trends continued into 
the 1980s and would culminate in the AJAC report, its recommendations for 
increasing deregulation of lawyers' work and the gradual relinquishment of the 
'monopoly' by the profession in the late 1990s.1227 
Finally, the period surrounding the post-war experience of legal aid also saw the 
transfonnative changes affecting citizenship. In the mid-l 970s, there was a change 
to the expectations which had underpinned civil relations in modem Australian 
society. Previously, the relationship between the citizen and the state had been 
defined predominantly in tenns of political rights to participate in public life.123 
Civil rights existed, but largely by default, with little recognition at common law and 
in few, overt instances in the Australian Constitution. 1~ The changed social 
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expectations of citizenship had a variety of causes. One influence were the pressures 
for social and cultural change which had accompanied the election of the Whitlam 
Government in 1972.1230 Australians and their opinion-makers now expressed 
expectations of 20th century modem "social rights", like' "public education, health 
care, unemployment insurance and old-age pensions."1231 Another cause was that the . 
expansion of health, education and welfar.e services had encouraged popular 
awareness of the social 'rights' of citizenship, directly linking those expectations to 
the state. 
Allied to these changed expectations were new profiles in the civil rights of 
citizenship. In 1980, Australia agreed to ratify the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 1232 This development, which also had its origins in the late 
1960s, was preceded by the establishment of machinery to "promote . . . the better 
observance of human rights generally". 1233 Proposals for the legal protection of 
human rights had first been advanced by the Whitlam Government in 1973, but were 
unsuccessful. 1234 By 1981, however, the Fraser Government had overcome the 
political obstacles, and Commonwealth human rights legislation was enacted to 
administer its new sex and racial discrimination laws, and to generally promote the 
objectives of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1235 
These changes to the modem configuration of law and government occurred in the 
context of a new national political profile of the Australian welfare state, its 
governments and legal machinery. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the legal system 
and the relationships it 'engineered' began to matter more - and more frequently - to 
Australian citizens, governments and businesses. Its 'presence' was more obvious, 
the social 'benefits' it could bestow more delineated and its impact 'felt' more often, 
and in a wider variety of forums tha,i eyer before. The only Australian parallel was 
the experience of wartime legal regulation. On this occasion, however, the changes 
did not 'disappear' with peace, but constituted a new phase in legally regulating the 
post-war welfare state. 
For these reasons, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the twilight years of law and 
government in the ~onfigurations which had previously served modem Australian 
society: The enthusiasm of the mid-1970s federal welfare state for its expanded 
social functions had dissipated, ana generally the Australian welfare state had begun 
to retreat. Governments and consumers had slowly begun to voice their criticisms of 
the legal profession and to raise their social and economic expectations of lawyers' 
work. Australians had developed a new sense of their social worth and individual 
expectations ~f the state, which had equipped them with new means of asserting their 
social 'tiiM'ts', including protecting their human rights. Administrative law, its 
mo 
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institutions and actors had begun to recontest the desirability of judicial supervision 
of administrative action and to publicly assert their role in the Australian legal 
system. Moreover, law reform had given 'open' encouragement the purposive and 
policy-oriented solutions of administrative law to the problems of modem legal 
regulation. 
The Fissuring of Modern Law and Government 
In themselves, however, these shifts and changes in the politics of Australian law and 
government were not the harbingers of the 'access to justice' response. Neither did 
they mark the 'end' of its modem configurations or of the social hegemony of the 
liberal legal centralist alliance. Nor did they 'indicate' a system of governance 
destined for collapse or in a condition approaching a state of 'crisis'. The shifts and 
changes of the late 1970s and early 1980s were instead cracks in the facade. What 
they indicated - as the experience of the 1970s demonstrated - was a need for 
ongoing repair, and even modest reconstruction, after several decades of serious 
neglect. At the time, it appeared that Australia was simply witnessing a new phase 
of modem legal regulation, with an increasingly reluctant, but nevertheless still 
socially responsive and responsible welfare state. A phase, moreover, in which its 
citizens were less passive and more assertive in their desire to match the 'promise' of 
'modern Australian law' with social reality. There was to reason to believe 
otherwise. Indeed, in 1983, when the Fraser Government was electorally defeated, 
we might have expected the new government to have continued down the path of 
socially oriented law refonn. After all, it was a Labor Party government, ostensibly 
with similar commitments to fair and effective citizens' access to the legal system as 
its predecessor in the early 1970s. However, this did not prove to be the case. The 
I ·'lwke Labor Government adopted and pursued reformist policies which had the 
effect of fissuring the cracks which had appeared in the modem configuration of 
Australian law and government in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The Sea Change in the Political Economy of the Welfare State 
The Hawke Government's election was the turning point in the politics of law in the 
post-war Australian welfare state. Throughout the rest of the 1980s, the Hawke 
Government pursued economic policies which produced a sea change in its social 
assumptions of the welfare state. To understand 'how' this occurred, we need to first 
consider the basis of public policy in the pre-1983 welfare state. 
Historically, in Australia - like in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
the United States - the political economy of the welfare state had been premised on 
·'the management and manipulation of broad macroeconomic policy factors". 1236 
This was different from the "countries of democratic corporatism", like the smaller 
Western European nations, Germany and Japan, where welfare state policy reflected 
'"detailed and negotiated agreement between major societal interests or on 
l?l6 F G Castles. above n 821 at 493. 
252 
microeconomic policy intervention".1237 In Australia and New Zealand, moreover, 
the political economy of the welfare state had a distinctive focus: 
From as early as the first decade of this century, the Antipodean nations had · 
consolidated a set of coherent and consistent policies clearly distinguishable from 
those of other democratic capitalist nations. Elsewhewer [sic] I have labelled this 
policy stance as the strategy of 'domestic defence'. 1231 
In Australia, according to Castles, the policy of domestic defence had three major 
components, "each involving strong regulative intervention in the economy, but 
rather little in the way of state ownership on the British model".1239 The first 
component was tariff policy - or import controls - which were used to protect 
domestic manufacturing from overseas competition. Secondly, there was the 
component in the legal system whereby quasi-judicial powers of compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes were used to regulate the labour 
market. The objective was to simultaneously achieve a social policy minimum - "a 
'fair' wage to support a bread-winner and family" - while adjusting wage levels to 
reflect fluctuations caused by dependence on highly unstable primary commodity 
markets. mo The third component was the regulation of migrant intake in order to 
adjust labour supply, with the aim of minimising unemployment and protecting the 
wage levels decided on through the arbitration system. 1241 Thus, the strategy of 
'domestic defence': 
... may be characterized in terms of its "conservative social welfare function", by 
which any decline in real income was minimised, the government providing insurance 
against income loss and social peace was protected by ensuring "no significant income 
shall fall if that of [sic] other is rising". 1242 
In the 1970s, for the reasons we indicated above, most welfare capitalist countries 
reassessed "existing public policy strategies". 1243 In Australia, the Hawke 
Government continued this process, stimulated as elsewhere by "the continuation of 
slow economic growth".'2"" In the English-speaking welfare states, however, policy 
reassessment in the 1980s took a particular direction: 
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an attempt, either in the arena of the welfare state and/or economic regulation, to 
diminish the degree of public intervention that had become customary in the post-war 
period ... although at some level of generality, it is possible to identify common 
themes in an attack on the state in these countries - expenditure and taxation were seen 
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as being too high, the state's direct role in production and regulation was seen as too 
extensive and market forces were seen as a means of enhanced efficiency1245 
According to Castles, the reappraisal of the role of the post-war welfare state in the 
English-speaking countries was a product of three factors. Fir~t, it was practicable 
because relations between government and capital had not assumed a corporate fonn. 
Instead, the political economy of the welfare state in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States was organised around a high 
d&gree of state economic regulation. Therefore, by reducing the amount of state 
regulation, it was within the power of governments in these countries to reorder the 
political economy of the post-war version of the welfare state. 1246 The second 
common factor was that the social climate was opportune, as Castles explains: 
... the occasion for policy challenge and subsequent transformation of policy strategy 
in the 1980s was a combination of sustained low economic growth in nations which 
had once been rich together with poor policy effectiveness in arenas affecting popular 
support for the existing policy regime. This was a combination of circumstances 
which characterised all five English-speaking countries in the 1970s. In the period of 
the greatest economic crisis of the western world since the 1930s, it was in these 
nations, together with Denmark. that the populace had the strongest reasons for feeling 
that the existing policy orthodoxy had outlived any utility it had once possessed. 1247 
The third factor was that it was possible for incumbent governments in the English-
speaking cou.'ltries to reconsider national post-war policy orthodoxy. All, according 
to Castles, were able to react decisively to "popular discontent". Each was able to 
distance themselves from the responsibility for the administration of their national 
welfare state in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, this enabled incumbent 
governments to jettison the existing policy orthodoxy and to reshape the political 
economy of the welfare state. This common factor was more important than overt 
ideological differences between conservative governments in Canada, Britain and the 
Unitt:d States, and social democratic Labor governments in Australia and New 
Zealand. as Castles once again explains:12' 1 
12,, 
12~6 
12,7 
12'8 
12,9 
In both Australia, and to a somewhat lesser degree, New Zealand, Labour had been the 
architect of the politics of 'domestic defence', but for most of the post-war period had 
been out of office and the policy stance they had helped shape was administered by 
their conservative opponents. lu Britain, Labour had created the welfare state and 
presided over it for much of the 1960s and 1970s. In the US, an uninterrupted 
Democratic congressional hegemony could be blamed for all that was wrong with the 
existing policy pattern, even if that pattern had been the template for many of the 
policy initiatives of occasional Republic (sic) Presidents. Similarly, economic 
nationalism was fimtly nailed to the masthead of the hegemonic Canadian Liberal 
Party.'2" 
Ibid at 493. 
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The reaction of these five governments differed, reflecting national differences in the 
role and political economy of the welfare state. 1250 Nevertheless, Castles argues that 
the policy reassessments can be divided into two types: 
... a retreat from the socially-protectionist welfare state and a shift away from 
economic nationalism or 'domestic defence' in the form of internal economic 
deregulation and/or freeing up trade barriers. iui 
The second type. of policy reassessment describes the Australian experience. In the 
mid-1980s, the Hawke Government identified the policies of 'domestic defence' "as 
the primary cause of [Australia's] weak competitiveness in world markets and of 
persistently poor economic growth".1252 The pattern of national policy moved away 
from "a big state". 1253 For governments • and their policy-advisers - it seemed that 
the "public generosity" of the post-war Australian welfare state "was no longer 
economically practicable [and] even that past generosity was amongst the causes of 
presents discontents". Thereafter, "the central theme for challenge of the existing 
role of the state was [to be] ... its regulative activities and the way in which these 
impeded economic competition " 1™ Throughout the remainder of the 1980s, and into 
the 1990s, we saw a dismantling of the post-war welfare state, and a reorientation of 
the role of governments. 
The Reorganisation of the Welfare State 
As pan of its realignment of public policy, the Hawke Government set about 
reorganising the administration of the welfare state. In the mid-1980s, the 
Commonwealth system of public administration was substantially transfonned. This 
transformation manifested itself in three principal ways. The first was the 
restructuring and 'refonn' of the Commonwealth Public Service, including important 
changes in personnel management, and the terms and conditions of civil service 
employment. im With associated downsizing, these changes were to have significant 
effects on the direction and administrative capacity of the welfare state. 
The second transformation was in the •culture' of public administration. The modem 
Anglo-Australian paradigm of regulation in the 'public interest' under the 'rule of 
law' which had hitheno governed the system of public administration was displaced. 
In its place, came the philosophy of 'New Public Management' (NPM) which would 
12'3 
ms 
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carry the Australian welfare state into the 1990s. '"' NPM is the philosophy of 
'managerialism'- or 'new managerialism' - which adopts 'economic efficiency' as its 
core value, i.e., its central managing 'test' is whether what has been or is proposed to 
be done represents the 'maximum output' for the minimum input of resources. The 
adoption ofNPM as the administrative culture of the welfare state had implications 
beyond the Commonwealth Public Service and its functions. As Yeatman indicates, 
the 'economic rationalism• and objectives of public management had an uneasy 
relationship with the governmental and civic assumptions of mid- l 970s Australian 
society: 1257 
... the discourse of management sits uncomfortably with, and by its logic tends to 
preclude, reference to substantive public service obligations like maintaining the rule 
of 'law', upholding citizen• rights of access to fair and equitable government 
administration, and providing high quality legal services. 1251 
The third significant transformation in public administration was the 
'commercialisation' of the welfare state. The 1980s saw the 'corporatisation' and 
'privatisation' of its machinery and economic functions, and the adoption of private 
sector business practices and models. 1259 At the national level, the chang~s wrought 
by 'commercialisation' covered a \\ide spectrum, including the corpomtisation of 
state-owned transport, communications and other commercial enterprist;s and non-
social welfare functions.' 260 In some cases, 'commercialisation' involved the transfer 
of the assets and functions of existing Commonwealth statutory corporations to new 
public companies. In other cases, pub?ic assets and functions were transferred to 
new statutory corporations, which were "required to conduct their activities in 
accordance with sound commercial principles and to operate on a largely self-
financing basis". 1261 
The •commercialisation' of the eight principal Commonwealth business enterprises -
Qantas, Australian Airlines, Australian National Line (ANL), Australian National 
Railways (ANR), Telecom, the Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (OTC), 
1260 
1261 
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Aussat, and Australia Post - was a notable instance.1262 Those enterprises that were in 
direct competition with private sector companies, or served no explicit social 
objective, or had a well-developed commercial culture - like Qantas, Aussat, 
Australian Airlines, ANL and OTC - were converted or continued as corporations 
under the Commonwealth companies legislation. The ANR remained a statutory 
corporation under its recently updated legislation. Telecom and Australia Post were 
renamed as 'corporations' - although they formally remained statutory authorities -
and their management was remodelled along corporate lines. At the same time, the 
Hawke Gove~ent abolished "almost all remaining direct controls over the eight 
enterprises day-to-day operations".1263 
The impact of 'commercialisation' was not limited to Commonwealth business 
enterprises. The 1980s also saw transformation of industry and trade functions into 
the public company form. 1264 Private sector management practices were adopted in 
Commonwealth statutory corporations and agencies providing public services and 
performing public ~functions. •m Increasingly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Commonwealth experience of 'commercialisation' in public administration was 
mirrored in the States. 
State Intervention in the Affairs of the Legal Profession 
The reorganisation of public administration was only a means of the Hawke 
Government facilitating its wider objective. This was to improve the 'economic 
performance' of late 20th century Australian society. The principal instrument of 
reform which the Hawke Government deployed was national economic policy. From 
the outset, it was vigorous in its pursuit of major reforms to the Australian economy 
to redress the perceived retardant legacy of the policies of 'domestic defence'. These 
reforms included: 
. . . financial deregulation and floating of the Australian dollar in the 1980s and the 
reduction of tariff protection, and ... more recent initiatives such as moving from the 
centralised wage fixing system to more flexible enterprise bargaining arrangements 
1266 
By the late 1980s, the general thrust of national microeconomic policy was towards 
reforms intended •;to make the best use of Australia's true economic potential, to 
secure a more productive economy capable of delivering more jobs and higher 
1~63 
1~65 
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growth."1267 The legal profession and the lawyers' services industry were not 
immune from the impact of these new policies. In 1988, the Commonwealth Trade 
Practices Commission announced "its intention to conduct a study of competition in 
markets for professional services" in Australia. 1261 More importantly, in late 1992 the 
Hawke Government commissioned an Independent Committee of Inquiry into a 
National Competition Policy to design "a competition policy framework" foi; the 
Australian economy.1269 The report of this committee, known as the "Hilmer Report" 
was completed in mid-1993, and, as Scales describes:1210 
. . . took a broad approach to competition policy which identified the need both to 
strengthen pro-competitive regulation and to remove anti-competitive government 
interventions. It proposed extending the Trade Practices Act to government business 
enterprises, statutory marketing arrangements and unincorporated associations, which 
all [had] considerable protection from trade practices scrutiny. It also identified many 
government regulations and interventions that impeded the functioning of markets. 1271 
The Hilmer Report did not specifically address the position of the legal profession, or 
the application of its proposals to the operations of the lawyer services market. 1272 
Nevertheless, it was, together with the final report of the Trade Practices 
Commission, which was completed in 1994, one of the principal reports the Keating 
Government directed the AJAC to consider in its inquiry into remedies to the 
'problems' in 'access to justice' .'273 Moreover, in its national strategy the AJAC 
made clear that whilst its members believed there was "far more in impro\ing access 
to justice than applying competition policy to the legal profession ... [n]onetheless 
[it] ... has a significant part to play," noting that: 127" 
1~6'i 
1~68 
mo 
1~71 
127~ 
12?3 
127~ 
We think that the reasons given by the Hilmer Committee and the TPC for the 
application of the Trade Practices Act to the legal profession, as part of a national 
strategy for subjecting all business and professional activity to competition principles, 
are convincing. Lawyers are, after all, active participants in commercial activities. It 
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is also undeniable that the legal services market constitutes a significant component of 
the national economy. 1275 
These 'pro-competition' premises formed the basis of the reforms the AJAC 
proposed to the legal profession, lawyers and the lawyers' services market. Its 
reforms addressed issues such as 'external'. regulation of the profession, entry 
requirements, the traditional division into barristers and solicitors, lawyers' business 
practices, specialisation and structuring a national legal profession. 1276 In particular, 
the AJAC favoured deregulating of the market for lawyers' services, noting: 
Legal work is reserved to lawyers by virtue of legislation that prohibits non-lawyers 
from carrying out legal work for reward or from holding themselves out to be 
qualified to perform such work ... We think that consumers of legal services should, 
to the greatest extent possible, have a choice about legal services delivery in 
appropriate areas ... Accordingly, we think that there may well be benefits in opening 
the legal services market to non-lawyers in some areas ... 1277 
Nor were practising lawyers the only target of the AJAC's concerns. Its inquiry also 
considered the work of the courts and judges, noting recent initiatives to present a 
more 'consumer-oriented' approach, and proposing the adoption of 'charters' to 
mark service delivery and performance. The AJAC also recommended greater 
provision for judicial education, recording the view of its members that "judges will 
benefit from having the opportunity to attend appropriate training courses at the 
commencement of and during their tenns of office". 1278 
In its report, the AJAC observed - somewhat cheekily - that "the prospect of the 
application of competition policy has been a powerful force for change in the 
structure of the legal profession in Australia". 1m However, in 1993 and 1994 
national competition policy was only beginning to make its presence felt amongst the 
legal profession and its various interests groups. Major changes had already 
occurred in New South Wales, but in other States, reforms to the regulation of the 
profession and work practices of la\\-yers, whilst on the agenda of governments, were 
yet to be realised. 1 ~10 Victoria, however, was already on the cusp of change, with 
reforms in 1996 creating a statutory authority charged with regulating the legal 
profession and responsible for managing new disciplinary regimes1m However, the 
AJAC did not see national competition policy as the sole justification for state 
intervention in the affairs of the legal profession. It referred to other principles to 
1~76 
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which its members "had regard in framing [their] proposals" to remedy the 
'problems' of 'access to justice':12a:: 
These include, in addition to competition principles, the accountability of public 
institutions and organisations, such as the legal professional organisations . . . Any 
refonns to the regulatory structure of the legal profession must ensure that bodies that 
exercise rule making functions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and that rules 
themselves are examined in the public interests. Similarly, the principle of consumer 
orientation requires that any reforms recognise the interest of consumers in gaining 
ready access to affordable legal services that are responsiye to their needs ... 1213 
By 1993 these policies had already begun to threaten and change the socio-legal 
assumptions of state, law and citizenship which had previously appeared politically 
sacrosanct. In the following three years these transformative forces were accelerated 
and adapted to the national competition agendas of the Hilmer Report. 1214 
The Impact on the Politics of Law in Australian Society 
Abandoning the policies of 'domestic defence', 'commercialising' state functions 
and assets, national competition policy and a new willingness to 'intervene' in the 
legal profession had a profound impact on the politics of law. By the early 1990s, 
there had been a substantial and significant change to the modem configurations of 
law and government in Australian society. These transformations not only truncated 
the patterns of incremental reform which had marked the new phase of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The fissures of the later 1980s and early 1990s threatened 
fundamental modern assumptions about social governance in the post-war welfare 
state. 
So far, neither legal, public administration nor Public Policy scholarship have 
sufficiently linked these changed configurations of law and government with the 
Australian 'access to justice' response. One reason is the 'intellectual' divide which 
continues to separate these otherwise natural bedfellows. Since the mid-l 980s, 
moreover, the attention of mainstream Australian legal scholarship has been focused 
upon commercial and corporate law. Furthermore, the AJAC and Australian 
governments have successfully defined the agenda and discourse for reform of the 
legal system and developments in 'access to law' policies. In any event, the 
Australian \Velfare state - with its social fields of law and reform, scholars, media and 
other opinion leaders - is only one generation removed from its experience of legal 
aid. In the mid- l 970s, the liberal legal centralist alliance, and its social construction 
of 'modern law', still determined the dominant paradigms of legal regulation in 
Australian society. 1215 Moreover, the sea change in the public policies of the welfare 
1182 
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state have taken place in the shadow of the apparently unchanging institutions of the 
modem Australian legal system and its centralist types of law. 
This part of the chapter aims to increase our awareness of the 'linkages' between 
these changed public policies and the origins and significance of the 'access to 
justice' response. The analysis which follows below proceeds from the premises of 
the revised analytical framework in Chapter Six, and from the insights gleaned from 
revisiting the Australian post-war experience of legal aid. It investigates the impact 
of the changed policies of the welfare state in different arenas of the politics of the 
modem Australian legal domain in the years of the 1980s. 
The Fragmenting of the Liberal Legal Centralist Alliance 
Perhaps the key shift in the politics of the legal domain was the fragmenting of the 
liberal legal centralist alliance - the modern 'bargain' between Australian 
governments, courts, judges, the organised legal profession and lawyers. The post-
war cohesion between the parties to the alliance had been weakened in the 1970s 
when governments began to contemplate reforms to the lawyers' services market and 
its modus operandi. 1286 The reappraisal of the role of the welfare state and the 
adoption of national competition policies produced an abrupt change to the 'internal' 
politics of the alliance. In fact, it signalled the end of a vital part of the modem 
'bargain' between the state and the legal profession. 
Modem Australian governments had 'delegated' responsibility for the administration 
of civil and criminal justice to the profession and given lawyers substantial, 
independent control of the 'private' market for legal services. In subjecting the legal 
profession and its markets to scrutiny by the Trade Practices Commission the Hawke 
Government was indicating the terms of these 'delegations' were to be renegotiated. 
Five years later, its successor, by including the principles of national competition 
policy in the AJAC agenda, made very clear it did not intend to maintain the 
'bargain' which the post-war welfare state had kept with the legal profession. The 
AJAC itself, moreover, reflected the new attitude of Australian governments in its 
proposed reforms to the market for lawyers' services, 'alternative dispute resolution', 
the courts and legal aid. 1287 In the case of the latter, neglect of the management of the 
national scheme since the late 1970s was another instance of the loss of comity 
between the interests of governments and the legal profession. The AJAC may have 
liked to give the impression the latter was freely participating in the process of 
·reform'. In reality, governments forced the legal profession to participate and 
defend its political interests in the face of a unilateral 'breach' of the alliance. 
In any event, professional commitment to the 'delegatory' advantages of the alliance 
had itself fragmented, although not to the same degree or consistency as the 'breach' 
by governments. The late 1970s had seen a continuation of the bifurcation of the 
legal profession evident at the end of the 1960s. 1288 In 1979, a Sydney corporate firm 
1:?87 
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of solicitors - Freehill Hollingdale & Page - had become the first 'mega-firm', via a 
Canberra office and a cross-State partnership with Perth solicitors. 1219 This marked 
the beginning of a limited, but significant trend. In 1982, the Sydney firm of Stephen 
Jaques became the second Australian 'mega-finn', merged with Stone James & Co 
in Perth. 1290 Other major corporate law finns in the State capital cities quickly 
followed suit, usually by cross-State mergers, but sometimes reorganising existing 
practices to serve a national market. 1291 The economic welfare of these 'mega-firms' 
was not dependent on the legislated 'monopolies' which enforced the delegatory 
'bargain' of t\le alliance. They participated in a competitive, unregulated market for 
the provision of 'non-individual', business or 'corporate-type' legal services and 
transaction making skills, with "rivals such as accountants, management consultants 
and investment bankers".'292 Moreover the culture, employment practices and 
structures of the 'mega-finns' - like those of their counterparts in the United States -
increasingly resembled those of their corporate clients. 1293 In these contexts, neither 
the 'protections' implicit in the alliance, nor the 'collective' interests of the 
. Australian legal profession carried much weight. 
Even amongst its sole practitioner and small finn majorities, the mutuality of the 
Australian legal profession had declined since the mid-1970s.1294 The 'collective' 
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sense of a single, professional community was rapidly unravelling. The number of 
lawyers continued to grow in the 1980s, whilst its mid-century work base in the 
'needs' of individuals for 'personal-type' lawyer services declined, as we discuss 
below. 1295 The impact of these diversifying and economically downward trends was 
compounded by the 'interventionist' stance of governments and the implications of 
the principles of national competition policy. By the end of the 1980s, the 
professional majority of Australian lawyers occupied comparable social 
circumstances as their contemporaries elsewhere in the Western world, as Abel 
described: 
... greater numbers have intensified competition within the profession and led to the 
erosion of restrictive practices ... Expanded university education has rendered the 
profession more heterogeneous, complicating efforts at concerted action and 
intensifying (and delegitimating) professional stratification ... Notwithstanding the 
visibility of a few high fliers, the income and status of the profession as a whole have 
declined ... The cumulative effect of these changes has fundamentally trausformed the 
professional configuration, if we can still perceive its successor only dimly. 1296 
Thus, quite apart from the 'breach' by governments, the 'collective' interests of the 
professional majority of Australian lawyers in the 'delegatory' functions of the 
alliance were more diverse and less cohesive than in the mid- l 970s. These new 
interests were, moreover, increasingly difficult to coordinate on the ever more 
significant national public policy stage. Moreover, the 'decline' which Abel 
describes may not be explicable merely as a reconfiguration of the modern legal 
profession. 1 ~97 It occurred within the context of the new social climates of post-
industrial society and its huge corporations. 1291 Changes which, in the Australian 
context in the 1980s, were reflected in the spread of NPM and the 
•commercialisation' of the welfare state and its society. As Shapiro has suggested, 
these developments may have had more fundamental transformative consequences 
for the legal profession. 1299 The pre-eminence of the 'mega-firms' and other 
concentrations of 'legal expertise' - as in segments of the Bar, law schools and the 
legal aid sector - may represent continuing 'pockets' of 'real', marketable skills 
amongst a professional majority sliding into an 'unprofessional' world of lawyer 
service providers. By the mid- l 980s, for the many Australian lawyers falling into 
the latter category, the 'delegations' of the alliance were already becoming remnants 
of history, even if the welfare state had not acted to truncate them. 
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The New Paradigms of Law and Government 
The new public policies of the welfare state did not only impact upon the 
'delegatory' functions of the liberal legal centralist alliance. For Australian 
governments, this part of the modem 'bargain' with the legal profession had always 
been of secondary importance. From the outset, they controlled alternative 
regulatory options, exercisable by expanding the scale and scope of the system of 
administrative law, and reversing its 'de-legitimation'. Neither had governments 
originally been attracted to 'working' with the legal profession for other than 
pragmatic reasons. The courts, judges and lawyers were the 'actors' and 'stage 
managers' of the system of civil and criminal justice. They embodied its legal 
technology and - as we argued in Chapter Six - represented an acceptable, privatised 
form of administration, consonant with the ideology and financial capacities of mid-
i 9th century liberal capitalist governments. Furthermore, the legal profession 
'brought' its peculiarly appropriate social ideology to bear in the interests of 
governments. Legalism was both aspirational and national in outlook. Its images of 
'law' and 'legal system' coincided with the needs of governments required to 
mediate amongst the irreconcilable, competing demands of administering 
democratised modern capitalist societies. Thus, for governments the primary 
importance of the alliance had been its 'external' role in projecting and organising 
the social construction of 'modem Australian law• - its version of the great legal 
enterprise of modem Anglo-American society .1300 
By the late 1980s, however, the importance of the political 'benefits' of the alliance 
for governments had declined. The regulatory significance of public administration 
and administrative law had steadily increased throughout the life of the modern 
Australian legal system. As we have indicated earlier, its everyday reality 
throughout the 20th century was not only courts, judges and lawyers, but ever-
increasingly public policy, the work of the decisional organs of the state and public 
officials. In the 1960s and 1970s, the role and governmental functions of the latter 
had increased exponentially. At the beginning of the 1980s, therefore, governments 
had long persisted in 'choices' which favoured administrative law and its modes of 
regulation. 'Choices', moreover, which highlighted the disjunction between the 
social construction of the 'Australian legal system' and the reality, and which served 
to decrease the reliance of the modem state on the administrative technologies of the 
legal profession. The assumptions which underpinned government involvement in 
the alliance had shifted. This shift was reflected in the new phase in the modern 
configurations of Australian law in the late 1970s and early 1980s discussed 
above. 1301 The basic assumptions of Australian government shifted again in the 
1980s, as a consequence of the sea change in public policy, and the reorganisation of 
the welfare state. Governments no longer required the support of the alliance - or its 
attendant system of 'public administration' - in the administration of Australian 
society. The 'commercialisation' of public functions signalled the adoption of new 
assumptions of government. NPM and its dictates no longer required the state to 
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perform its 'balancing', mediative role to· the same degree or in the same 
configurations as it had done in modem Australian society since the 1850s and 
1860s. 
NPM also dissipated the political incentives for Australian governments to sustain 
their post-war commitment to the liberal legal· centralist alliance. The 'engineering' 
of law under the guidance of the legal profession and the auspices of legalism lost its 
modem social essentiality. The rise of economic rationalism in the 'engines' of the 
1980s welfare state saw economists and econometricians pisplace judges and 'public 
service' lawyers in key decisional forums. 1302 The diminution of the value of 
'lawyer's expertise' was part of a wider and far more significant decline. 1303 
Legalism, its ideals and styles of 'legal rationality' were no longer the dominant 
paradigms of modem social governance. In the 1980s, the 'economic rationalist' 
ideas associated with NPM became the dominant regulatory paradigms of the 
Australian welfare state. Bayne has described the implications of this "fundamental 
change" in the context of its impact upon administrative law, in the world of 'public 
administration' :.13°" 
Mark Considine observes that, heretofore, "the dominant fonn of rationality which has 
underpinned bureaucratic work has been legal rationality", that is, "rational to the 
extent that they follow the standardised steps of a logical procedure". On the o.ther 
hand, "[c]orporate management ... elevates eeonomic rationality to primary status 
"and in so doing attempts to replace the legal and procedural framew.ork of the 
classical model" .... 1305 
These observations are equally applicable to the commitment of governments and 
their executive organs in the state to legalism, and its social constructions of 'law' 
through the alliance. The primary organising values of legalism had never been 
those of 'economics', but were instead ideals of highly 'legalised' societies, 
administered by the state, in conjunction with the legal profession, where 
government, business and social life were safeguarded through the conduits of the 
'rule of law'. In the 1980s version of the welfare state, however, the legal system, 
social life and 'modem Australian law' had become commodities to compete in the 
'market' for the favours of government and business. 
The Changed Politics of the Central Legal Domain 
The changes in public policy and assumptions of social governance in the welfare 
state had two other important effects on the modem configurations of Australian law. 
The first is that they changed the politics of the central legal domain. The second 
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effect, which is discussed below, is that these changes prompted the dilution of social 
citizenship in the 'new' version of the post-war welfare state. 
The changes in the welfare state changed the politics of the central legal domain in 
two significant respects. The first was that they produced a functional 
transformatiofl in its legal institutions and centralist law. The circumstances of 
functional transformation were explained in the revised analytical framework and its 
social preconditions rehearsed in Chapter Six. 1306 In Australia in the 1980s and early 
1990s, comparable circumstances existed as when the 'old' institutions and law of 
Western society were incorporated into the modern natfonal legal systems.1307 As 
then, changes in legal ideology and the functions performed by centralist law saw a 
change in the social functions of the legal institutions of the modern state. In the 
post-war state in Australia, these changed social functions were not as spectacular as 
the transformation of the 'old' Western legal systems into modernity, nor did they 
exhibit the same dramatic degree of difference with the recent past. 
However, the changes in social function were analogous to modem transformation of 
the poor persons institutions on their voyage to legal aid. 1308 In the welfare state in 
the 1980s there was also a near contemporaneous change within the 'legal' realm and 
society itself. On the one hand, the 'economic rationalist' ideas ofNPM became the 
dominant regulatory paradigms of the welfare state. On the other hand, the 
abandonment of the policies of 'domestic defence', the adoption of 'market 
economics', national competition p:>licy and the reorganisation of administration 
altered the regulatory functions of the legal institutions and law of the welfare state. 
Modem centralist law and its institutions still served the state and its governments, 
but for different social purposes and with different social objectives. 
These functional transfonnations changed the role and functions of centralist-types 
of law in Australian society. In the case of judicial-types of centralist law, the 
impact is difficult to measure. Unlike legislation and administrative law, judicial law 
remains within the effective control of the courts and the legal profession, through its 
judges and lawyers. One might speculate and say that changes in the welfare state 
have relegated to the courts problems in social ordering which once may have been 
mediated by governments. In any event, the courts, their 'management' of judicial 
law and their interpretation of legislation are now frequently criticised "as getting in 
the way of achieving the goals" of govemments. 1309 The standing of judicial types of 
law and their actors in the central legal domain has been diminished, a decline 
inextricably associated with the fragmentation of the liberal legal centralist alliance 
and the attitude of the 'new' welfare state towards to lawyers. 
The impact of the functional transfonnation on legislative and administrative-types 
of centralist law in the 1980s and early 1990s is easier to assess. It has also been 
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more pronounced, as these law types were more vulnerable to the 'architects' of 
NPM and economic reform. Nevertheless, there are dangers in generalisation, 
especially in the case of the enormous scope of the legislation, even in the 'new' 
welfare state. However, in the case of regulatory legislation it is safe to say that it 
has increasingly taken on the flavour of deregulation, and the ideals of national 
competition policy. In other fields, legislation, its 'internal' values and its design is 
more flexible in its procedural safeguards, and more easily separated from the 
templates 'engineered' during the long period of modem administration under the 
'rule of law'. Abandoning the guiding policies of 'domestic defence' has also 
truncated the legislative tendencies of Australian Parliaments to accord social 
precedence to objectives of popular or 'collective' well-being. 
Functional transformation has had its most marked impact upon administrative-type 
of centralist law and its modes of regulation. The changes in the social direction of 
the welfare state have called "[f]undamental values (such as due process) inherent in 
administrative law principle [into] question".1310 As Yeatman described above, the 
techniques and technologies of modem administrative law have been seriously 
threatened, and have been displaced in many departments and agencies of the 'new' 
welfare state. 1311 Moreover, implementation of regulatory and economic reforms 
through the paradigms ofNPM have generated new and different styles of decision-
making and administrative regulation, as Bayne once again describes: 
The new thinking proposes or implies a cenain fonn of action for governments; that 
is, "purposive action" (as opposed to "bureaucratic action" defined "legalistically") 
"which attempts to elevate values of strong leadership and systematic control and 
restructuring" ... It is conceded by the advocates of change that mistakes will be made. 
"[P]erfonnance management assumes a relatively high degree of failure but seeks to 
ensure that critical targets are met" .... 1312 
The other significant change the central legal domain was to increase its diversity. 
Deregulation of the political economy of the welfare state unleashed the 'law-
making' potential of non-government corporate actors. Private corporations, 
industry and trade associations, service providers previously were freer to order their 
O\Vn affairs and to regulate their 'external' relationships. Moreover, the 'self-
regulatory' objectives sanctioned by governments and national competition policy 
gave them positive encouragement. The reorganisation of the welfare state created 
new privatised regulatory regimes to administer business enterprises, and to 
negotiate new relationships with its central regulatory system. 
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The Dilution of Social Citizenship 
The expanded conceptions of citizenship in the 1970s had raised popular 
expectations of the welfare state. 1313 The Whitlam Government had positively 
encouraged Australians to view the state as a provider of benefits and a protector of 
rights. Its successor, whilst discouraging the former, had sanctioned the latter, 
expanding state involvement in the protection of civil and h'uman rights. 1314 The 
public policy transformations of the 1980s, however, saw Australian governments 
dilute and diminish the significance of the modem ideals of social citizenship. 
As part cf its 'reforms', the Hawke Government adopted the alternative "vision of 
citizenship" promoted by New Right critics in Britain and the United States, 
although not to the same degree as its Conservative colleagues.131' Citizenship began 
to be linked to - and conditioned upon - the fulfilment of the personal obligations of 
individuals to contribute to 'society' .1316 Its primary obligations, therefore, now 
rested with and were seen to shift to the citizenry. The state was portrayed as a 
facilitator, to ensure that citizens had the 'opportunity' to panicipate. Its primary 
role was to enable full social participation by ordinary citizens, who were assumed to 
be willing and able to contribute. The Keating Government affirmed this in 
responding to the AJAC repon in 1995, saying that it "policies across the whole 
spectrum of community life are oriented towards enabling our citizens to panicipate 
fully in the life of the nation". 1317 The secondary role of governments was to actively 
·encourage' social participation by recalcitrants, the 'poor', the unemployed, the 
marginalised, or others unaware of the •opponunity' of attaining full citizenship. In 
this new vision of citizenship, as Mead makes clear, it was necessary for the state: 
. . . to obligate the dependent as others are obligated is essential to equality, not 
opposed to it. An effective [welfare] policy must include recipients in the common 
obligations of citizens rather than exclude them. 1311 
The 'safety net' approach to welfare, •work testing' and 'tightening' of social 
security eligibility which these visions inspired in the "Thatcher/Reagan years" in 
Britain and the United States appeared in Australia in the l 980s.1319 The result was to 
significantly dilute the newly acknowledged 'social' rights of the 1970s , at least for 
those on the margins. for whom they mattered most. 
The significance of social citizenship was also diminished by the 
·commercialisation' of the welfare state, and by its national competition policies. In 
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Australia, as in other English-speaking countries in the 1980s, this type of economic 
reform "aimed to extend the scope of the market in people's lives - through freer 
trade, deregulation [and] tax cuts".1320 The result was the 'consumer-citizen' of the 
1990s, whose presence we first identified in Chapter One.1321 'Market-oriented' 
policies in the welfare state can, on the one hand, be seen as enhancing social 
citizenship by elevating ordinary citizens to equality in the 'market'. This 'market', 
moreover, now has its social efficacy of its mechanisms guaranteed by public policy, 
including official recognition of 'consumer' rights and interests. 'Consumer-
citizenship' can, on the other hand, also be seen as a device of welfare states in 
retreat to teach citizens "the virtues of initiative, self-reliance, and self 
sufficiency".1322 Its association with these social ideals of the New Right means, 
according to their critics, that 'consumer-citizenship' and its 'market-oriented' social 
imperatives are, as Kymlicka and Norman describe: 
... most plausibly seen not as an alternative account of citizenship not as an assault on 
the very principle of citizenship. As Plant puts it, "Instead of accepting citizenship as 
a political and social status, modern Conservatives have sought to reassert the role of 
the market and have rejected the idea that citizenship confers a status independent of 
economic standing."1323 
Making the 'Access to Justice' Response Transparent 
In making these linkages, we have sought to demonstrate important features of the 
impact of the 'new' post-wsr welfare state on the politics of Australian law. The 
fragmenting of the liberal legal centralist alliance, the changed assumptions of 
government and law, the new politics of the central legal domain and the rise of 
'consumer-citizenship' combined to end its modem configurations. This did not 
happen in the sense of changing the structures of the modem Australian legal system: 
few changes occurred in its 'machinery', save for the reorganisation of the welfare 
state. Nor did the modem configurations of the system of government change 
overtly. Australia retained the monarchical and parliamentary system of government 
as it was in the mid-1970s. Its citizens, moreover, remained subjects of the British 
Crown - although more distantly so - and still lived under the 'rule of law' in a 
democratic societv . 
. 
However, the ne\"I politics of law had changed the established relationships of 
modem social governance in the welfare state. In significant instances, as we have 
shown above, those relationships were transformed. Previous notions of 'collective' 
public interest disappeared with the 'old' policies of 'domestic defence' and the 
•traditional' system of public administration and its notions of disinterested social 
service. NPM, economic deregulation, national competition policy and their acolytes 
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'contractualised' the social space of the welfare state. Citizenship became 
commodified and conditional, and citizens' assertiveness became a precondition of 
'rights', instead of a state-backed outcome. The link between the design of 
legislation and administrative law and plaMed, coordinated social ordering became 
less predictable. The fragmentation of the liberal legal centralist alliance meant that 
the courts, judges, and lawyers themselves could no longer be confident of a heafing 
in the administration of the state. In society itself, the liberal assumptions of 
'modern Australian law' also had a diminished resonance. None of these 
transformations, however, meant that the 'old' ways of legal ordering and social 
governance had been banished or destroyed. From any perspective, however, their 
modem configurations had been badly fractured, if not cracked beyond immediate 
prospects of repair. 
Against this backdrop, we can finally begin to contextualise the 'access to justice' 
response. Earlier, we formulated a series of questions based on the remaining 
unanswered questions of the NLAAC report, which were restated at the beginning of 
the chapter. 13~4 We asked how the origins of the 'access to justice' response could be 
e~plained in the context of the welfare state. Why did the Keatinz Government 
initiate this action in 1993? Why did it adopt an 'access to justice' approach, given 
the mid-1970s rhetoric of its predecessors supporting 'legal aid'. and the relative 
success of the national scheme in the 1980s? 
In providing answers to these three questions, the chapter does not purport to provide 
an exhaustive explanation of the origins and significance of the Australian 'access to 
justice' response. To do so \vould require a full-scale investigation applying the 
Public Policy techniques outlined in the revised analytical framework developed in 
Chapter Six. This is impracticable at this stage in the thesis, and, in any event, is 
beyond its stated objectives. The studies of the twilight of the modem configurations 
of law and government, the subsequent fissuring and the impact of those 
developments has increased what we 'know' about the politics of law in Australian 
society in the mid- l 980s and early 1990s. The value of these studies is, moreover, 
enhanced by the insights gleaned from revisiting the origins and significance of post-
war legal aid in Part II and, more generally, the institutional and ideological history 
in Part I. These and associated 'databases' within the thesis are sufficient to enable 
us give greater transparency to the 'access to justice' response and thereby to better 
understand its significance for the feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to 
law in the Australian welfare state. 
The Reasons behind the 'Access to Justice' Response 
Like its national legal aid scheme, the Australian 'access to justice' response had its 
origins in the public policy of the welfare state. When the Keating Government 
·decided' to respond to the 'problems' in access to the legal system, especially its 
courts and lawyers. it did so for political reasons and in response to political 
pressures. Foremost amongst those pressures were the two separate, but related 
phenomena which constituted the 'problems' in 'access to justice' in Australian 
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society in 1993}3" The first was the presence of real and ongoing problems in 
popular access to courts and lawyers, which had risen to national prominence since 
the mid- l 980s. The other constituent phenomenon was the perception of the growing 
inaccessibility of the courts and their machinery of civil dispute resolution. A 
perception which was based in part on popular observation and experience of the 
operation of these legal institutions and actors. It was, however, also based upon 
expectations of the 'legal system' which were the legacy of some 130 years of social 
governance under the supervision of the liberal legal centralist alliance and its 
'modem Anglo-Australian law'. 
T/1e Real and Ongoing Problems in Popular Access to tl1e Legal System 
In 1993 it was indisputable that there were real and ongoing problems in popular 
access to the legal system, particularly its courts and lawyers. Yet, as we indicated in 
Chapter One, the evidence of the scale or degrees of inaccessibility is more equivocal 
than in some comparable countries. 1326 Nevertheless, real and ongoing problems 
existed, even if we significantly discount the more polemical Australian 
•assessments'. 
In the case of case of poorer and disadvantaged people, the work in the thesis so far 
has demonstrated the historical foundations of these problems. In Chapter Six, we 
showed that the functions assigned to courts and lawyers in the modern Anglo-
American legal systems did not disturb the trends established in earlier phases of 
legal modernisation. Instead, it institutionalised the separation which had emerged 
between the role and administration of judicial-types of centralist law and the worlds 
of poorer and disadvantaged people. Thus, modern Australian courts and lawyers 
had functioned primarily to serve the social interests of the state and to administer its 
system of civil and criminal justice. Poorer people were clearly beneficiaries of the 
new social welfare policies of modem governments and of judges and lawyers giving 
expression to the 'charitable' ideals of the modem legal profession. Nevertheless, 
providing poorer citizens with acceptable degrees of access to courts and lawyers 
remained an intractable problem for reforming liberal capitalist governments. The 
'solution· to this problem was the development of modem legal aid, as we explained 
in Chapter Six. 
However, neither the pre-1973 Australian legal aid schemes described in Part I, the 
national scheme, nor its operations since the mid-1970s had solved all the problems 
of poorer litigants and accused and other poorer people experiencing legal problems. 
As we saw in Chapter Seven, the establishment of the national scheme certainly 
'helped' poorer Australians}327 However, it did not alter the institutional biases of 
judges and courts in the legal system or significantly impact upon the social 
distribl!tion of lawyers' services. Moreover, the improved access to advice and 
repre5entation, which its schemes provided, were generally within established arenas 
of lawyer expertise, like family law, criminal law and - to a markedly lesser degree -
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civil litigation in the superior courts. The national scheme did little to address 
citizens' ordinary everyday legal problems, which often potentially had extraordinary 
significance in the lives of poorer and disadvantaged people. 
Moreover, the scheme proved incapable of adequately addressing the special legal 
problems of poor people, including those identified by the Commissioner for Law 
and Poverty, the Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission and Legal Aid Council and 
the researchers commissioned by its Attorney-General's Department. 1321 One reason 
was the restrictive funding formulae in the first Commonwealth-State legal aid 
agreements discussed in Chapter Four.1329 Another was that, as the national scheme 
commenced operations, the Australian welfare state began to retreat. Thenceforth, 
its managers became involved in a continuous process of restricting eligibility 
criteria, and rationing the availability of legal aid. In the 1980s, the expanded 
network of community legal centres and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal 
Services had alleviated some of the special legal problems of poorer and 
disadvantaged people, but not on the scale or to the degree required. 1330 By 1990, the 
limitations of the national legal aid scheme were clear. The scheme was failing to 
provide sufficient numbers of poorer people with access to the civil courts, criminal 
defences and advice, and failing to satisfy the acknowledged 'unmet needs' 
generated by the special legal problems experienced by poorer and disadvantaged 
people. Moreover, its managers had a very limited capability to finance the legal aid 
services which contemporary evidence and new research indicated were required by 
disadvantaged Australians. 1331 
In any event, as we indicated in Chapter One, by the early 1990s there was a growing 
public perception that it was no longer just the •poor' who were disadvantaged by 
inadequate access to the legal system. 1332 Whilst this had an ideological dimension, 
as we explain below, it also had very solid foundations. In the first place, the 
•commercialisation· of the welfare state and the 'corporatisation' and 'privatisation' 
of its functions in the 1980s had quietly produced a very different kind of Australian 
society. For individuals and business alike, the protective umbrella of the 
administrative machinery of the 'socially defensive' welfare state had rapidly 
vanished. Its institutions now played a greatly diminished role in the legal regulation 
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of economic and social relationships, including wage fixation, the terms and 
conditions of employment and, indirectly, the protection of social well-being through 
employment itself. Instead, the 'consumer-citizen' of the 'new' welfare state was 
increasingly expected to be legally self-reliant, and its businesses and organisations 
given new freedoms to deploy lawyers and rely on the courts as forums to negotiate 
their relationships with their 'client citizens'. 
Secondly, average-income and ordinary Australians no longer enjoyed the same 
levels of social access to lawyers, particularly the sole practitioners and lawyers in 
the small and medium-sized partnerships, which comprised the majority of the 
solicitors' industry. 1333 As we showed in Chapter Four, in the late 1960s and early 
1970s these segments of the industry exploited a healthy market for 'personal type' 
legal services, although experiencing upward overhead cost pressures. 13J.1 Little 
changed over the next few years leading up to the national legal aid scheme. Thus, 
in the mid-1970s, real property transactions - including sales and purchases, leases 
and mortgages - were the major source of income for ordinary solicitors. 1335 Income 
from motor accident and other personal injury proceedings, includlng workers 
compensation and industrial accidents, probate, wills and estate management was 
also significant, as was commercial and company work. 1336 
By 1993, however, these client bases and markets had changed, and the income base 
of the majority of Australian solicitors had declined. The most obvious and 
celebrated causes were the gradual deregulation of the solicitors• monopoly over 
conveyancing and increased industry price competition within the residual market. 1337 
The result was a marked decline in the income of most solicitors, and the "strong 
likelihood is that conveyancing will steadily decline as a proportion of solicitors' 
work ... ". 1331 Less obvious causes were the liberalisation of the requirements of 
probate and estate administration law, and substantial reductions - if not abolition - in 
the imposition of death duties. Since the mid-1980s, moreover, many Australian 
States have radically altered the law applying to common law claims for personal 
injury and statutory rights in industrial accidents. These reforms further diminished 
the work base of ordinary solicitors, as did the steadily restricted availability of legal 
aid. Furthermore, like their 'mega-finn' colleagues, sole practitioners and 'non-
corporate• partnerships faced increased competition across the board from other legal 
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services providers. This trend was already evident in the mid- l 970s, increased in the 
short reformist phase which followed, and was accelerated by the 'interventions' of 
the new welfare state. 
As a consequence, the gross incomes of many solicitors servicing "individuals and 
their own small businesses" declined in the 1980s and early 1990s. 1339 Their 
operating costs, however, did not. In fact, they probably increased through the need 
to improve work practices, productivity and adopt new technologies to more 
effectively c~mpete in the shrinking market for 'personal type' legal services. Thus, 
the real incomes of the ·non corporate' solicitor majority were also on a downward 
slide. This encouraged the more flexible and responsive sole practitioners and small 
and medium-sized solicitor partnerships to adopt business management practices to 
maximise profit-making potential, to reinvigorate 'old' income lines and to create 
new ones. 13"° For these practices, the provision of 'personal type' lawyer services 
remained an important source of work. However, the fees attached to service 
provision increased to match the new 'business' income expectations of the practice 
managers. A significant number of sole practitioners and small partnerships, 
however, had not adapted to the changing organisational, technological and 
commercial demands of ·solicitor practice. Neither had they kept abreast of 
developments in legal regulation so as to be able to respond to the changing 'needs' 
of individuals for legal services, or to supply them at appropriate standards of 
quality. Whether from the 'cosf or 'quality' perspective, or both, the result was a 
decline in the social accessibility of lawyer services for average income and ordinary 
Australians. 
Thus, both poorer and 'ordinary' Australians faced problems in access to the courts 
and lawyers. In February 1993, after hearing "357 submissions, the comments made 
by many witnesses during the 12 days of public hearings, and remarks made 
informally", the Senate 'Cost of Justice' inquiry advised that the evidence "painted a 
truly bleak picture·•. 1:m Moreover, the majority of its members noted that: 
1339 
13~0 
Australia has a basically sound legal system which nevertheless is in urgent need of 
substantial reform ... The disrepair is of such a degree that it will require continual 
attention by those who share the responsibility for the current situation and who, 
through that responsibility, have an opportunity to contribute to making the system 
what it should be ... The vast majority of the users of the system are touched by it 
Ibid at 7. 
In 1993, a consultant described changed demographics. polarisation and consolidation. brand name 
emergence, price competition. the bargaining power of clients. incursion by other providers, income 
polarisatior.. backward integration. client sophistication. investment in marketing, geographic expansion 
into other markets. shake-out, income polarisation and changes in practice funding as factors affecting 
·non-corporate' practice management in the early 1990s. He warned that willingness to accommodate 
these factors would prove a major factor in practical survival: M S Beasley, "Legal Practice Management 
in the Nineties"', paper presented to the 28th Australian Legal Convention. above n 1337 nt 6S: M Murrill. 
"Specialisation the key for mid-size finns" Business Review Weekly, The Professions. January 16 1987 at 
12; G Beaton, -survi,·al rules for the suburban solicitor" Business Review Weekly, The Professions 
Liftout,, October 10 1986, at 18. 
Sc:nate Standing Comminee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 9, para 16 at .J. 
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or.:y occasionally in their lives. When they try to use the system and find it 
unsatisfactory, the consequences, both personally and financially, can be 
devastating. 1342 
Tlte Perception of t/1e Growing Pop11lar Inaccessibility of t/1e Legal System 
The other constituent of the 'problems' in 'access to justice' was an ideological 
phenomenon. By 1993, Australians had lived for almost 10 years in a social 
environment forged by the reordering and reconfiguration of the policie3 and 
institutions of the 'new' welfare state. The experience of 'commercialisation', its 
paradigms of government and projection of the virtues of'consumer-citizenship' had 
been confronting. For the majority, life under NPM and the internationalisation of 
the economy was a marked contrast to the historical experience of a century of state 
capitalism. Social governance in the 'new' welfare state, moreover, followed 
different patterns to those which had subtly managed well-being for poorer and 
ordinary people in a 'socially protective' welfare state for over 70 years. 
Furthermore, the configurations of law and government as they had existed in 
modern Australia were fractured. The system of public administration had already 
been substantially transfonned, together with the social functions of administrative 
law and its institutions. 1343 Increasingly, legislation had become the instrument of the 
'architects' of national competition policy and of others set upon transforming the 
political economy of the welfare state. Moreover, Australian governments had 
demonstrated their intention to revoke their commitment to the liberal legal centralist 
alliance, and - in some cases - had already done so. 
Yet changing public policy, even on the scale achieved in Australia in the 1980s, and 
reorganising the machinery and legal technology of the modern state is more rapidly 
achieved than transfonning social perceptions. In 1993, the great majority of citizens 
retained expectations of the 'interventionist' social functions and responsibilities of 
the Australian welfare state. These expectations were difficult to quantify. Few 
Australians fully understood the significance of the policies of 'domestic defence' in 
the social administration of the pre-1983 welfare state. Furthermore, by 1993 it was 
almost 20 years since the peak of the great post-war expansion in national education, 
health, welfare, transport and other social welfare expenditure under the Whitlam 
Government. The memory - and its long-tenn social consequences - however, 
lingered on. Thus, whilst public policy reform had been very active in distancing 
governments from the responsibilities implicit in modem social citizenship, the 
message was yet to penneate throughout Australian society. Most Australians were 
yet to comprehend the implications of the governmental assumptions of their 'new' 
welfare state, or to assume their new social responsibilities as 'consumer-citizens'. 
Indeed, it wa~ difficult to expect them to have done so. For it is even more difficult 
for governments to change social conceptions of 'law'. In the mid- J 980s. the 
modem configurations of Australian law and government had existed for nearly 150 
1342 
1343 
Ibid, paras 18. 19 & 22 at 5. 
Above at pp 254-256 
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years. Its legal system, liberal legal centralist alliance, 'public administration' and 
the social construction of 'modem Anglo-Australian law' were culminant products of 
Western legal modernisation. As we discussed in Chapter Six, at the time court'.> the 
legal profession and its ideology of judicial law and 'legal system' were already 
indelibly implicated in modem Anglo-American society. 1344 Throughout the 20th 
century, moreover, the court-based, lawyer-administered 'institutional' paradi8Ills of 
a 'modem legal system' 'engineered' in the modem Australian legal system by 
governments through their alliance with the legal profession were hegemonic and 
omnipresent. These paradigms of 'modern law' were imbricated in the Australian 
welfare state and omnipresent in Australian society, defining its conceptions of law. 
This situation had not changed by the mid-1970s, as we demonstrated in Chapter 
Seven when revisiting the significance of the social prominence of 'legal aid' during 
the post-war experience. The hegemony of the alliance and its 'modem law' had 
slipped by the early 1980s, as we discussed earlier in this chapter. 134' Nevertheless, 
in 1993 these ideals of 'law', defined by reference to courts, judges and lawyers, in a 
'legal system' administered under the 'rule of law', remained the most powerful and 
coherent conception of law in the society of the 'new' welfare state. The legal 
transformations of the 1980s had so far been superstructural and too recent to 
dislodge the images of 'modem Australian law' from the minds and expectations of 
its citizens. 
The social presence of this 'law' was the principal source of the ideological 
dimensions of the 'problems' in 'access to justice'. Its ideals continued to constitute 
the defining social association between citizens and the state. As we described in 
Chapter Six, in the common law world the modem state had deliberately deployed 
the ideals of a 'legal system' within 'modem Australian law' as an adjunct to the 
performance of its administrative and governmental functions. 1346 Since the 1980s, 
however, the weighting accorded to these ideals in the policy and administrative 
mechanisms of the 'new' Australian welfare state had been significantly diminished. 
Moreover, the content of 'modem Australian law' - with its focus on courts, judges 
and lawyers - had permitted Australian governments to 'disguise' the locus of control 
over social administration, as we argued in Chapter Six. 1347 In their modem role as 
'stage managers· of the Australian legal system, courts, judges and lawyers became 
deeply associated in the popular 'mind' with the administration of government. As 
importantly, in the present context, they became deeply identified as conduits of the 
social 'benefits' which the modem state could confer in a 'legal system' governed by 
the rule of 'law'. For Australian citizens, moreover, the historical experience of the 
welfare state had been one of governments which had delivered social 'benefits', 
initially - before the 1970s - through covert policies of 'domestic defence'. and - in 
the mid-1970s - in a hybrid form of a 'defensive' overtly welfarist style of 
govenunent. 
13.j.j 
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Above at pp 180-183. 
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Since the late 1970s, however, Australian governments had begun to withdraw from 
their role as 'benefit' providers, as we have described earlier. However, courts, 
judges and lawyers remained in the frontline, facing the legacy of popular experience 
of a socially-oriented welfare state and ongoing popular expectations of the state and 
its 'legal system' as a source of social 'benefits'. As mere 'stage managers', they 
were unable to satisfy these expectations. In fact, courts, judges and lawyers, and the 
civil and criminal justice systems which they administered, had rarely been the 
source of material state 'benefits' in modem Australian society. Neither was this 
their function, nor were modem justice systems des\gned to do so. Modern 
administrative law had supplied the vehicle for supervising the distribution of 
material social 'benefits', through the configurations of 'public administration'. By 
1993, however, as we have shown above, these original modem social functions of 
administrative law had been transformed. Its role as the 'hidden' public face of law 
in the welfare state had thereby been diminished. Moreover, the de facto functions 
of administrative law, its actors and 'public administration' in 'buffering' the harsher 
social consequences for citizens unable to 'access' the courts to advance their social 
'rights' had been removed. In their place had come the 'architects' of NPM and 
competition policy, and the 'new' administrative law of the 'new' welfare state. This 
not only reduced the buffer, its new paradigm of government made access to the 
courts seem even more significant. 
The other source of the ideological dimensions of the 'problems' in 'access to 
justice' was in the reaction of interest groups. The legal professional groups, 
reformers, social welfare organisations, judges and lawyers and many individuals 
who made submissions to the NLAAC inquiry and the Senate 'Cost of Justice' 
inquiry had deep investments in the modern configuration of law and government. 1348 
So did the players in national political forums who highlighted the presence of 
ongoing problems in access to courts and lawyers. The social capital of these 
political interests groups was adversely affected by the demise of the liberal legal 
centralist alliance and other cracks in the modern configurations of Australian law 
and government. Furthermore, by 1993, the "control' of the legal system was at 
stake. Governments now took counsel from economists and economic rationalists 
about the legal system's future role and social functions. This threatened the 
influence established by the interest groups over the public policy processes of law-
making and law refonn. Furthermore, the political capital invested by the interest 
groups in legislation, judicial types of law and 'law' itself was threatened by the 
changed politics of the central legal domain. New axes of social governance had 
been established in the worlds of business and the 'privatised' corporate machinery 
of the welfare state. Its techniques of social ordering and regulation were not 
welcomed by the 'legal' interest groups, who were hostile to the 'removal' of 
political responsibility for legal regulation from governments, and who feared the 
implications for their future capacity to participate in law-making and to mould the 
content of centralist law to protect the social interests which they represented. 
1348 National Legal Aid Advisory Committee. above n 7 at 15·22; Senate Standing Committee on Legal ana 
Constitutional Affairs. above n iJ at 53-63. 
277 
Why the Keating Government Adopted an 'Access to Justice' 
Approach 
Prima facie, the actions of the Keating Government in adopting an 'access to justice' 
response are explicable by reference to the reasons discussed above. In 1993, there 
were real and ongoing problems in popular access to the Australian legal system. 
Moreover, there was a perception - amongst ordinary citizens and the 'legal' interest 
groups - that the legal system was becoming increasingly inaccessible. Either of 
these reasons provided a sufficient political justification for renewed state action to 
improve fair and effective access to law in Australian society. 
However, what is not so clear is why that action necessarily involved jettisoning the 
legal aid response, which had been the premier national policy towards access to law 
since 1973. Neither is it clear why the new response took the particular form which 
it did. Why did the Keating Government adopt its 'access to justice' response and 
why did its ostensible justifications exhibit the paradoxical features we described 
above? If the response was intended to improve the quality of citizens' access to the 
legal system, why did it, at the same time, appear to doubt the social efficacy of the 
key institution<: of its system of civil and criminal justice - the courts - and the judges 
and the legal profession? 
The Jettiso11i11g of the Legal Aid Response 
By 1993, the 'legal aid' response had already faded into history. It was no longer a 
credible base for the public policy of access to the legal system in the 'new' welfare 
state. As a public policy response, legal aid suffered from two irremediable 
problems. The first was that it was 'guilty by association' with the past. In the eyes 
of the Keating Government and its policy-advisers, the national legal aid scheme was 
tarnished by the 'inefficiencies' of government in the 1970s and deeply implicated in 
its 'out-dated' attitudes to social welfare and citizenship. Moreover, within the 
Labor Party and the federal conservative parties - and, indeed, Australian society 
itself - the national scheme was linked to the perceived maladministration of the 
\Vhitlam Government For the dominant 'right wing' political factions of the Keating 
administration. this was an experience of Labor in government which they were 
anxious to forget. 
Moreover, the national scheme and 'legal aid' had become closely associated in the 
·minds' of governments, policy-makers and the public with the legal profession and 
lawyers. In 1993, the organised profession and lawyers still dominated the 
administration of the national scheme. Furthermore, private practising lawyers 
continued to be the major recipients of public expenditure on legal aid. Neither of 
these factors made expanding the legal aid response an attractive option to 
governments determined to subject the profession and the lawyers' services industry 
to competition policy, the 'market' and 'consumer-oriented' policies. 
It was, however, not only that governments saw the profession and lawyers as 
economic dinosaurs. They were also unattractive because the organised profession 
and the majority of Australian lawyers remained deeply committed to the ideals of 
legalism and 'modern Australian law'. As a lobby group, lawyers and their 
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professional organisations projected ideals of the role of the courts, the 
responsibilities of the state and social citizenship which were increasingly 
antithetical to the thrust of government and public policy in the 'new' welfare state. 
Governments, therefore, were unlikely to have reinvigorated a policy so irrevocably 
linked to these rapidly vanishing configurations of modem Australian law and 
government. 
The 'legal aid' response was also 'guilty by association' with the expansion of the 
post-war welfare state. The idea that Australians might possess a 'right' to legal aid -
either as an incident of poverty or social citizenship - was not in keeping with the 
prevailing 'contributory' notions of the 'New Right', and its flourishing notions of 
'consumer-citizenship'. Moreover, in the national corridors of power - particularly 
amongst those ministers and officials responsible for managing public finances - the 
national legal aid scheme had achieved a reputation for profligacy, as unjustified as 
this might have been. The Keating Government was, therefore, unlikely to have 
resolved to have increased expenditure on an already questionable response. A 
response, moreover, which was widely perceived amongst its advisers and officials 
to have for too long unduly enriched lawyers and subsidised the operation of their 
practices. 
The second irremediable problem of the legal aid response was its diminished 
relevance. By 1993, as we have seen above, Australian governments had breached 
their modem 'bargain' with the legal profession. Neither the ideals of 'modem 
Australian law', nor a lawyer-centric market for legal services dominated access to 
law policy, as they had done in the mid- l 970s. Governments had stepped away from 
the legal profession and its 'solutions' and towards the market-managed answers of 
the economists. The 'problems' in 'access to law' were seen as resolvable by 
establishing 'level playing fields' for lawyers' services providers, in which 
'consumer-citizens' could purchase cost-effective services appropriate to their 
incomes and 'needs'. To the extent that the poor had any residual special claims on 
the state for legal aid, the ever more restrictive eligibility criteria applied within the 
national scheme guaranteed the presence of a minimal safety net, consistent with the 
changed assumptions of government in the 'new' Australian welfare state. 
Tile Paradoxical Features oft/1e 'Access to Justice' Response 
It would be all too easy to dismiss the paradoxical features of the decision to adopt 
an ·access to justice' response as a cynical exercise of a government bent on 
pursuing policies of economic reform and disciplining the legal profession and 
lawyers. The opinion polls cited by the federal Minister for Justice in 1993 which 
'"suggested a 'corrosion of faith' in the integrity of most ... social, corporate, 
economic and poiit1cal institutions" had not been conducted in a social vacuum. 1349 
They reflected the views of citizens living in the 'new' Australian welfare state. 
Moreover, "the pressing need to address the 'crisis of confidence' in the institutions 
fundamental to the rule of law" had not occured by accident. 1350 It was a product of 
1349 
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Above at p 248. 
Above at p 248. 
279 
the changed politics of law in Australian society in the 1980s and, in particular, of 
the decline of its modem configurations of law and government. In turn, these 
transformations were not the outgrowth of some unforeseen evolutionary process. 
The role of the Australian welfare state and the functions of its legal institution and 
law changed through the deliberate actions of governments, especially those of 
successive Federal Labor Governments since 1983. No doubt,.these transformations 
were influenced - and even exacerbated - by extra-national changes in the global 
economy. Nevertheless, the overt instruments of change were the new styles of 
social governance 'engineered' through the legal system of the Australian welfare 
state. 
As always, however, the causes of modern legal development are complex. 
Cynicism is an inadequate explanatory perspective, as are the cruder forms of 
Marxist critiques of the role of the state and its agents in the legal system. Care must 
also be taken in interpreting the significance of the rheto.ric of the Minister for Justice 
and the liberal ideals of 'modem Australian law' espoused by the AJAC outlined at 
the beginning of the chapter. On the one hand, the celebration of the ideals of the 
'rule of law', whilst at the same time engaging in deep criticism of the courts, judges 
and practising lawyers, might simply reflect the contradictions of a radical agenda of 
law reform. Indeed, this was partly so, both on the part of the Keating Government 
and its advisers and also on the part of the members of the AJAC. The chair of the 
latter, Mr. Justice Sackville, had been the Commonwealth Commissioner for Law 
and Poverty in the 1970s and remained - like other lawyer members of the AJAC -
genuinely and deeply committed to reform and 'modern Australian law'. In this 
respect, they were not unlike other lawyers and the Australian citizenry at large in 
1993, as we have indicated above. Thus, these residual perspectives on 'law' and the 
modern configurations of Australian law and government clearly influenced the 
decision to adopt an 'access to justice' approach, and to pursue its particular reform 
agendas. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Keating Govenunent 
was also motivated by less noble factors. By 1993, Australian governments had 
breached the liberal legal centralist alliance and distanced themselves from their 
modem relationship with the legal profession. Governments no longer relied on the 
profession to the same degree or in the same proportion to manage the state and its 
justice system, or to administer lawyers' services. The legal profession had been 
relegated to the status of one amongst many competing interest groups, bereft of its 
modem privileges, and with its lawyers demoted to the status of 'day labourers'. Yet 
governments had retained the construction of 'law' originally designed by the legal 
profession as the continuing ba!,..iS of 'modem law' in Australian society. In doing 
so, they had disconnected 'modern Australian law' both from its modem roots in the 
liberal legal centralist alliance and from the designing liberal assumptions of social 
governance of its 'architects' and 'stage managers' amongst the legal profession. and 
its judges and lawyers. 
Moreover, these functional transfonnations had occurred in a social context where 
the legal system itself was increasingly disconnected from its role in the 'old' 
welfare state as a distributor of material 'benefits' and the guarantor of social well-
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being, as we have shown above. Thus, by 1993 the ideals of 'modem Australian 
law', which had informed the 'access to justice' response, had increasingly become 
an ideological 'shell'. Significant parts of its 'legal system' had become remnant 
ideals of 'ideals' of 'law', existing amongst the shards of the modem configurations 
of Australian law and government. Moreover, disconnected from the modem social 
constraints imposed by the legal profession, they had become the exclusive property 
of the 'new' welfare state, now free to 'engineer' and design new social functions for 
'modem Australian law'. 
. 
All these legal transformations occurred, as we have shown above, in a context 
where Australian governments were pre-occupied with minimising public 
expenditure, reducing their civic responsibilities and maximising 'efficiency' in 
social governance. Thus, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the adoption of an 
'access to justice' response was also attractive to the Keating Govenunent because it 
was relatively inexpensive, whilst at the same time redressing some of the real and 
ongoing problems in access to the legal system and satisfying some of the popular 
and other expressions of concern about its growing inaccessibility. For by 1993, the 
ideals of 'modem Australian law' had become another public commodity in the 
'new' welfare state, subject - like its other assets - to the exegetical prescriptions of 
NPM and economic rationalism. Its newly disconnected character, allied with the 
transformations of the legal system, meant that it was a low cost commodity, both in 
design, 'manufacture' and content. This 'commodification' of 'law' was another and 
less obvious aspect of the explanation for the adoption of the 'access to justice' 
response. It saw the Keating Government sanction the 'production' of a new social 
construction of law, which transformed the unfulfilled expectations of 'modem 
Australian law' into a hollow promise of fair and effective access to law in the 'new' 
welfare state. 
Conclusion 
In applying the lessons of revisiting the post-war experience of legal aid, we have 
rendered the 'access to justice' response more transparent. Like the post-war 
experience of legal aid, neither the origins of the 'problems' in 'access to justice' 
which emerged in the mid-l 980s, nor the significance of the response of the Keating 
Government are adequately explained within the sdf-referential ideals of 'modern 
Australian law'. This chapter has shown that the appearance of the 'problems' was 
linked to the transformation in public policy and legal regulation in the Australian 
welfare state. These transformations exacerbated the ongoing shortcomings in 
popular access to the legal system, making them both more socially prominent and 
the inaccessibility of courts and lawyers more socially significant. Moreover, like 
the post-war experience, the origins of the 'problems' in 'access to justice' were 
linked to developments in the political economy of the legal profession and to the 
changing functions of lawyers. These developments and changes were, in part. a 
continuation of trends evident in the 1960s and 1970s, but they were also a product 
of the growing interventionism of Australian governments since the iatc ! 970s. 
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Furthermore, the chapter has shown that the experience of 'access to justice' in 
Australian society also had bifidial dimensions. On the one hand, the new 
'problems' of the 1980s reflected real and 'concrete' difficulties faced by poorer and 
ordinary citizens in paying the transaction costs of the legal system and overcoming 
its social, non-financial barriers. These disabilities impacted upon greater numbers 
of citizens and produced heightened levels of social inequity in popular access to 
legal services, particularly those 'supplied' by courts and lawyers. The 'access to 
justice' response of the Keating Government, and its acceptance of many of the 
recommendations of the AJAC, were similarly 'concrete' responses to these real 
difficulties in access to legal services faced by its citizens. Moreover, both were in 
large part genuine responses to the shortcomings in fair and effective access to law in 
the 'new' Australian welfare state. Even if the scope and scale of the 'access to 
justice' response and the 'solutions' proposed by the AJAC fell impossibly short of 
the measures required to restore the social reciprocity which Australians had come to 
expect from modem governments. Although conceived in confusion, following the 
departure of the modern configurations of Australian law and government from the 
centrefield of social governance, they remained genuine responses by well-meaning 
refonners, who were ignorant of the need - and neglected the ideological 'opticns' -
to c9nstruct new images appropriate for fair and effective access to law in the society 
of the 'new' welfare state. 
On the other hand, like the social prominence of 'legal aid' in the post-war 
experience, 'access to justice' was also an ideological phenomenon, eliciting an 
ideological response. Unlike 'legal aid', the Australian experience of 'access to 
justice' was not a celebration of the vitality of the liberal legal centralist alliance, but 
an indication of its demise. Viewed in the context of the politics of the welfare state, 
it indicated instead a society still deeply committed to the ideals of 'modem Anglo-
American law', but administered by governments which had become selective in 
their commitment to its ideals of social governance under the 'rule of law'. This 
chapter has shown that the ideological dimensions of the 'problems' in 'access to 
justice' were in a tangible sense a fonn of social protest by ordinary citizens 
objecting to their increasing exclusion from the 'traditional' protective regulatory 
umbrella of regulation in the Australian welfare state. The reaction of the Keating 
Government also had ideological dimensions, and it was not alone. It signalled that 
Australian governments were now prepared to 'manufacture' new social 
constructions of law through the 'engines' of the Australian legal system. These 
were constructions which, unlike those 'engineered' in the great modem enterprise of 
governments, the courts and the legal profession in the liberal legal centralist 
alliance, increasingly treated modern centralist law as a commodity, to be bartered in 
the 'markets' of governance, citizenship and access to legal services in the 'new' 
welfare state. This, as we see in Chapter Nine, would have implications for the 
feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to law in contemporary Australian 
society. 
Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
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In Chapter One, we began by posing the general question of whether fair and 
effective access to law is a feasible expectation of citizens or governments in the 
contemporary Australian welfare state. This question was posited in the context of 
the reality of the on-going 'problems' citizens experienced in access to the legal 
system, and 'access to justice'. The thesis proclaimed as its goal to consider whether 
these problems are realistically capable of being resolved. 
In answering this initial question, our emphasis is upon whether these 'problems' are 
"capable" of being resolved and upon the .. feasibility" of citizens achieving fair and 
effective access to law in the Australian welfare state. This conclusion neither 
prescribes specific remedial measures, nor does it conclusively assess the 
practicability of law reform and changes to public policy or their prospects of 
success. Instead, it reviews the results of defending the opening contention of the 
thesis, explains why it holds 'keys' to understanding access to law and briefly 
discusses the feasibility of achieving fair and effective access to law in the 
contemporary Australian welfare state. 
The Results of Defending the Opening Contention 
The opening contention of the thesis was that revisiting the origins and significance 
of the mid-l 970s national legal aid scheme held the key to determining the feasibility 
of achieving fair and effective access to law in contemporary Australian society. The 
thesis has successfully defended this contention. In the first place, it has done so by 
revealing the origins of the phenomenon which was the Australian post-war 
experience of legal aid. Part I of the thesis narrated the institutional developments 
which preceded the national scheme and described its ideological context. This 
history gave us a clearer picture of its origins and significance, particularly with 
respect to its connection with post-war changes in the legal profession, the 
economics of solicitors' practices, the growing consciousness of the plight of poorer 
Australians and developments in public policy in the welfare state over 1973-76. 
Part II began by pursuing the 'missing' aspects of the story of the Australian 
experience in a cross-national context. Modern legal aid in Western society was 
shown to have been a product of legal modernisation, and of the establishment of its 
national legal systems. Legal aid assumed its familiar bifidial form, i.e., 
simultaneously being part of the 'concrete' legal machinery of the modern state and 
an ideal of 'modem Western law', through the subsequent functional transformation 
of the poor persons procedures. However, contrary to the explanatory orthodoxy, the 
thesis demonstrated that the ideals of 'legal aid' fulfilled different social functions in 
the modem civil law and common law worlds. In the former, its ideals were closely 
linked with emerging social 'rights' of citizenship. Whereas, in the common law 
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world, 'legal aid' was seen as an 'institution' of the 'legal system' of the 'modem 
Anglo-American law' created by the liberal legal centralist alliance. 
By locating its origins in modernity and identifying the impact of the different social 
constructions of 'modern Western law', the thesis has presenteJ an alternative 
history of legal aid. This is a history, moreover, which sourced legal aid in the same 
legal systems which continued to service the regulatory needs of post-war modem 
Western governments, perfonning comparable tasks and functions to their mid-19th 
century ancestors. Furthennore, to reconstruct the history of legal aid, Part II of the 
thesis developed a revised framework to analyse modern.legal developments. This 
framework promised to be applicable in revisiting the post-war experience of legal 
aid, as it proved to be. 
In the light of this alternative history and its underlying investigative 'tools', the 
thesis provided new insights into the origins and significance of the post-war 
experience. Importantly, it showed that, instead of looking for 'answers' to the 
causes of a single phenomenon, i.e., "post war legal aid", we were actually looking at 
the causes of dual phenomena: first, the reorganisation of national arrangements for 
legal aid, and, secondly, the unprecedented social prominence of the Anglo-
American 'legal aid' ideal in the post-war Western world. In the case of the former, 
the thesis confinned that the post-war national schemes were products of changes in 
public policy in the welfare capitalist states. These changes were caused by a variety 
of political factors, which had their origins across the social experience of modernity. 
The catalytic cause, however, was shown to be the great post-war expansion of the 
social functions and responsibilities of the welfare capitalist states. The thesis 
confinned that the post-war schemes were demonstrably impm1ant in advancing 
popular social well-being, whilst highlighting some of their limitations in addressing 
the legal problems of poorer and disadvantaged people. It also explained 'why' and 
'how' the new legal aid schemes were significant for the welfare state and its organs, 
la\vyers and the legal profession, as Abel and others had suggested. 
Ho\vever, the thesis demonstrated that the principal 'benefits' of revisiting the post-
war experience came from exploring the origins and significance of its second 
dimension. The social prominence of the ideals of Anglo-American 'legal aid' were 
shown, in the first place, to 'test' the social integrity of the liberal legal centralist 
alliance and its 'law' in the Anglo-American welfare states. In the United States, the 
thesis argued that the post-war experience revealed an alliance facing 'external' 
threats to its hegemony. Elsewhere, in countries like Australia, Britain and Canada, 
it showed the modem alliance of governments, courts and the legal profession to be 
vitally intact, and its social constructions of 'modem law' to be both omnipresent and 
hegemonious. In the second place, the thesis linked the prominence of the ideals of 
Anglo-American 'legal aid' in other parts of the Western world to the post-war social 
penetration of Anglo-American culture, and the gradual internationalisation of its 
ideals of 'modem law'. Part II concluded that the ultimate and lasting significance 
of the post-war experience, in both its 'concrete' and 'ideal' dimensions, was to 
reinforce and consolidate the political interests of modern centralist law in the 
Western legal domain. In doing so, the thesis was recording an important new 
insight gleaned from revisiting the experience. Incidentally, however, this 
284 
conclusion also deliberately confronted our deeply ingrained liberal sensibilities 
about legal aid. Thus, revisiting its post-war experience was also important because 
it illustrated the 'mind' shifts necessary, if governments, policy-makes and lawyers 
in liberal welfare capitalist states like Australia are to effectively engage with the 
social problems of access to law. 
The previous chapter has been a practical demonstration of this policy imperative. It 
has applied the methodology, insights, 'benchmarks' and other lessons of revisiting 
the post-war experience to give greater transparency to the Australian 'access to 
justice' response. Once again, the thesis has revealed the shortcomings of liberal and 
other centralist analyses in explaining the origins of legal developments in the 
welfare state. These manifested themselves, in this instance, in the justifications for 
renewed state action offered by the Keating Government, and echoed by the AJAC. 
In part, its decision to adopt an 'access to justice' response reflected a desire amongst 
Australian governments to enhance the social 'rights' of citizenship. More 
significantly, it was a reaction to political pressures and social discontent arising out 
of real and ongoing problems in access to the legal system, and especially to its 
courts and lawyers. Many of these problems were a legacy of modernity, left 
unaddressed by the national legal aid scheme. However, the thesis showed that 
others were a direct result of actions of Australian governments since the mid- l 970s, 
beginning with the retreat from social services in the late 1970s, and compounded by 
the transformations of the welfare state in the 1980s. Not only did these actions 
exacerbate the existing problems, but they created a new climate in which access to 
lawyers and courts became more socially significant - in both actual and perceived 
terms. 
In various ways, Chapter Eight has shown that the transformations in public policy, 
government and law in the welfare state in the 1980s cracked the modern 
configurations of Australian law and government beyond immediate hope of repair. 
Thus, like legal aid before it, the 'problems' in 'access to justice', and the subsequent 
response of the Keating Government, served as a 'litmus test'. In this case, however, 
the thesis has shown its results were confused, and indeterminate. On the one hand, 
the 'test' revealed governments which had abandoned their political compact with 
the legal profession, and were pursuing alternative ideas of social governance, styles 
of legal regulation and civic relationships, with the aid of non-lawyer, economic 
advisers. On the other hand, daily life in Australia was still governed by conceptions 
of 'modern law', and by citizens' expectations of a 'legal system' in a welfare state 
designed to promote social well-being. From either perspective, however, the 'test' 
revealed a society where modern centralist law, its ideologies and social functions 
had undergone major transformation in less than 20 years. The thesis has not fully 
explored or explained the 'story' of this transformation. Neither has it fully 
considered its implications. It has, however, demonstrated that improving our 
understanding of the origins and significance of the post-ware experience lets us 
begin to 'see' its real story, and points in the direction in which it can eventually be 
fully told. 
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The 'Keys' to Understanding Access to Law 
The contribution of the thesis to understanding access to law goes beyond revisiting 
the origins and significance of post-war legal aid and unravelling the 'access to 
justice' response. The work in the thesis has provided other insights into post-war 
law, government and society impinging upon access to the legal system. These are 
scattered throughout its chapters, and include the constant presence of the legal 
profession and changes in the political economy of legal practice and the 
organisation of the lawyers' services industry. However, the thesis has also provided 
three important 'keys' or methodological insights into studying the causes and 
solutions to problems in access to law. In particular, it has provided insights from 
the perspective of researching, planning and developing the public policy of access 
to the law - and courts and lawyers - in the contemporary welfare state. 
In the first place, the thesis has reminded us of the significance of history, something 
all too frequently forgotten in economic modelling of the 'new' welfare state. This 
refers not only to the significance of the history of the modem Australian social 
experience of law and its legal systems, ideologies and actors. The history relevant 
to access to law includes the stories of the Australian welfare state, its policies and 
public administration. Moreover, it includes the yet largely overlooked stories of 
'lesser', socially-based forms of legal ordering. If we are to understand modem 
Australian law today and to plan or speculate about its future development, we must 
first better understand its past, even if - as in the case of modem centralist law - the 
evidence suggests that its future may be quite different to its disappearing, post-war 
modem past. 
Secondly. the thesis has throughout emphasised the connection between 
developments in centralist law, and the decision-making processes and public 
policies of the modem state. In Chapter One, we noted that the law of the welfare 
state is its servant, and that its legal agendas project public policy. Part II, however, 
showed that the modem legal system and its law are creatures or 'inventions' of the 
state. In Australia, we had become accustomed to viewing public administration -
and its 'public servants' - as part of the legal machinery of the state, with notionally 
little room for independent manoeuvre. However, until very recently, 'we', like 
others in the modem common law societies, had seen courts, judges and lawyers as 
inherently different, apart from and 'independent' of the state in their role and 
functions. Much of the work in the thesis has demonstrated this to be a social 
artifice. Modem courts, judges and lawyers have always been creatures of the state 
and its functions, far more so than the imprints of the modem configurations of 
Australian law disclosed. For these reasons, the thesis suggests that judges, lawyers 
and 'lawyer-educated' policy makers may not be the most appropriate people to 
shape the future direction of access to law policy. The role of economists in the 
'new' welfare state may be socially delterious, as Chapter Eight implies. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that economists, Public Policy scholars and 
practitioners, 'New Public Managers' and others will not be needed in sufficient 
numbers to leaven the presence of lawyers and their images of law. For like war, 
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access to law policy, "is much too serious a thing to be left to military men", or, in 
this case, lawyers of either gender. 13' 1 
Thirdly, in Part II the thesis articulated a revised analytical framework for better 
understanding the modern origins of legal aid. This framework adopted a 
'kaleidoscope approach' to modern legal development. It drew upon what.we 
'knew' from history, together with the insights offered by the liberal legalist, liberal 
centralist and Marxist-oriented ideological premises which informed the explanatory 
accounts of tqe post-war experience of legal aid. However, the framework sought to 
redress the defects in the existing - or 'old' - analytical perspectives, and to 
accommodate the political dimensions of modem law. Accordingly, it included four 
new explanatory perspectives: first, a legal pluralist perspective; secondly, a dynamic 
model of development in the state legal system; thirdly, the methodology and 
techniques of Public Policy; and, fourthly, it acknowledged an ultimate brake on 
explaining legal development in the welfare state. 
The thesis has successfully deployed this analytical framework to discover new 
insights into the origins and significance of the post-war experience of legal ·aid and 
to explore the reasons behind the 'access to justice' response. This suggests that the 
framework may have a wider application in modelling the causes of legal 
developments in the contemporary welfare state and in assisting in identifying 
possible 'solutions' to its problems in access to law. 
The Feasibility of Fair and Effective Access to Law 
The thesis has shown that the Australian welfare state is "capable" of achieving fair 
and effective citizens' access to law. Neither the post-war legal aid scheme, nor the 
"access to justice' response were designed as exhaustive coordinated national 
attempts. Thus, those responses cannot be said to have demonstrated the 
impracticability of achieving fair and effective citizens' access to law. Moreover, the 
'new' welfare state retains the legitimacy, technology and administrative capacity to 
direct a sustained campaign to overcome the existing problems in access to the legal 
system. However, it is evident from the thesis that it is unlikely to do so. The 'old' 
welfare state, operating within the modem configurations of Australian law, 
neglected the legal problems of its citizens at a time when it was otherwise actively 
engaged in the 'institutional' prot~ction of national social well-being. The 'new' 
welfare state has stepped away from these responsibilities. Its new principles of 
social governance and expectations of 'consumer-citizenship' make it an unlikely 
candidate to pursue systemic law reform and inject socially significant additional 
funds into the system of legal aid. 
Thus, if Australian citizens are to achieve practicable forms of fair and effective 
access to law, they must first diversify their expectations. The ideal of universal fair 
and effective popular access to courts and lawyers was always a modem dream. 
1351 Attributed to Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, quoted by Briand to Lloyed George during World \Var I: 
The Concise O.rford Dictionary of Quotations. (I 964) at 225, para 5. 
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matched neither by historical experience nor administrative reality. Governments, 
policy makers and citizens must become more catholic in their taste for law, and 
must begin reminding each other of the historical and ever-present reality of the 
pluralism of the legal domain. This should not be an excuse for the legal system to 
avoid the many occasions when court-based, 'expert, facilitated procedural justice is 
appropriate, necessary and fair. It means that the legal system should - whenever 
possible - elevate existing and new fonns of social ordering and dispute resolution 
which legal modernisation placed 'outside the law,. Bringing modem Australian law 
back into the fold of the legal system must be part of the process of moving towards 
fair and effective access to law. 
On the other hand, the state and its powers are an undeniable reality. In Chapter 
Eight, we described the changed politics of the Australian central legal domain since 
the mid-1980s, and the legal transfonnations being 'engineered, by the 'new' welfare 
state. These have contributed to the demise of the modern configurations of 
Australian law. However, in the rhetoric of NPM and its adherents, the 'death' of 
those configurations, and the fading of 'modern Australian law, and its 'legal 
system' also provide those pursuing fair and effective access to law with 'new 
opportunities'. In a sense, these 'opportunities' are unwelcome, for they are based 
on new ideals of governance which challenge or deny the more comfortable 
assumptions of modernity. However, the changed politics of law in the Australian 
welfare state do provide real and identifiable opportunities for legal change. Change 
which cannot and need not ignore the state, but which should seek to use its pursuit 
of deregulation and freedom from 'law' to reclaim the popularity oflaw itself - in its 
many and multitudinous fonns - on behalf of law's diverse interests and claimants. 
In reclaiming the sociability of law and in distributing responsibility for access to its 
other institutions, citizens may be better equipped to remind the 'new' welfare state 
of its responsibilities to provide social justice in the fonn of the improved material 
well-being which was the real achievement of the modern legal system for poorer 
and disadvantaged people. 
Appendix A 
AGREEMENT 
between 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
and 
THE ~TATE Of WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
in relation to 
The Provision of Legal Aic 
(1977) 
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THIS AGREEMENT is made the ~~/ day 
of-~·~~)"' One thousand nine hundred and sevent~~~ 
-:fa-tween - · 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (in this agreement called 
"the Commonwealth") of the one part, and 
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA (in this agreement 
cal led "the State") of the other part. 
WHEREAS 
(A) the Commonwealth and the State are desirous of ensuring 
that legal aid is available, both in matters relating 
to the Commonweal th and in matters relating to the 
State, to persons in Western Australia who are in need 
of assistance; 
(B) the Commonwealth and the State are in agreement that 
such legal aid can most appropriately be p~ovided by a 
statutory body, independent of government, established 
by the State and conducted and funded in accordance 
with arrangements made between the Commonwealth and the 
~tate; 
( C) by the Legal Aid Cammi ssion Act, 1976-1977 the 
Parl iarnent of the State has ma9e provision for the 
establishment of a corporation to be known as the Legal 
Aid Commission of Western Australia and for the 
functions and duties of the Commission that is so 
established; 
(D) section 68 of that Act provides that the State may from 
time to time enter into an agreement or arrangement 
with the Commonwealth for ~r with respect to -
(a) the moneys to be made available by the Common-
weal th, or by the State and the Commonweal th, 
for the pwrposes of legal asistance; 
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(b) the priori ties to be observed in the provision 
of legal assistance as b~tween classes · of 
persons or classes of matters, or both; 
( c). the transfer to the staff of the Commission of 
persons who are Commonweal th employees within 
the meaning of section 77 of the Act; 
(ca) the sharing of -
( i) the costs of establishing the Commission; 
and 
(ii) operational costs incurred in the 
provision of legal assistance by the 
Commission; 
( d) any matter incidental to a matter mentioned in 
paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (ca) of the section; 
(E) by the Commoweal th Legal Aid Commission Act 1977 the 
Parliament of the Commonweal th has made provisior. for 
the establishment of a Commission to be known as the 
Commonweal th Legal Aid Commission and for the functions 
and duties of the Commission that is so established; 
(F) provision is also made by the said Commonwealth Legal 
Aid Commission Act 1977 for the Commonwealth to make 
arrangements with a State with respect to the transfer 
of certain persons employed by the Commonweal th to a 
legal aid commission of the State and for the 
implementation of arrangements so made; 
(G) in order to give effect to the said agreements, provi-
sions and proposals the Commonweal th and the State are 
desirous of entering into the agreements and arrange-
ments hereinafter set forth: 
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NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED as 1bllows 
Interoretation 
1.1 · In this agreement, except where the context 
otherwise requires or unless a contrary intention appears -
"appointed day" means the day appointed by the 
Commission pursuant to section 13 of the State Act as 
the day on which the Cammi ssion wi 11 commence to 
provide legal assistance in accordance with the State 
Act; 
"Federal area" means the matters to which that 
expression relates as provided in paragraph (a) of 
clause 4.3 ana·a& deemed by clause 4.4; 
"legal aid" means legal services, including advice on 
matters of law, of the nature performed by a legal 
practitioner for a client; 
"State area" means the matters to which that expression 
relates as provided in paragraph (b) of clause 4.3; 
"the ALAO" means the Division of the Attorney-General's 
Department of the Commonwealth ;hat is designated the 
Australian Legal Aid Office; 
"' 
"the Commission" means the Legal Aid Commission of the 
State referred to in clause 2.1; 
"the Commonweal th Act" means the Commonweal th Legal Aic 
Commission Act 1977; 
"the Commonweal th Commission" means the statutory 
Commission of the Commonwealth that is established by 
the Commonwealth in accordance with clause 3.1; 
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"the State Act" means the Legal 
1976-1977 of the State; and Aid Commission Act 
"year" means a year commencing on a first day of July. 
1.2 In this agreement, except where a contrary intention appears -
(a) words or expressions that are defined in the 
State Act shall have,. where appropriate to the 
context, the re spec ti ve meanings attributed to 
them by the State Act; 
(b) a reference to a clause is to the relevant 
clause of this agreement; 
(c) the Schedule referred to is the Schedule to this 
agreement; 
( d) where part of a Yea:- is referred to the 
reference shal 1 be to .:he period less than a 
year which commences on the relevant 1st JuJy or 
which ends on the relevant 30th Jur.e as the 
context requi~es. 
State Commission 
2.1 The State will establish and provide for the 
operation of a statutory Legal Aid Commission independent of 
government but responsible to the Attorney-General of the State. 
2. 2 The Ccmmi ssion shall be cons ti tu ted by pe rs ans 
Who are nominated by the State, the Commonwealth and the 
legal profession in Western Australia and by the person who 
is the Director of Legal Aid. 
-. 
I 
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2. 3 The Legal Aid Commission of Western Australia 
that is established by the s'tate Act shall, unless other 
provision is made- by the Parliament of the State 
consistently with clause 2.1, be the ~ommission referred to 
in that clause. 
Commonwealth Commission 
3.1 The Commonwealth will establish and provide for 
the operation of a statutory Commission for purposes that 
include ascertaining and keeping under review the extent of 
the need for legal assistance in Australia and in particula~ 
the need for legal assistance in respect of Commonweal th 
matters, including the making of recommendations concerning 
the provision of such legal assistance by legal aid 
commissions of States and Territories. 
3.2 The Commonwealth Commission shall be constituted 
by persons who are nominated by the Commonwealth, the States 
of Australia, the Law Council of Australia, and welfare 
bodies or consumer bodies. 
3. 3 The Commonweal th Legal Aid Commission that is 
established in pursuance of the Commonwealth Act shall, 
unless other provision is made by the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth consistently with cla~se 3.1, be the Commission 
referred to in that clause. 
Provision of Le~al Aid 
4.1 The provision in Western Australia of legal aid 
to which this agreement relates shall be the responsibility 
of the Commission and le gal' aid shall be provided by the 
Commission accordingly. 
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4. 2 The Commission shall carry out its opera ti ens 
under the name "Legal Aid eommfssion of' Western Austra11a" 
and shall f'or a Period of twelve months af'ter the appointee 
day indicate on 1ts letterhead, in advertisements and on 
not! ces outside its Off'i ces that it incorporates the ALAo 
and the Legal Assistance Scheme. 
4. 3 The legal a! d to Which this agreement re 1 ates 
consists of' legal aid on anct f'rom the appointed day to 
persons Who are in neec of assistance of' that nature with respect to -
(a) matters relating tc er arising under or out of 
Federal law (which matters are ref'errec to in 
this agreement as the "Federal area" J; anc 
(b) matters relating to or arising Under or cut of 
State law (which matters are referred to ir. this 
agreement as the "State a.:-ea
11
). 
4.4 For the purposes cf clauses 5.J, S.2, 5.3, S.1, 
e.2, a.2, 9.3 and 19.2 of this agreer.:ent the "Federal area" 
shall, without af'fecting the r.:eaning in this agreement of 
"State area" under paragraph (t:) Of clause •.3, be deemed to include -
(a) any matters relating to or arising under or out 
of' State law, being matters in respect of' Which 
the persons seeking assistance are members or 
discharged memt.ers of the Defence Force or their 
dependents, migrants, persons in rece!pt or 
benefits under the focial Services legislat!on 
of the Common>.·ea1 th, Aboriginals or students, in. 
respect of Which and to the extent to which the 
Commonweal th agrees to make payments for the 
purpose of the provision by the Commission cf le gal aid; anc 
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(b) any matters relating to or arising under or out 
of State law which the Attorney-General of the 
Commonwealth may from time to time designate. 
4.5 The Commonwealth and the State will arrange for 
the legal aid services that are being provided in Western 
Australia at the date of this agreement under Part v of the 
Legal Contribution Trust Act, 1967 of the State to be 
brought within the scope of the responsibility of the 
commission under clause 4.1 as at the appointed day or as 
soon as practicable thereafter. 
4.6 Notwithstanding clause .a.l, the Commission may 
provide financial assistance to volur.:ary legal aid bodies 
in Western Australia in respect of the provision of legal 
aid subject to the proportions in which the financial 
assistance is to be provided having been determined by 
agreement between the Commonweal th and the State and to 
moneys having been appropriated for that purpose by the 
Parliaments of the Commonwealth and of ~he State. 
Provision of Le~al Aid in Federal Area 
5 .1 In the provision of lege:l aid in the Federal 
area the Commission shall be required to have regard to the 
recommendations of the Commonwealth Com~ission. 
5.2 The recommendations of the Commonweal th 
Commission to which clause 5.1 rela~es are those in respect 
of legal aid in the Federal area and include recommendations 
that are made by the Commonwealth Commission in the perform-
ance of its functions as for the time being provided by the 
Commonwealth Act. 
5.3 Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
agreement the Commission shal 1 not be required to provide 
legal aid in the Federal area that involves expend! ture by 
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the commission in excess of the sum of the funds in respect 
of that aid that are provided or to be provided by the. 
Commonwealth under this agreement and are contributed by and 
recovered or to be recovered from applicants for legal a.id 
in the Federal area. 
Liabilities Prior to Aooointed Dav 
6 .1 The Commonweal th and the State accept respons-
ibility for prov icing the Commission with sufficient funds 
to meet the liabilities of their respective legal aid 
schemes that are out~~f.~c:ng immediately prior to the 
appoin":ed day. 
Establ:shment Costs 
7 .1 The costs of t:2t:"ablishing the Commission shall 
be shared by the Commonwealth and the State in a manner that 
shall be agreec upon between the Commonwealth and the State. 
Commonwealth ?avments 
8.1 In respect c:· :he part of a year commencing on 
the appointee day, the Comm·::>nweal th will make payments to 
the State from time to time for the purpose of the provision 
by the Commission curir.g tha~ part of a,year of legal aid in 
the federal area. 
8.2 In respect of a year after the part of a year 
referred to in clause S.1 the Commonwealth will make 
payments to the State from time to time for the purpose of 
the provision by the Commission during the year of legal aid 
in the Federal area in accordance with a program and 
estimates of expenditure which have been prepared by the 
Cammi ssion and approved by the Commonweal th in accordance 
with the succeeding provisions of this agreement. 
298 
- 9 -
8 
. 
3 
Sub Jee t to moneys for the purpose bei.ng a., Pro-
pr i a ted by the Parliament of 'the Commonwealth, the payments 
by the commonwealth under clauses 8.1 and B.< will not be 
less than the amount that is required to maintain during the 
part of" the year or the year to Which the payments relate a 
level of provision of legal aid in Western Australia in 
respect of the Federal area which, in terms of the legal 
services available to persons in need of assistance in 
respect of matters referred to in Paragraph (a) Of clause 
4. 3 and of matters in respect of persons referred to in 
paragraph (a) of clause 4. 4, is equivalent to the lever of 
legal aid tha" was Provided by the ALAO during the twelve mon~hs immediately preceding the appointed day. 
Submission of Pro2rams and Estim&tes··of Exoendi ture 
g. 1 The State- Will, when from time to time so 
requested in ··writing by the Commonwealth submit to the 
Commonwealth a program and estimates of expenditure in 
respect of the provision by the Commission of legal aid in the F'eceral area. 
9. 2 A program and estimates of expenditure referrec 
to in clause 9 .1 shall be prepared by the Cammi SSion anC 
shall be in such form and shall relate to such period or 
, per:ocs as the Commonwealth requests and be submitted by 
such Cate or dates as the Commonweal th specifies in the request. 
9.3 The program and estimates of expenditure shall 
cover all matters relevant to the provision of legal aid by 
the Commission in the Federal area, including -
(a) the Celi ve,.y of legal services by salaried and 
private practitioners; 
( b) the Provision of legal advice through 'shop 
front' offices; 
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(c) the operation of regional offices; 
(d) 'duty lawyer' services; and 
(e) 'mobile lawyer' services. 
and shal 1 include the share of salaries and administrative 
costs of the Commission that are referable to the provision 
of legal aid in the Federal area. 
9.4 In the preparation, including the revision, of 
programs and estimates of expenditure, the Commission will 
consult with the Commonwealth Commission. 
Revision of Pro~ra~s and Estimates of Exoenditure 
10.1 The State shall arrange for the preparation by 
the Commission of a revisec program or revised estimate~ of 
expenditure -
(a) at any time when the Commer.wealth so requests in 
writing an~ in accordance with a timetable 
specified by the Commonwealth; or 
(b) if at any time the Stat~ wishes to make a cha~ge 
or changes in the program or in the estimates of 
expenditure, 
and shall submit the revised program or the revis:d 
estimates of expenditure to the Commonweal th in accorda~ce 
with the timetable or when a revisec program or revised 
estimates incorporating the change or changes has be~n 
prepared. 
Aooroval of Pro~rams and Estimates 
11.1 Programs and estimates of expenditure, including 
revised programs or estimates of expenditure, submit,ed 
under the preceding clauses shall be considered by -:::.e 
Commonwealth, which may propose to the State any variatic:is 
the Commonwealth considers a~propriate. 
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The State will furnish to the Commonwealth such 
. 
information and material as may reasonably be requested by 
the commonwealth for the purpose of considering programs or 
estimates of expenditure, including. proposed variations, 
under clause 11.1. 
11.3 The Commonwealth will inform the State that, or 
of the extent to which, the Commonwealth approves a program 
and estimates of expenditure or a revised program or 
estimates of expenditure submitted by the State and a 
program and estimates of expenditure so approved, or 
resulting from the approved revision, shall be the approved 
program and estimates of expenditure for the purposes of 
this agreement in respect of the period or periods to which 
th·e--p-ro-grarn· and ~s-tima tes of expenditure relate. 
State Fundin'1: 
12.1 
priated by 
Subject to moneys for the purpose being appro-
the Parliament of the State, the State wi 11 
provide to the extent required by the State P.ct the funds 
needed to meet expenditure by the Commission i~ respect of 
legal aid that is provided after the appointed day with 
respect to matters in the State area, other than matters 
that are deemed to be included in the Federal area under 
clause 4.4, after account has been taken of contributions by 
and costs recovered or to be recovered from .::ppl icants and 
statutory interest available in solicitors trust accounts 
and other trust accounts. 
Transfer of ALAO Staff 
13.1 The Commission will offer to each person who at 
the date of this agreement was, and on the date of offer is, 
an eligible person employed as a member of the staff of the 
Commission on and from the appointed day upon and subject to 
the terms and conditions set out in the Schedule. 
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13
.2 For the purposes of clause 13.1, including the 
operation of the Schedule -
"eligible person" means a person who holds an office 
or who is performing duties in the ALAO in Western 
Australia and includes a person within that 
description who is for the time being on leave; 
"offer" means an offer by .the Commission in accord-
ance with clause 13.1; and 
"the date of offer" shall be a date arranged between 
the Director of the ALAO and the Commission for 
offers to be made under clause 13.1 which shall not 
be later than 28 days from the date of this 
agreement or earlier than twelve weeks before the 
appointed day. 
13.3 An offer shall -
(a) 
set our. par~iculars cf ~he position on the staff 
of the Commission which is offered to the 
eligible person; 
(b) contain , adequate information concerning the 
terms and conditions of the employment which is 
offered; 
(c) indicate the date of the appointed day as the 
date upon which the offer if it is accepted will 
take ef feet; 
(d) specify a period of time, not being less than 2S 
days from the date of offer, within which the 
offer may be accepted; and 
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( e) provide that, where an eligible person is on 
leave or other authorized absence from duty on 
the date of offer, the period of time referred 
to in (d) shall commence when the eligible 
person receives the offer or returns from that 
leave or other absence, whichever is the 
earlier. 
13.4 An eligible person who accepts an offer shall be 
employed as a member of the staff of the Commission as from 
the appointed day in the position to which the offer relates 
in accordance with the particulars set out in respect of the 
position and in accordance with the terms and conditions set 
out in the Schedule. 
13.5 
(a) 
Where a member of the staff of the Commission -
was an eligible person entitled under the Long 
Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 
(in this clause callee "the Act") immediately 
before the appointed day to be paid in lieu of 
long service leave on ceasing to be employed in 
Government Service; 
(b) has not been paid in lieu of long service leave 
in respect cf that entitlement; and 
(c) has exercised the election referred to in 
paragraph 10 of the Schedule to have long 
service leave entitlements determined otherwise 
than in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act, 
the Commonweal th wil 1, upon that person being granted the 
whole or part of the entitlement of that person to long 
service leave or being paid in lieu of that entitlement, to 
the extent that the entitlement is cerived from Government 
303 
- 14 -
. under the provisions of the Act, .pay to the State Service 
nt that would have been payable by the Commonwealth the amou 
. tue of the entitlement referred to in paragraph (a) by vir 
l·n ·respect of the period of leave that is granted or above 
~pect of which payment is made. in re-
Suoerannuation Pavments and Arran2ements 
14.l In respect of each person who is a member of the 
staff of the Commission and who for the time being continues 
t 0 be or who has remained an eligible employee for the 
purposes of the Superannuation Act 1976, as amended, of the 
commonwealth (in this clause called "the Act"), the State 
will -
(a) arrange for the contributtons .. of that person 
under the Act to be deducted from payments of 
salary from time to time made to that person; 
(b) pay to the Commonwe~th amounts deducted under 
paragraph (a); 
make payments to the Commonweal th at such rate 
in relation to the salary for superannuation of 
that person as is from time to time determined 
I by 
as the the Commonwealth 
employer's contricution towards the super-
annuation benefits of that person under the Act; 
and 
( d) arrange for the provision by the Commission to 
the relevant Ccmmonweal th authorities of such 
information and documents as are from time to 
time requested for the administration and 
operation of the Act with respect to that 
person. 
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2 Payments made by the State to the Commonweal th 14. 
agraph (c) of clause 14.1 shall for the purposes of under par 
r eement be provided for in estimates of expenditure this ag 
and inciuded in expenditure of the Commission as an 
St in respect of legal assistance in the Federal operating co 
area. 
"" Arrangements shall be made between appropriate lA.-' 
Com~onwealth and State authorities in relation to the manner 
in which payments are to be made.by the State under clause 
a nd for any other matters that require to be arranged l 4. l 
with respect to the operation of that clause. 
Further Arran~ements 
15.l The Commonweal th and the State will negotiate 
and enter into arrangements between them for or with respect 
to the taking over and possession and use by the Commission 
of such office accommocation, furniture, records and 
equipment of the ALOA as is appropriate to the functions and 
needs of the Commission. 
Manner of Provision of LeQal Aid 
16.l 
The Commission may provide legal aid in a matter 
I 
by making available the services of the Director of Legal 
Aid or ~he staff of the Commission or by arranging for the 
services of a private practitioner or practitioners to be 
made available wholly or partly at the expense of the 
Commission. 
16.2 
In the allocation of work between the Director 
and staff of the Commission and private practitioners regarc 
shal 1 be given to the desirability of enabling officers of 
the Commission to utilize and develop their expertise and 
maintain their professional by stancards conducting 
litigation and doing other kinds cf professional legal work. 
- 16 -
and Client Relationshio Sol ic1 tor 
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17.1 The state will take action to ensure that 
is and continues to be in force by virtue of legislation 
the l ike privileges as those that arise from the "'hi ch 
relationship of client and solicitor acting in his 
professional capacity and in the course of his professional 
e~ployment shall arise between a person who has applied for 
legal aid, or to whom legal aid is being provided, and the 
r.' ector of Legal Aid or a practitioner who is a member of 
..... r 
:.he staff of the Commission wh~n the Director or that 
r· c::""' '-~~-•itioner practises as, or performs any of the functions 
c·:, a solicitor for the applicant or assisted person in 
~~~ordance with this agreement. 
Advances of Commonwealth Pavments 
18.1 
Payments to be provided by the Commonwealth to 
the state under this agreement shall be made on request in 
writing by the State by way of advance for a specific 
purpose or purposes for which payments may be made in a sum 
or sums not exceeding in total the amount of the funds 
a~reed to be advanced f'or the Period, not being less than 
one month or more than three months, in respect of which the 
advance is made. 
18.2 
The State will ensure that an advance is 
expended only for the specific purpose or purposes for Which 
the advance is made. 
18.3 An advance or any part of an advance that is not 
expended during the period for which it is made shall, at 
the option of the Commonweal th, be repaid by the State to 
the Commonwealth or set off against subsequent advances mace 
by the Commonwealth. 
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Of Statements and Statistics Provision 
19. 1 The State will provide i11 a manner approved by 
the Commonweal th such statements of expenditure as the 
Commonweal th may reasonably require "for the purposes of this 
agreement· 
l9.2 The Commission will keep records of the 
provision of' legal aid in the Federal area and Will as soon 
as possible after the end of each Year furnish to the 
Com mo nwe alt h , 1 n a -form approved by the Commonweal th, a 
s ta temen t of' the le gal aid in that area that has been 
provided during the yea~. 
19.3 
The Commission will at such times as the Common-
weal th Commission requests ~rovide to the Commonweal th 
commission such statist.i.<:s; and othe,- information as the 
Commonwealth Commission may reasonably request. 
Audits, Financial_Statements and Certificates 
20.1 
The accounts, books, vouchers, documents and 
othe,- recorCs relating to the administration of the Fune by 
the Commission shall be subject to audit by the 
Auditor-General of the State. ~ ,.{!,, 
20. 2 As soon as possible aft.'r th., end of eacnear, ~ 
Mi,.irtc- to .. Fi .. ,.'"<e the State will submit in a form approvec by the "' • • ~ of 
the Commonwealth a financial statement t:or thet year Which 
shall be accompanied by a report by the Auditor-General of 
the State on the audits and the financial statement 
indicating, inter alia -
(a) the correctness or otherwise of the financia: 
statement; 
(b) 
( c) 
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whethe~ the financial statement is based on 
proper accounts and· records and is in agreement 
with those accounts and records; and 
whether the expenditure of moneys is in accord-
ance with this agreement, 
and including reference to such other matters arising out of 
the audits and financial statement as .the Auditor-General of 
the state considers should be reported to the c, == =· .. -· 1::.. 
- • Mi•O,+,. f.- Fi••••• .; ~i,. C•--··-••lth. r ~ 
t
. -na· Te.~m_inc::.=t_,·on of A•reement y-1 ~,,/ ooera 1on ~- • fy 
21.1 The intention of the parties on entering into 
this agree:ner:-: .. is that it will continue in operation 
1ncrer.tn1 tely but the agreement is nevertheless subject to 
termination as hereinafter provided. 
21. 2 Either party may terminate this agreement upon 
or at any time after the expira~ion of the period of three 
(3) years from the appointed day by notice of termination in 
writing which has been given by the party to the other party 
and was expressed to take effect on a date specified in the 
notice, not. being less than twelve months from the date on 
I which the notice is given. 
21.3 
If this agreement is terminated -
(a) the assets of the Commission shall, after any 
requisite realization by _sale or otherwise, be 
shared between the Commonwealth and the State in 
proportions Which shall be agreed upon beween 
the Commonwealth and the State; and 
(b) liabilities of the Commission -.... c.1. the date of termination shall be borne -
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( 1) by the Commonwealth as to all matters in respect of which the Commonweal th 
is liable pursuant to paragraph (a) 
of clause 4.3 and to clause 4.4; 
(ii) by the State as to all matters in 
respect of which the State is liable 
pursuant to paragraph (b) of clause 
4.3. 
21. 4 If this agreement is terminated by the Common-
wealth under clause 21.2 and the State is adversely ~ffected 
by that termination then. notw:!.thstanding clause 21.3, the 
Commonwealth will pay to the State such sum of money as the 
Commonweal th and the State agree upon as adequate comper.-
sation for the State. 
Commonwealth Lekal Aid Service 
22.1 Without prejudice to the opera ti on of clause 
4.1, the Commonweal th acknowledges that this agreemer:t is 
made on the basis that the Commonwealth will not establ:!.sh a 
Federal legal aid se!"'vice in the State curing the cor.tin-
uance cf this agreement. 
Notices 
23.1 NoticeE" L<nCE!' and :fer the purposes of this 
agreement may be signed -
· (a) in the case of the Ccmmonweal th, by or on behalf 
of the Secretary to the Attorney-General's 
De~artment of the Commonwealth; 
(b) in the case cf the State, by or on behalf of the 
Under Secretary for Law, Crown Law Department of 
the State. 
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23. 2 The addresses for notices and other 
communications under and for the purposes of this agreement 
shall be -
(a) in the case of the Commonwealth -
The Secretary, 
Attorney-General's Department, 
Administrative Building, 
PARKES. A.C.T. 2600 
(b) in the case of the State -
The Under Secretary for Law, 
Crown Law Department, 
109 St. George's Terrace, 
PERTH. W.A. 6000 
SCHEDULE 
Clause 13.1 
Terms anc Conciticns to Transferred Staff 
Definitions 
1. In these terms anc concitions -
(a) "transfe!"red employee" means an eligible 
per-sen who has acce~tec the offer of 
emp l c·yliien t mace to that person by the 
Commission and who is employed by the 
Commission accordingly; 
(b) "remuneration" means salary or pay and 
includes such allowance as the Common-
weal th anc State agree should be 
regarced as having formed part of the 
salary or pay of the relevant 
transferred employee as an eligible 
officer but, except where 
provided, does not include 
duties allowance; and 
expressly 
a higher 
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(c) references to employment by or with the 
Commission shall, where the contex~ 
permits, include appointment to and the 
holding for the time being of a full 
time statutory office of the State the 
function of which is to administer and 
provide legal assistance and the meaning 
of the expression "transferred employee" 
shall, if the case so requires, be 
extended accordingly. 
State Terms and Conditions 
2. Subject to these terms and conditions and, without 
detracting from the operation of these terms and conditions, 
to any law applying generally to employment by the State 
Government and its instrumentalities, the employment of a 
transferred employee by the Commission shall be upon terms 
and conditions that from time to time apply generally to 
staff employed under the Public Service Act of the State fn 
the category of staff in which the transferred employee is 
for th~ time being employed. 
Remuneration 
3. A transferred employee shall, upon becoming employed 
by th~ Commission, be entitled to be paid remuneration at a 
rate not less than the rate at which remuneration is payable to the transferred employee as an eligible person immediately before the appointed day. 
4. Subject to -
(a) any law relating to the reduction of the 
salaries Of employees of the State generally; 
and 
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( b) any provisions of the terms and conditions of 
the State that are applicable under paragraph 2 
and relate to the reduction of salary by' reason 
of misconduct, inefficiency or incapacity, or 
excess officers, 
if the rate of remuneration that is payable at any time to 
the transferred employee is less than the rate of remuner-
ation that was payable to the transferred employee as an 
eligible person immediately before the appointed day, the 
transferred employee will be en'ti tled to be paid by the 
Commission an allowance of an amount that is equivalent to 
that deficiency in rate. 
Hiszher Duties 
5. For the purposes of paragraph the rate of .. .;: , 
remuneration that was payable tc a transferred employee as 
an eligible person immeciately before the appointed day 
shall, for so long as the allowa:.ce would have continued tc 
be payable if the transfe:-rec e:nployee had continued to be 
employee in the ALAO, be deemed to include any allowance for 
highe~ duties that was payable ~c the transferred employee 
immediately before the appointee cay. 
6. A transferred employee whc as an eligible persor. 
' was immediately before the ap~c~nted day entitled to a 
higher duties allowance shall ccn-.:inue to be enti tlec tc 
that allowance during such time as the circumstances 
relating to the performance of these higher duties continue 
to exist and the transferred employee continues to be the 
appropriate person to perform those higher duties. 
Increments 
7. Where at any time a transferred employee wculc 
if the transferred employee had ccntinuec to be employee in 
the ALAO have become entitled to an increment of salary ir. 
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accordance with a scale of rates of salary that was at the 
appointed day applicable to. that employment and with the 
conditions that were applicable to the payment of that 
increment, the salary of the transferred employee as an 
eligible person immediately before the appointed day for the 
purposes of paragraph 3 shall, as from the date on which the 
transferred employee would have become so entitled, be 
deemed to be increased by the amount of that increment. 
Recreation Leave and Sick Leave 
8. Where a transferred employee has, immediately 
before employment by the Commission, accrued an eligibility 
for the grant of a period of leave of absence for recreation 
or on account of illness, the transferred employee shall 
become eligible as at the appointed day for the grant of an 
equal period or equaL.r;;>eriods of leave of absence, on either 
or each of those grounds as if that eligibility had arisen 
under the terms and conditions applicable to the transferred 
employee in respect of that employment by the Commission. 
Transferred Emolovees on Current Leave 
9. A transferred employee who immediately befc·!"e 
the appointed day was on leave of absence which continued 
into or through the appointed day shall be entitled to 
I 
complete th~ period of that leave of absence for the purpcse 
for which and subject to any conditions on wi1 i ch :. ~ \·:as 
granted and these terms and conditions shall be applied and 
have effect with respect to the transferred employee 
notwithstanding that period of absence. 
Lon~ Service Leave 
10. A transferred employee shall be entitled to a 
period or periods of long service leave· in respect cf 
employment by the Commission and payment in lieu of lcr.g 
service leave shall be made to a transferred employee in 
- 24 -
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respect of that employment in accordance With the Provision' 
of the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 
as in force immediately before the appointed day as if 
employment were employment in the Australian Public Service 
unless Within three months after the appointed day the 
transferred employee elects in writing for those benefits tc 
be determined otherwise. 
l l. A transferred employee who makes an electior. 
referred to in paragraph 10 s_hall be entitled to bring into 
account for the purpose of long service leave and payment in 
lieu thereof the service prior to the appointee day that the 
eligible officer would have been entitled to have taken into 
account under the Long Service Leave (Commonweal th Emoloyees) Act 1976 if the transferred employee had 
continued to have entitlements as provided in that Act. 
Sucerannuation 
12. A transferred employee who was an eligible 
employee for the purposes of the Superannuation Act 1976 of 
the Commum•eal i:h immeCiately before the a;:pointed day Shall 
be enti tlec for a perioc of three months commencing on that 
day to elect, in writing, to contribute for bener'its under 
the s u pe r-annua ti on and F amuy E ene fits Act, 19 38 of the State. 
, 
13. Unless a transferrec employee makes the election 
to which he is entitled in accordance With paragraph 12, he 
shall, in respect of his employment with the Commission, 
continue to be an eligible employee upon and subject to the 
provisions of the said Superannuation Act 1976 as amended 
from time to time and to the Regulations fer the time being 
in force thereunder and be exempt from liability to 
contribute for superannuation benefits othe~Nise than under that Act. 
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Parental Leave 
14. A transferred employee shall be entitled to 
parental leave to the same extent and subject to the like 
conditions as leave of that nature is at the relevant time 
referred to in paragraph 15 available to persons employed in 
the Australian Public Service who were so employed on the 
appointed day and arrangements will be made by the State and 
the Commonwealth to ensure that benefits to that effect are 
so made available notwithstanding but consistently with the 
position of State employees generally with respect to such 
leave. 
15. The relevant time for the purposes of paragraph 
14 is -
(a) subject to sub-paragraph (b) 
day; or 
the appointed 
(b) if the Maternity Leave (Australian Government 
Employees) .A.ct 1973 is amended in accordance 
with a Statement issued by the Minister 
Assisting the Pri:ne Minister in Public Service 
Matters on 27 May 1977 - the day on which the 
Act is so amended. 
Reco£nition of Service 
16. Where the employment of a member of the s":aff of 
the Commission under clause 13.4 of this agreement is 
continuous with a continuous period of ·service under the 
Public Service Act 1922 of the Commonwealth, as amended, 
(including any employment deemed under that Act to have been 
continuous with service under that Act), that conUnuous 
period of service shall be recognized and taken into account 
by the Commission for the purposes of the experience and 
seniority of the member. 
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Probationarv Service 
17. A transferred employee who was on probation 
immediately before the appointed day shal 1 be entitled to 
have the probationary service in the Australian Public 
Service brought into account for any probationa~J 
requirements of the State. 
18. The reports relating to probationary service of 
a transferred employee with the Commonweal th or with the 
State shall be made available for the respective purposes of 
the Commission and the Commonwealth in accordance with 
arrangements for the exchange of reports that shall be made 
between the ALAO or the Commonweal th Commission and the 
Commission. 
Notification of Vacancies 
19. When the Commission decides to advertise a 
vacant position the Commonwealth Commission shall be 
informec of the cecision in orde~ that the vacancy may be 
brought to the attention of persons employed by the Common-
weal th or by the Commonweal th Commission or by any State 
government or Commonweal th or ~tate body which provides 
legal aid. 
20. Any applications which the Commission receives 
from persons referred to in paragraph 19 will be considered 
by the Commission, which shall have regard to -
(a) aptitude for the discharge of those duties; 
(b) the extent of relevant experience; 
(c) training, including formal training; 
(d) ca.pacity for development; and 
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(e) relevant personal qualities, 
but will retain the right to exercise its discretion in the 
selection of any person to fill the relevant vacancy. 
Determination of Differences 
21. In the event that in respect of' the application 
of these terms and conditions with respect to a transferred 
employee, a difference arises as between the Commission and 
the transferred employee for the consideration and 
resolution of which official machinery is not for the time 
being available, the difference shall be determined by an 
adjudicator appointed by the Public Service Board of the 
State who is acceptable to both parties and who shall act as 
an expert and not as an arbitrator. 
22. The adjudicator shall consider the matter in 
such manner as he or she cons:cers fit and the determination 
upon the adjudication shall be accepted as being conclusive 
cf the di.fference by both the t:-ansferred employee and the 
Commission. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF this agreement has been signed on 
behalf of the parties respectively as at the date· first 
above written. 
SIGNED by the Right Honourable 
JOHN MALCOLM FRASER, Prime 
Minister of the Commonwealth, 
in the presence of 
SIGNED by the 
Honourable SIR CHARLES WALTER 
MICHAEL COURT, Premier of 
Western Australia, in the 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~ ~: 
presence of ~ 
1-Z. J. 7-S. 
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